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SUPPLEMENTUM CENTESIMUM SEPTUAGESIMUM PRIMUM

EGBERT J. BAKKER (ED.)

GRAMMAR AS INTERPRETATION

GRAMMAR AS INTERPRETATION

Greek Literature in its Linguistic Contexts

EDITED BY

EGBERT J. BAKKER

BRILL
LEIDEN · NEW YORK · KÖLN
1997

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Grammar as interpretation : Greek literature in its linguistic
contexts / edited by Egbert J. Bakker.
p. cm. — (Mnemosyne, bibliotheca classica Batava.
Supplementum, ISSN 0169-8958 ; 171)
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
ISBN 9004107304 (alk. paper)
1. Greek literature—History and criticism—Theory, etc.
2. Language and culture—Greece. 3. Greek language—Grammar.
4. Rhetoric, Ancient. I. Bakker, Egbert J. II. Series.
PA3074.G73 1997
880.9'001—dc21 97-8213
CIP

Die Deutsche Bibliothek – CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

[Mnemosyne / Supplementum]
Mnemosyne : bibliotheca classica Batava. Supplementum. –
Leiden ; New York ; Köln : Brill.
Früher Schriftenreihe
Reihe Supplementum zu: Mnemosyne
171. Grammar as interpretation. – 1997

Grammar as interpretation : Greek literature in its linguistic
contexts / ed. by Egbert J. Bakker. – Leiden ; New York ; Köln :
Brill, 1997
(Mnemosyne : Supplementum ; 171)
ISBN 90-04-10730-4 Gewebe

ISSN 0169-8958
ISBN 90 04 10730 4

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PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

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INTRODUCTION

Egbert J. Bakker

Amidst the many changes in the interpretation of ancient Greek texts that have taken place in the past decades perhaps none has had so many potential consequences as the shift in interest from the "what" to the "how" in the production of meaning. The conception of ancient texts as messages with a referential object that has to be reconstructed through philological interpretation has long receded in favor of an attitude that pays due attention to the *means by which* ancient discourses bring their message across, or even to the *medium* in which their intended public is addressed. For example, we now readily acknowledge that ancient historians are narrators in addition to their stating the facts we might want to verify; we realize that what happens in a Platonic dialogue, even in an Aristotelian treatise, is more than philosophical exposition; we begin to accept that in some cases our notion of "text" has to be handled with circumspection, as in the case of Homer and poetry of the archaic age; and, perhaps most important, we begin to realize the importance of the human voice, a speaker addressing a public, in the reality constituted by many of the discourses that have come down to us in the form of text.

Given the fact that in all these developments the way in which we use language is the central issue, it is surprising that the conception of language and grammar that still prevails in the philological profession does not seem to have really changed since the days of *Altertumswissenschaft*. It may perhaps not be too misleading to say that grammar in philology reflects a conception of language that is representational and sentence-bound. Our grammars most commonly used for teaching and reference tend to present the facts of the language as a matter of sentential syntax, and they tend to explain the use of grammatical elements in terms of the properties of the reality thought to be the referent of the text. This referent may be the physical reality denoted or invoked by the text, or the thoughts of its author.

We do not have to go into the many controversies related to the business of interpretation in the postmodern age to see that such a conception of language, which posits meaning outside the text, is one-sided at best. More precisely, the representational and sentential

view of language and grammar goes back to a hermeneutics that few critics today would accept in its original form. Today's hermeneutic practice would require a conception of grammar that does due justice to the physical features of the discourses recorded in many of our texts, or to the requirements of presentation to which any communicative transaction, whether spoken or written, is subjected. Any amount of attention to such medial or communicative factors will soon reveal that grammar is often deployed for reasons that easily transcend the scope of any single sentence or its referential object. This is not to say that no important studies on these issues have appeared since the time of the standard reference grammars. Rather, it means that such studies have either not crossed the boundaries of "linguistics" as a specialized subdomain within the profession or failed to communicate the importance of their findings to wider issues of interpretation.

On the assumption that in many of our texts language is used in ways that often differ substantially from the function ascribed to it in traditional philology, the contributors to this volume all hold that the modern critic cannot afford to ignore advances in areas of research explicitly devoted to language and grammar in its actual social use. The essays collected in this volume thus have all in common that they privilege language over its referent in the production of meaning. Their authors attempt to show how the study of such "grammatical" phenomena as tense, word order, or particles can be brought to bear upon issues of interpretation. The genres and discourse types discussed in this way include historiographical narrative, scientific discourse, tragedy, and Platonic dialogue.

In asking why and in which contexts a Greek author prefers one grammatical form over another, seemingly equivalent form, the authors of this volume also share a stance with regard to the notions of *style* and *stylistics* as they are commonly used in classical philology. In one philological understanding of the concept, "style" seems to be used whenever the language user is thought to have had a choice between two or more "equivalent" expressions. Terms frequently encountered for such stylistic choices are "vivid" or "expressive." These or similar terms may or may not be felicitous for a given case in a given context, but it seems more pertinent to ask, when a critic speaks of vividness or liveliness, whether the explanatory potential of our grammars is not simply depleted: the communicative or medial reasons for preferring the "more vivid" form over the "less vivid" one

may lie outside the domain of traditional grammar, so that either important cues provided by the language itself are missed or the interpretation is left to the perceptiveness of the individual critic.

A second important sense of "style" relates to the obvious "literariness" of the language of many of the texts in our corpus. In this respect, style is commonly seen as what makes language literary, distinguishing it from the artlessness of ordinary discourse, and serving as a "dress" for the author's thought. This aesthetic understanding of style and stylistics is related to the referential view of language, in that the idea of dress or adornment implies that style can be removed, leaving a naked body, a plain text with a purely referential, representational function; or it could imply that it is possible to write without a style, producing plain speech: a matter of pure content, and no form.

Each of the chapters that follow addresses in some way or another the interrelated issues of representation, "vividness," or aesthetics. In Chapter One, Bakker discusses the use of tense in Thucydides. The meaning of tense, and the difference between the aorist and the imperfect in particular, has traditionally been discussed in referential terms: events referred to with an aorist form are thought to be punctual in nature, and actions referred to with the imperfect tense durative. This referential, semantic distinction, however, is hard to substantiate in many individual instances, and, accordingly, critics have often contented themselves with an author's apparent *view* of an event as either durative or punctual: an ultimately arbitrary criterion. And Thucydides in particular seems to be a narrator who often does not behave according to the rules of our grammars. On the basis of an analysis of the use of tense by speakers who do not narrate but who react in words to the concrete situation surrounding them, Bakker argues that tense can be used in narrative as a means to state the relative distance of the events narrated vis-à-vis the consciousness of the narrator. In Thucydides, such an analysis leads to a distinction between two modes of narrative presentation, one that is overtly mediated by the historian as narrator, and one in which events are shown mimetically, as if they have been perceived on the spot.

In dealing with point of view in narrative and with the discourse function of tense, Bakker's essay has obvious links with the essays by Sicking and Stork (Chapter Four) and by Wakker (Chapter Six). Sicking and Stork deal with the so-called historical present in Greek narrative, a phenomenon whose treatment has suffered in particular

from the perspective described earlier. In our sentence-bound grammar with their division of labor between "referent" and "style," no explanation of the recurrent present tense forms in narrative has been arrived at other than stylistic liveliness or its opposite, mere annalistic reporting. Sicking and Stork show that a description of the historical present has to transcend the level of the single sentence; these verbs have a function with respect to the narrative as a whole, or, more precisely, with respect to its communicative function: the present tense forms may provide direct answers to an addressee whose question prompted the narrative; or they may be used by narrators to set event sequences off from the surrounding narrative.

Wakker studies the phenomenon of point of view from a different angle. Her principal domain of reference is the speech or thought of protagonists as represented in the historical narrative of Herodotus and Thucydides, in particular the use of modal particles in this type of context. Particles such as *ára* or *dḗ* have long been interpreted in the "semantic" sphere, as expressing the logical relations between sentences that represent the author's thoughts. We know now that this is to undervalue the wider communicative use of such discourse markers by speakers in concrete situations. This raises the question as to their exact function in narrative: when occurring in indirect speech, do they represent the narrator's attitude or the protagonist's? Wakker's discussion, involving such further elements of indirect speech syntax as the oblique optative or indirect reflexive pronouns, shows that the answer is a complex one.

The important subject of word order, which has long deluded sentence-bound referential grammars, is discussed in the essays by Dik (Chapter Two) and Slings (Chapter Five). Dik focuses on the use of attributive adjectives in Herodotus, a subcorpus that is limited, but for that reason allowing of precise demonstrations that are likely to have a much wider application. Dik shows that the position of the attributive adjective vis-à-vis its noun is neither arbitrary nor "semantic," that is, a matter of the nature of the properties assigned by the adjective to the noun or its referent. Instead, adjective position is pragmatically motivated, depending on such factors as contrastiveness in context, or relative importance of the idea represented by the noun and by the adjective. Dik's analysis not only reveals the limitations of previous approaches, but also shows how adjective position is a grammatical cue that may add depth and detail to a context in a way that has been largely overlooked.

Slings's contribution, consisting of two separate essays, is the most direct and explicit discussion of problems pertaining to style and stylistics. In the first essay, Slings deals with those figures of speech that involve word order, such as anaphora, antithesis, and chiasmus. These phenomena have traditionally been dealt with as devices for the embellishment of texts. Slings draws them out of the aesthetic sphere by showing how they can be explained as strategies that naturally occur in ordinary speech: in spoken discourse it is quite normal for constituents to be uttered, as "theme," before their sentence or clause. In this way speakers adapt their discourse to the complexity of the ideas communicated. The idea of complexity, furthermore, is important in that the constructions in question will be felt as more "literary" to the degree to which the message is simpler. In the second essay, Slings deals with anacoluthon in Plato, using the same notion of "theme" in a pragmatic understanding of the sentence to show that anacolutha are neither a matter of careless syntax on the part of the author nor stylistic features to be condoned as such because of their "vividness". Many anacolutha, Slings argues, are quite regular in an oral grammar, and become problematic only through the culturally determined bias of our handbooks.

The essay by Van der Eijk (Chapter Three), finally, does not deal with any particular grammatical or stylistic issue *per se*; instead, Van der Eijk discusses the "grammar" of Greek scientific discourse. He shows how even in this most referential of all Greek discourse genres, matters of medium, presentation, and communication cannot be ignored: Greek scientists had to work in a competitive setting, and their discourse accordingly often bears the mark of conscious rhetorical design. The essay addresses a wide range of questions, including style and its motivation, audience, context, and authorship. Like Slings, Van der Eijk approaches the numerous syntactic anomalies of his texts in terms of the actual discourses to which they go back: spoken discourse obeys different rules of presentation. But the texts themselves had also functions of their own, the study of which might shed light on various aspects of their design. Even the Ionic dialect of many of the Hippocratic texts, Van der Eijk argues, might be a conscious act of communication, rather than referring to the speech of their authors.

Together these essays form a representative sample of the ways in which an interest in structure, means, and media may contribute to

an understanding of ancient discourses and their meaning. The authors aim at showing that the study of the Greek language may yield results whose relevance is not limited to the specialized subdomain that linguistics has become. In locating the communicative contract on which any discourse depends in the very mechanism of the language, they argue in a variety of ways for an interrelationship of grammar and interpretation.

CHAPTER ONE

VERBAL ASPECT AND MIMETIC DESCRIPTION IN THUCYDIDES

Egbert J. Bakker

> The imperfect occurs in many instances which would seem to require the aorist.
> —Rusten 1989:22

1. *Introduction: Point of View in Thucydidean Narrative*

The beginning of Book Eight of Thucydides' *Histories* could serve as a touchstone for our assessment of the ancient historian's methods and aims. This passage, describing the arrival in Athens of news about the total annihilation of the Athenian army and fleet in Sicily, has been taken by historically oriented readers as an unduly gloomy statement of *facts* relating to the Athenian position in the war, to be corrected later on in the work. However, as W. R. Connor notes in his engaging sequential reading of the *Histories*, Thucydides is here not so much concerned with "facts" as with the Athenians' *experience* of them, and rather than with a discrepancy in the work, we are faced with the historian's strategy to draw his readers into the situation, to make them share the Athenians' bleak mood, so that they will also participate in the temporary revival of spirits later on.[1]

Connor's interpretation of the passage as conveying the *internal point of view* of characters or parties in the story helps to bring modern criticism more in line with the concept of *enargeia* "vividness" in the ancient rhetorical tradition of literary criticism: the power of language to create a vivid presence that is intimately connected with the emotions of those perceiving it, ultimately the reader him or herself.[2] Thucydides' celebrated passages have been imitated in antiquity,

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[1] Connor 1984:212 n. 6; see also Connor 1985:14–15; the prominent "factual" reading of the passage is that of Meiggs 1972:351.

[2] On *enargeia* and the theory and practice of historiography in Antiquity, see recently Walker 1993.

but the modern critic is more concerned with description or explanation: how is *enargeia* achieved? how does a rhetoric, or a poetics, of *enargeia* function? and how does *enargeia* as a rhetorical strategy relate to the historian's method and the composition or presentation of his discourse?

Almost any way of approaching these questions leads us into the territory of narratology, a field of literary study that has just begun to be applied to Thucydides and Greek historiography.[3] Usually, the narratological analysis of a text involves the application of insights from narratological models. But we may also start directly from Thucydides' discourse, and investigate the means, provided by the language, by which Thucydides can effect the shifts in point of view and perspective that make his narrative so rich and, at times, opaque and difficult.[4] We may ask, then, what the grammatical observations are by which Connor's reading of the beginning of Book Eight could be corroborated. In the following presentation of the passage, the underlinings mark the elements that will play a role in the discussions below:[5]

> 'Ες δὲ τὰς 'Αθήνας ἐπειδὴ ἠγγέλθη, ἐπὶ πολὺ μὲν ἠπίστουν καὶ τοῖς πάνυ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔργου διαπεφευγόσι καὶ σαφῶς ἀγγέλλουσι, μὴ οὕτω γε ἄγαν πανσυδὶ διεφθάρθαι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔγνωσαν, χαλεποὶ μὲν ἦσαν τοῖς ξυμπροθυμηθεῖσι τῶν ῥητόρων τὸν ἔκπλουν, ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ ψηφισάμενοι, ὠργίζοντο δὲ καὶ τοῖς χρησμολόγοις τε καὶ μάντεσι καὶ ὁπόσοι τι τότε αὐτοὺς θειάσαντες ἐπήλπισαν ὡς λήψονται Σικελίαν. πάντα δὲ πανταχόθεν αὐτοὺς ἐλύπει τε καὶ περιειστήκει ἐπὶ τῷ γεγενημένῳ φόβος τε καὶ κατάπληξις μεγίστη δή. ἅμα μὲν γὰρ στερόμενοι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστος καὶ ἡ πόλις ὁπλιτῶν τε πολλῶν καὶ ἱππέων καὶ ἡλικίας οἵαν οὐχ ἑτέραν ἑώρων ὑπάρχουσαν ἐβαρύνοντο· ἅμα δὲ ναῦς οὐχ ὁρῶντες ἐν τοῖς νεωσοίκοις ἱκανὰς οὐδὲ χρήματα ἐν τῷ κοινῷ οὐδ' ὑπηρεσίας ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀνέλπιστοι ἦσαν ἐν τῷ παρόντι σωθήσεσθαι, τούς τε ἀπὸ τῆς Σικελίας πολεμίους εὐθὺς σφίσιν ἐνόμιζον τῷ ναυτικῷ ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ πλευσεῖσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοσοῦτον κρατήσαντας, καὶ τοὺς αὐτόθεν πολεμίους τότε δὴ καὶ διπλασίως πάντα παρεσκευασμένους κατὰ κράτος ἤδη καὶ ἐκ γῆς καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ἐπικείσεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους σφῶν μετ' αὐτῶν ἀποστάντας.

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[3] Hornblower 1994, making use of de Jong's (1987; 1991) narratological analyses of Homer and the messenger speeches in drama.

[4] Cf. recently Lang 1995; see also Wakker's contribution to this volume, dealing with the role of modal particles in the flow of perspective in Herodotus and Thucydides.

[5] Translations of the extracts of Thucydides in this chapter are borrowed from Warner 1954, modified slightly where necessary. More important departures have been indicated.

> When the news reached Athens, for a long time people would not believe it, even though they were given precise information from the very soldiers who had been present at the event and had escaped; still they thought that this total destruction was something that could not possibly be true. And when they did recognize the facts, they turned against the public speakers who had been in favour of the expedition, as though they themselves had not voted for it, and also became angry with the prophets and soothsayers and all who at the time had, by various methods of divination, encouraged them to believe that they would conquer Sicily. They were feeling the stress in every department and on every front, and now, after this last blow, great indeed was the fear that beset them and the consternation. Not only was the state as a whole and the mind of every man in it weighed down by the thought of the loss of so many hoplites, cavalry, and men of military age who, they saw, could not be replaced; they saw, too, that the numbers of ships in the docks were inadequate, as was the money in the treasury, and that there were no crews for the ships. So at the moment they had little hope of being able to survive; they thought that their enemies in Sicily, after their great victory, would set sail immediately with their fleet for Piraeus, that their enemies at home would now most certainly redouble their efforts and attack them with all their might by land and sea, and that their own allies would revolt and join in the attack.
>
> (Th. 8.1.1–2)

In narratological terms, this is free indirect speech, in which a point of view other than that of the narrator is presented.[6] If any historiographical assertion is made, it is that the Athenians were in despair, and if any "facts" are presented, it is the Athenians' assessment of the situation, not the historian's. Notice in this connection the repeated use of verbs of seeing and feeling, underlined in the passage and its translation.[7] Perhaps less obvious is the observation that these verbs are all in the imperfect tense.[8] While it is true that the mental dispositions described are more like *states* than punctual *events*, it remains to be seen whether the durative nature of the Athenians' mood is in and of itself the explanation for the use of the imperfect verbs. This question will be one of the main themes of this chapter. For now we notice that no imperfects are used, at least not in a similar way, in a comparable passage: near the end of Book Eight,

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[6] See also Wakker's contribution to this volume (Chapter 6).

[7] ἠπίστουν "they did not believe," ὠργίζοντο "they were angry with," ἑώρων "they saw," ἐβαρύνοντο "they were weighed down," ἐνόμιζον "they thought."

[8] Notice also the present participle ὁρῶντες "seeing."

similar bad news reaches the city of Athens, after a naval defeat off the coast near Eretria in Euboia:[9]

> τοῖς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις ὡς ἦλθε τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὔβοιαν γεγενημένα, ἔκπληξις μεγίστη δὴ τῶν πρὶν παρέστη. οὔτε γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ ξυμφορά, καίπερ μεγάλη τότε δόξασα εἶναι, οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν πω οὕτως ἐφόβησεν. ὅπου γὰρ στρατοπέδου τε τοῦ ἐν Σάμῳ ἀφεστηκότος ἄλλων τε νεῶν οὐκ οὐσῶν οὐδὲ τῶν ἐσβησομένων αὐτῶν τε στασιαζόντων καὶ ἄδηλον ὂν ὁπότε σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ξυρράξουσι, τοσαύτη ἡ ξυμφορὰ ἐπεγεγένητο, ἐν ᾗ ναῦς τε καὶ τὸ μέγιστον Εὔβοιαν ἀπωλωλέκεσαν, ἐξ ἧς πλείω ἢ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ὠφελοῦντο, πῶς οὐκ εἰκότως ἠθύμουν;
>
> When the news of what had happened in Euboia came to Athens, it caused the very greatest panic that had ever been known there. Not the disaster in Sicily, though it had seemed great enough at the time, nor any other had ever had so terrifying an effect. The army at Samos was in revolt; they had no more ships, nor crews for ships; there was civil disturbance among themselves, and no one could tell when it might not come to actual fighting; and now, on top of everything, this disaster in which they had lost their fleet, and, what was worst of all, Euboia, from which they profited more than from Attica itself: how could they not reasonably be dispirited?
>
> (Th. 8.96.1–2)

The parallels between the two passages are obvious. Apart from the similarity in narrative information—the arrival of bad news in Athens—there are similarities in wording, for example, the repetition of *ékplēxis (katáplēxis) megístē dḗ* “consternation a great one indeed.” Yet the differences between the two passages, and their contexts, are equally remarkable. The new passage is not free indirect discourse: whereas the earlier passage informs us that the Athenians did not *see* enough ships, in the present passage we are told that there *were* no ships. This difference in intended objectivity is confirmed by the authorial question at the end (*pôs ouk eikótōs ēthúmoun?* “how could they not reasonably be dispirited?”), reflecting an *external* presentation of the Athenians’ despondency.

In connection with this difference in point of view between the two comparable passages, we observe that in the second passage we find the *aorist*, not the imperfect, at key points in the description. The first aorist, *paréstē* “occurred”, has *ékplēxis* “consternation” as its subject. In the previous passage, this same concept, related to an

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[9] Warner’s translation (1954:597–98), slightly modified.

imperfect verb, had been judged "great" with respect to no particular criterion; but here the consternation is compared to previous, similar cases. This comparison is continued in the next sentence, where the panic that befell the Athenians is not described as something that happened in the narrative, but as something that had *not* happened *before*. In other words, the historian is making comparisons from his own perspective. Again, the vehicle for this comparison is an aorist verb: *oúte . . . pō . . . ephóbēsen* "nor ever had terrified."

We observe, then, that a difference in perspective between two otherwise similar passages is related to a difference in the use of tenses. In this Chapter I will test the hypothesis that the use of the aorist in Thucydides' narrative is related to the *external* point of view of the narrator, and that the imperfect may be used to present an *internal* point of view.[10] In studying tense and aspect in this way, I try to provide a linguistic basis to the understanding of point of view in Thucydides' narrative, and thus, perhaps, to the wider interpretation of this author. Such an investigation does not mean to reduce Thucydides' art to an automatic use of grammatical categories; rather, it intends to present the study of those categories as a contribution to our understanding of Thucydides' narrative texture.[11]

2. *States, Events, Foreground, and Background*

When one takes the trouble to examine the use of narrative tenses in Thucydides in closer detail throughout extended passages, one notices that there are striking differences across various sections of the narrative. Some stretches of narrative appear to be chiefly carried by imperfects, even though there are frequent zones of aorist clustering.

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[10] This chapter is a continuation of an earlier effort (Bakker 1991b) in which I tried to demonstrate grammatical evidence in Greek historians for a distinction between the point of view of the narrator and that of the characters in the story. I was mainly concerned with the aspectual opposition in participles (ἐλπίζων vs. ἐλπίσας "expecting"), arguing that the first member of each pair conveys the point of view of characters, and the second member that of the narrator. The present chapter will rely only briefly (see section 6) on the earlier discussion of aspect in participles (which in the meantime has been followed by Sicking 1996:54–65).

[11] Thoughts on the relation between "style" and scholarly interpretation are also offered in the contributions of van der Eijk and Slings in this volume. Similarly, Sicking and Stork are concerned with formulating a communicative, structural rationale for a phenomenon that has traditionally been dealt with in aesthetic terms. Point of view in historiography is also discussed by Wakker.

This happens, for example, in the description of the great plague at Athens (2.49–53), or in the narrative preceding the beginning of Book Eight, the description of the events about which the Athenians hear in the first extract quoted above: the naval battle in the great harbor of Syracuse followed by the retreat and subsequent destruction of the Athenian army (7.69–87). This pattern appears to be quite frequent in Thucydides. But, in striking contrast, there are numerous other passages in which aorist verbs appear to be the chief vehicle for the articulation of the narrative.

In order to appreciate the differences in narrative style between stretches of narrative carried by the imperfect, and those carried by the aorist, we need to look into the semantics of the Greek verb as far as the contrast between aorist and imperfect is concerned. Perhaps the most widely held view on that contrast is still the one found in some way or another in the various handbooks of grammar: the imperfect is "durative," presenting an action as ongoing, or as having an imprecise location in time, whereas the aorist is "punctual," presenting a "snapshot" picture of a given event.[12] Not entirely identical, but still similar in orientation is the view in which the aorist is seen as denoting a "closed," "completed" action, and the imperfect an "open," "noncomplete" action.[13] When one looks at Thucydides' narrative in this regard, one finds that while many verbs seem to behave according to this principle, there are others that do not. Especially in passages where imperfect tense is the chief narrative vehicle, a durative interpretation seems often unlikely. Consider, for example, the following passage, the beginning of the description of the great battle in the harbor of Syracuse:

> ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀθηναῖοι <u>προσέμισγον</u> τῷ ζεύγματι, τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ ῥύμῃ ἐπιπλέοντες <u>ἐκράτουν</u> τῶν τεταγμένων νεῶν πρὸς αὐτῷ.
>
> When the Athenians on their side <u>came up to</u> the barrier with the impetus of their first charge, they <u>overpowered</u> the ships stationed in front of it.
>
> (Th. 7.70.2)

[12] E.g., Goodwin 1889:11–13, 16–18; Kühner and Gerth 1898–1904:1:142–46, 153–69. Smyth has the most suggestive formulation (1956:427): "The imperfect may be represented by a line, along which an action progresses; the aorist denotes a point on the line (either starting point or end), or surveys the whole line from beginning to end." See also Comrie 1976:16–40.

[13] Cf. Ruijgh 1985; Rijksbaron 1986; arguments against either view are presented in Sicking 1991, 1996.

One might want to say that durative aspect does not inhere in the events described, and that Thucydides wished to *present* the events as ongoing and noncompleted. This may be true, but it does not in itself explain why Thucydides used the imperfects, and not aorist forms.[14] In any case, the reverse situation seems to occur in the following example:

> χρόνον μὲν οὖν τινὰ ὀλίγον οὕτω πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἠκροβολίσαντο
>
> This fighting at long range continued for some time.
>
> (Th. 4.34.1)

We see here an aorist verb used for what in the scene described apparently was a continuing action.[15] Again, one might suppose that something durative was *presented* by Thucydides as punctual; such a move, however, would merely relegate the problem to the question as to the reason for Thucydides to do such a thing. As I shall try to show, this question can only be answered when we look at aorists or imperfects in their narrative context, with due attention to the perspectival orientation of the passage. For the moment I propose to defer the question of the durativity or punctuality of Greek verbs or of the events denoted by them.

A recent extension to narrative discourse of the traditional view of durative versus punctual aspect can be found in the distinction between *foreground* and *background* in the modern linguistic study of narrative: some events, typically closed, punctual as well as kinetic, have been found to form the "foreground" of a story, its narrative "backbone" or *time-line*; such events move ahead narrative time, and are thought to be typically expressed by "perfective aspect" (represented typologically in Greek by the aorist). Other events are "backgrounded:" these are typically durative, "open-ended" actions or states, expressed by verbs with imperfective aspect. Backgrounded action is thought not to propel narrative time forward but to provide motivation for

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[14] For an answer to this question that differs considerably from the usual views, see recent work by Sicking, who claims (e.g., 1996:103–5) that the imperfect is used when the statement in which the verb occurs "is not meant to perform an independent informative function" and has to be "connected with another statement (or other statements) in the immediate or wider context" (p. 104). This characterization captures important aspects of the imperfect (see also below, note 52), but it still does not explain why imperfects occur in large clusters in Thucydides and not in others.

[15] Cf. also 2.92.1 ὀλίγον μὲν χρόνον ὑπέμειναν "they resisted only for a short period;" 4.115.2 μίαν ἡμέραν ἀπεκρούσαντο "they beat <them> off for one day."

foregrounded events, or description of attendant circumstances.[16] In other words, on this view, foregrounded tenses *narrate*, while backgrounded tenses *describe*.

The distinction between foreground and background can thus be seen as an extension of the contrast between "durative" and "punctual" from the level of the single sentence to the level of discourse. Accordingly, just as that aspectual contrast itself, this distinction works well in some passages, but not in others. In the following passage, for example, aorist (underlined) and imperfect (boldfaced) verbal forms seem to be neatly distributed across portions of narrative "foreground" and "background" respectively:[17]

> Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὡς ᾔσθοντο **τειχιζόντων**, ἐστράτευσαν ἐς τὸ Ἄργος αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι πλὴν Κορινθίων· **ὑπῆρχε** δέ τι αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Ἄργους αὐτόθεν **πρασσόμενον**. **ἦγε** δὲ τὴν στρατιὰν Ἆγις ὁ Ἀρχιδάμου Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως **δοκοῦντα** προϋπάρχειν οὐ προυχώρησεν ἔτι· τὰ δὲ **οἰκοδομούμενα** τείχη ἑλόντες καὶ καταβαλόντες καὶ Ὑσιὰς χωρίον τῆς Ἀργείας λαβόντες καὶ τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ἅπαντας οὓς ἔλαβον ἀποκτείναντες ἀνεχώρησαν καὶ διελύθησαν κατὰ πόλεις.

> In the following winter the Spartans, when they had noticed that walls **were being built**, marched against Argos with all their allies except the Corinthians. **There was** also a certain element inside Argos itself which **was collaborating** with them. King Agis, the son of Archidamos, **led** the expedition. The help which they had **expected** to get from their party inside the city failed to materialize. But they captured and demolished the walls **that were being built**, and took the Argive town of Hysia, and put to death all the free men who fell into their hands. They then went back and returned to their various cities.
> (Th. 5.83.1–2)

The two imperfect verbs, *hupêrkhe* "was present" and *êge* "led" have temporal reference that is different from the aorist verbs: they denote circumstances (the situation in Argos and the leadership of the attacking army) that have apparently been considered important for understanding the events denoted by the aorists. Notice that the participles, too, conform to the principle: e.g., *teikhizóntōn* "building walls" and *tà oikodomoúmena teíkhē* "the walls that were being built"

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[16] See Hopper 1979; Dry 1983; Fleischman 1990:168–83; Ehrlich 1990:25–26, 106–17. See also Bakker 1991a; thoughts on the applicability of foreground-background to oral discourse in Bakker 1997a:67–68.

[17] Warner's 1954 translation modified.

apply to the Argive wall-building that forms the background to this passage; aorist participles, on the other hand (*helóntes* "having taken," *katabalóntes* "having demolished," *labóntes* "having taken prisoner," *apokteínantes* "having killed"), denote time-line events just as the main verbs which they precede (*anekhṓrēsan* "they retreated," *dielúthēsan* "they dispersed").[18]

In other passages, however, the reverse situation seems to obtain: here it is imperfect verbs, and not aorists, that express events that "happen" in the story, and so constitute the time-line or foreground. An example occurs in the passage opening Book Eight quoted above:

> ὠργίζοντο δὲ καὶ τοῖς χρησμολόγοις τε καὶ μάντεσι καὶ ὁπόσοι τι τότε αὐτοὺς θειάσαντες <u>ἐπήλπισαν</u> ὡς λήψονται Σικελίαν.
>
> and they also **became angry** with the prophets and soothsayers and all who at the time <u>had</u>, by various methods of divination, <u>encouraged them to believe</u> that they would conquer Sicily.
>
> (Th. 8.1.1)

The narrative of the battle in the harbor of Syracuse provides examples too:[19]

> ταῖς δὲ ναυσὶ προσπλεύσαντες τὰς ναῦς τῶν 'Αθηναίων ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰγιαλοῦ ἀφεῖλκον (<u>ἐνέπρησαν</u> δέ τινας ὀλίγας, ὥσπερ <u>διενοήθησαν</u>, αὐτοὶ οἱ 'Αθηναῖοι), τὰς δ' ἄλλας καθ' ἡσυχίαν οὐδενὸς κωλύοντος ὡς ἑκάστην ποι ἐκπεπτωκυῖαν ἀναδησάμενοι ἐκόμιζον ἐς τὴν πόλιν.
>
> And with their ships they [the Syracusans] sailed up to the Athenian ships and **dragged** them from the beach. The Athenians themselves <u>had burned</u> some of them, as they <u>had planned</u>; as for the others, the Syracusans towed them away as they liked, just as each one was driven ashore, and **brought** them, with no opposition from anyone, to their city.
>
> (Th. 7.74.2)

In these two passages the situation of the previous example is reversed. We see imperfects used for events that happen in the narrative at this point, and aorists for what is off the time-line: the statement about the prophets' earlier activities or about the Athenians burning

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[18] Such participles, placed before their main verb, and always aorist, could be called clause-chaining (Bakker 1993a:288–90), borrowing a term that is used for languages in which nonfinite verbal material along with its main verb codes tight sequences of events.

[19] Warner's 1954 translation modified.

their own ships does not necessarily denote "durative" events, but in explaining what happened before, it is off the narrative time-line and so backgrounded all the same.

It appears, then, that the usual aspectual distinction formulated for the aorist and the imperfect, as well as the application of this contrast to narrative discourse, is by no means universal: there are "punctual" imperfects and "durative" aorists, and beside passages where aorist and imperfect seem to have been used according to the principle of foreground-background, there are also passages where this relation is reversed. The durative-punctual and foreground-background-distinction, then, without being downright false, is at least incomplete as a model for the analysis of Greek historiographical narrative (or for the analysis of the use of the Greek verb in general, for that matter). One of the reasons for this, as I shall suggest, is that the distinction ignores the dimension of point of view in narrative.[20]

3. *Consciousness, Memory, the Near, and the Far*

In modern linguistics it is usual practice to conceive of tense as the grammaticalized expression of the location of an event in time.[21] A given tense may have a foregrounding or a backgrounding function, but it is a tense in its temporal relation to a given event or state. Tense, in other words, is commonly seen as a matter of *reference*. I will argue later on that this is a one-sided conception of tense; but first I submit that the conception of narrative—and of discourse in general—in terms of "reference" reflects a deep and hidden assumption about language in our—literate—culture. Language, we assume, however implicitly, is a matter of imparting *knowledge*, a business in which "facts" are referred to, established, evaluated, doubted, or denied. I believe it is useful to recognize this conception as such, and I propose to speak of the type of discourse that is naturally associated with it as the "discourse of the knower." In the next section I will identify one possible mode of presentation in Thucydides in this way.

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[20] Similar conclusions are reached when the foreground-background distinction is considered in connection with literary narrative, e.g., Ehrlich 1990:106–17; Lopes 1995:6–27.

[21] See, e.g., Comrie 1985:9; Fleischman 1990:15.

Unlike most ordinary speech, the discourse of the knower is not "situated;" it does not occur in a concrete situation, and has often nothing to do with the actual experience of the speaker. The knower asserts the occurrence or existence of events or facts, expresses opinions or beliefs about them, and locates them in time. Most linguists are fully aware that the discourse of the knower—the dominant mode of their own academic communication—is not to be equated with language use in general; yet, almost imperceptibly, they project their conception of it on discourses in which knowledge is not the central issue. In fact, most of our ideas and theories of language and grammar are based in one way or another on knowledge, information, and reference—and the study of tense and aspect is no exception.

According to logicians and linguists, speakers express their opinions and beliefs about propositions and sentences; yet real speakers in real situations are more likely to do different things. They experience what happens around them, and react in words to it; and they *remember* situations and events, rather than *asserting* them or *referring* to them in the technical philosophical sense.[22] I propose to speak of the "discourse of the observer," to differentiate it—for the purposes of the study of tense and aspect—from the discourse of the knower. As we shall see, this discourse, too, can be associated with a possible mode of presentation in Thucydides' narrative.

A useful background for the study of discourse in terms of the reality surrounding the speaker is provided by Wallace Chafe in a recent wide-ranging study of discourse (spoken or written) and *consciousness*. A speaker's consciousness, Chafe argues, can be in two modes: *immediate* or *displaced*.[23] In the first case, a consciousness receives its primary input from its immediate environment, mostly by way of perception. In the displaced mode on the other hand, the consciousness that perceives and evaluates is in the past; it provides the input for a consciousness in the present that verbalizes what it remembers.

The "displaced" mode of consciousness thus presupposes two consciousnesses. The one consciousness speaks and remembers, and is *external* to the events narrated; from the standpoint of storytelling as an act of communication "here and now," we might say that it is

[22] For an application of this insight to tense in the Homeric performance, see Bakker 1997b; cf. the similar argument about "information" in Bakker 1993b.

[23] Chafe 1994:195–201.

"near." The other consciousness sees and observes, and is *internal*; it was "there and then," and so we might call it "far." In this way, we can define *tense* without recourse to the notions of knowledge and reference: in terms of perception and observation, present tense is the expression of *immediacy*, perception in the here and now; past tense, on the other hand, is a matter of *displacement*.[24] The immediacy and displacement of everyday speech can be stylized in various ways in writing and written narrative. In sections 4 and 5 below I will discuss Thucydides' ways of doing this. I will argue that Thucydides frequently aims at *pretended immediacy*, the presentation of events as if they are seen on the spot, while at the same time keeping his narrative on the track in discourse segments to which the more familiar concepts of knowledge and reference apply. But let us first briefly study the use of the imperfect and the aorist in Greek in connection with Chafe's notions of displacement and immediacy.

To begin with, it is uncontroversial to say that when one uses present tense, the action in question is thought to continue beyond the moment of speaking, and often to have started before, for example:

> κατὰ δὲ μικρὰ πολίσματα οἰκοῦσιν
>
> they live in small towns
>
> (Th. 4.109.4)

Assertions such as this one can of course be equally made about a past situation, in which case the present tense turns into an imperfect, to express a fact in the past, for example:[25]

> καὶ οἱ παρὰ θάλασσαν ἄνθρωποι μᾶλλον ἤδη τὴν κτῆσιν τῶν χρημάτων ποιούμενοι βεβαιότερον ᾤκουν.
>
> And those who lived on the sea-coasts were in a position to acquire wealth and live a more settled life.
>
> (Th. 1.8.3)

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[24] Chafe's own discussion of tense in connection with displacement (1994:205–6, 230–32) is more complex than this, and involves, among other things, a distinction between conversational and literary narrative, and a further distinction between a *representing* and a *represented* consciousness (p. 198), the former becoming the narrator in written fiction (p. 225). For more on displacement, see section 5 below.

[25] The word "now" ("... were now in a position ...") has been omitted from Warner's translation, since in Greek the combination of "now" (νῦν) with past tense (imperfect) is much more marked than in English—if it occurs at all; see below, and section 5.

But more interesting than speaking about temporal reference is that in providing information about the inhabitants of Acte or the Greeks before the Trojan war, Thucydides wants to impart knowledge. His use of the present tense in the first example has to be distinguished from utterances for which present tense is an equally appropriate vehicle: the verbalization of an *observer* of things that happen before his eyes. For a simple example, consider Nestor's words in the *Iliad*:

> ἀϋτὴ δ' οὐρανὸν ἵκει
>
> cries reach up to the sky
>
> (*Il.* 14.60)

Of course, the action described by this speaker lasts beyond the duration of the moment of speaking, and for this reason *hikei* "reaches up" is present tense. But more important is that the event verbalized is actually *perceived* by the speaker, and that the consciousness verbalizing the event is in what Chafe calls the immediate mode. Indeed, the verbalization of events occurring in a speaker's here and now may well have been the primary function of present tense in Greek and Indo-European.[26] We may observe, then, that besides present temporal reference, immediacy is an important semantic feature of present tense. We will see below that this feature has important consequences for our understanding of the imperfect: this tense need not always refer to the past, as does *oíkoun* "they lived" in the example just presented; it may also *displace an observation to the past.* This use of the imperfect will be further explored below in section 5. Let us first turn to the aorist in connection with immediacy and displacement, and its relation to the imperfect. Consider the next example, the words of the Homeric Diomedes after he has just failed to kill Hector on the battlefield:

> ἐξ αὖ νῦν ἔφυγες θάνατον κύον· ἦ τέ τοι ἄγχι
> ἦλθε κακόν· νῦν αὖτέ σ' ἐρύσατο Φοῖβος 'Απόλλων,
> ᾧ μέλλεις εὔχεσθαι ἰὼν ἐς δοῦπον ἀκόντων.

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[26] In particular, the ending -ι in ἵκει (cf. δείκνυμι, etc.) can be seen diachronically as an original deictic suffix that came to be reanalyzed as marker of present tense. Thus spatial deixis would precede temporal deixis in the development of the Greek verbal system. See Lehmann 1993:180; see Bakker 1997b on the *absence* of the suffix -ι (in connection with the absence of the augment of the verb) and the idea of "past" in the Homeric performance.

> Now you've escaped death, dog; doom came very close to you; but now he's just saved you, Phoebus Apollo, to whom you must be praying when you go into the barrage of battle-spears.
> (*Il.* 11.362–64)

Diomedes' consciousness is evidently in the immediate mode: he verbalizes what has just happened in his immediate environment. Diomedes uses twice the particle *nûn* "now," the quintessential marker of speaker-oriented temporal deixis in Greek. Yet the verbs with which this adverb is combined are not present but aorist (*éphuges* "you've escaped," *erúsato* "he has saved"), and a third verb in the passage is equally aorist (*êlthe* "came").[27] These aorists are "past tense," of course, in that they denote an event that, *qua event*, has already occurred at the moment of speech; *qua utterance*, however, these verbs are just as present as verbs with present tense marking: the "past" events constitute the very essence of the speech situation.

The observation that aorist verbs can be used in the discourse of speakers who act and perceive in a concrete situation, and whose consciousness is thus in the immediate mode, has important consequences for our understanding of the imperfect. If we substitute imperfect verbs for the aorists in the extract just quoted, the result is something far more serious than the mere change from a "punctual" to a "durative" action. To say *épheuges thánaton* "you escaped death" is something very different from Diomedes' *éphuges thánaton*: the former expression would locate the escape not in the present but in the past. In this expression of a past event the deictic element *nûn* would be very odd, and in fact, while we frequently find the aorist with *nûn*, the imperfect is never modified in this way in Homer.[28]

There is a difference, then, between the two tenses: the aorist may be used to express an event whose completion constitutes the essence of a speaker's present experience, whereas the imperfect seems to be incompatible with signs pertaining to a speaker's present situation. This difference, I propose, can be characterized with Chafe's notion of immediacy. Without going into all the details of the use of the imperfect, we can simply state, at this point in the argument, that the imperfect is "past." Accordingly, this tense cannot be used by

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[27] For more discussion of the "evidential" nature of this passage, see also Bakker 1997b, 1997c, focusing on the use of the evidential modal present verb μέλλεις.

[28] For aorists and νῦν, see *Il.* 1.354, 417–18; 2.82, 114, 239, 274; 3.367–68, 405, 415, 439; 13.772, etc.; *Od.* 1.35, 43, 182, 194, 219, 241, etc.

speakers who are concerned with the "near," their immediately present situation. The aorist, by contrast, is quite frequent in the discourse of such speakers. Insofar as "near" is incompatible with "past," we may say, then, that the aorist is not a past tense.[29] In fact, the aorist is not a tense at all, in view of the fact that it is not limited to a single temporal relation between an event and a speaker's situation: it may be present, past, or future. Aorists pertaining to the present have just been presented; aorists pertaining to the past will be presented below in section 5. For a future example, consider Achilles' words on his own epic existence:[30]

> εἰ μέν κ' αὖθι μένων Τρώων πόλιν ἀμφιμάχωμαι,
> ὤλετο μέν μοι νόστος, ἀτὰρ κλέος ἄφθιτον ἔσται·
> εἰ δέ κεν οἴκαδ' ἵκωμι φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν,
> ὤλετό μοι κλέος ἐσθλόν, ἐπὶ δηρὸν δέ μοι αἰὼν
> ἔσσεται.
>
> If, staying here, I battle around the city of the Trojans, then my home-coming is thereby (ipso facto) destroyed, but my fame will be everlasting. If on the other hand I go home to my dear fatherland, then my fame is thereby destroyed, and my life will be a long one.
>
> (*Il.* 9.412–16)

Achilles' consciousness is not in the immediate but in the displaced mode; with the prospective conditional clauses he envisages complementary situations in which he can say, with an aorist, either *ṓletó moi nóstos* "my home-coming is (now) destroyed" or *ṓletó moi kléos* "my fame is destroyed." The conditional clauses displace these situations to the future, but from his present situation Achilles can use the same aorist verb as he would use in the real situation.[31] An imperfect as substitute for *ṓleto* is impossible, since its unambiguous meaning of "past" is incompatible with the nonpast nature of the situation envisaged. Unlike the imperfect, then, the aorist does not by itself effect a displacement from the present to the past. Rather, it relates an event vis-à-vis a given consciousness that is situated either in the present or in the future, or, as we shall see, in the past. This account

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[29] For this general assessment of the difference between the imperfect and the aorist, cf. also, from a different point of view, Rijksbaron 1986:244–48.

[30] See also E. *Alc.* 386; 1 *Ep. Cor.* 7.28.

[31] On the use of aorists in the apodosis of prospective conditionals (future or generic), see Kühner and Gerth 1898–1904:1:166; Rijksbaron 1986:244. Goodwin (1889:171) speaks of the "gnomic aorist" in such cases.

of the aorist would seem to find some support in the discussion of tense by the Greek grammarians, who, after all, introduced the term *aóristos* for what we still call aorist, and used it in its proper sense of "indefinite."[32]

The difference between the aorist and the imperfect in nonnarrative, interactive speech can be further gauged when we compare the following contrastive pair:

> οἷον εἶδον ἄλγος δόμων,
> οὐ τλητὸν οὐδὲ ῥητόν. ἀλλ' ἀπωλόμην·
> ἔρημος οἶκος, καὶ τέκν' ὀρφανεύεται.
> (. . .) ἔλιπες, ἔλιπες, ὦ φίλα
> γυναικῶν ἀρίστα θ' ὁπόσας ὁρᾷ
> φέγγος (. .) ἀλίοιο.
>
> What a grief I've seen in my family, unbearable, unspeakable. I'm lost! Empty is my house, and my children are orphans. (. . .) You've left, you've left, my beloved, best of all women whom the sun looks down upon.
>
> (E. *Hipp.* 847–50)

> πρός τ' ἀλόχου καὶ πατρός, ὅ σ' ἔτρεφε τυτθὸν ἐόντα,
> Τηλεμάχου θ', ὃν μοῦνον ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἔλειπες·
>
> In the name of your wife, and your father, who cared for you when you were little, and Telemachos, whom you left, an only child in your house.
>
> (*Od.* 11.67–68)

In the first example, the act of leaving, twice expressed with the aorist *élipes* "you've left" is indeed completed, but its occurrence as such is less important than the utterance of the verb as the expression of the speaker's grief in the present, along with the aorist *apōlómēn* "I'm lost." In the second example, on the other hand, the care that Odysseus enjoyed from his father, and the act of leaving his only son are presented as having occurred in the past. The speaker's (Elpenor's

[32] In particular, Dionysius Thrax's positing a relation of *sungéneia* "kinship" between the aorist and the future (see Uhlig 1883:53) would seem to be less abstruse than has sometimes been thought. It may be that morphological considerations play a role in Thrax's account (the aorist and the future share the element *-s-*); but note that the future, too, is "indefinite" with respect to a speaker's temporal stance: just as the aorist can apply to a future situation, the future can apply to the past (see, e.g., λήψονται "they would take" in the opening passage of Book Eight cited in section 1).

ghost) language is meant to direct Odysseus's attention to that earlier time: the use of imperfects is meant to evoke memories (i.e., reactivate a distal consciousness), not to state that a certain action was "durative" or to say something about the present situation.

At the heart of this essential aspect of the aorist to which I am calling attention is a use of the aorist that is sometimes called "dramatic," and treated separately in the handbooks.[33] For this use the present tense has to be used in translation, for example:

> – ζητοῦντος αὐτοῦ τῆς σελήνης τὰς ὁδοὺς
> καὶ τὰς περιφοράς, εἶτ' ἄνω κεχηνότος
> ἀπὸ τῆς ὀροφῆς νύκτωρ γαλεώτης κατέχεσεν.
> – ἥσθην γαλεώτῃ καταχέσαντι Σωκράτους.

> When he was investigating the course and orbit of the moon, then, when he was gaping upward in the night, from the roof a lizard defecated down on him.—I like that, a lizard defecating down on Socrates!
> (Ar. *Nu.* 171–74)

The last speaker, Strepsiades, is not reporting a past event, but gives verbal articulation to the thought that, at this moment, constitutes his present. Verbalizing the thought (*hēsthēn* "I've enjoyed myself") is by itself an event *post factum*, but no memory or distal consciousness in the past is involved; the thought, and the event of which it approves, is a matter of the speaker's observing consciousness in the present. An imperfect verb, by contrast, would have displaced the speaker's amusement to the past, which would obviously result in an altogether different utterance. Rather than characterizing *hēsthēn* "I like it" and similar aorists as "dramatic" or "vivid,"[34] I would stress that they are the expression of a speaker's immediate reaction to a given situation. They do not so much *refer* to the action that is lexically denoted by the verb as *constitute the speech act* that defines a speaker's very situation at hand.

I conclude this section with some examples in which the aorist and the imperfect are used in one and the same context, with differences, and transitions, between them that further illustrate the present

[33] E.g., Smyth 1956:432; Goodwin 1889:60; Kühner and Gerth 1898–1904:1:163–65.

[34] Other cases occurring in comedy and tragedy are ἐπῄνεσα "I approve," ἐγέλασα "I laughed about it," ἀπέπτυσα "I reject it" (lit: "I've spat [it] out"), ἀπώμοσα "I swear," συνῆκα "I understand," εἶπον "I say," ἐδεξάμην "I accept," τί οὐκ ἔλεξας "why don't you say?."

argument. See for example the following words from the beginning of the conversation between Socrates and the rhapsode Ion:

> – μῶν καὶ ῥαψῳδῶν ἀγῶνα τιθέασιν τῷ θεῷ οἱ Ἐπιδαύριοι;
> – πάνυ γε, καὶ τῆς ἄλλης γε μουσικῆς.
> – τί οὖν; <u>ἠγωνίζου</u> τι ἡμῖν; καὶ πῶς τι <u>ἠγωνίσω</u>;
> – τὰ πρῶτα τῶν ἄθλων <u>ἠνεγκάμεθα</u>, ὦ Σώκρατες.
>
> They don't also organize a rhapsodes' contest in honor of the god, do they, the Epidaurians?—Sure, and of other music art as well.—And? <u>Did you participate</u>? And how <u>did you do</u>?—<u>We've won</u> the first prize, Socrates.
>
> (Pl. *Ion* 530a5–b1)

Socrates first establishes with an imperfect verb the event in the past, Ion's participation in the contest (*ēgōnízou?* "did you participate?") and then proceeds with an aorist question (*pōs ēgōnísō?* "how did you participate?"), establishing the relation between this fact and the present situation. Ion's answer, equally with an aorist verb, does not so much refer to a fact in the past as state Ion's proud position in the present: "I am the winner."

Another instructive passage is Andromache's *rhesis* in the *Troades*, where after describing her past life and conduct in the imperfect, the speaker switches with aorist verbs to her present situation:

> ἐγὼ (. . . .) τῆς τύχης <u>ἡμάρτανον</u>.
> ἃ γὰρ γυναιξὶ σώφρον' ἔσθ' ηὑρημένα,
> ταῦτ' <u>ἐξεμόχθουν</u> Ἕκτορος κατὰ στέγας.
> πρῶτον μέν (. . .) αὐτὸ τοῦτ' ἐφέλκεται
> κακῶς ἀκούειν, ἥτις οὐκ ἔνδον μένει,
> τούτου παρεῖσα πόθον <u>ἔμιμνον</u> ἐν δόμοις·
> ἔσω τε μελάθρων κομψὰ θηλειῶν ἔπη
> <u>οὐκ εἰσεφρούμην</u>, τὸν δὲ νοῦν διδάσκαλον
> οἴκοθεν ἔχουσα χρηστὸν <u>ἐξήρκουν</u> ἐμοί.
> γλώσσης τε σιγὴν ὄμμα θ' ἥσυχον πόσει
> <u>παρεῖχον</u>· (. . . .)
> καὶ τῶνδε κληδὼν ἐς στράτευμ' Ἀχαιϊκὸν
> ἐλθοῦσ' <u>ἀπώλεσέν</u> μ'· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡρέθην,
> Ἀχιλλέως με παῖς <u>ἐβουλήθη</u> λαβεῖν
> δάμαρτα·
>
> I (. . .) <u>lost</u> what I aimed for. What has been found to be woman's modesty, I <u>practiced</u> it all in Hector's house. First of all (. . .), if a woman does not stay in the house, this very thing brings ill fame upon her. So I gave up my longing for it and <u>stayed</u> in the house; and within its walls I <u>did not admit</u> female gossip. Having my own mind

> as a useful teacher, I was content with myself, and for my husband I kept a quiet tongue and a modest look (. . .). And now the fame of all this, in reaching the Achaean's camp, has destroyed me. For since I've been taken prisoner, Achilles' son wants to take me as his bride.
>
> (E. *Troad.* 643–60)

On might want to argue that the imperfect forms denote "states" or habitual events without specific temporal reference, whereas the aorists at the end of the extract (*apṓlesen* "has destroyed," *eboulḗthē* "has wanted") denote punctual or completed events; yet the real difference between the two groups of verbs lies in the direct relevance of the action for the speaker in her present situation. The action denoted by the aorist, in fact, *is* that situation, and Andromache's switch from imperfect verbs to aorists is, in Chafe's terms, a switch from the displaced to the immediate mode of consciousness, from the far to the near.[35]

The last example before we return to Thucydides takes us to narrative. The situation in narrative is obviously different from that in concrete speech situations, since the very act of conducting a narrative is a matter of displacement to the past. Still, a narrative not only involves a reality remembered, invoked, or referred to, but also a narrator, who is not "far" but "near" with respect to the act of storytelling. And the use of narrative tenses may be motivated by this relative distance. Herodotus's Croesus *logos* provides an instructive example. In 1.46–56, Herodotus relates the dealings of the Lydian king Croesus with the Delphic oracle. The business of sending envoys and, later, votive offerings to the oracle is at first reported with imperfect verbs. The verbs not only locate Croesus's actions in the past, but also invite the reader to imagine that past, to participate in what is "far" as befits the displaced mode of consciousness (46.2 *apepeirâto* "he tested," *epémponto* "they were sent;" 46.3 *diépempe* "he sent around;"[36] 47.1 *apépempe* "he sent away;" 51.1 *apépempe*).[37]

The continuous stream of offerings sent to the oracle by the Lydian

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[35] Which is not to say, of course, that a speaker like Andromache who remembers things from the past cannot be aware of her immediately present situation. Chafe suggests (1994:201) that neither of the two modes, immediacy or displacement, "dominates consciousness to the complete exclusion of the other." In Chafe's terminology, the opposite mode is always *semiactive*.

[36] There are two aorists in 46.3, however (ἀπέπεμψε, ἀπέστειλε), in a passage in which the narrator effects a transition in the discourse with μέν . . . δέ; for such discourse-organizing moments, see further section 5 below.

[37] See also the remarkable recurrent use of the present participle ἐλπίζων "expect-

king, however, effects a shift in perspective in the discourse. Not only are the offerings past actions, represented within the narrative framework of the story; the offerings are also objects that are *still to be seen* in the sanctuary, and Herodotus does not miss the opportunity to talk about them in this light. Thus from the past the narrative switches to the present, and the perspective changes from internal to external: Croesus's acts of sending votive offerings to the oracle are now viewed in terms of their *result*, and in relation to the historian's "speaking" consciousness in the present. Consequently, the narrative, which is now strictly speaking not a narrative anymore, switches to aorists, in a presentation that does not relate Croesus's *action qua action*, but in relation to the speaker's "now" (51.3 *apépempse* "has sent," *anéthēke* "he set up as a votive offering;" 51.5 *apépempse, anéthēke*; 52 *apépempse*).[38] After this intermezzo, the narrator resumes the thread of his story, and the imperfect verbs return (53.1 *enetélleto* "he commanded," etc.).

I conclude from the previous discussion of the aorist and the imperfect in terms of Chafe's immediacy and displacement that a perspectival, "modal" difference between the imperfect and the aorist may be posited. Whereas the latter presents an event as relevant with respect to a given vantage point (usually, but not necessarily, a speaker's "now"), the former locates an event in the past. In narrative, this means that whereas imperfect verbs locate a chain of events in the past, an aorist may have the effect of taking the speaker (and the reader or hearer) *out of* that chain, into the present of the narrator and his communication with his readers or hearers.

Let us return once more to Herodotus's narrative of Croesus and the oracle. We do not have to go into the details of the flow and organization of the passage in order to observe that the use of the aorist and the imperfect in it cannot be immediately accounted for by way of the foreground-background method. With respect to the aorists the imperfects are *past* and "far" in the first place, rather than "durative" or "backgrounded;" and rather than "foregrounded" or

ing" in the Croesus *logos* (1.27.3, 30.3, 50.1, 56.1) denoting Croesus's point of view, as discussed in Bakker 1991b (see now Sicking 1996:54–57). See also section 6.

[38] See also earlier, 1.50.3 κατέπεσε "fell down," ἀπετάκη "was melted away from," 51.1 μετεκινήθησαν "were moved," all of which apply to the votive offerings as observable objects, and not to Croesus's actions. Cf. also the signs pertaining to the "speaker-now" of the discourse: νῦν "now" (50.3), ἐπὶ δεξιὰ ἐσιόντι ἐς τὸν νηόν "when you enter the temple on your right" (1.51.1), ἐγὼ δοκέω. . . . φαίνεταί μοι "it seems to me" (1.51.3), ἐς ἐμέ "up to my time" (1.52).

punctual, the aorists are *present* and "near" in the first place, in the sense that they present events and physical objects vis-à-vis the speaking consciousness of the narrator. It appears, then, that the passage represents a perspectival dimension that eludes a simple distinction between foreground and background. Still, there are passages, as already indicated in section 2, where aorist actions seem to be presented against a background, or at least in combination with, "imperfect" actions or states that do not seem to move forward narrative time. How do we explain this situation?

For the beginning of an answer, we turn again to the distinction between knower and observer introduced above. In most of the examples discussed in this section the speaker is either someone who reacts to a given concrete situation, or someone whose consciousness is displaced, in remembering or imagining a situation. This discourse of the observer, as I called it above, has not been sufficiently recognized, I believe, in discussions of tense and other linguistic features. Yet the study of it should not lead us to neglect the discourse of the knower, from which it has to be set apart. In fact, the cases of backgrounding imperfect presented earlier are all part of a knower's discourse, in which facts are presented or referred to, for example:

> ἦγε δὲ τὴν στρατιὰν Ἆγις ὁ Ἀρχιδάμου Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς
>
> Leader of the expedition was Agis, the son of Archidamos, and king of the Lacedaemonians.
>
> (Th. 5.83.1)

This fact is meant to provide a background, a frame, for other events, and is presented from the external perspective of the historian, who refers to a fact in the past known to him. Similarly, in the second passage cited in section 1, a given fact in the past is the subject of the historian's evaluation:

> πῶς οὐκ εἰκότως ἠθύμουν;
>
> how could they not reasonably be dispirited?
>
> (Th. 8.96.2)

These examples, then, are not the verbalization of a perception, nor is this the discourse of a speaker who remembers things and whose consciousness is displaced. These are facts vis-à-vis the historian's writing present, located in time by the tense of the verb, and expressed in a discourse that is carried by knowledge. By contrast, there

are also imperfect verbs for which location in time does not seem to be the appropriate concept. This applies in particular to those imperfect verbs that state "what happened" in the story, being as such foregrounded, for example:

> ἐπειδὴ δὲ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀθηναῖοι <u>προσέμισγον</u> τῷ ζεύγματι, τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ ῥύμῃ ἐπιπλέοντες <u>ἐκράτουν</u> τῶν τεταγμένων νεῶν πρὸς αὐτῷ.
>
> When the Athenians on their side <u>came up to</u> the barrier with the impetus of their first charge, they <u>overpowered</u> the ships stationed in front of it.
>
> (Th. 7.70.2)

> ἅμα μὲν γὰρ στερόμενοι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστος καὶ ἡ πόλις ὁπλιτῶν τε πολλῶν καὶ ἱππέων καὶ ἡλικίας οἵαν οὐχ ἑτέραν <u>ἑώρων</u> ὑπάρχουσαν <u>ἐβαρύνοντο</u>·
>
> Not only was the state as a whole and the mind of every man in it <u>weighed down</u> by the thought of the loss of so many hoplites, cavalry, and men of military age, who, <u>they saw</u>, could not be replaced.
>
> (Th. 8.1.2)

The crucial modality in the presentation of these statements, and of the wider context to which they both belong, is not knowledge but something more basic: *observation*, or, rather, the *pretense* of observation. Both examples are presented as if they are seen or experienced, whether or not Thucydides saw or experienced himself. Rather than locating the action in time, the imperfect has the effect of displacing us into the past. The observer, and hence the narrative perspective, is not the historian in his present, but a remote consciousness to which he has access—really or fictionally—by way of remembering, empathy, or hearsay.

The imperfect can thus be used for the expression of things *known* and things *observed*. These two perspectives, I argue, correspond with two major concerns of Thucydidean narrative. I will speak of two *modes of discourse*. Borrowing Platonic terminology for the presence or absence of a narrator in poetry, I will speak of the *diegetic mode* and the *mimetic mode* of Thucydidean narrative. The former, to be associated with the discourse of the knower mentioned earlier, is meant to capture a way of presentation of historical material in which the narrative is overtly mediated, with the historian in the role of annalist or evaluator. This mode may be opposed to those portions of the text in which the historian recedes in favor of a remote observer on the spot. In this mimetic mode, to be associated with the discourse

of the observer mentioned earlier, Thucydides stylizes the possibilities of the Greek verb for immediacy and displacement in ways that may well have been new at the time, and which today could be referred to as *foregrounded description*.[39]

Before I discuss the two modes, two remarks need to be made. First, although I treat them separately, I do not see the two modes as mutually exclusive. An in-depth analysis of longer stretches of Thucydidean narrative would reveal a more subtle interplay of "knowing" and "observing" than a mere differentiation of these two modalities in the form of the two modes would suggest. Second, the mimetic mode as I understand it here should not be equated *as such* with character's point of view.[40] Very often events related in this mode are indeed "focalized"[41] by characters, such as the Athenians at the beginning of Book Eight. But often the "focalizer" is the persona of the historian himself, not as the knower of facts but as an observing distal consciousness on the spot. In fact, my argument intends to demonstrate that the notion of "narrator" has to be distributed across two narrative functions, or consciousnesses: one "near," the other "far." These two considerations will be briefly addressed in section 6 below. Let us first turn to the two modes.

4. *The Diegetic Mode and the Discourse of the Knower*

Winters and seasons come and go in Thucydides' narrative in a way that has perhaps more to do with the method of narrative presentation and organization adopted by the historian than with the actual experience of those participating in the war. At the simplest level of analysis, Thucydides' work is segmented according to a mechanical and annalistic principle which involves the following recurrent formula:

> καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα οὗτος, καὶ τρίτον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε ὃν Θουκυδίδης ξυνέγραψεν

[39] For this concept, see Lopes 1995.

[40] Cf. Hornblower, who speaks (1987:80–81) of *mimêsis* as the "presentation of facts as seen through the eyes of protagonists, rather than as direct narration."

[41] For this term, see de Jong 1987:31–40, who is followed for Thucydides by Hornblower 1994:134–35.

> And that winter ended, and thereby the third year ended in the war which Thucydides has described. (Th. 2.103.2).

The perspectival orientation of this passage, as well as of its numerous recurrences,[42] is obvious. A relation is established between the author—who is overtly present—and his subject, the Peloponnesian War. In line with the previous discussion, this relation is specified with the aorist verb *xunégraphsen* "wrote" by which Thucydides introduces himself as the *xungrapheús* "writer" of the war. The assertion made with the verb is not a reference to Thucydides' actual writing activity in the past, but a statement of his role in the present as well as in the future, at all the subsequent moments of fictional speaking during the reading of Thucydides' *ktêma es aeí* "property that lasts forever."[43] The context within which the assertion takes place is the mentioning of the end of a winter, and so of a year in the war. The imperfect verb *eteleúta* "ended" marking this transition does not denote an event as such in the narrative; rather, it is meant, as a truly *backgrounding* verb, to accommodate narrated events, to serve as "anchor" relative to which events are presented.[44]

In a context in which the narrator and his speaking consciousness in the "present" is highlighted, and in which the prime organizational principle of the narrative is most apparent as an annalistic grid, the historical events are, likewise, presented as facts viewed from the historian's position in the present, or his position in the future, as the vicarious voice that is fictionally "heard" in the act of reading. In line with the interpretation of Greek verbal aspect in the preceding sections, we observe that the events surrounding the historian's year-divisions tend to be recorded with aorist verbs. This type of context was already discussed in section 2 above, in connection with

[42] The end of a year in the war (the end of winter) occurs at 2.47.1, 70.4, 103.2; 3.25.2, 88.4, 116.3; 4.51.1, 116.3, 135.2; 5.9.3, 51.2, 56.5, 81.2, 83.4; 6.7.4, 93.4; 7.18.4; 8.6.5, 60.3 (the only year-end that is different is the 10th one, 5.24.2, due to the special circumstances of the Peace of Nicias). Mid-season (end of summer) is overtly marked at 2.92.7; 3.86.5, 102.7; 4.49.1; 5.12.2, 50.5, 75.6, 82.6, 115.4; 6.6.5; 7.9.1; 8.1.4, 28.5. The summer-winter-principle is explicitly stated at 2.1 and 5.26.1 (in the so-called "Second Preface," a juncture that has played an important role in the discussion of the composition of Thucydides' work—for two recent "unitarian" views, see Rawlings 1981:40–41, Connor 1984:143) as well as justified in 5.20.

[43] Thucydides' own characterization of his work: 2.22.4.

[44] On this understanding of the imperfect, see also Rijksbaron 1986:246–47.

the distinction between foreground and background in the study of verbal aspect; we consider here one more example:[45]

> καὶ ὁ χειμὼν ἐτελεύτα οὗτος, καὶ πέμπτον καὶ δέκατον ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα.
> Τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους 'Αλκιβιάδης τε πλεύσας ἐς Ἄργος ναυσὶν εἴκοσιν 'Αργείων τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἔτι ὑπόπτους εἶναι καὶ τὰ Λακεδαιμονίων φρονεῖν ἔλαβε τριακοσίους ἄνδρας, καὶ κατέθεντο αὐτοὺς 'Αθηναῖοι ἐς τὰς ἐγγὺς νήσους ὧν ἦρχον· καὶ ἐπὶ Μῆλον τὴν νῆσον 'Αθηναῖοι ἐστράτευσαν...
>
> And that winter ended, and the fifteenth year in the war ended. In the next summer, Alcibiades sailed to Argos with 20 ships, and he seized those of the Argives who were still suspected of having pro-Spartan sympathies, 300 in all, and the Athenians put them into the nearby islands that were under their control. And the Athenians made also an expedition against the island of Melos...
>
> (Th. 5.83.4–84.1)

By the foreground-background criterion, the aorist verbs denote events that are sequential and on the time-line. In the next section, we will see, however, that in the mimetic mode of presentation aorists do *not* advance narrative time, and in the previous section I have argued that, strictly speaking, the aorist is not even a past tense at all.[46] The sequential function of these aorists, then, seems less a matter of any inherent meaning of the aorist than of its function in context. And the context here is constituted by the recording or establishment of facts from the point of view of the historian. The recordings are accommodated and grouped together by the summer-winter framework that provides labels, records containing itemized information.

In this connection we note the frequent use of the particle *kaí* "and (also)" in this type of context. As I have shown elsewhere, this particle frequently links together items of information that as a whole are presented under the scope of the more "discontinuous" particle δέ.[47] In the recurrent year-end formula, the double use of *kaí* in combination with the imperfects signals that the end of winter is not an assertion in its own right, but the end of a larger statement: the recording of a winter's events. The aorist verbs do constitute state-

[45] Translation departs from Warner 1954.

[46] See also Rijksbaron 1986:246, who argues that the pastness of aorist verbs is a matter of "conventional implicature." Aorists, Rijksbaron argues, owe their pastness to an imperfect in the context.

[47] Bakker 1993a:289–90; 1997a:71–74.

ments in their own right,[48] but the particle *kaí* binds them together as "fields" in the overarching record marked by the more discontinuous particle *dé* (*toû d'epigignoménou thérous* "and in the next summer").[49]

The narrative around points of transition between seasons, then, is the discourse of a knower rather than of an observer. Events are presented as facts known and recorded by the historian, not as a spectacle seen on the spot. In this connection we note that often enough imperfect verbs in this mode of discourse denote states or other durative situations known by the historian, and provided as background for the events recorded. Sometimes, however, imperfect verbs seem to do something different. Consider, for example, the two imperfect verbs at the end of the following passage:[50]

> Καὶ 'Αργείων ὁ δῆμος κατ' ὀλίγον ξυνιστάμενός τε καὶ ἀναθαρσήσας ἐπέθεντο τοῖς ὀλίγοις, τηρήσαντες αὐτὰς τὰς γυμνοπαιδίας τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων· καὶ μάχης γενομένης ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐπεκράτησεν ὁ δῆμος, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτεινε, τοὺς δὲ ἐξήλασεν. οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἕως μὲν αὐτοὺς **μετεπέμποντο** οἱ φίλοι, οὐκ ἦλθον ἐκ πλέονος, ἀναβαλόμενοι δὲ τὰς γυμνοπαιδίας **ἐβοήθουν**.
>
> Meanwhile the democrats at Argos had formed into a party again and regained their confidence. They waited till the very day that the Gymnopaedic festival was to be celebrated at Sparta, and then made their attack on the oligarchs. In the fighting that broke out in the city the democrats were victorious: they killed some of their enemies and exiled others. The Spartans had **so far** not appeared in response to previous appeals from their friends in Argos, but now they put off the Gymnopaedia and **marched to their help**.
>
> (Th. 5.82.2–3)

The first imperfect verb in this passage, *metepémponto* "they appealed," apparently denotes a series of appeals from the Argive oligarchs, made over a period of time (*héōs* "so long as") before the moment referred to, and does not, therefore, constitute an event that is recorded as such by the historian. The second imperfect verb, *eboḗthoun* "they came to the rescue," on the other hand, does, and we may ask why the imperfect form, rather than the aorist has been chosen. In view of

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[48] On this differentiation of the imperfect and the aorist, see Sicking 1991:37; 1996:103.

[49] On the discourse function of such preposed adverbial elements, see Bakker 1991a:230–35, with more literature on this phenomenon in discourse linguistics. On *dé* as a discontinuity device ("boundary marker"), see Bakker 1993a:281–95; 1997a: 62–71.

[50] Walker's translation (1954:398–99) modified at the end of the passage.

information given a few sentences later, to the effect that the Spartan help was half-hearted and constantly put off,[51] one might suppose that the help was itself an ongoing and "durative" affair. This, however, is unsatisfactory, since in the diegetic mode any event that is "durative" in and of itself, rather than "punctual," can be recorded as historical fact by an aorist verb. More pertinent is the observation that at the moment referred to the help in question has not yet occurred; the historian merely mentions a given event before its actual occurrence in the story or chronicle. That is, the event is "open-ended," not in the reality referred to, but *in the discourse itself*: the Spartan punishment of the democrats in Argos is not (as yet) an accomplished fact, but the leading theme in the discourse to come. The imperfect verb puts the discourse in this perspective, whereas an aorist would have recorded the help as "fact" without further ado.[52]

We may say, then, that imperfect verbs in Thucydides' diegetic mode of presentation have a backgrounding function: they provide information (e.g., the end of a season, the circumstances under which a given action took place, etc.) relative to which the historian presents his facts; or they provide a frame for the recording of those facts. The historical facts themselves are presented as aorist verbs.

It might seem so far that the diegetic mode is entirely "objective" in the sense that no mediating consciousness is involved: no judgment is passed, nor are evaluations given. Yet, as we saw, the most "objective," annalistic passages are also the moments when the narrator is overtly present, by his name, as the author of the work. And in fact, we can observe that the same use of narrative tenses, with the aorists stating the facts of the Peloponnesian War, is also used in the most "subjective" passages, where the historian is most overtly present

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[51] 5.82.4: διατριβαὶ καὶ μελλήσεις ἐγίγνοντο "there was delay and waste of time" (note the imperfect).

[52] For an account of the imperfect in general in these terms, as dependent with respect to the discourse to come, and thus inviting readers or hearers to direct their attention to what is to follow, see Sicking 1991:22–24; 1996:66–70; 103–5 (see also note 14 above). This use, however, does not apply to the important function of the imperfect in the mimetic mode of storytelling to be discussed below. Other examples of this use in Thucydides can be found at, e.g., 5.70 (ἦν), 8.104.1 (ἐναυμάχουν). An example from Herodotus is the repeated mention of Croesus's military expedition against the Persians (1.71.1, 73.1, 75.2), not as an actual statement of fact, but as the thread keeping the Croesus *logos* together in a way that Lang 1984:1–17 has characterized with the term "target-sentences." For a discussion of discourse-structure by means of forward-pointing devices (not including tense and aspect), see Bakker 1997a:100–8.

in the discourse, either by drawing attention to his own activity or by explicitly expressing an opinion on the war and its participants.

An example of the first possibility occurs in the so-called Second Preface of the work, in which Thucydides, in his own voice, oversees the war in its totality, up to the very end, the demolition of the Long Walls of Athens by Sparta and its allies:

> γέγραφε δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὁ αὐτὸς Θουκυδίδης 'Αθηναῖος ἑξῆς, ὡς ἕκαστα <u>ἐγένετο</u>, κατὰ θέρη καὶ χειμῶνας, μέχρι οὗ τήν τε ἀρχὴν <u>κατέπαυσαν</u> τῶν 'Αθηναίων Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη καὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ <u>κατέλαβον</u>.
>
> The history of this period has also been written by the same Thucydides, an Athenian, keeping to the order of events as they <u>happened</u> by summers and winters, down to the time when the Spartans and their allies <u>put an end</u> to the empire of the Athenians and <u>occupied</u> the Long Walls and Piraeus.
>
> (Th. 5.26)

This is not a narrative passage in which events are represented for their own sake; this is a historian's summarizing the facts of which his subject consists, a perspective which, in line with the above discussion of Greek verbal aspect, calls for aorist verbs. And this is what we in fact find. Openly expressed opinion on Thucydides' part occurs also at 8.96–97, a passage of which the second initial example in section 1 above is a part. Thucydides' report on the arrival of more bad news in Athens takes place in a "subjective" context, in which the historian evaluates and compares the Athenian, Spartan, and Syracusan style and habits of warfare, and where he gives a personal assessment of the government of the Five Thousand at Athens after the regime of the Four Hundred. The evaluations are conducted in aorist discourse, marking the "facts" discussed and assessed not as "narrative" but as data before the historian's scrutinizing eye.[53]

If the above analysis of the aorist is correct in providing a common feature for seemingly dispassionate and overtly opinionated discourse in Thucydides, then we have a criterion by which Thucydidean narrative in general can be analyzed and interpreted. Frequently,

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[53] Cf. also 2.65.5–13, the assessment of Pericles' genius, and the self-inflicted demise of Athens in the war after his death, where the facts pertinent to the assessment are expressed as aorist verbs, and the circumstances necessary to put these facts into perspective with imperfects. Other examples include 7.87.5–6, the final assessment of the Sicilian expedition.

aorist verbs occur outside annalistic or reflective contexts, in passages describing the events of a battle or other military operation in considerable detail. A case in point is 2.91–92, the account of an unexpected Athenian naval victory off Naupactus. In this passage the aorist is the dominant mode of presentation, in marked contrast with so many other detailed and vivid battle descriptions in Thucydides. The description is obviously meant to be exact and "objective," but for that very reason the historian betrays his position in the present by evaluative details that are best understood as belonging to the recording of the events *post factum* rather than to a reenactment of their very perception. Thus Thucydides calls the Spartan crews dropping their oars in order to let the other ships catch up with them a "detrimental thing to do" (*axúmphoron drôntes*, 2.91.4), and speaks a little later of the "mistakes that had been made" (*tà hupárkhonta hamartémata*, 2.92.1). In the mimetic mode of Thucydidean narrative, as we shall see later, such narratorial evaluations do not occur.[54]

A similar case occurs at 3.49.4, where the mission of an Athenian crew to execute the Mytileneans is called a *prâgma allókoton* "a horrible thing." It has been asked whose characterization this is, Thucydides' or the sailors'.[55] It is probably wrong to assign the judgment exclusively to either of the two parties. But by the criteria put forward here there is nothing against letting Thucydides speak in his own voice, since the evaluative term occurs in a context displaying diegetic features: aorists carry the story line with imperfects in a backgrounding function. The dramatic value of the second trireme arriving just in time to prevent the massacre is considerable, but in spite of the detail supplied, nothing is described or "shown" in the way of the mimetic mode to be discussed below. This is not a displaced consciousness observing the events as they occur, but the historian himself telling us of a memorable episode in the war. The

[54] Notice that a prominent feature of the passage is the abundant use of the historical present (2.90.5 ὑπεκφεύγουσι; 2.91.1 φθάνουσι; 2.91.4 ἐμβάλλει, καταδύει, ἐμπίπτει); the historical present is frequently found in diegetic passages, being less frequent in mimetic passages. This observation not only adds another linguistic criterion to the differentiation of the two modes, but also lends support to the account of Sicking and Stork (see Chapter 4), who argue that the historical present has nothing to do with the "vividness" of the description. Rather, the historical present would seem to relate to the "presence" of the narrator and his or her audience.

[55] Hornblower 1994:135; cf. 1987:192.

historian's perspective is explicitly expressed in the phrase rounding off the episode:

> παρὰ τοσοῦτον μὲν ἡ Μυτιλήνη ἦλθε κινδύνου
>
> So narrow had been the escape of Mytilene (Th. 3.49.4)

This phrase has been aptly compared with the *if not* situation in Homer ("and now ... had happened, if not ...") and is one the strongest narratorial evaluations in Thucydides.[56]

Finally, I mention the description of the Battle of Mantinea (5.70–74). The events are presented with a wealth of detail,[57] but no illusion of *seeing* is created. In fact, a large part of the passage is a matter of *knowledge* of the Spartan army (5.70) and of hoplite warfare (5.71).[58] And the detailed report on military tactics that follows, carried by the narrative tenses in the way characteristic of the diegetic mode, is almost too good to be true: no participant in the fighting or observer on the spot could have had the helicopter view that the historian is adopting, and we may say that the description is unrealistic by its very objectivity. In the closing paragraph (5.74.1) Thucydides states his concern with exactness, saying that his account comes "as close as possible" (*hóti engútata*) to the real thing. The phrasing is reminiscent of the famous methodological remarks concerning the content of speeches that Thucydides has not witnessed himself.[59] So Thucydides was not present at this hoplite battle. But more important is that the battle of Mantinea was apparently not selected for presentation in the discourse mode in which objectivity and exactness is not asserted but presupposed. It is to this discourse mode that we now turn.

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[56] Hornblower 1994:158. The same phrase recurs at 7.2.4, applying to the narrow escape of Syracuse; see Connor 1984:187, who calls it "one of the most astonishing in the *Histories*," calling attention to the fact that it puts subsequent events in a perspective that is that of the reader in the future, not that of the participants in the war.

[57] Connor emphasizes (1984:144) the detailed nature of the description in contrast with the compressed nature of most of the rest of Book Five.

[58] However, in 5.71.3 the events seem to be briefly "focalized" by the Spartan king Agis. See further section 6 below.

[59] 1.22.1 ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων "as close as possible to the overall meaning of what was said;" cf. 7.86.5 on the real reasons of the Syracusans for killing Nicias.

5. *The Mimetic Mode and the Discourse of the Observer*

Annalistic recording does not take place in Thucydides for its own sake; nor is "exactness" (*akríbeia* or *tò akribés*), important though it is, an end in itself. Thucydides himself links the intended factual nature of his narrative to its paradigmatic potential, its power to serve as touchstone for similar events in the future.[60] In order to live up to this potential, the historian's discourse must not only be "exact;" it must also be *convincing*, not only focused on the relation between the historian and his material, but also on the impact of that material on a reader. If the historian's discourse is to carry conviction in the judgment of future readers, it is the historical events, not the historian, that have to speak. And they speak better when one has the illusion of *seeing* them. Accordingly, knowledge, of which the historian has almost always a limited quantity, may at times recede in favor of a different modality: the illusion that events are observed on the spot.

To achieve this effect, the Greek language offers a resource in the past tense of a present verb expressing events perceived as they occur. This use of the imperfect is not so much a reference to an event as the displacement of its observation into the past. Chafe speaks of "displaced immediacy" for this narrative situation, which is typically a matter of written fiction, where, in English, the expression of "now" may freely occur with past tense.[61] In Greek we may note—though more research is necessary here—that the use of the imperfect with which this displaced immediacy is effected does not occur in Homer. This would seem understandable, in view of the fact that oral epic narrative is more a matter of "remembering" in a firmly established speaker-now than of pretended observation in the past.[62] In any case, Thucydides' abundant use of the "fictional" potential of the imperfect might be explained on the basis of the possibilities for displacement offered by writing.[63]

I argue, then, that what I called above the mimetic mode of

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[60] 1.22.4. Cf. 2.48.3 (on the description of the symptoms of the Plague), with the same participle, σκοπῶν "observing," for the activity of readers in the future as in 1.22.4.

[61] Chafe 1994:224–32; 249–57.

[62] On the conception of the past in the epic performance, see Bakker 1997b.

[63] On the rise in ancient Greek of "fictional" means of presentation, see Bakker 1997c.

Thucydidean narrative is related to a specific use of the imperfect that has to be distinguished from the better known use of the imperfect in the diegetic mode. Aorists occur in either mode, but have a different effect in the mimetic mode, as we shall see. The best example of how Thucydides' discourse switches back and forth between the two modes of presentation is perhaps the way in which the two most memorable ingredients of Book Two, the Funeral Oration and the description of the plague, are accommodated by annalistic discourse. Much attention has been paid to the juxtaposition of the two, and the stark contrasts produced by it.[64] Yet the remarkable resonance in the superstructure of the work takes place within the firm confines of the annalistic grid, and derives in fact an air of objectivity from it. Immediately after the Funeral Oration at 2.46, the first year-end mark of the work occurs, followed by the almost formulaic recording of the annual Spartan invasion of Attica. Then the first, annalistic, mention of the Plague follows, with the usual linguistic characteristics:

> <u>καὶ</u> ὄντων αὐτῶν οὐ πολλάς πω ἡμέρας ἐν τῇ 'Αττικῇ ἡ νόσος πρῶτον <u>ἤρξατο</u> γενέσθαι τοῖς 'Αθηναίοις
>
> They had not been many days in Attica before the plague first *broke out* among the Athenians.
>
> (Th. 2.47.3)

Preliminary diegetic remarks on the epidemic then follow, ranging from factual information (2.48.1–2) to an overtly "subjective" passage (2.48.3), in which the historian stages himself as an eyewitness who has suffered from the disease himself, announcing the upcoming description as the account of one who was in the middle of things. In Chafe's terminology, this is the transition from the "immediate" mode of consciousness to the "displaced" mode, in which a proximal consciousness does the actual talking (fictionally or not), and a remote, remembered consciousness the seeing on which this talking is based.

In the description of the plague (2.49–53), Thucydides speaks in his own voice, but this voice is very different from that of the evaluative or diegetic voice whose position is the present. This Thucydides is in the past, and his account is as far removed from the discourse of the "knower" as anything in the *Histories*, insofar as "knowing"

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[64] E.g., Connor 1984:63–64.

here was an unattainable goal: no one knew the causes or the true nature of the disease, and Thucydides contents himself with reporting as accurately as possible, in the hope that his account is of use in case the disease strikes again in the future. The result is a prime example of what I call mimetic discourse, presented from the internal standpoint of the observer, and largely conducted with imperfect verbs. It is true that the sustained use of the imperfect here (as well as of the optative mood in temporal subclauses preceding the main clauses) can be characterized with such catchwords as "generic," "habitual," or "iterative."[65] Yet this does not diminish the mimetic quality of the passage; on the contrary, the description can reach its level of accuracy and vividness because it is based on *generic remembering*, producing an account of the most typical features of the phenomenon at hand that is convincing by the very specificness with which it describes the universal. This "specific universality" can also be found elsewhere in Thucydides' mimetic discourse, as we shall see.[66]

After the internal and mimetic description, a brief evaluative passage (2.54.1–4) follows, in which Thucydides, now once more historian in the present rather than observer in the past, discusses the controversy about the meaning of an oracular line at the time, and concludes that people will always adapt their interpretation of oracles to their present circumstances. The discourse then veers back to the diegetic remarks of the beginning (2.54.5).[67] In this whole concluding chapter, aorists are the default verbal vehicle, and imperfects resume their backgrounding function.

The description of the plague, its medical symptoms, and its effects on the Athenians' behavior and morality, is a case where Thucydides' role as an "internal" observer is not in doubt. Other cases are less clear, and often we may doubt whether Thucydides was on the spot when things happened. Yet in such cases we may find the same

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[65] Goodwin 1889:170–72; Kühner and Gerth 1898–1904:2:476–77; Smyth 1956:546.

[66] We may say, then, that the "repetition" lies not so much in the reality described as in its perception. The way in which the handbooks (see previous note) speak of "repeated action" is a good example of the referential bias of Greek linguistics mentioned in the Introduction. Apart from this, "iterativity" is in and of itself not a feature of the imperfect or the present as such: aorists, too, can be "gnomic," "generic," or "iterative;" see also Sicking 1991:34–37.

[67] I do not see μὲν οὖν. . . . δέ in 2.54.5 as a *contrast* "between the guesses of others (ᾔκαζον) and the facts known to T." (Rusten 1989:193), but as a *transition* from one discourse section to another (cf. Bakker 1993a:302–5).

mode of presentation: a descriptive discourse that displaces the act of observation into the past by means of a sustained series of imperfect verbs. The obvious example is the description of the decisive naval battle in the Great Harbor of Syracuse (7.69.3–71.7).[68] Here, too, specific universality is reached, not so much by the "iterativity" of the observations underlying the description as by their "distributivity." The observing consciousness focuses on what was most typical anywhere in the confused battle, and hence most salient for its description.[69]

The narrative is so "internal" that the distinction between the historian's displaced observing consciousness and the experience of those actually participating in the fighting fades, to the point that the deictic center, usually the speaker's actual present, is displaced to the past: the particle *nûn* "now" applies to the past situation:

> πολλὴ γὰρ δὴ ἡ παρακέλευσις καὶ βοὴ ἀφ' ἑκατέρων τοῖς κελευσταῖς κατά τε τὴν τέχνην καὶ πρὸς τὴν αὐτίκα φιλονικίαν ἐγίγνετο, τοῖς μὲν 'Αθηναίοις βιάζεσθαί τε τὸν ἔκπλουν ἐπιβοῶντες καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐς τὴν πατρίδα σωτηρίας νῦν, εἴ ποτε καὶ αὖθις, προθύμως ἀντιλαβέσθαι, τοῖς δὲ Συρακοσίοις καὶ ξυμμάχοις καλὸν εἶναι κωλῦσαί τε αὐτοὺς διαφυγεῖν καὶ τὴν οἰκείαν ἑκάστους πατρίδα νικήσαντας ἐπαυξῆσαι.
>
> And indeed, in the ordinary course of duty and in the present excitement of battle, plenty of instructions were given and plenty of shouting was done by the boatswains on either side. To the Athenians they cried out, urging them to force the passage and now, if ever, to seize resolutely upon the chance of a safe return to their country; and to the Syracusans and their allies the cry was that it would be a glorious thing to prevent the enemy from escaping and for each man to bring honour to his own country by winning the victory.
>
> (Th. 7.70.7)

In written English narrative, the adverb "now" is readily used with past tense to apply to the "internal now" of the narrative.[70] In Greek, on the other hand, the connection between *nûn* and the "external now" of the narrator (or the now of any speaker) is very strong. Accordingly, the use of *nûn* in this extract is remarkable, and confirms that

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[68] For a recent discussion of the passage and its criticism in antiquity, see Walker 1993:355–61 (cf. Connor 1984:197).

[69] Just as in the description of the Plague, "iterative-distributive" optative verbs freely occur in temporal subclauses, e.g., 7.70.3 (προσπέσοι), 70.4 (τύχοι, προσφέροιτο), 70.5 (προσμείξειαν), 70.8 (ὁρῷεν), 71.3 (ἴδοιεν), 71.4 (ἀναγκάζοιτο).

[70] See Chafe 1994:205–6.

the narrative is cut loose from the historian's own writing present, or from the speaking present of his narrator. The consciousness from which the narrative derives merges with the perception and the experience of the crews on the ships, with as intended effect that this unmediated experience will communicate itself to the readers of the present, and of the future.[71]

The viewpoint then shifts to the spectators on the shore,[72] whose confused and partial view of what actually happened in the harbor has been recently interpreted as reflecting the historian's own difficulties in assembling evidence, and thus as emblematic for the formation of the historiographical work as such.[73] In contrast with the account of the battle of Mantinea, we are not told exactly what happened in the harbor, and this is precisely why the narrative is more realistic. The mimetic nature of the presentation is achieved through a point of view that is not only internal and distributive, but also multiple: watching the battle is a collective experience, and the description reaches an intensity that not even a direct first-person narrative could easily achieve. Everything is epitomized in a memorable phrase with an instructive use of tense:

> αἰεὶ γὰρ παρ' ὀλίγον ἢ <u>διέφευγον</u> ἢ <u>ἀπώλλυντο</u>
>
> They were constantly on the verge of <u>being saved</u> or <u>lost</u>
>
> (Th. 7.71.4)

The imperfect, in accordance with the common view, denotes that the actions referred to did not in fact reach their natural end; but more important is that the verbs present the action *as experienced* (the

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[71] Cf. also Th. 4.28.1. Usually νῦν applies, with the present tense or the aorist (see above, note 28), to a speaker's present situation (also the historian's own, e.g., Th. 1.100.3). Accompanied by the particle δέ (νῦν δέ), however, νῦν can occur idiomatically after a counterfactual conditional, even in narrator's discourse, without the mimetic overtones described here ("as it was then," e.g., Th. 2.77.6; Hdt. 3.25.5).

[72] 7.71.1—notice the unusual linkage with τε instead of δέ (ὅ τε ἐκ τῆς γῆς πεζὸς "and the infantry on the shore," where ὁ δέ would have been more normal as a switch-indicating device). The much tighter and more continuous coordinator τε has been used, it seems, to stress the essential similarity of the experience of soldiers and sailors: the onlookers on the shore are fighting too (cf. 7.71.5 παραπλήσια δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν αὐτοῖς ἔπασχον "and the soldiers on board the ships had much the same experience"). On τε as "sentence-co-ordination;" see Rusten 1989:23–24.

[73] Walker, who interprets (1993:354) the Harbor scene as a *mise en abîme* (the self-reflexivity of the gaze: the spectators being a spectacle themselves), as part of a "post-structuralist reading of Greek historiography, one attentive to the ways in which these texts invariably call attention to their own formation."

non-completeness of the action being a natural consequence of the point of view adopted). This is the mental state of people who are for an extended period of time about to exclaim, by the aorist usage discussed above (section 3), either *diephúgomen* "we're saved!" or *apōlómetha* "we're lost!," but who never quite reach either point.

The same internal perspective can be found in the description of the mood in the Athenian army before and during the retreat (7.75.1–6), as well as in the description of the final massacre in the river Assinaros (where the visual perspective of the narration becomes virtually that of the Syracusans looking down on the Athenians from the cliffs of the river banks), and in the description of the mood in Athens after news of the disaster has arrived there (8.1), the passage mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. The narrative vehicle in these passages as well as in the more linear and sequential narrative that connects them, and indeed in most of the description of the Sicilian expedition as a whole, is the imperfect.

But at least as instructive as this observation for the study of tense and aspect in narrative and of Thucydidean discourse, is the variety of reasons why the aorist is used in these and other mimetic passages. For aorists do occur here, in ways that can tell us something of the motives of the historian's speaking consciousness in the present to *intrude* into the "internally focalized" account of the past.

First of all, we note that in itself the occurrence of an aorist in a mimetic passage need not imply a shift from an internal to an external point of view, or from the "far" observing consciousness to the "near" narrating consciousness: the aorist, as we have seen above (section 3), can be used in the discourse of the observer on the spot, where, whether or not accompanied by the adverb *nûn* "now," it firmly applies to the immediacy of a speaker's present. This use of the aorist, as we saw, is reserved for events that can only be observed *post factum*, or whose very nature lies in being "completed." Such observations may also occur in Thucydides' mimetic discourse, as for example in the account of the battle in the Syracusan harbor:

> εἰ μέν τινες ἴδοιέν πῃ τοὺς σφετέρους ἐπικρατοῦντας, ἀνεθάρσησάν τε ἂν καὶ πρὸς ἀνάκλησιν θεῶν μὴ στερῆσαι σφᾶς τῆς σωτηρίας ἐτρέποντο
>
> When some saw that at one point their side was winning, they took courage at the sight and began to call upon the gods not to deprive them of their salvation.
>
> (Th. 7.71.3)

The aorist *anethársēsan* "they took courage" contributes just as much as do the surrounding imperfects to the "specific universality" of the passage. The difference between them is that when the discourse would be produced "on line," at the very same moment of observation, the imperfects would turn into present verbs, whereas the aorist would *remain* an aorist.[74]

Other aorists in the mimetic mode appear to be narratorial intrusions, interventions in the mimetic presentation from the point of view of the historian's "near," speaking consciousness. It might not be too misleading to compare narrative presentation in Thucydides' mimetic mode with a movie, or a series of pictures passing before the reader's eye. To this flow of visual information, commentary may then be added, as background explanation, as "regulatory" information, or as argumentative information. The result is a mixture of "showing" and "telling" in which the relation between the aorist and the imperfect is reversed with respect to the diegetic mode discussed above: the aorist serves as background to a descriptive, visualizing foreground carried by imperfect verbs.

Explanatory background is often provided with aorist verbs. In referring to events that took place before the moment described, these seem at first sight to be equivalent to the *pluperfect* tense in English. Consider for instance:[75]

> ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης καὶ Μένανδρος καὶ Εὐθύδημος (οὗτοι γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰς ναῦς τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοὶ ἐπέβησαν) ἄραντες ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑαυτῶν στρατοπέδου εὐθὺς ἔπλεον πρὸς τοῦ ζεῦγμα τοῦ λιμένος

[74] Cf. also Th. 4.36.2, where ἐξέπληξε and ἐπέρρωσεν seem amenable to the same analysis, or 2.51.5 (ἐκενώθησαν). See also Htd. 1.56.1: τούτοισι ἐλθοῦσι τοῖσι ἔπεσι ὁ Κροῖσος πολλόν τι μάλιστα πάντων ἥσθη, ἐλπίζων ἡμίονον οὐδαμὰ ἀντ' ἀνδρὸς βασιλεύσειν Μήδων. "At these words, as they came, Croesus had a fit of joy, more than at anything that had come so far. He supposed a mule would never be king of the Medes instead of a man." This is a description of a situation in which Croesus *himself* would have said ἥσθην "I like it!." Cf. προσεδέξατο at Hdt. 1.48.1, where προσεδεξάμην "I accept it!" would be the utterance in the situation envisaged. Cf. Pl. *Chrm.* 156d1, with the same verb as in Thucydides' passage in the text. Students of Greek aspect may want to compare this interpretation with the so-called "ingressive" aorist, a usage by which the speaker allegedly focuses on the point at which a given state came into being. Under my present analysis the aorists that are amenable to an ingressive interpretation divide between the diegetic usage discussed above (including the text-book examples of ἐβασίλευσε, ἐτυράννευσε, ἐνόσησε, "became king/tyrant, fell ill," etc.) and the mimetic use discussed here.

[75] Warner's 1954 translation modified in order to bring out the γάρ clause.

> And now Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus (for these men had boarded the ships of the Athenians as commanders) put out from their own camp and sailed straight for the barrier across the mouth of the harbor.
>
> (Th. 7.69.4)

The aorist *epébēsan* "(had) boarded" is off the time-line, and denotes something that happened earlier than the point of time reached in the narrative. But more important is that it represents information that is known, and not seen, serving as explanation to what is shown. Accordingly, the temporal status of the aorist is not so much anteriority with respect to the time denoted by the imperfect verbs, the narrated moment, as anteriority with respect to the present moment of the historian, who uses his knowledge to guide the reader's experience: this is a narratorial intrusion, rather than a case of what linguists call "relative tense."[76] In other cases, the anteriority is not even a possibility, whereas the "modal" difference between the explanation and the surrounding discourse remains. For example, consider the following passage, somewhat later in the description:

> ξυμπεσουσῶν δὲ ἐν ὀλίγῳ πολλῶν νεῶν (πλεῖσται γὰρ δὴ αὗται ἐν ἐλαχίστῳ ἐναυμάχησαν· βραχὺ γὰρ ἀπέλιπον ξυναμφότεραι διακόσιαι γενέσθαι) αἱ μὲν ἐμβολαὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὰς ἀνακρούσεις καὶ διέκπλους ὀλίγαι ἐγίγνοντο . . .
>
> Many ships crowded in upon each other in a small area (indeed, never before had so many ships fought together in so narrow a space. For there were almost 200 of them on the two sides); consequently, there were not many attacks made with the ram amidships, since there was no backing water and no chance of breaking through the turning about.
>
> (Th. 7.70.4)

The observation that there was no space to maneuver in the harbor is put in perspective by the remark—the discourse of a knower, not an observer—that the battle was exceptional because of the mismatch between the number of ships and the space available. The first aorist in the remark between brackets, *enaumákhēsan* "had fought a naval battle" compares the present event to previous, similar, events, just as in the second example of section 1 above the Athenians' con-

[76] Apart from this, note that imperfect verbs, too, may be used as a "pluperfect" to mark anteriority, e.g., 4.9.3 (ἐτείχιζον), 4.29.3 (ἐφοβεῖτο), 6.31.1 (ἐψηφίζοντο), 7.75.7 (ἐξέπλεον). The reason for the choice of the imperfect tense seems to have been, again, point of view: the "pluperfect" imperfects represent characters' thoughts about an earlier situation, not a narratorial explanation.

sternation is compared to earlier situations. The second aorist, *apélipon* "fell short of" backs up this comparison, and is not anterior with respect to the events narrated. But rather than being different from each other as regards relative tense, the two aorists are similar in providing narratorial information that has been set off from the surrounding context.

In the two examples just presented, we notice that the explanation is marked and introduced by the explanatory particle *gár*. This particle, in fact, is regularly used as a device to mark the switch from the internal perspective of the observer to the external perspective of the historian, as well as *vice versa*.[77] A particularly instructive example of this use is the account of the death of Nicias and Demosthenes, the generals of the Sicilian expedition (7.86). They were executed by the Syracusans, an event that is discretely not described as such, and that, accordingly, receives only aorist mention:

> Νικίαν δὲ καὶ Δημοσθένη ἄκοντος τοῦ Γυλίππου ἀπέσφαξαν
>
> Nicias and Demosthenes they executed against the will of Gylippus. (Th. 7.86.2)

The detail "against the will of Gylippus" triggers an explanation, modified by *gár*, in the form of an internal presentation (featuring imperfect verbs) of the considerations of the Spartan general on the spot: he wanted to bring them as prisoners to Sparta, the one (Demosthenes) being most hateful, the other (Nicias) dearest to the Spartans. This information, in its turn, leads to a new explanation, marked again by *gár*, but this time presented from the historian's perspective, pertaining to Nicias's conduct with regard to the treatment of the Spartan prisoners from the Pylos-episode. Because of this previous fact, the historian notes, Nicias had surrendered to the Spartan general, rather than to the Syracusans. The surrender has already been told, and this second mention with an aorist is the historian's evaluation, not narrative.[78] We see, then, that a narrative

[77] This use of γάρ to switch between the two narrative modes is entirely parallel to the use of the particle in Herodotus to mark switches between narrator's discourse (in the indicative) and indirect speech (in the infinitive). For narratorial intrusions in this respect marked by γάρ, see Bakker 1991a:229–30; for intrusions of a character's thought or speech, see Cooper 1974:52–65.

[78] Th. 7.86.4 ἑαυτὸν τῷ Γυλίππῳ παρέδωκεν "he had surrendered himself to Gylippus"—7.85.1 Νικίας Γυλίππῳ ἑαυτὸν παραδίδωσι "Nicias surrenders himself to Gylippus,"

may switch back and forth between the two modes of presentation, and that *gár* is instrumental in that regard.[79]

The historian's motive for intruding into the mimetic presentation may also be argumentative, as if to forestall a question or criticism of his audience. Thus, for example, in the ongoing description of the Plague, its symptoms, and its characteristics, there is the following interruption, after the observation that scavenging animals such as vultures or dogs either did not approach the corpses or died after eating from them:

> τεκμήριον δέ· τῶν μὲν τοιούτων ὀρνίθων ἐπίλειψις σαφὴς ἐγένετο
>
> Evidence for this may be found in the fact that there was a complete disappearance of all birds of prey.
>
> (Th. 2.50.2)

This is a fact, rather than an observation, and its verbalization does not aim at presenting the fact as it happened, but rather *post factum*, as evidence for a claim in the communication between the historian and his audience.

Yet another reason for intruding into the discourse of the observing consciousness could be called discourse-organizing. The stream of observation, after all, is not always entirely self-evident, and may need some management in order to be felicitous and convincing. Thus we frequently find aorist statements preceding, by way of "label," the actual mimetic description of a given scene (which, in its turn, may be presented as an explanation modified by *gár*). This is, for example, the way in which the final scene of the Athenian prisoners in the Syracusan stone quarries is introduced:

> Τοὺς δ' ἐν ταῖς λιθοτομίαις οἱ Συρακόσιοι χαλεπῶς τοὺς πρώτους χρόνους μετεχείρισαν. ἐν γὰρ κοίλῳ χωρίῳ ὄντας καὶ ὀλίγῳ πολλοὺς οἵ τε ἥλιοι τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ πνῖγος ἔτι ἐλύπει διὰ τὸ ἀστέγαστον καὶ αἱ νύκτες ἐπιγιγνόμεναι τοὐναντίον μετοπωριναὶ καὶ ψυχραὶ τῇ μεταβολῇ ἐς ἀσθένειαν ἐνεωτέριζον.

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with historical present, a relatively rare phenomenon in mimetic narrative (see above, note 54).

[79] For narratorial intrusions marked by γάρ, cf. also 7.75.7. Compare Lys. 1.11 (ὕστερον γὰρ πάντα ἐπυθόμην "for later I got to know everything"), where γάρ modifies an aorist statement lifting the discourse out of the displaced reality of the story into the immediacy of the speaker and his public. For examples of the reverse phenomenon, γάρ modifying an internal description following, by way of illustration, a narratorial statement, cf. Th. 4.11.4, 29.3 (πρότερον γὰρ οὔσης), 4.33.2; 7.87.1. The perspectival use of γάρ in Thucydides is also discussed by Hornblower 1994:134.

> Those who were in the stone quarries were treated badly by the Syracusans at first. For there were many of them, and they were crowded together in a narrow pit, where, since there was no roof over their heads, they suffered first from the heat of the sun and the closeness of the air; and then, in contrast, came on the cold autumnal nights, and the change in temperature brought disease among them.
>
> (Th. 7.87.1)

The aorist *metekheírisan* "they treated/handled" does not evoke the conditions in the quarries so much as mention them, serving as label for the upcoming internal description which is conducted with imperfect verbs, till the moment at which the description is rounded off with general evaluative closing remarks on the Sicilian expedition, with aorists. In other cases the aorist statement is a regulatory intervention in ongoing mimetic discourse, to serve as a connection between two scenes. For example, the vivid and mimetic description of the defeat and capture of the Spartan hoplites on the island of Sphacteria (4.33–36) is briefly interrupted by a short passage mentioning the Spartans' retreat to the place where they make their last stand:

> τέλος δὲ τραυματιζομένων ἤδη πολλῶν διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀναστρέφεσθαι, ξυγκλῄσαντες ἐχώρησαν ἐς τὸ ἔσχατον ἔρυμα τῆς νήσου, ὃ οὐ πολὺ ἀπεῖχε, καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν φύλακας.
>
> Finally, after many of them had been wounded, penned in as they were and unable to move freely, they closed their ranks and fell back on the fort at the end of the island, which was not far off and was garrisoned by their own men.
>
> (Th. 4.35.1)

This is not narrative description itself, but a link between two narrative descriptions, inserted as a regulatory backgrounded statement. In a similar way the mimetic description of the moral consequences of the Plague in 2.52–53 is divided by means of aspectual morphology into clearly demarcated subsections, each dealing with a separate aspect of the overall topic at hand, and each starting with an aorist verb. Thus first (52.1) the narrator focuses on the overcrowded situation in the city as a complicating factor (*epíese d'* . . . *hē xunkomidḕ ek tôn agrôn es tò ástu* "what afflicted them . . . was the removal of people from the country into the city"), after which a description of the appalling living conditions in the summer follows; the description is conducted with imperfect verbs and introduced by *gár*. The narrator then turns (52.4) to the collapse of funeral ritual (*nómoi te pántes xunetarákhthēsan* . . . *perì tàs taphás* "all the funeral customs had been

shattered"), and concludes (53) with a description of general moral decline (*prôtón te ếrxe kaì es tâlla têi pólei epì pléon anomías tò nósēma* "and the plague started also in other respects an increase in lawlessness in the city"). The description labeled in this way is again carried by imperfects and introduced by *gár*.

As a final example of aorist intrusion into mimetic narrative we note the way in which battles end. Irrespective of the nature of the preceding account, the end of a battle is always presented in similar fashion, as a coda or "wrap up," in discourse displaying annalistic, even formulaic features. As often, the Syracusan harbor battle provides the most instructive example:[80]

> γενομένης δ' ἰσχυρᾶς τῆς ναυμαχίας καὶ πολλῶν νεῶν ἀμφοτέροις καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀπολομένων οἱ Συρακόσιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐπικρατήσαντες τά τε ναυάγια καὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς ἀνείλοντο, καὶ ἀποπλεύσαντες πρὸς τὴν πόλιν τροπαῖον ἔστησαν.
>
> After this hard-fought fight, in which many men and many ships had been lost on both sides, the victorious Syracusans and their allies took up the wrecks and the dead bodies, sailed back to their city, and put up a trophy.
>
> (Th. 7.72.1)

Battles may differ considerably from each other in what is at stake, in the experience of the participants, in the changes of fortune, or in other military vicissitudes; but they all end in the same way, with both parties taking up the dead bodies (often under treaty), and the winners putting up a trophy. This appears to be encoded in Thucydides' discourse, where we invariably see phraseology that is as formulaic as that used for the annual Spartan invasion of Attica. Not mentioning these events would leave the narrative incomplete and without closure, but actually describing them would make what is general and recurrent too specific.

6. *Character's Point of View*

In the preceding argument I have tried to show that a simple distinction between the narrator on the one hand and the character or protagonist on the other cannot do sufficient justice to the complex-

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[80] Cf. also 2.90.5–6; 4.14.4–5; 6.23.4; 7.53.3–4, 82.3.

ity of Thucydides' narrative: the narratological concept of "narrator," I believe, is underspecified, and can be divided into the historian's persona in the present of the narrative and the observer in the middle of the events narrated. The latter mode of presentation often verges into a view of the events from the standpoint of the actual protagonists in the war. This happens, as we saw, in the description of the battle in the harbor of Syracuse, as well as in the first chapter of Book Eight, which in fact forms one seamless whole with the preceding narrative of the disaster in Sicily.

However, there are reasons to suppose that character's point of view in Thucydides is also a narrative phenomenon in its own right, with its own possibilities, rather than a mere by-product of the mimetic mode. At this point there is no space or time for a full discussion. I note here only the aspectual usage of verbs of thought or feeling. In the opening passage of Book Eight cited at the beginning of this chapter, we see the imperfect *enómizon* "they considered" as a means to sustain the Athenians' point of view. More characteristic and interesting is the use of the *participle* of such cognitive verbs, which in the present context amounts to the aspectual opposition between present and aorist participle (e.g., *nomízōn* vs. *nomísas*/*nomízontes* vs. *nomísantes* "considering," sg./pl.).[81]

Thucydides' participial usage has been recently explored by Mabel Lang, who proposes that the use of participles expressing "motivation" is less a matter of knowledge of protagonists' actual thoughts than of "a narrative technique which links actions and actors chainwise."[82] In personalizing causes and their effects, participles are thus a means to situate events psychologically, both in their context and with respect to each other. To this relational function of participles we may now add the perspectival potential of their aspectual morphology. Combined with the lexical meaning of the participle, aspect may become a means for the historian to lend depth to the narrative and to situate an event in a perspective other than his own or that of his readers. For example, in present participial clauses of verbs of thinking and opinion, we frequently find "subjective" elements such as *rhaidíōs* "easily" or *rhâion* "more easily." These do not occur in aorist

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[81] On νομίζειν in Thucydides, see Huart 1986:263–72.
[82] Lang 1995:53.

participial phrases, and are naturally taken as characters' judgment of their situation, for instance:[83]

> ἀφικνοῦνταί τε ἐπὶ Στράτον, πόλιν μεγίστην τῆς 'Ακαρνανίας, <u>νομίζοντες</u>, εἰ ταύτην πρώτην λάβοιεν, <u>ῥᾳδίως</u> σφίσι τἆλλα προσχωρήσειν.
>
> they arrived in front of Stratus, the biggest town in Acarnania, <u>thinking</u> that, if they captured this place first, the rest of the country would <u>easily</u> fall into their hands.
>
> (Th. 2.80.8)

Thoughts represented in this way turn out almost always to be miscalculations, and so participial *nomízontes* clauses are frequently used ironically.[84]

In the present example the internally focalized thought occurs in an otherwise not particularly mimetic passage. Similarly, in the account of the battle of Mantinea, which, as I argued (section 4), is diegetically presented, the narrative briefly (5.71.3) adopts the point of view of the Lacedaemonian king Agis in his deliberations concerning a crucial strategic aspect of the battle; this passage, too, has a present participle *nomízōn* "considering." Such passages alone would suggest that point of view in Thucydides is more complicated than a simple alternance of the viewpoints of the historian and of the observer. But more importantly, the Lacedaemonians' judgment or king Agis's deliberations are hardly observations, or the pretense of them, as in the description of the soldiers' experience during the Syracusan harbor battle or the Athenians' despair at the beginning of Book Eight. Whereas those passages depend for their effect on our adopting the Athenians' viewpoint at the moment, the participial clause in the example just quoted is effective precisely because we *know more* than

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[83] See also Th. 1.57.5, 127.1; 2.2.4; 3.94.2; 4.2.4, 8.4 (ἐλπίζοντες); 6.33.3 (ἡγούμενοι); 7.84.2 (οἰόμενοι); 8.25.5; in other cases the represented thought depends on a finite imperfect verb ἤλπιζον: 4.24.4, 76.5, or is modified by the modal verb μέλλειν, a linguistic sign of free indirect discourse—see Bakker 1997c as well as Wakker in this volume (Chapter 6). Only in two cases do we find aorist verbal forms for the thought that something was "easy" (2.3.2 ἐνόμισαν; 6.96.1 νομίσαντες); in both cases the thought was more factual and less subjective (notice the negation at 6.96.1).

[84] See also Connor 1984:112. Dramatic irony presupposes of course the knowledge of the narrator and his public *post factum*, but the mistaken thought or action of the protagonist can still be either *shown* or *told*. The latter seems to be the case at Hdt. 1.75.2 <u>ἐλπίσας</u> πρὸς ἑωυτοῦ τὸν χρησμὸν εἶναι, ἐστρατεύετο ἐπὶ τὴν Περσέων μοῖραν "<u>supposing</u> [aor. ptc.] that the oracle was in his favor, [Croesus] marched against the Persians", where we seem to be told not *what* Croesus thought but that he had the *wrong* thought. See also Sicking 1996:57.

the protagonists whose judgment is shown—not told—to be erroneous.

Thus although participial clauses as the one just quoted represent characters' thoughts in narratological terms, the historian's mediating presence is clearly felt. Passages representing characters' thought, then, seem to be a way of presentation that cuts across the two modes discussed in sections 4 and 5. They constitute neither the discourse of a knower nor of an observer but that of a storyteller who routinely ascribes motives and intentions to the actors of his narrative. His account of the war is not only a recording—diegetically or mimetically—of the events, but also of the psychology of those involved in them. Such a technique of presentation befits the work of a historian who considers "human nature" to be the paradigmatic element that ascertains the relevance for the future of the account of the past.[85]

7. *Conclusion*

In this chapter I have tried to discuss Thucydides' use of the narrative tenses in terms of the way in which speakers situate themselves vis-à-vis the reality they have in mind. This led to the observation that in addition to the dimension of tense and temporal reference (present versus past) there is a second dimension in which verbal morphology might have a function, the relative distance of events: "near" or "far." This second dimension, in which knowledge and reference recede in favor of such experiential concepts as perception and memory, is particularly relevant for the discourse of speakers that reflects their involvement in the reality surrounding them. These two dimensions were then used to characterize two modes of narrative presentation in Thucydides, one in which knowledge is the central modality, and one that is primarily characterized by observation. In this second, mimetic mode, the opposition between "far" and "near" takes the form of a description of events as if they are seen on the one hand, and the historian's intrusions in it on the other. When he intrudes, the imperfect verbs expressing the events seen temporarily yield to aorists.

The discussion has thus been concerned with two main subjects: Thucydides' techniques of narrative presentation on the one hand,

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[85] Th. 1.22.4.

and tense/aspect on the other. My treatment of each of these two subjects has deliberate limitations that are meant to make them interrelated. First, in itself there is nothing new in the observation that Thucydides may present events mimetically, as if seen on the spot: perceptive readers have observed this from antiquity onwards. I have been concerned not so much with the phenomenon per se as with its relation to tense. But my discussion of tense is incomplete for the same reason: in the preceding argument I am interested not in tense per se but in its relation to point of view and narrative presentation. The two concerns are thus interlocking, and together constitute a case of grammar and interpretation in service of each other. Further research is necessary to determine to what extent the observations made, if valid, are a matter of the Greek language as such or of Thucydides' specific use of it in the written medium. What seems clear at any rate is that grammar is an important aspect in the study of how the three perspectives of historian, observer, and character interact in the shaping of Thucydides' narrative.

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CHAPTER TWO

INTERPRETING ADJECTIVE POSITION IN HERODOTUS

Helma Dik

Introduction

In Herodotus 1.53.3, the oracle of Delphi tells Croesus that if he goes to war against the Persians, he will destroy "a great empire" (*megálēn arkhḗn*). It is only later that he will find out, to his detriment, just *which* empire the oracle refers to. A few chapters further on in the *Histories*, we read about Pisistratus's second attempt to secure power in Athens. As part of a brilliantly staged piece of deception, heralds proclaim (1.60.5) that Athena herself is bringing Pisistratus home, and the Athenians are urged to receive him "with good will" (*agathôi nóōi*).

What is the point of these two examples? At first sight, neither sentence is particularly remarkable for its grammar or problematic in its interpretation. The adjective-noun combinations quoted in the Greek will not raise any eyebrows either. This may have prompted Bergson's use of precisely these examples in order to illustrate the "banal" value of the adjective in these noun phrases, in which, he claims, no logical or emotional emphasis attaches to the adjective.[1]

In this paper I will evaluate the merits of this claim, and eventually propose an interpretation that is virtually the opposite of Bergson's. Sceptical readers may well wonder whether it is at all possible to reach any definite conclusions. My response can only be to ask for their patience, and one shared premise: the simple fact that there exists variation between adjective-noun and noun-adjective ordering in Herodotus—and, for that matter, in Greek in general—justifies an attempt to account for the distribution of these alternative orderings in the text.

But before I can present a convincing argument for an alternative interpretation of my two initial examples, some foundations will need

[1] See Bergson 1960:65. Banaler Wert des Adjektivs—"ohne irgendeine logisch (durch Antithese u. dgl.) oder affektiv bedingte Hervorhebung."

to be laid. First of all, I will give a brief outline of Bergson's description of adjective position. Next, I will say a few words about methodology and present the data upon which I base my own account of adjective position in Herodotus. I will then introduce my alternative proposal and in my conclusion return to the two examples above.

Bergson and the Semantic Explanation

The scholar looking for literature on the position of the adjective in Greek will find that the most recent publications on the subject are now thirty years old. In what follows I will mainly take issue with Bergson's study, *Zur Stellung des Adjektivs in der älteren griechischen Prosa*,[2] which follows closely the ideas of Marouzeau on the position of the adjective in Latin.[3] Since Marouzeau's study, however, scholarship has moved on, and the peculiar situation has arisen that where Marouzeau has been superseded for Latin,[4] no attention, as far as I know, has been paid to Greek adjective position in the past thirty years.[5]

At the basis of Bergson's description lies Marouzeau's categorization of adjectives on semantic grounds. The main dichotomy is that between quantifying and qualifying adjectives on the one hand and determining adjectives on the other. This is not the place to go into the precise definitions of the categories advocated, but just to give an idea, *mégas* "big" is a quantifying adjective, *agathós* "good" is a qualifying adjective, and *Hellēnikós* "Greek" is a determining adjective. Below I will merely take adjectives from both main categories recognized by Marouzeau and later evaluate the need for categorization that is claimed. What is important here is the contention that adjectives belonging to different semantic categories follow different ordering rules. Bergson's proposal for Greek can be schematized as follows:[6]

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[2] Bergson 1960.

[3] See Marouzeau 1922.

[4] See the remarks, and references, in Pinkster 1990:163–88.

[5] Brunel 1964 came to my attention too late to fully incorporate a discussion of his analysis. One main point in which I find myself in agreement with Brunel against Bergson is the "importance propre" he attributes to the preposed adjective. I will not follow his analysis of "synthetic" vs. "analytic" construction of the noun phrase.

[6] See Bergson 1960:167–68.

I "Determining" adjectives *follow* their nouns, unless:
a. they are used as qualifying adjectives, or
b. they have contrastive emphasis.
(and they will also follow if they are non-contrastively emphatic)

II "Qualifying" and "quantifying" adjectives *precede* their nouns, unless:
a. they are used as determining adjectives;
b. they have non-contrastive emphasis; or
c. they are unemphatically added as afterthought.
(and they will also precede if contrastive)

Leaving aside for the moment the question whether the rules above give the right predictions, a few problems will immediately be apparent.

The first problem is the "loophole" provided by the possibility of recategorizing adjectives on an *ad hoc* basis. No matter how well-founded the individual instances of such recategorization, this runs counter to the whole idea of a semantic categorization: if "category membership" can change on the basis of the context, then most probably pragmatics, and not semantics, lies at the basis of the phenomenon in question.

Secondly, there is the concept of "emphasis," used by both Bergson and Marouzeau. By an accident of history, Dover's book about Greek word order came also out in 1960, with salutary words of warning about the misuse of this term.[7] Fortunately, the recent history of linguistics has seen a lot of interest in pragmatics, and we are now equipped with a better theoretical apparatus to handle many finer distinctions formerly subsumed under the term "emphasis." I will be using terminology from the theory of Functional Grammar (FG),[8] replacing the term "emphasis" (or some uses of it) with "Focus," defined as the most salient element in a clause.[9] Contrast is a parameter in its own right, which will prove to be an important factor in ordering.

However, there are two further problems that are even more pressing, because they are central to Bergson's claim. One of them is the question whether it can be shown conclusively that it is really necessary to postulate two different default orderings for the two categories of

[7] See Dover 1960:32–34.
[8] The standard reference for FG as a theory is Simon C. Dik 1989, where references to earlier work within the theory can be found. In Dik 1995 I discuss the pragmatic framework of FG at greater length.
[9] [Editor's note: see also the contribution of Slings (Chapter 5), who in the introduction to his two essays cites the definition of Focus proposed by (S. C.) Dik.]

adjectives. I will argue below that the data from Herodotus do not call for such a dichotomy. Finally, it is important to mention an element that so far has been conspicuously absent from this discussion. As Dover already noted in his review of Bergson, one half of the equation is being ignored, viz. the status of the noun with which the adjective forms a phrase. Consider the simple English example "a red circle and . . .," which could be continued with "a *blue* one" or with "a red *square*." In the first case, it is the adjectives that are contrastive, in the second, it is the nouns. Or, as Dover puts it: "In order to answer the question 'why does this word come at this point in this group?' we should ask not 'what part of speech is it?' but (1) 'what element of the sense of the whole group does it communicate, and what is the order of communication in the group?' (. . .)."[10] The following remark in a recent article may serve to illustrate how the importance of the noun is often overlooked: *déspoinan tȇn emȇn* "my mistress" at Hdt. 1.8.3 prompts the following comment: "[Gyges] stresses that she is his *own* mistress" (original emphasis).[11] Surely, Gyges is most worried about the fact that the woman concerned is his *mistress*, and not, or at least not yet, his *wife*.

Fig. 1: *Interpreting adjective position with Bergson*[12]



[10] Dover 1961:837.
[11] Cairns 1996:78.
[12] See Bergson 1960:167–68. AN: Adjective-Noun order; Q: Quantifying or qualifying adjective; D: Determining adjective.

By way of conclusion to this section, I would like to point out that Bergson's schema is of scant predictive value. No ordering possibilities are excluded. This is even more apparent when one looks at it from the point of view of text-interpretation. In Figure 1 above, the representation is reversed: the graph shows what interpretations are possible if we find a particular case of adjective-noun, or noun-adjective order in a text. Every arrow can be read as "X (before arrow) can be interpreted as Y (after arrow)." The ensemble looks remarkably like the one thing a hypothesis should not be: unfalsifiable.

A New Look at the Data

This paper will be concerned with attributive adjectives in Herodotus.[13] This makes for a uniform corpus[14] of manageable size. Unlike Bergson, I include definite noun phrases as well as indefinite ones.[15] On the other hand, I do not include appositions and unambiguously predicative adjectives, as in the following example:

(1) ἀσπίδας δὲ κοίλας τὰς ἴτυς μεγάλας ἐχούσας

hollow shields with broad rims (lit. having the rims broad)

(Hdt. 7.89.3)

The subject of this paper is the *internal* order of noun phrases, so to speak, and since predicative and appositive adjectives are constituents in their own right, they cannot be analyzed by the same principles.[16]

For a number of frequent adjectives, I have collected all the instances of attributive use.[17] Looking at the set of instances for each adjective individually allows for a close comparison of the contexts in which we find adjective-noun order and those in which we find the opposite ordering pattern. This procedure allows us to ignore in the first

[13] This paper was prepared using the text of Herodotus on TLG's CD-ROM D, and Conc (© Summer Institute of Linguistics), a concordance program.

[14] With the possible exception of quoted oracle texts, which I have not excluded.

[15] I fail to see why it is "irreführend" (Bergson 1960:9) to include definite noun phrases.

[16] Their position should be analyzed at the level of the clause, not that of the constituent. For an analysis of Greek word order at the level of the clause, see Dik 1995.

[17] A surprisingly large number of adjectives, however, is scarcely used attributively. For example, δίκαιος turned out to be virtually useless for my purposes here, yielding only eight instances of attributive use.

instance the claims about the importance of *semantics* for adjective position, since we will concentrate on one adjective at a time, keeping the "semantics parameter" constant. On the other hand, if the semantic distinction is indeed relevant, then this will be borne out by a comparison of the figures for determining and qualifying adjectives. Consider now the following tables, in which words in double quotes (e.g., "marked") correspond with Bergson's categories:

Fig. 2: *Some attributive adjectives in Herodotus and their position in the noun phrase*

Type of adjective	*adjective*	*adj-noun order*	*noun-adj order*
"DETERMINING"		"marked"	"normal"
nationality	Ἑλληνικός	18	13
	Μηδικός	11	11
	ἐπιχώριος	10	20
material	λίθινος	3	10
	ξύλινος	14	12
precious metal	χρύσεος	12	41
	ἀργύρεος	4	10
color	λευκός	7	14
TOTAL		79	131

Type of adjective	*adjective*	*adj-noun order*	*noun-adj order*
"QUALIFYING"		"normal"	"marked"
size	μέγας	42	228
	(σ)μικρός	1	19
	μακρός	5	12
quality	δίκαιος/ἄδικος	4	4
	ἀγαθός	1	33
	δόκιμος	3	23
	κάλλιστος	3	21
	θωμάσιος/θωμαστός	0	4
		6	16
TOTAL		65	360

Although these tables are far from being a complete collection, or even from being a representative sample, a look at the totals for adjective-noun and noun-adjective ordering shows that both for determining and for qualifying/quantifying adjectives, noun-adjective order prevails. The labels "normal" and "marked," corresponding with Bergson's descriptions, are clearly not borne out by the data, although these are, admittedly, merely quantitative.

It is now time to become a little more constructive, and present an alternative proposal for the description of adjective position in the noun phrase. The main point will by now be obvious. I propose to recognize *one* default ordering for all categories of adjectives: they follow the noun. The consequence of this is that for every *preposed* adjective, we will have to argue why it can be interpreted as marked in the context. Postposed adjectives, on the other hand, are supposed to be unmarked, and should not be the most salient part of the noun phrase.[18] Besides the quantitative data presented above, I think it is appropriate here to point out that a general cognitive principle can be invoked as an explanation for the tendency to put marked elements earlier than unmarked ones: "Attend first to the most urgent task."[19] Urgency can here take the form of information given by the speaker or writer that runs counter to the addressee's expectations or that the speaker/hearer judges to be the most important new information in a unit.

The question now arises how we can evaluate the merits of this description. With looking at isolated examples like the two that opened this paper, clearly we cannot make much progress. What we will do instead is look at the total set of instances of a particular adjective, and see if we can indeed describe preposing as an expression of pragmatic markedness. In the specific adjectives to be discussed I will follow Bergson's categorization, starting with examples of determining adjectives.

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[18] There is one exception to this rule. When the Topic of a clause is expressed as a noun, and the Focus as an adjective in the same noun phrase, the ordering will be Topic-Focus, or noun-adjective. Elsewhere I have argued (Dik 1995:14) that this is the case in sentences like the following: ᾧ δὲ μάλιστα ἡμῶν προύχουσιν, <u>ἵππους τε πολλοὺς</u> κέκτηνται καὶ <u>σίτῳ οἰκείῳ καὶ οὐκ ἐπακτῷ</u> χρῶνται (Th. 6.20.4). Note that the adjectives take Focus position in the sentence, immediately preceding the predicate.

[19] Givón 1983:20.

"Determining" Adjectives

A. *Nationality*. *Ethnica* are typical examples of determining adjectives. I have looked at *Hellēnikós* "Greek," *Mēdikós* "Median," and *epikhṓrios* "native," "local." Looking at the first table we see that *Hellēnikós* is more often preposed than it is postposed. This is less damaging to Bergson's thesis that determining adjectives of this type are normally postposed than it seems at first sight, since one of the recurrent motifs in the *Histories* is the contrast between Greek and barbarian.[20] Thus we can hardly expect to find *Hellēnikós* as an "innocent" determining adjective in Herodotus. Let us consider two instances of *Hellēnikós* in context:

(2) τὴν γὰρ ἐξ Ἐφέσου ἐς Σάρδις ὁδὸν δεῖ προσλογίσασθαι ταύτῃ. καὶ δὴ λέγω σταδίους εἶναι τοὺς πάντας ἀπὸ <u>θαλάσσης τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς</u> μέχρι Σούσων (. . .) τεσσεράκοντα καὶ τετρακισχιλίους καὶ μυρίους·

The journey from Ephesus to Sardis must be added to that. So I say that the total distance from <u>the Greek sea</u> to Susa (. . .) is fourteen thousand and forty stages.

(Hdt. 5.54.1)

(3) μετὰ ὦν τὴν διάνοιαν ταύτην αὐτίκα ἀπεπειρᾶτο τῶν μαντηίων τῶν τε ἐν Ἕλλησι καὶ τοῦ ἐν Λιβύῃ, διαπέμψας ἄλλους ἄλλῃ, τοὺς μὲν ἐς Δελφοὺς ἰέναι, τοὺς δὲ ἐς Ἄβας τὰς Φωκέων, τοὺς δὲ ἐς Δωδώνην· οἱ δέ τινες ἐπέμποντο παρά τε Ἀμφιάρεων καὶ παρὰ Τροφώνιον, οἱ δὲ τῆς Μιλησίης ἐς Βραγχίδας· ταῦτα μέν νυν <u>τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ μαντήια</u> ἐς τὰ ἀπέπεμψε μαντευσόμενος Κροῖσος· Λιβύης δὲ παρὰ Ἄμμωνα ἀπέστειλε ἄλλους χρησομένους.

Upon this decision, he immediately proceeded to test the Greek and Libyan oracles, sending messengers separately to Delphi, to Abac in Phocia, and to Dodona, while others again were dispatched to Amphiaraus and Trophonius, and others to Branchidae in the Milesian country. These are <u>the Greek oracles</u> to which Croesus sent for divination; in Libya, he sent others to consult the oracle of Ammon.

(Hdt. 1.46)

In (2) the adjective *Hellēnikês* "Greek" is postposed. There is no reason why it should be contrastive or otherwise salient here. Ephesus, mentioned just before, lies on this coast.[21] In (3) the "Greek oracles" are only one group of oracles consulted by Croesus; accordingly, preposed *Hellēniká* contrasts with *Libúēs dé* "in Libya" in the next

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[20] See Hartog 1980.

[21] The combination noun-article-adjective, instead of more "regular" article-noun-

sentence. It is this contrast that explains the prominent preposed position of the adjective. Consider also:

(4) φανεροὶ δέ εἰσι καὶ οἱ Σκύθαι διώξαντες αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐσβαλόντες ἐς <u>γῆν τὴν Μηδικήν</u>, ἁμαρτόντες τῆς ὁδοῦ· οἱ μὲν γὰρ Κιμμέριοι αἰεὶ τὴν παρὰ θάλασσαν ἔφευγον, οἱ δὲ Σκύθαι ἐν δεξιῇ τὸν Καύκασιν ἔχοντες ἐδίωκον ἐς οὗ ἐσέβαλον ἐς <u>γῆν τὴν Μηδικήν</u>, ἐς μεσόγαιαν τῆς ὁδοῦ τραφθέντες. οὗτος δὲ ἄλλος ξυνὸς Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ βαρβάρων λεγόμενος λόγος εἴρηται.

It is clear that the Scythians pursued them and invaded <u>Media</u>, missing their way; for the Cimmerians ever fled by the way of the coast, and the Scythians pursued with the Caucasus on their right till where they came into <u>the Median land</u>, turning inland on their way.

(Hdt. 4.12)

(5) ξεινικὰ δὲ νόμαια Πέρσαι προσίενται ἀνδρῶν μάλιστα. καὶ γὰρ δὴ <u>τὴν Μηδικὴν ἐσθῆτα</u> νομίσαντες τῆς ἑωυτῶν εἶναι καλλίω φορέουσι καὶ ἐς τοὺς πολέμους τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους θώρηκας.

Of all men the Persians most welcome foreign customs. They wear <u>the Median dress</u>, deeming it more beautiful than their own, and the Egyptian cuirass in war.

(Hdt. 1.135)

In (4) the adjective *Mēdikēn* "Median" is postposed much like *Hellēnikēs* in (2); that it is this territory that is invaded by the Scythians is obvious from the context. By contrast, in (5), Median dress is contrasted with *tēs heōutōn* "their own." Similarly, later in the same sentence *Aiguptious* "Egyptian" precedes its noun. Here the contrast is left implicit but clearly (*tous*) *heōutōn* "their own (cuirass)" can be understood.

In some cases it is difficult if not impossible to establish with absolute certainty that contrastive emphasis has indeed been intended. However, the numbers in themselves are an indication that preposing of the adjective is the marked option. This leads me to expect that even in cases where the motive for preposing is not glaringly obvious, an explanation for the salience of the adjective can be found in the context, for example:

(6) ἔλεγον δὲ οἱ ἀπονοστήσαντες οὗτοι τῶν βαρβάρων, ὡς ἐγὼ πυνθάνομαι, ὡς πρὸς τούτοισι καὶ ἄλλα ὥρων θεῖα· <u>δύο γὰρ ὁπλίτας μεζόνως ἢ κατὰ</u>

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article-adjective, is another indication that the adjective has been added as an afterthought rather than that it was indispensable in the first place.

ἀνθρώπων φύσιν ἔχοντας ἕπεσθαί σφι κτείνοντας καὶ διώκοντας. τούτους δὲ τοὺς δύο Δελφοὶ λέγουσι εἶναι ἐπιχωρίους ἥρωας, Φύλακόν τε καὶ Αὐτόνοον...

Those of the foreigners who returned said, as I have been told, that they had seen other signs of heaven's working besides: two hoplites of stature greater than human had followed them, slaying them in pursuit. These two, say the Delphians, were the native heroes Phylacus and Autonous...

(Hdt. 8.38–9)

Here I think the explanation for the adjective-noun order lies in the fact that the concept expressed by *hḗrōas* "heroes" can be deduced from the previous context: hoplites who were larger than humans. One could say that the question to be settled was the precise identity of this supernatural intercession, and that the Delphians claimed the heroes as theirs. By contrast, an expression such as *katà nómous toùs epikhōríous* "according to local custom" (e.g., Hdt. 1.35) is not much different from *katà toùs nómous* "according to custom," and clearly the noun, not the adjective, is the essential element of the phrase.

B. *Material.* Turning now to adjectives denoting material, we consider the following contrastive pair:

(7) ἐν δὲ Πλαταιῇσι οἱ Πέρσαι, ὡς ἐτράποντο ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ἔφευγον οὐδένα κόσμον ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον τὸ ἑωυτῶν καὶ ἐς τὸ τεῖχος τὸ ξύλινον τὸ ἐποιήσαντο ἐν μοίρῃ τῇ Θηβαΐδι.

But at Plataeae, the Persians being routed by the Lacedaemonians fled in disorder to their own camp and to the wooden fort that they had made in the lands of Thebes.

(Hdt. 9.65)

(8) τὴν ταχίστην ἐτρόχαζε φεύγων οὔτε ἐς τὸ ξύλινον τεῖχος οὔτε ἐς τὸ Θηβαίων τεῖχος ἀλλ' ἐς Φωκέας, ...

He fled with all speed not to the wooden fort nor to the Thebans' fort, but to Phocis.

(Hdt. 9.66.3)

These two instances are very similar. In both cases, the same wooden fort is referred to; however, the adjective *xúlinon* is postposed in (7) and preposed in (8). Can we still discern a difference between the two orderings? The difference is certainly less clear-cut than that between the instances compared above, but I would suggest that the replacing Focus construction (*oúte es tò xúlinon teîkhos oúte. . . all' es*

Phōkéas "not to the wooden wall, nor. . . , but to the Phocians") in (8) provides at least part of the explanation.[22]

However, not all instances of preposed *xúlinon* can be attributed to contrast. Curiously, the exceptions have to do with another *xúlinon teîkhos*, viz. the "wooden wall" of which the oracle predicted that it would save Athens from being overcome by the Persians. In the following example this wall is mentioned twice:

(9) ἡ γὰρ ἀκρόπολις τὸ πάλαι τῶν Ἀθηναίων ῥηχῷ ἐπέφρακτο. οἱ μὲν δὴ [κατὰ τὸν φραγμὸν] συνεβάλλοντο τοῦτο τὸ ξύλινον τεῖχος εἶναι· οἱ δ' αὖ ἔλεγον τὰς νέας σημαίνειν τὸν θεόν, καὶ ταύτας παραρτέεσθαι ἐκέλευον τὰ ἄλλα ἀπέντας. τοὺς ὦν δὴ τὰς νέας λέγοντας εἶναι τὸ ξύλινον τεῖχος ἔσφαλλε τὰ δύο τὰ τελευταῖα ῥηθέντα ὑπὸ τῆς Πυθίης·

The acropolis of Athens had in the past been fenced by a thorn hedge, and they concluded that this was the wooden wall. But others said their ships were meant by the god, and urged to equip these and leave everything else. Those who held the ships were the wooden wall were stumped by the last two verses spoken by the Pythia.

(Hdt. 7.142)

How can we explain this fixed ordering (which recurs at 8.51)? I think that *xúlinon* "wooden" is presented as the main clue to the "riddle" posed by the oracle, which we might paraphrase as: "Your only viable line of defense is made of wood."[23] Thus, the preposing of *xúlinon* is due not to contrast, but to the fact that it is the most salient word of the noun phrase.

To conclude this section, I quote an example that illustrates how the relative importance of nouns and verbs can fluctuate in only a couple of sentences:

(10) καὶ τούτων χίλιοι μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖσι δόρασι ἀντὶ τῶν σαυρωτήρων ῥοιὰς εἶχον χρυσέας καὶ πέριξ συνεκλήιον τοὺς ἄλλους, οἱ δὲ εἰνακισχίλιοι ἐντὸς τούτων ἐόντες ἀργυρέας ῥοιὰς εἶχον· εἶχον δὲ χρυσέας ῥοιὰς καὶ οἱ ἐς τὴν γῆν τρέποντες τὰς λόγχας, καὶ μῆλα οἱ ἄγχιστα ἑπόμενοι Ξέρξῃ.

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[22] The construction "not A, but B" is here complicated because the first half is made up of οὔτε . . . οὔτε. For further discussion see Dik 1995, section 3.2.

[23] Incidentally, the order cannot be explained as a literal quote of the oracle text, which has τεῖχος Τριτογενεῖ ξύλινον διδοῖ εὐρύοπα Ζεύς. Here the position of ξύλινον (immediately preceding the verb, as a case of hyperbaton) is also very prominent. I am grateful to David Sider for drawing my attention to the problem of quoted oracle texts when I presented an earlier version of this paper at the APA annual meeting of 1995.

> Of these, a thousand men bore golden pomegranates on their spear shafts in place of the spike, and surrounded the rest; the nine thousand were enclosed within, and bore silver pomegranates; they that held their spears reversed carried golden pomegranates also, and they that were nearest to Xerxes, apples.
>
> (Hdt. 7.41)

In the first phrase it is the noun *rhoiàs* "pomegranates" that is contrasted (see *antì tō̂n saurōtḗrōn* "instead of spikes"), and the adjective *khruséa* "golden" is a noncontrastive piece of additional information. Then the next army contingent is introduced, and they have *silver*, not *golden* pomegranates: now it is the adjective that carries the contrast, and so precedes the noun. But Herodotus has forgotten to mention another contingent with *golden* pomegranates (*eîkhon dè khruséas rhoiàs kaì hoi* . . . "but *golden* pomegranates were holding those who . . ."), which explains the position of the second *khruséas*. Finally, *mē̂la* "apples" are the privilege of those nearest to Xerxes (on account of their size?).

"Quantifying" Adjectives

In this section I will start with *makrós* "long." This adjective is not very frequent in its attributive use, which will allow us to discuss all the instances in which it is preposed. Two of these are rather straightforward:

(11) ἐν γὰρ τῷ μακρῷ χρόνῳ πολλὰ μὲν ἔστι ἰδεῖν τὰ μή τις ἐθέλει, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ παθεῖν.

> In the long time (a man lives), he may see much he dislikes, and suffer many things.
>
> (Hdt. 1.32.2)

(12) ὅκως δὲ οὗτοι Μήδων ἄποικοι γεγόνασι, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἔχω ἐπιφράσασθαι, γένοιτο δ' ἂν πᾶν ἐν τῷ μακρῷ χρόνῳ.

> How they came to be colonists of the Medes, I cannot understand, but all is possible in the long term.
>
> (Hdt. 5.9.3)

Whether or not *en tō̂i makrō̂i khrónōi* "in the long time" is a fixed expression, it is understandable why the adjective is preposed: anything can happen in the *long* term. The other examples of *makrós* are more intriguing. They concern warships. We know that the Greek

for warships is literally "long ship," but where does the adjective go? Herodotus shows variation, but I want to argue that the variation is not random. Consider the following examples:

(13) αὐτὸς μὲν ὑμῖν οὐ φερέγγυός εἰμι δύναμιν παρασχεῖν τοσαύτην ὥστε κατάγειν ἀεκόντων τῶν τὴν πόλιν ἐχόντων Ναξίων· πυνθάνομαι γὰρ ὀκτακισχιλίην ἀσπίδα Ναξίοισι εἶναι καὶ <u>πλοῖα μακρὰ</u> πολλά.

For myself, it lies not in my rights to give you such a power as will restore you, against the will of the Naxians who hold your city; for I am assured that the Naxians have eight thousand men that bear shields, and many <u>ships of war</u>.

(Hdt. 5.30.4)

(14) οἱ γὰρ δὴ Θάσιοι, οἷα ὑπὸ Ἱστιαίου τε τοῦ Μιλησίου πολιορκηθέντες καὶ προσόδων ἐουσέων μεγαλέων ἐχρέωντο τοῖσι χρήμασι <u>νέας</u> τε ναυπηγεόμενοι <u>μακρὰς</u> καὶ τεῖχος ἰσχυρότερον περιβαλλόμενοι.

The Thasians, inasmuch as they had been besieged by Histiaeus of Miletus and had great revenues, had used their wealth to build their <u>ships of war</u> and build themselves a stronger wall.

(Hdt. 6.46.2)

These two examples represent the normal pattern. The adjective is unmarked and follows the noun. Note that we find ourselves in a war context: *aspída* "shield" in (13), and *poliorkēthéntes* "having been besieged" in (14). But now consider the next two examples:

(15) μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀπεπειρᾶτο ὁ Δαρεῖος τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὅ τι ἐν νόῳ ἔχοιεν, κότερα πολεμέειν ἑωυτῷ ἢ παραδιδόναι σφέας αὐτούς. διέπεμπε ὦν κήρυκας ἄλλους ἄλλῃ τάξας ἀνὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, κελεύων αἰτέειν βασιλέϊ γῆν τε καὶ ὕδωρ. τούτους μὲν δὴ ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἔπεμπε, ἄλλους δὲ κήρυκας διέπεμπε ἐς τὰς ἑωυτοῦ δασμοφόρους πόλις τὰς παραθαλασσίους, κελεύων <u>νέας τε μακρὰς</u> καὶ ἱππαγωγὰ πλοῖα ποιέεσθαι.

After this, Darius tried to find out what the Greeks were planning, whether they were going to fight or surrender themselves. So he sent heralds all over Hellas, telling them to demand earth and water for the king. These he sent to Hellas, and others he sent to his own tributary states to order <u>ships of war</u> and transports for horses to be built.

(Hdt. 6.48)

(16) οἱ μὲν γὰρ νέας παρείχοντο, οἱ δὲ ἐς πεζὸν ἐτετάχατο, τοῖσι δὲ ἵππος προσετέτακτο, τοῖσι δὲ ἱππαγωγὰ πλοῖα ἅμα στρατευομένοισι, τοῖσι δὲ ἐς τὰς γεφύρας <u>μακρὰς νέας</u> παρέχειν, τοῖσι δὲ σῖτά τε καὶ νέας.

Some supplied him with ships, others were enrolled in his infantry, some were charged with the provision of cavalry, others of horse bearing transport ships to follow the army, and others again of warships for the bridges, or of food and ships.

(Hdt. 7.21)

I have juxtaposed examples (15) and (16) on purpose. Example (15) is exactly like (13) and (14), in that the adjective follows; in (16), however, the adjective is preposed. I think the explanation for this can be found in the preceding phrase *hippagōgà ploîa* "horse bearing transport ships" in (16): the context is concerned with distinguishing between various types of vessel, so that the preposed position of the adjectives in both cases is explained by its contrastive function. The following *sîtá te kaì néas* "food and ships" may be interpreted as a third type of ship: a supply-vessel. The next two examples are the remaining instances with preposed *makrós*:

(17) μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Ἕλληνας αἰτίους τῆς δευτέρης ἀδικίης γενέσθαι. καταπλώσαντας γὰρ μακρῇ νηῒ ἐς Αἶάν τε τὴν Κολχίδα καὶ ἐπὶ Φᾶσιν ποταμόν, ἐνθεῦτεν, διαπρηξαμένους καὶ τἆλλα τῶν εἵνεκεν ἀπίκατο, ἁρπάσαι τοῦ βασιλέος τὴν θυγατέρα Μηδείην.

After that the Greeks were guilty of the second wrong. They sailed in a warship to Aea of the Colchians and the river Phasis, and when they had done the rest of the business for which they came, they carried off the king's daughter Medea.

(Hdt. 1.2.2–3)

(18) Αἰγινῆται δὲ (. . . .) τότε Θηβαίων δεηθέντων πόλεμον ἀκήρυκτον Ἀθηναίοισι ἐπέφερον. ἐπικειμένων γὰρ αὐτῶν Βοιωτοῖσι ἐπιπλώσαντες μακρῇσι νηυσὶ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν κατὰ μὲν ἔσυραν Φάληρον

At the Thebans' request the Aeginetans then made war on the Athenians without first sending a herald. When these were fighting the Boeotians, they sailed to Attica in warships and ravaged Phaleron.

(Hdt. 5.81)

Here it is not a matter of simple contrastiveness that can account for the preposed adjective. However, I would like to argue that the fact that both (17) and (18) describe unexpected acts of war has something to do with it. Notice further that the idea of "ships" is already conveyed by the immediately preceding participles (*kataplṓsantas* "having sailed" and *epiplṓsantes* "having sailed to"), so that without the preceding modifying adjectives the actual mentioning of ships would have been a needless addition.

We now turn to *mégas* "big," of which we have already seen one instance at the beginning of this paper. This adjective represents a large proportion of the cases examined here. The numbers allow for some safer generalizations than is the case with many less frequent adjectives. At the same time, it is difficult to evaluate the individual instances with one or the other order. Still, the material shows an interesting pattern in the type of nouns that tend to be modified by preposed adjectives as opposed to those that get only a few or none at all: Herodotus's use of *mégas* shows a general preference for postposing, but this tendency is strongest where *mégas* concerns the physical dimensions of things and places. I think this can be linked to the importance which the concepts described by these nouns typically have in Herodotus's narrative: geographical details, however impressive their size, will never take on a major role in the narrative. It is people and their actions that are more likely to be of interest to the narrative and hence to the narrator. Thus it comes as no surprise that we rarely find *mégas* preposed with nouns for mountains and rivers, even though there are many mountains and rivers in Herodotus that are called *mégas*. Exceptions in this category can be understood fairly easily. For example, *potamós* "river" is found only once with *mégas* preposed, and in this case *mégas* is in obvious contrast with "normal size:"[24]

(19) αὗται αἱ πᾶσαι οὐδ' ἕτεραι πρὸς ταύτῃσι προσγενόμεναι στρατηλασίαι μιῆς τῆσδε οὐκ ἄξιαι. τί γὰρ οὐκ ἤγαγε ἐκ τῆς 'Ασίης ἔθνος ἐπὶ τὴν 'Ελλάδα Ξέρξης; κοῖον δὲ πινόμενόν μιν ὕδωρ οὐκ ἐπέλιπε, πλὴν <u>τῶν μεγάλων ποταμῶν</u>;

All these armaments with others added to them could not together be compared with this single one. For what nation did not Xerxes lead from Asia against Hellas? What water did not fall short of the needs of his host, save only <u>the great rivers</u>?

(Hdt. 7.21)

Another common use for the contrastive adjective is of course in identifying one particular item in a group:

(20) ἐκ τούτων δὲ τῶν λίθων ἔφασαν τὴν πυραμίδα οἰκοδομηθῆναι τὴν ἐν μέσῳ τῶν τριῶν ἑστηκυῖαν, ἔμπροσθε <u>τῆς μεγάλης πυραμίδος</u>

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[24] Ποταμὸς (οὐ) μέγας: 1.179; 2.32; 3.117; 4.52, 178; 7.59, 200; πεδίον μέγα: 1.178; 2.75; 7.40, 59; ὄρος μέγα: 6.47; 7.22; λίμνη μεγάλη: 1.93; 2.29; 4.51, 52, 57, 109, 178.

> Of these stones they said the pyramid was built that stands midmost of the three, over against the great pyramid (Cheops's pyramid)
>
> (Hdt. 2.126)

By contrast, the temple mentioned in the following example is called the "great temple" by convention, not in order to distinguish it from any other in the context:[25]

(21) ἀνέθηκε δὲ καὶ ἀναθήματα ὁ Ἄμασις ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, τοῦτο μὲν ἐς Κυρήνην (. . .), τοῦτο δ' ἐς Σάμον τῇ Ἥρῃ εἰκόνας ἑωυτοῦ διφασίας ξυλίνας, αἳ ἐν τῷ νηῷ τῷ μεγάλῳ ἱδρύατο ἔτι καὶ τὸ μέχρις ἐμέο, ὄπισθε τῶν θυρέων.

> Moreover Amasis dedicated offerings in Hellas, in Cyrene for one, (. . .), and to Here in Samos two wooden statues of himself, which stood yet in my time in the great temple, behind the doors.
>
> (Hdt. 2.182)

At first sight, the following example is more puzzling, but its position in a concluding chapter on the magnificence of Samos may be the explanation. Perhaps we are to conclude that the spring is not just another spring, but a *really* big one:

(22) ἐμήκυνα δὲ περὶ Σαμίων μᾶλλον, ὅτι σφι τρία ἐστὶ μέγιστα ἁπάντων Ἑλλήνων ἐξεργασμένα (. . .)· διὰ παντὸς δὲ αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ὄρυγμα εἰκοσίπηχυ βάθος ὀρώρυκται, (. . .), δι' οὗ τὸ ὕδωρ (. . .) παραγίνεται ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἀγόμενον ἀπὸ μεγάλης πηγῆς·

> I have written thus at length about the Samians, because they are the makers of the three greatest works to be seen in any Greek land. [description of a big tunnel] Throughout its entire length there runs another channel (. . .) through which the water (. . .) reaches the city from an abundant spring.
>
> (Hdt. 3.60)

When we turn from physical objects to human emotions, *mégas* is still postposed in the vast majority of instances. The word *pénthos* or *pénthea* "affliction" occurs four times with *mégas* postposed and only once with *mégas* preposed. Do we have to conclude that in the latter case, the suffering was greater? Hardly. But it might not be accidental

[25] This is of course also the case with βασιλεὺς ὁ μέγας, standard appellation of the Persian "great king", and not motivated by the need to clarify which king is meant.

that it is Cyrus, and not a minor character in the narrative, who *méga pénthos epoiēsato* "mourned deeply."[26]

Another interesting subcorpus is formed by *khrēmata* "money." Money is of course an important factor in human motivation, and it is interesting to see how the two different orderings occur in Herodotus's narrative. As it turns out, the standard way to refer to riches is with the adjective postposed. In argumentative contexts, however, we are more likely to find the opposite order, *megála khrēmata*. Compare the straightforward narrative in (23) with the argumentative context in (24):[27]

(23) τοῦτον τὸν Ἀρίονα λέγουσι (. . .) ἐπιθυμῆσαι πλῶσαι ἐς Ἰταλίην τε καὶ Σικελίην, ἐργασάμενον δὲ <u>χρήματα μεγάλα</u> θελῆσαι ὀπίσω ἐς Κόρινθον ἀπικέσθαι.

They say that this Arion (. . .) formed the plan of voyaging to Italy and Sicily, and after he had earned a <u>fortune</u> he wished to return to Corinth. (Hdt. 1.24.1)

(24) οὕτω δὴ ἡ Ῥοδῶπις ἐλευθερώθη καὶ κατέμεινέ τε ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καὶ κάρτα ἐπαφρόδιτος γενομένη <u>μεγάλα</u> ἐκτήσατο <u>χρήματα</u> ὡς ἄλις εἶναι Ῥοδώπι, ἀτὰρ οὐκ ὥς γε ἐς πυραμίδα τοιαύτην ἐξικέσθαι. τῆς γὰρ τὴν δεκάτην τῶν χρημάτων ἰδέσθαι ἔστι ἔτι καὶ ἐς τόδε παντὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ, οὐδὲν δεῖ <u>μεγάλα</u> οἱ <u>χρήματα</u> ἀναθεῖναι.

Thus Rhodopis was set free and abode in Egypt, where, her charms becoming well known, she amassed <u>riches</u> so as to satisfy herself, but not for the building of such a pyramid. Since a tenth of her possession is still to be seen for anyone who so wishes, she cannot be credited with <u>great wealth</u>. (Hdt. 2.135)

Clearly, where Arion is credited with an unspecified fortune, the exact size of which is not at issue, Rhodopis may be very rich but the magnitude of her riches is found wanting.

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[26] Hdt. 2.1: Κῦρος αὐτός <u>τε</u> μέγα πένθος ἐποιήσατο <u>καὶ</u> τοῖσι ἄλλοισι προεῖπε πᾶσι τῶν ἦρχε "he himself mourned deeply and he made his subjects mourn also." Admittedly, the τε-καί construction may be of influence here as well. Of the other πένθος instances (1.46; 2.46, 66) only 1.46 concerns a major character, Croesus.

[27] Further examples: μέγας preceding χρήματα: 1.61.3 (where the Thebans exceed other cities); 7.164.2 (where Cadmus remains true to his promise despite the fortune at his disposal); I do not have an explanation for the adjective-noun order in 2.150; μέγας following χρήματα: 1.89; 2.135; 3.117, 134, 137; 4.1, 43; 5.6, 31; 7.29, 144; 8.105, 112.

However, the group of nouns that most frequently has *mégas* preposed are those referring to central concepts of the narrative, such as *érga* "deeds," *prégmata* "good fortune," or the activity of the historian himself, e.g., *tekmérion* "proof." I would argue that the large proportion of preposed *mégas* with precisely these words is a reflection of their importance. A typical example of a Herodotean *sententia* will suffice:[28]

(25) <u>μεγάλα</u> γὰρ <u>πρήγματα μεγάλοισι κινδύνοισι</u> ἐθέλει καταιρέεσθαι.

<u>Great successes</u> are not won save by <u>great risks</u>.

(Hdt. 7.50.3)

I will conclude this discussion of *mégas* with the instance I mentioned in the introduction:

(26) οἱ μὲν ταῦτα ἐπειρώτων, τῶν δὲ μαντηίων ἀμφοτέρων ἐς τὠυτὸ αἱ γνῶμαι συνέδραμον, προλέγουσαι Κροίσῳ, ἢν στρατεύηται ἐπὶ Πέρσας, <u>μεγάλην ἀρχήν</u> μιν καταλύσειν·

Such was their inquiry, and the judgment given to Croesus by each of the two oracles was the same,· that if he should send an army against the Persians he would destroy a <u>great empire</u>.

(Hdt. 1.53.3)

Croesus is told he will destroy a *megálēn arkhḗn* "great empire." I think the force of the adjective here lies in the fact that "great" is the only clue Croesus is given. What he should have asked, but of course did not, was *whose* empire was going to be destroyed.[29]

"Qualifying" Adjectives

As a final category we will consider so-called qualifying adjectives. Unfortunately, adjectives such as *agathós* "good," *díkaios* "just," *kakós* "bad," and the like are far more often used predicatively than as

[28] Further instances: 1.14, 59; 2.13, 104; 3.10; 7.18; 8.17. The only instance of preposed μικρός "small" is in the programmatic statement in 1.5.3: προβήσομαι ἐς τὸ πρόσω τοῦ λόγου, ὁμοίως <u>μικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἄστεα</u> ἀνθρώπων ἐπεξιών "I will proceed with my narrative, treating *small and great* cities alike".

[29] For a full version of the oracle, see Arist. *Rhet.* 1407^{a}39. It can of course be argued that Herodotus simply quoted an oracle from a no longer extant source with this word order, in which case this instance does not belong to the Herodotean

attributes. But we can still look at a small number of instances. I will start with *iskhurós* "strong:"

(27) κακότητος τοίνυν ἐγγινομένης ἐς τὰ κοινὰ ἔχθεα μὲν οὐκ ἐγγίνεται τοῖσι κακοῖσι, φιλίαι δὲ ἰσχυραί·

When evil comes into the public cause, the result is not enmity among the bad men, but close friendship.

(Hdt. 3.82.4)

(28) εἰ δὲ ποιήσεις τὰ ἡμεῖς παραινέομεν, ἔφασαν λέγοντες, ἕξεις ἀπόνως πάντα τὰ ἐκείνων ἰσχυρὰ βουλεύματα.

If you do as we say, they said, you will effortlessly overcome all their strong counsels of battle.

(Hdt. 9.2.2)

(29) οὐ μὲν οὐδὲ ἡ Φερετίμη εὖ τὴν ζόην κατέπλεξε. (. . .) ἀπέθανε κακῶς· ζώουσα γὰρ εὐλέων ἐξέζεσε, ὡς ἄρα ἀνθρώποισι αἱ λίην ἰσχυραὶ τιμωρίαι πρὸς θεῶν ἐπίφθονοι γίνονται.

Things didn't end well for Pheretime either. (. . .) She died a terrible death; as she was still living her body festered with worms; so wroth, it would seem, are the gods with over-violent human vengeance.

(Hdt. 4.205)

The order of adjective and noun is easily explained in these three instances. In (27), the noun *philíai* "friendships," opposed to preceding *ékhthea* "enmities," is the more salient part of the phrase and thus precedes the adjective. In (28) *iskhurà* "strong" has a concessive flavor that is also brought out by the addition of *apónōs* "without effort:" "however strong their stratagems may be, you will overcome them effortlessly." Finally, in (29), the adverb *líēn* "excessively" modifies *iskhuraí* "strong," making it clear that it is not vengeance in itself, but vengeance *in excess* that angers the gods.

Finally, let us turn to the qualifying adjective *par excellence*, *agathós* "good". This adjective shows a particularly skewed distribution. Most often it is used in the phrase *anḕr agathós* "good man". The ordering in this combination, fossilized in the noun *andragathía* "bravery," appears to be so fixed that it occurs even in contexts where we would by now expect the opposite order, for example:

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corpus in the strictest sense. However, in the case of the ξύλινον τεῖχος, the oracle itself had a different wording (see note 23). I conclude that if Herodotus adopted μεγάλην ἀρχήν from a source, the wording was at least acceptable in his "grammar."

(30) ταῦτα οὐδαμῶς ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔργα, ἀλλὰ πλεῖστον δὴ ἐν ὑμῖν ἐψεύσθημεν·

This is not the work befitting brave men, on the contrary, we are highly disappointed in you.

(Hdt. 9.48.3)

In fact, the only time we find *agathós* preposed is in the following example, which I briefly mentioned in the introduction as well:

(31) ὦ 'Αθηναῖοι, δέκεσθε ἀγαθῷ νόῳ Πεισίστρατον, τὸν αὐτὴ ἡ 'Αθηναίη τιμήσασα ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα κατάγει ἐς τὴν ἑωυτῆς ἀκρόπολιν.

Athenians, receive Pisistratus with good will, the man whom Athene herself honors above all other men and brings home to her own citadel.

(Hdt. 1.60.5)

As I mentioned, this example illustrates, for Bergson, the banal, unmarked use of the adjective. By now it will be clear that I want to argue for the contrary position. Since this is the only time that we find preposing of *agathós*, can we attach any meaningful interpretation to the position of the adjective here? In other words, can we reasonably describe it as contrastive or otherwise salient? I think we can. This extract comes from a point in the *Histories* where Herodotus describes Pisistratus's second attempt at seizing power in Athens, after having been ousted by the people at the first attempt. So there is something to be said for a contrastive interpretation of *agathôi nóôi* "with good will" here: "Please be kinder to him this time."

The Status of the Noun

In the introduction it was already pointed out that in analyzing individual instances of adjective position, we should not lose sight of the role of the noun which this adjective modifies. And in the preceding pages, we have seen a number of examples where it was the noun that was contrastive and therefore preceded the adjective. Here is an example of how a two-word noun phrase can vary in order according to the salience of either element in the context.

The noun phrases in question all contain the word *ánemos* "wind." This noun is frequently used to indicate geographical direction in conjunction with qualifications such as *boréēs* "northern," *nótios* "south-

ern," etc. The prevailing order for this usage is *boréēs* (etc.) *ánemos*, for example:[30]

(32) τούτων δ' ὑπεροικέουσι πρὸς βορέην ἄνεμον Μῆδοι

To their north live the Medians.

(Hdt. 4.37)

However, beside the abundant number of instances with this ordering, there are a few with *ánemos* as the first element. It turns out that in these cases we are not dealing with geographical directions, but with sudden gales, where knowledge about the direction they blow you is not immediately relevant:[31]

(33) καί μιν, ὡς πλέοντα γενέσθαι κατὰ Μαλέην, ὑπολαβεῖν ἄνεμον βορέην καὶ ἀποφέρειν πρὸς τὴν Λιβύην.

When in his course he was off Malea, a north wind caught and carried him away to Libya.

(Hdt. 4.179.2)

In sum, both orderings follow the same general rule: put the most salient element first in the noun phrase.

Conclusion

The data adduced in this paper have led me to one main conclusion: in interpreting Herodotus, it is a valid question to ask why a particular adjective has been preposed, and answers to that question can lie in its contrastive relationship with the context—these are the instances most easily explained—or in the importance of the information expressed in the adjective. For the latter category it is generally more difficult to "prove" the significance on the basis of the context, but I hope to have shown that careful examination often provides interesting answers. From the perspective of language production and rules of grammar, we can formulate the results as follows:[32]

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[30] See 1.6, 72, 148, 174; 2.28, 32, 101, 112, 153, 158; 3.97, 115, etc.

[31] See also 7.188; 8.196.

[32] Keeping in mind the caveat in note 18, and hyperbaton, which is the subject for a different paper altogether (Dik, in prep.).

a. When the adjective is not pragmatically marked, it will be post-posed.
b. When the adjective is contrastive or otherwise the most salient element of a noun phrase, it will be preposed.

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CHAPTER THREE

TOWARDS A RHETORIC OF ANCIENT SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE

Some Formal Characteristics of Greek Medical and Philosophical Texts (Hippocratic Corpus, Aristotle)

Philip J. van der Eijk

1. *The Scope of this Chapter*

How was scientific knowledge expressed and communicated in the ancient world?[1] What modes of verbal expression, technical idioms, stylistic registers, and literary genres were available to scientists in order to convey their views to their colleagues and their wider audiences? What rhetorical strategies did they employ to make their ideas

[1] In the title of this chapter, the word "rhetoric" is used to refer to a set of formal techniques and procedures for the production of texts (both oral and written), in particular for communicative purposes. "Discourse" is used (instead of "language," "text," or "writing") in order to cover both oral and written utterances and both semantic and pragmatic aspects of linguistic communication. As for "scientific," this is used throughout this article in a non-sophisticated, non-evaluative manner to refer to any serious attempt at studying and understanding the nature of things (or part thereof), and—as far as texts are concerned—to any verbal expression intended to communicate about this with an audience (I have considered substituting "scientific" by "technical," but the latter may suggest a stricter distinction between "technicians" and "laymen" than actually existed in antiquity). Of course I do not wish to claim that the texts in question meet the criteria of what would count as "scientific" in any modern sense of the word; and I am aware that there is no clear distinction between "science" and "philosophy" in antiquity, certainly not in the fifth and fourth century B.C.E. For practical reasons, my examples are chosen from Hippocratic and Aristotelian texts, but this is not to exclude from consideration texts on mathematics, geography, music, astronomy, and other ancient sciences. The only deliberate exclusion concerns historiography, not because this is not "scientific" but because historiographical texts are predominantly narrative and thus pose a number of problems that are quite different from argumentative texts—though obviously they, too, have their rhetorical strategies and their "messages" to convey. I am aware that not all scientific texts are intended to persuade an audience, that not all historiographical texts are narrative and that also non-scientific texts (e.g., epic poetry, tragedy) may contain sections in which scientific knowledge is communicated; a discussion of all these complicating factors is beyond the scope of this chapter (on didactic poetry, see Althoff 1995, Ch. 1).

intelligible, acceptable, or even fashionable? What were the circumstances in which they had to present their ideas, and what audio-visual means (writing facilities, diagrams, opportunities for live demonstration) did they have at their disposal? What were the interests and the expectations of their audiences, and how did these influence the actual form their writings took? In what respects did scientific language differ from "ordinary" and "literary" language? Was there such a thing as a scientific "discourse" in the ancient world?

These are interesting questions, but answers to them are not easily available. Although philosophical and scientific texts represent a major part of the surviving corpus of ancient Greek and Latin literature, surprisingly little systematic attention has been paid to the formal (i.e., linguistic and structural) characteristics they display. To be sure, separate studies into certain aspects of the language and style of individual authors (e.g., Aristotle),[2] the structure of individual writings,[3] or the features of certain genres (e.g., the *Lehrbuch* or the philosophical dialogue)[4] do exist. However, no attempt seems to have been made at looking into the formal characteristics all these texts have in common and the different species that can be discerned, let alone at writing a history of scientific discourse in the ancient world.[5]

To be sure, as a result of some recent developments in linguistics and the historiography of science (on which see section 2), the last two decades have seen a significant increase of attention to the forms of ancient scientific writing, especially among students of the Hippocratic Corpus, with some studies focusing on "strictly" linguistic and textual characteristics,[6] while others attempt to relate such characteristics to the wider context in which the texts were produced.[7] Yet the study of this is still in its infancy, and many fundamental problems remain to be dealt with. The present chapter aims at providing a rough outline of work, both done and to be done, in this area. It partly draws on the results of recent work already carried out by others or in progress, partly on the results of my own research.

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[2] See, e.g., Verdenius 1985; Schütrumpf 1989.

[3] E.g., Düring 1943.

[4] E.g., Fuhrmann 1960; Hirzel 1895.

[5] This is not to deprecate the importance of existing scholarship in this area, as will become clear from the references.

[6] E.g., García Novo 1995; Guillén 1992; López Eire 1992 and 1996; Hernández and Henríquez 1992; López Férez 1996; Pérez Cañizares 1995; Redondo 1996.

[7] E.g., Ducatillon 1977; Lloyd 1979; Althoff 1995.

As such it lays little claim to originality, let alone exhaustiveness; rather it intends, in a tentative and exploratory manner, to sketch the outlines of a research program which I believe to be promising and worth pursuing. After some preliminary observations, I shall first discuss some problems related to what may be called the setting, scene, and participants in scientific communication;[8] then I shall briefly deal with a number of formal issues on the levels of genre, mode of presentation, style, dialect, terminology, syntax (with particular reference to the phenomenon of topic-marking), structure and structuring devices, tone or "key" (focusing on the presence of the author and the audience in the text), commonplaces, modes of argument, and patterns of thought. Each of these issues would deserve a study in its own right, and my discussion may appear disappointingly brief and superficial; but my intention is merely to draw attention to them and to give an impression of some of the questions that may be further examined. For practical reasons, I shall concentrate on fifth and fourth century B.C.E. prose literature, mainly the Hippocratic Corpus and Aristotle.

2. *The Formal Analysis of Ancient Scientific Texts: Some Preliminary Observations*

The lack of scholarly attention to formal aspects of ancient scientific discourse would seem to be due, at least partly, to a number of rather unhelpful or just anachronistic categorizations, such as the distinction between "literary" and "non-literary" texts (or, in German, *Kunstprosa* versus *Sachprosa*), ambiguous stylistic characterizations such as "lecture notes" (which actually look quite different from what is referred to in German as *Notizenstil*, though the two are often equated), or vaguely defined genre-distinctions like the French *cours* versus *discours*[9] (or *essais* versus *ouvrages théoriques*, etc.).[10] Accordingly, the scholarly

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[8] For the meaning of these terms, see section 2.

[9] Jouanna 1984 and 1992:117, where *cours* is defined as "exposés didactiques, sortes de 'cours' s'adressant aux disciples ou aux spécialistes," *discours* as "sortes de conférences destinées à un public plus large." This distinction becomes immediately problematic insofar as works such as the Hippocratic *On the Art of Medicine* and *On Breaths*, which Jouanna regards as *discours*, have an emphatically didactic, schoolmasterly style.

[10] Maloney, Potter and Frohn 1979.

approach to scientific and philosophical texts has long been determined by a notion of style which is "aesthetic" rather than "functional." As a result, while "literary" forms of scientific and philosophical writing such as Plato's dialogues or Lucretius's didactic poetry have received ample attention, there has been little appreciation for the formal peculiarities of texts supposedly "hastily jotted down without stylistic pretensions," such as the Hippocratic *Epidemics* or the scholarly works of Aristotle.[11]

To be fair, the apparent lack of an appropriate theoretical apparatus has possibly made researchers hesitant to approach ancient scientific writings from a formal point of view. No ancient systematic theory of genres and stylistic levels of scientific writing has survived, and it is not certain whether it has ever existed (although from Middle Platonism onwards, and for medical writings at least since Galen, ancient theorists of language and interpretation have made some impressive attempts at such a systematization).[12] Hence it is not quite clear whether to describe these characteristics with the apparatus of classical rhetorical theory[13] (or with the aid of, say, Aristotle's dialectics) would be adequate in the sense of analyzing them in terms the ancient writers themselves would have adopted or were in fact consciously employing.

Finally there is the general neglect ancient "technical" writings have fallen victim to. Medical texts have long been ignored by classicists and left to historians of medicine and retired physicians, and the fate of mathematical and astronomical texts has not been much better. As a result, these writings have been studied almost exclusively with a view to their scientific or philosophical contents; their form was considered to be irrelevant to their interpretation and unimportant from a literary or linguistic point of view, since they were thought to lack any significant degree of linguistic or stylistic organization. The

[11] Cf. Palmer 1980:143: "The former (i.e.: the 'technical jottings for lecture notes' such as the Hippocratic *Epidemics*) have no stylistic pretensions.... Of greater literary interest are two works etc."

[12] See Mansfeld 1994; Sluiter 1995 (on Galen's views on the "scientific way of didactic writing," ἐπιστημονικὴ διδασκαλία); von Staden 1995a (on Galen's views on metaphor in scientific writing); Slings 1995 (on ancient views on the genre of the *protrepticus*).

[13] Thus Lausberg's *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik* excludes most of the philosophical and *a fortiori* scientific prose because of its supposedly non-aesthetic nature—although it has long been noted that much scientific writing in the classical world was influenced by rhetorical theory and that at least some aesthetic effects were intended to enhance the persuasiveness of their contents.

presupposition—sometimes, as in the case of Aristotle, based on ancient testimonies[14]—that the majority of these texts were not "published" for a larger audience but mainly circulated in small communities of professionals and pupils, has prompted the belief that there is nothing to be enjoyed in these writings from a formal, let alone literary point of view. They have been categorized or implicitly regarded as "cognitive," "referential," or "informative" texts in which, according to established models of linguistic communication,[15] the emphasis is on the contents rather than on the form or the participants in the communicative process, and whose predominant pragmatic function is to convey information about a particular subject-matter to a reader or a group of readers.

Only recently has a shift of approach to these texts occurred. First, general trends in the study of rhetoric and discourse analysis, in particular the study of "non-literary" texts such as advertisements, legal proceedings, minutes of meetings, political pamphlets, medical reports, etc.,[16] the study of rhetoric and persuasive strategies in apparently "neutral" scientific writings,[17] and the development of genre categories based on function rather than form[18] have led to a growing awareness among classicists that even such seemingly "inartistic," non-presumptuous prose writings as the extant works of Aristotle, the *Elements* of Euclid and the "notebook-like" Hippocratic *Epidemics* do have a form and structure which deserves to be studied in its own right, if only because they have set certain standards for the emergence and the subsequent development of the genre of the scientific treatise (*tractatus*) in Western literature. For example, it is clear to any student of Aristotle that, however impersonal the tone of his works may be and however careless the structure of his argument may appear, his writings nonetheless contain a hidden but undeniable rhetoric aimed at making the reader agree with his conclusions, e.g., in the subtle balance between confident explanation and seemingly

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[14] The best known passage is *Eudemian Ethics* 1217b22; for a discussion of this issue, see Flashar 1983:191, and Dirlmeier 1962:1–24.

[15] E.g., Jakobson's "sending-model" (Jakobson 1960).

[16] E.g., Kinneavy 1971; Toulmin 1958.

[17] Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Kruijger 1984; Braet and Berkenbosch 1989; Pera and Shea 1991; Pera 1994.

[18] For example Kinneavy's (1971) category of "reference discourse"—as distinct from "persuasive," "literary," and "expressive" discourse—and its subdivision into "scientific," "informative," and "exploratory" types of discourse. For an application of Kinneavy's views on ancient argumentative texts, see Schrijvers 1974.

genuine uncertainty, resulting in a careful alternation of dogmatic statements and exploratory suggestions.

Once such an awareness has been developed, however, a dilemma arises: on the one hand, the form and structure of scientific texts may, in each particular case, be seen as a deliberate creation or usage by an individual author, e.g., as part of a persuasive or didactic strategy aimed at making his message intelligible and palatable to his audience. Yet on the other hand, one need not go so far as to make strained efforts to ascribe an aesthetic dimension to texts which have traditionally been despised because of their supposed "lack of care" and "clumsy style."[19] It may prove more fruitful to examine to what extent the formal peculiarities of a scientific text are inspired, or even dictated, by factors which have to do with the specific (communicative) situation for which the text was intended and the conventions inherent in this situation. On this view, the particular formal characteristics of a scientific text may be said to be elements of a "grammar of scientific discourse," a system of rules and conditions pertaining to the possibilities that are available to the users of scientific language in order to present knowledge in a certain way, with a certain purpose, and for a certain audience. For to regard such devices as matters of *style* rather than grammar suggests too much of an "aesthetic," "optional" or "individual" component in a communicative process which may well obey, at least to a high degree, a number of rules and conventions.[20]

This is not to suggest a rigid determinism: even if one were to make the strong claim that the rules of such a discourse grammar are (at least theoretically) just as strict as those of traditional sentence grammar, one would still grant that the author of a text is at liberty to use a certain device or not, or to use it more frequently than someone else (just as, e.g., the choice between an imperfect or an aorist verb form is, to some extent, up to the user of the Greek language). Yet viewing this as a matter of personal style fails to acknowledge the interdependence of such choices with the context and the communicative situation as a whole.[21] Thus an attempt at system-

[19] For examples of such efforts with regard to the Hippocratic *Epidemics*, see Hellweg 1985:181 and 228, and the comments by van der Eijk 1991:197. For examples in Aristotle, see Schütrumpf 1991.

[20] [Editor's note: see also the contribution of Slings to this volume, who aims at qualifying along similar lines the notion of "figure of speech."]

[21] For example, while the choice of an imperfect verb may be motivated by the

atizing the formal techniques users of scientific language employ by no means intends to belittle their originality or creativity, but on the other hand refuses to regard the language and style of their writings as entirely a matter of subjective, individual choice.

The study of these formal characteristics has further been enriched by a growing appreciation of the role of non-literal, or even non-verbal aspects of communication (and conversely, the non-communicative aspects of language). Aesthetics of reception, ethnography of literature and studies in orality and literacy have opened our eyes to the importance of the situation in which a text has, or is supposed to have, functioned, e.g., the audience for whom it is intended (as distinct from the audience by whom it has actually been received), the conditions in which it has been produced, "published" and performed, the medium in which it has been transmitted, and so on. Here, again, discourse studies and ethnography of literature have provided useful instruments of research, such as, for example, D. Hymes's analysis of the "speech event" into a number of components that can, not without some irony, be listed according to the initial letters of the word SPEAKING:

setting (time, place, and other circumstances);
scene (e.g., didactic, general or specialized audience, informal communication or festive occasion);
participants (speaker/writer, hearer/reader, addressee);
ends (objective of communication, e.g., conveying information, persuasion, entertainment);
act sequences (style, linguistic structure of the speech act);
keys (tone of communication, e.g., ironic, emotional);
instrumentalities (medium of communication: oral/written, letter/fax/e-mail, illustrations, dialect, technical language);
norms (stylistic, social, scholarly);
genres.[22]

Though not all of these components will be equally relevant in each particular case, models like this do provide a heuristic framework

author's desire to highlight a certain aspect of a certain action or event, the choice between the aorist and the imperfect is by no means arbitrary; and once the choice has been made, a number of options for the phrasing of the sequence are ruled out. On verbal aspect, see Sicking 1991 as well as the contributions of Bakker and Sicking and Stork to this volume.

22 See Hymes 1972:58 ff. I am not aware of explicit systematic applications of Hymes's model to ancient scientific literature, although many of the individual components he distinguishes are, of course, often recognized.

which may be helpful to the understanding of the actual linguistic form of any text, including scientific texts. A recent German collection of articles on *Wissensvermittlung* "communication of knowledge" in the ancient world gives an impression of the kind of questions and answers envisaged from such an integrated approach.[23] Thus a number of syntactic peculiarities of such texts as the "case histories" of patients in the Hippocratic *Epidemics* might better be accounted for on the assumption that they represent private notes made by doctors for their own use.[24] But further refinement of such an explanation comes within reach when stylistic variations within the *Epidemics* are related to a development in scientific writing towards greater audience-orientedness.[25]

At this point, a most fortunate connection can be perceived between linguistically inspired approaches within classical philology and the recent surge of a "contextual" approach in the history of science, whereby the text is seen as an instrument for scientists and practicing physicians to define and assert themselves, to establish the position of their profession and to gain authority and power.[26] To be sure, the rhetorical nature of some of the Hippocratic writings has not been completely overlooked. But it used to be regarded with disdain by scholars (such as Diels), apparently on the assumption that this was sheer stylistic, meaningless embellishment used in order to mask thinness of substance. Consequently, the authors of works such as *On the Art of Medicine* and *On Breaths* were deprecatingly labeled as "iatrosophists."[27] Historians of ancient science, however, have recently pointed to the competitive setting in which Greek scientists had to work and to the rhetorical devices doctors had to use to attract customers in what has appropriately been called the "medical market place:"[28] in a situation where no independently recognized qualifications and certificates were available and where everyone could call himself doctor, the Hippocratic physicians had to assert themselves not only against drugsellers, quacks, magicians, and practitioners of temple-medicine, but also against intellectuals (such as Empedocles)

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[23] Kullmann and Althoff, eds. 1993.

[24] Hellweg 1985; Langholf 1977.

[25] See Althoff 1995:104–28.

[26] See Barton 1994; Lloyd 1979; van der Eijk, Horstmanshoff, and Schrijvers, eds. 1995.

[27] For a critical discussion of this concept, see Jouanna 1988:48.

[28] Nutton 1992.

who advocated healing on the basis of philosophical postulates. Again, the variations the Hippocratic Corpus displays with regard to the use of rhetoric (not only the well-known Gorgianic figures of speech but also argumentative techniques, analogies, metaphors, etc.) admit of greater appreciation and explanation if the social and cultural context (or, in Hymes's terminology, setting and scene) in which they were intended to function is taken into account.[29]

Finally, even within the traditional, content-oriented approach to ancient scientific writing, there has been a growing awareness of the relevance of the particular communicative situation of the text to its interpretation, such as the audience for whom the text was intended, or the occasion for which it was produced. Such an awareness has led to greater caution in the establishment of doctrinal "parallels" or "inconsistencies" between different works of the same author, which would have been used as evidence of a development in doctrine or even as a basis for declaring a work genuine or spurious. Indeed, it has prompted greater restraint in the establishment of the author's intention (insofar as it may be questioned whether it is appropriate to speak of an "author" in cases such as the Hippocratic *Epidemics*). Such caution is inspired by a consideration of differences in genesis (single or multiple authorship); status (e.g., data collection, introductory work, rhetorical pamphlet, or comprehensive systematic account); intended audience (e.g., specialists or laymen); occasion (e.g., oral performance or written communication), etc. Thus it has been attempted to relate varying degrees of philosophical sophistication in some of Plato's dialogues to differences between the audiences for whom they were intended (as indicated by the contribution of the interlocutors).[30] And something similar has been attempted with regard to differences in method—and to some extent also doctrine—between the three treatises on ethics preserved in the Aristotelian Corpus.[31] Likewise, in some cases apparent inconsistencies in one and the same Aristotelian work can better be accounted for on the assumption of a didactic strategy of the work and a "progressive character of the exposition,"[32] whereby the reader is psychagogically led to a number of

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[29] On polemical writing in the Hippocratic Corpus, see Ducatillon 1977.
[30] See Rowe 1992.
[31] For a summary of this discussion, see Flashar 1983:244.
[32] Kahn 1966:56.

new insights, which may be refinements or indeed modifications of views put forward in an earlier stage of the treatise.[33]

3. *Audience-Orientedness*

A problem with this "audience-oriented" approach is that in most cases we know very little about these audiences (although, as we shall see, the Hippocratic writings contain a surprising amount of information about the situations in which they were meant to function and the audiences they were intended to address). Moreover, even if we have independent evidence that a text is intended for "specialists" rather than "laymen," we know not very much of the intellectual baggage and cognitive abilities such specialist readers might be expected to possess. Most attempts at defining the audience for whom a text is intended remain hypothetical reconstructions based on the "foreknowledge" apparently presupposed by the author, or on claims concerning the (un)intelligibility, (un)attractiveness, or (in)appropriateness of a text, or parts thereof (e.g., its degree of technicality), for a certain group of readers or hearers. Here, modern scholarship tends to display conflicting tendencies. On the one hand, the audience of literary texts (e.g., an ode of Pindar) is often silently assumed to be capable (even at an oral presentation) of performing fairly complex mental operations in a very short time, of recognizing the most subtle allusions and of fathoming the deepest dimensions of intertextuality. Yet on the other hand, scientific prose with a considerable amount of detail and complexity is soon regarded as being beyond the "layman's" understanding—even in the face of counter-evidence provided by the text itself.

A striking example is the Hippocratic work *On Affections*, a general survey of diseases and their treatment, where at various places the author indicates that he is giving instructions for "the intelligent layman" (*sunetòs idiṓtēs*). In the introduction he says:[34]

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[33] Van der Eijk 1994:40, 76.

[34] Ἄνδρα χρή, ὅστις ἐστὶ συνετός, λογισάμενον ὅτι τοῖσιν ἀνθρώποισι πλείστου ἄξιόν ἐστιν ἡ ὑγιείη, ἐπίστασθαι ἀπὸ τῆς ἑωυτοῦ γνώμης ἐν τῇσι νούσοισιν ὠφελέεσθαι· ἐπίστασθαι δὲ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ἰητρῶν καὶ λεγόμενα καὶ προσφερόμενα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα ἑωυτοῦ καὶ διαγινώσκειν· ἐπίστασθαι δὲ τούτων ἕκαστα, ἐς ὅσον εἰκὸς ἰδιώτην. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐπίσταιτο ἄν τις μάλιστα εἰδὼς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων τάδε (. . . .) δεῖ δὲ πρὸς ταῦτα τὸν ἰδιώτην ἐπίστασθαι, ὁκόσα εἰκὸς ἰδιώτῃ· ὅσα δὲ τοὺς χειροτέχνας εἰκὸς ἐπίστασθαι καὶ προσφέρειν καὶ διαχειρίζειν, περὶ δὲ

> Any man who is intelligent must, on considering that health is of the utmost value to human beings, have the personal understanding necessary to help himself in diseases, and be able to understand and judge what physicians say and what they administer to his body, being versed in each of these matters to a degree reasonable for a layman. Now a person would best be able to understand such things by knowing and applying the following (. . .) The layman must understand as much about them as benefits a layman; and what it is fitting for the expert to understand, to administer, and to manage, about these matters, both what is said and what is done, let the layman be able to contribute an opinion with a certain amount of judgment. So now, from the point whence the layman must comprehend each of these things, let me proceed to explain them.
>
> (Hp. *Aff.* 1 = 6.208 L.)

The suggestion that this is a work intended for laymen is confirmed later on in the work, when the author says:[35]

> Through understanding of these things, a layman will be less likely to fall into incurable diseases that tend, from minor provocations, to become serious and chronic.
>
> (Hp. *Aff.* 33 = 6.244 L.)

In spite of these rather emphatic indications, the view that we are dealing with a book of popular medicine has recently been challenged by Potter, who has concluded from its high degree of detail and technicalities that this work cannot possibly have been intended for such an audience, but must be addressed to specialists, and that the passages just quoted do not belong to the work in its original form[36]—which leaves the question what inspired this later interpolator to believe that such technical details could be swallowed by laymen.

τούτων καὶ τῶν λεγομένων καὶ τῶν ποιουμένων οἷόν τ' εἶναι τὸν ἰδιώτην γνώμῃ τινὶ συμβάλλεσθαι. ἤδη οὖν ὁπόθεν τούτων ἕκαστα δεῖ τὸν ἰδιώτην ἐπίστασθαι, ἐγὼ φράσω. Translation Potter 1988:7–9.

[35] ταῦτα ἐπιστάμενος ἀνὴρ ἰδιώτης οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως ἐμπίπτοι εἰς ἀνήκεστα νοσήματα, ἃ εἴωθεν ἀπὸ σμικρῶν προφασίων μεγάλα καὶ πολυχρόνια γίνεσθαι. Translation Potter 1988:57. Significant is also the alternation of ὁ θεραπεύων and ὁ ἰητρός in ch. 13. On the lay-orientedness of *Affections*, see also Kollesch 1991:179.

[36] Potter 1988:4–5: "Thus, we must suppose that the first chapter of the work, together perhaps with one or two other sentences, represents a frame, into which a two-part medical treatise has been set." Potter bases his view on two arguments: "First, in every single instance in which the reader is addressed in the second person, the context dictates that it must be a physician, and not the layman, that is meant." This is a clear *petitio principii*, for it is precisely the author's claim that the layman should be able to carry out the prescriptions in question, and none of the passages explicitly identify the addressee as "doctor." "Second, the general level of

Here the so-called "fallacy of audience limitation" emerges: there is no reason why an audience who must have been capable of making sense of a Pindaric ode sung by a chorus, was unable to cope with a set of therapeutic instructions which were presumably available in written form; nor is there any reason why such an audience would be uninterested in potentially useful indications as to how to preserve their own health and to deal with the diseases that must have been a recurring phenomenon in their everyday life; nor would it be unlikely for a medical author, given the rhetorical context of ancient science referred to above, to inspire confidence with his audience with an impressive display of technical know-how. Moreover, there is no reason why one and the same work could not be addressing various groups or different layers of audience at different occasions, or even at the same time. For example, the author of the Hippocratic *Regimen* states quite explicitly that part of his dietetic prescriptions are intended "for the crowd" (*tò plêthos tôn anthrôpôn*), who are said to live "an haphazard life without the chance of neglecting everything to concentrate on taking care of their health," whereas other sections of the text are said to be meant for wealthy people, who are in a position to concentrate fully on their health.[37] Similarly with other Hippocratic writings one may assume a mixed readership.[38]

Examples such as these indicate that modern interpreters need to

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technical sophistication evident in *Affections* is no different from that of other Hippocratic works universally held to be addressed to physicians." This should be investigated in detail, but again the argument presupposes that we have a clear view as to where the border-line between expert and lay knowledge lay, and it ignores the possibility that precisely in this respect *Affections* may differ from the other nosological works in the Hippocratic Corpus.

[37] *Regimen* 69 (transl. Jones): ταῦτα μὲν παραινέω τῷ πλήθει τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὁκόσοισιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἰκῇ τὸν βίον διατελέειν ἐστὶ, μηδ' ὑπάρχει αὐτέοισι τῶν ἄλλων ἀμελήσασι τῆς ἑωυτῶν ὑγιείης ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· οἷσι δὲ τοῦτο παρεσκεύασται καὶ διέγνωσται, ὅτι οὐδὲν ὄφελός ἐστιν οὔτε χρημάτων οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενὸς ἄτερ τῆς ὑγιείης. On the two audiences envisaged here, see Ducatillon 1969; Kollesch 1991.

[38] E.g., the Hippocratic *Prognostic*, where the listing of the standards the good physician should comply with, and the various usages of the second person singular in prognostic instructions suggest (according to Althoff 1995:131) that the primary target group of the work are physicians, but where later on a broader readership seems to be envisaged. Cf. Althoff 1995:141: "Eine solchermaßen entwickelte Gestaltung läßt die Vermutung zu, daß ein etwas breiteres Lesepublikum angesprochen werden soll als der kleine Kreis der unmittelbar bekannten Kollegen bzw. Schüler." However, Althoff assumes that "In erster Linie wird aber an ein, wenn auch weites, Fachpublikum gedacht sein, denn es kann nicht im Interesse des Autors liegen, Laien die Fähigkeit der Krankheitsprognose zu vermitteln," which is, again, based on a presupposition concerning the interests of specialists and laymen.

beware of confusion between the "ideal" and the "actual" reader/hearer (both from the author's and from their own point of view),[39] as well as between the "addressee" and the "audience" or between the "target group" and the audience.[40] Furthermore, we need to be aware of wishful thinking as to the "ideal" understanding of a text (while, perhaps, hearing an ode of Pindar or viewing a tragedy in the theater is a matter of experience rather than understanding), and to explicate presuppositions concerning the dividing-line between "specialists" and "laymen." And most of all, we need to beware of retrojections of our own reading experiences.[41] All these, mostly hidden presumptions have to be carefully considered in order to avoid unreflective appeals to "the audience" in favor of a particular analysis or interpretation.

4. *A Variety of Forms and "Genres"*

One of the first things that strike the reader of ancient scientific and philosophical literature is the sheer variety of forms of expression. Scientific knowledge is presented both in (didactic) poetry (Hesiod, Parmenides, Empedocles, Xenophanes, Nicander, Aratus, to mention only some of the Greek writers) and in several different forms of prose ranging from carefully composed letters (Epicurus), dialogues (Plato), speeches or discourses (*lógoi*), handbooks (*tékhnai*), introductions (*eisagōgaí*), compendia (*sunagōgaí*), aphorisms, commentaries, and paraphrases, to less well defined species of text sometimes referred to in modern terms as "treatises," whose style is usually considered to be less elaborate and whose formal structure does not fit in with existing categories. As I have already said, no unified system of genres of scientific literature seems to have existed in antiquity, and no consistent distinction between formal and functional categories seems to have

[39] Thus Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics* (1094^{b}22–1195^{a}13) describes the ideal "recipient" (ἀκροατής) of his work, but this need not mean that his actual audience consisted of readers or hearers who met with all these requirements.

[40] This pertains especially to polemical writing: the person criticized need not be the person addressed: for example, if Empedocles is criticized in the Hippocratic work *On Ancient Medicine*, this obviously does not mean that he is the intended addressee. Examples such as this should make for caution in concluding too easily that a work dealing with "what the doctor should do or know" is necessarily addressing an audience of doctors.

[41] For examples of the latter, see the discussion by Schütrumpf 1989:190–91.

been adopted; and in some cases it is unclear whether a certain label is intended to serve as a title or as characterization of the form.

Thus in the Hippocratic Corpus, texts are characterized as *gnômai* "sentences," i.e., short statements,[42] *lógos* "speech," "discourse," *parangelíai* "instructions," *aphorismoí* "aphorisms," *hórkos* "oath," *prognṓsies* "prognoses," *nómos* "law" or "standard," *dógma* "decree." In the Aristotelian Corpus texts are referred to as *akroáseis* "lectures,"(?) *problḗmata, aporḗmata* "problems," *epitomaí* "epitomes," *diairéseis* "divisions," *epikheirḗmata* "essays,"(?) *théseis* "general questions," *exōterikoì lógoi* "discourses intended for a wider audience," *hóroi* "definitions," *protáseis* "premises," *pragmateíai* "treatises,"[43] *parangélmata* "instructions," *hupomnḗmata* "notes," "comments"(?).[44] These lists may be supplemented with terms used by other writers such as *tékhnē* "handbook," *súntagma* "treatise,"(?) *súngramma* "treatise," *suntomḗ* "compendium," *súnopsis* "summary," *sunagōgḗ* "compendium," *encheirídion* "manual," *encheírēsis* "manual, procedure," *diágnōsis* "diagnosis," *eisagōgḗ* "introduction," *biblíon* "book," *exḗgēsis* "explanation," *epistolḗ* "letter," *protreptikós* "exhortation," *hupothḗkē* "advice," "instruction," *paradeígmata* "examples," *hupotupṓseis* "outlines," *historía* "account of research." Studies in the meaning and development of each of these terms would be most welcome.[45] It would, for example, be useful to examine how the word *hupómnēma* "note," "comment," which is used by Xenophon to refer to his works on horse-keeping clearly in the sense of "note," "reminder," "memorandum" intended to prevent knowledge from being forgotten, came to be used in late antiquity in the sense of "commentary."[46]

The emergence of these prose forms in the archaic and classical periods of Greek literature raises a number of problems which cannot be dealt with within the scope of this chapter. When, how, and for what purposes prose came to be used and why some writers (such as Parmenides and Empedocles, or in later times Aratus and Nicander) preferred to write in verse when prose was available as an alternative, is not in all cases easy to say.[47] The answer seems more obvious

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[42] The meaning of γνῶμαι in the title Κνίδιαι γνῶμαι is disputed; "sentences" or "opinions" is the standard translation, but Langholf (1990:13 n. 9) prefers "signs".

[43] On this word, see Dirlmeier 1962:9–11.

[44] On the distinction between σύνταγμα and ὑπόμνημα, see Schütrumpf 1989:188.

[45] Attempts at systematic discussion can be found in Geffcken 1932; Mansfeld 1994; Bodéüs 1993.

[46] On this, see Althoff 1995:324. Perhaps the explanation is that the comments Galen (and others) wrote on the works of Hippocrates were regarded as "notes" to be taken into account when reading the text of Hippocrates.

[47] Cf. Althoff 1995:33–59.

in later antiquity: once a tradition had been established (e.g., the association of medical prose with the Ionic dialect), it could simply be imitated; but who started such a tradition and for what reasons, remain subjects of speculation.

However, the Hippocratic Corpus provides opportunities to gain some idea of the process of text-production and genre-formation. As is well-known, the Corpus consists of over sixty medical works written by a number of different (anonymous) authors and stretching over a period of more than two hundred years.[48] The problem which of these works, if any, is by the historical Hippocrates—the so-called "Hippocratic question"—has provoked much discussion over the past hundred years, but need not concern us here. I shall follow the by now established policy of treating these writings as anonymous works whose interrelations may vary from one case to another and which need not all come from the same intellectual environment. It remains a difficult problem, however, whether with regard to these writings one should drop the label "Hippocratic" altogether, for it seems that at least a number of them originated in, and were the common property of, some sort of medical community which may well have been associated with the historical Hippocrates.[49]

Likewise, there are numerous problems of dating and chronological relationship between various works (or different layers within one work) which have not yet been settled; as far as they are relevant to the present discussion, I shall proceed on the basis of what seems to be a rough consensus among specialists.[50] What matters for the present purpose is that the collection represents the oldest surviving body of scientific and/or philosophical[51] literature and thus provides us with a much more detailed view of how Greek thought in its beginning stages was formulated than the scraps preserved of the Presocratic philosophers.[52] Indeed, as I shall argue, Hippocratic medicine has played a decisive role in the formation of scientific literature.

The variety of forms of writing referred to above is manifest also within the Hippocratic Corpus itself. Some works (e.g., most of the

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[48] For a useful, up-to-date survey of the Corpus, with brief summaries of the contents, tentative dating, and short bibliography, see Jouanna 1992:527–63.

[49] All this is highly problematic and controversial; see Langholf 1990:12–36, and Smith 1990:6–18.

[50] This is conveniently summarized by Jouanna 1992:527–63.

[51] On these concepts, see note 1 above. It should be said that many of the Hippocratic works display a more general interest in "the study of nature."

[52] On the form of Presocratic writing, see Wöhrle 1992, 1993a, and 1993b.

gynecological texts) show hardly any organization and present themselves as seemingly unstructured catalogues of symptoms, prescriptions, recipes, etc., though in some cases (e.g., Books One and Three of *Epidemics*) this lack of structure is only apparent.[53] Other works, however (e.g., *Airs Waters Places, On the Sacred Disease, On the Nature of Man*), show a degree of care and elaboration on account of which they deserve a much more prominent place than they now occupy in the chapters on prose in Greek literary history.

The Corpus Aristotelicum presents different problems. Here we do have a large body of texts generally agreed to be by one author (although there is disagreement about the authenticity of some of them). Yet any general account of Aristotle's philosophy is bound to begin with a discussion of the problems posed by the form and status of his writings. Do they represent the "lecture notes" written by Aristotle himself on the basis of which he presented his oral teaching? Or are they to be taken as the "minutes" or "verbatims" of his oral teaching as written down by his pupils? To be sure, some characteristics of his works may be interpreted as evidence of oral presentation;[54] and with some of his works or parts of them it is not easy to imagine how they might have been understood without additional oral elucidation—although, again, this may be a case of our underestimating the abilities of his then audience and an extrapolation of our own difficulties in understanding his work. However, other parts of his work are certainly far too elaborate to assume such a procedure.[55] Some works display a careful structure of argumentation which may well be understood by reference to an audience which is supposed to go through a learning process; and certainly the "dialectical" passages where he deals with the views of his predecessors reflect a very elaborate composition.[56] All in all, it is clear that not much is gained by premature generalizations and unreflective categorizations (such as "lecture notes"),[57] and that we should allow for considerable variation in forms of expression and degree of linguistic

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[53] This has been demonstrated by Hellweg 1985.

[54] For examples, see Föllinger 1993; van der Eijk 1994:97; for direct references to the teaching situation, see section 11 below, and Bodéüs 1993:83–96.

[55] E.g., *Metaphysics* 1.1 (980^{a}22–982^{a}4) or *Nicomachean Ethics* 4.3 (1123^{a}34–1125^{a}35); for other examples, see Schütrumpf 1989.

[56] E.g., *Generation of Animals* 1.17–18 (721^{a}31–726^{a}28).

[57] On the problems inherent in this notion, see Schütrumpf 1989:178–80 with notes 12, 13, 17, 23, and 26.

and structural organization between the various works in the Corpus Aristotelicum.

5. *Orality, Literacy, and the Organization of Knowledge*

Although the details and the precise significance of the process are disputed, the importance of the transition from orality to literacy for Greek culture and intellectual life is beyond doubt. Since the majority of the Hippocratic writings were produced in the late fifth and early fourth century B.C.E., the Corpus testifies in a variety of ways to this transition. As for orality, it can safely be assumed that several treatises, especially the older gynecological works *On Diseases of Women* and *On the Nature of the Woman*, which contain long catalogues of prescriptions and recipes, preserve traditional knowledge that has been transmitted orally over a number of generations.[58] More interesting is the fact that several treatises explicitly refer to oral presentations of medical knowledge. Thus the author of *On Ancient Medicine* begins his work by referring to "all who have attempted to speak or to write on medicine and who have assumed for themselves a postulate as a basis for their discussion."[59] Later on in the same work, he expresses his disdain for "whatever has been said or written down by a sophist or a doctor about nature."[60] Likewise, the author of *On the Nature of Man* refers to an audience "used to listen to people who speak about the nature of man beyond what is relevant for medicine;"[61] and further on in the same chapter, he describes how the people referred to are engaged in a rhetorical contest in which they try to gain the upper hand in front of an audience:[62]

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[58] Althoff 1995:60–72; Grensemann 1975 and 1987.

[59] *On Ancient Medicine* 1.1 (1.570 L.): ὁκόσοι μὲν ἐπεχείρησαν περὶ ἰητρικῆς λέγειν ἢ γράφειν, ὑπόθεσιν αὐτοὶ ἑωυτοῖσιν ὑποθέμενοι τῷ λόγῳ...

[60] *On Ancient Medicine* 20.2 (1.622 L.): ὅσα τινὶ εἴρηται σοφιστῇ ἢ ἰητρῷ ἢ γέγραπται περὶ φύσιος...

[61] *On the Nature of Man* 1 (6.32 L.): ὅστις μὲν οὖν εἴωθεν ἀκούειν λεγόντων ἀμφὶ τῆς φύσιος τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης προσωτέρω ἢ ὅσον αὐτῆς ἐς ἰητρικὴν ἐφήκει...

[62] γνοίη δ' ἂν τόδε τις μάλιστα παραγενόμενος αὐτοῖσιν ἀντιλέγουσιν· πρὸς γὰρ ἀλλήλους ἀντιλέγοντες οἱ αὐτοὶ ἄνδρες τῶν αὐτῶν ἐναντίον ἀκροατέων οὐδέποτε τρὶς ἐφεξῆς ὁ αὐτὸς περιγίνεται ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλὰ ποτὲ μὲν οὗτος ἐπικρατεῖ, ποτὲ δὲ οὗτος, ποτὲ δὲ ᾧ ἂν τύχῃ μάλιστα ἡ γλῶσσα ἐπιρρυεῖσα πρὸς τὸν ὄχλον. καίτοι δίκαιόν ἐστι τὸν φάντα ὀρθῶς γινώσκειν ἀμφὶ τῶν πρηγμάτων παρέχειν αἰεὶ ἐπικρατέοντα τὸν λόγον τὸν ἑωυτοῦ, εἴπερ ἐόντα γινώσκει

> The best way to realise this is to be present at their debates. Given the same debaters and the same audience, the same man never wins in the discussion three times in succession, but now one is victor, now another, now he who happens to have the most glib tongue in the face of the crowd. Yet it is right that a man who claims correct knowledge about the facts should maintain his own argument victorious always, if his knowledge be knowledge of reality and if he set it forth correctly. But in my opinion such men by their lack of understanding overthrow themselves in the words of their very discussions, and establish the theory of Melissus.
>
> (Hp. *Nat. hom.* 1 = 6.34 L.)

The author of the First Book of *On Diseases* seems to refer to a similar situation of public question and answer on medicine:[63]

> Anyone who wishes to ask correctly about healing, and, on being asked, to reply and rebut correctly, must consider the following (. . .) When one has considered these questions, one must pay careful attention in discussions, and when someone makes an error in one of these points in his assertions, questions, or answers (. . .) then one must catch him there and attack him in one's rebuttal.
>
> (Hp. *Morb.* 1 = 6.140–42 L.)

It is by no means inconceivable that some of the medical works preserved in the Hippocratic Corpus were actually delivered orally for a predominantly nonspecialist audience, some possibly in the setting of a rhetorical contest. In actual fact, such a situation is almost certainly envisaged by the authors of the two rhetorically most elaborate works preserved in the Corpus, the already mentioned *On the Art of Medicine* and *On Breaths*, in which Gorgianic figures of speech and sound effects abound.[64] The following passages from *On Breaths* may give some idea of the more striking features (parallelism, antithesis, anaphora, etc.) of the form of these works, creating an almost schoolmasterly impression:

καὶ ὀρθῶς ἀποφαίνεται. ἀλλ' ἐμοί γε δοκέουσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνθρωποι αὐτοὶ ἑωυτοὺς καταβάλλειν ἐν τοῖσιν ὀνόμασι τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ὑπὸ ἀσυνεσίης, τὸν δὲ Μελίσσου λόγον ὀρθοῦν. Translation Jones 1931:5.

[63] ὃς ἂν περὶ ἰήσιος ἐθέλῃ ἐρωτᾶν τε ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐρωτώμενος ἀποκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ἀντιλέγειν ὀρθῶς, ἐνθυμεῖσθαι χρὴ τάδε· (. . .) ταῦτ' ἐνθυμηθέντα διαφυλάσσειν δεῖ ἐν τοῖσι λόγοισιν· ὅ τι ἂν δέ τις τούτων ἁμαρτάνῃ ἢ λέγων ἢ ἐρωτῶν, ἢ ὑποκρινόμενος, (. . .), ταύτῃ φυλάσσοντα χρὴ ἐπιτίθεσθαι ἐν τῇ ἀντιλογίῃ. Translation Potter 1988:99–101, modified.

[64] A comprehensive account of these stylistic devices can be found in Jouanna's edition of the two works: Jouanna 1988:10–24, 169–73.

ἑνὶ δὲ συντόμῳ λόγῳ
τὰ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστὶν ἰήματα·
ἰητρικὴ γάρ ἐστιν ἀφαίρεσις καὶ πρόσθεσις,
ἀφαίρεσις μὲν τῶν πλεοναζόντων,
πρόσθεσις δὲ τῶν ἐλλειπόντων.
ὁ δὲ τοῦτ' ἄριστα ποιέων ἄριστος ἰητρός,
ὁ δὲ τούτου πλεῖστον ἀπολειφθεὶς πλεῖστον ἀπελείφθη τῆς τέχνης.

To put it concisely:
opposites are remedies of opposites;
for medicine is taking away and adding:
taking away what is in excess,
adding what is deficient.
He who does this best is the best doctor,
he who is farthest remote from this, is farthest remote of the art [of medicine].

(Hp. *Flat.* 1.5 = 6.92 L.)

ὁπόταν γυμνασθὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πόνων τὸ σῶμα θερμανθῇ,
θερμαίνεται καὶ τὸ αἷμα·
τὸ δὲ αἷμα θερμανθὲν ἐξεθέρμηνε τὰς φύσας·
αὗται δὲ διαθερμανθεῖσαι διαλύονται
καὶ διαλύουσιν τὴν ξύστασιν τοῦ αἵματος,
αἱ μὲν συνεξελθοῦσαι μετὰ τοῦ πνεύματος,
αἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ φλέγματος·

Whenever the body has been exercised by the efforts and has been heated,
the blood is also heated;
and when the blood is heated, it heats the breaths;
and when these are heated, they are dispersed,
and they disperse the congestion of the blood,
some because they leave [the body] with the air,
others with the phlegm.

(Hp. *Flat.* 14.7 = 6.114 L.)

As has already been said, it has long been doubted whether these works were actually written by doctors; yet their style and character fits in very well with the competitive setting of ancient medicine referred to earlier, and they are apparently aimed at self-definition and self-assertion of a discipline whose scientific nature (*tékhnē*) was not beyond dispute.

However, the oral transmission of medical knowledge not only served the purpose of self-presentation to a larger, non-specialized audience, but also had a didactic, educational justification: medicine being the practical art it naturally is, the importance of oral teaching and direct contact between the teacher and the pupil is repeatedly

stressed. Thus both Aristotle and his medical contemporary Diocles of Carystus acknowledge the usefulness of written knowledge for the medical profession, but they emphasize that this is not sufficient and of no use to those lacking the experience to put it into practice. In a comparison between legislation and medicine, Aristotle says:[65]

> Neither do men appear to become expert physicians on the basis of medical books. Yet they try to discuss not only general means of treatment, but also how one might cure and how one should treat each individual patient, dividing them according to their various habits of body; these [discussions] appear to be of value for men who have had practical experience, but they are useless for those who have no knowledge about the subject.
>
> (Ar. *EN* 1181^{b}2–6)

And a report about Diocles' reply to someone who claimed to have bought a medical book (*iatrikòn biblíon*) and therefore no longer to be in need of instruction, makes the same point: "Books are reminders for those who have received teaching, but they are gravestones to the uneducated."[66] For what we know about the history of medical education in the ancient world, these remarks indeed reflect the standard situation.[67] The tradition of the *viva vox* as the preferred mode of teaching (not only in medicine) continued also in times in which literacy had established itself and in which medical literature was available on a very large scale; even Galen, the most learned physician of antiquity, who frequently recommends the use of the medical books written by the great authorities of the past, stresses the importance of learning from the master by direct oral teaching.[68]

All these references suggest that at least some of the medical works preserved in the Hippocratic Corpus were presented orally, and also that probably the majority of written texts were used in combination with oral teaching and transmission of knowledge. This means that they were not intended to stand on their own (hence perhaps the

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[65] οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται οὐδ' ἰατρικοὶ ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμάτων γίνεσθαι. καίτοι πειρῶνταί γε λέγειν οὐ μόνον τὰ θεραπεύματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὡς ἰαθεῖεν ἂν καὶ ὡς δεῖ θεραπεύειν ἑκάστους, διελόμενοι τὰς ἕξεις· ταῦτα δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἐμπείροις ὠφέλιμα εἶναι δοκεῖ, τοῖς δ' ἀνεπιστήμοσιν ἀχρεῖα. Cf. also Ar. *Pol.* 1287^{a}35.

[66] τὰ βιβλία τῶν μεμαθηκότων ὑπομνήματα εἰσιν, τῶν δὲ ἀμαθῶν μνήματα (see Wellmann 1912:160).

[67] Kudlien 1970.

[68] Galen, *On the Powers of Foodstuffs* 1.1.47 (6.480 K.); *On the Mixtures and Powers of Simple Drugs* 6, proem (11.797 K.); *On the Composition of Drugs according to Places* 6.1 (12.894 K.).

term *hupómnēma*, see above), and this fact may provide an explanation for some of the formal peculiarities they display and for some of the difficulties involved in their interpretation.[69]

At the same time, however, the Hippocratic writings refer on numerous occasions to "written" information that is available and should be taken into account.[70] Thus at *Epidemics* 3.3.16 it is said that an important component of the medical art is the ability to form a correct judgment about "what has been written down" (*tà gegramména*), i.e., the case histories of patients that have been put down in writing.[71] Very similar instructions are found elsewhere in the Corpus, suggesting that this use of written information—probably in addition to oral information and the doctor's own observations—is by no means something self-evident, but needs to be encouraged and to be done correctly. It is further noted at several points that a particular observation is "worth writing down" (*áxion graphês*);[72] and an interesting passage in *Regimen in Acute Diseases* refers to initial codification (*sungráphein*) of the "Cnidian sentences" and subsequent revision (*epidiaskeuázesthai*) by a later generation in the light of further discoveries and growing experience.[73] Another interesting reference to the use of written records is to be found at *Epidemics* 6.8.7, where a section of text is introduced by the words "(data) derived from the small writing-tablet" (*tà ek toû smikroû pinakidíou*), suggesting that the author is drawing on an existing collection (an archive or "database") of information.[74] As Langholf has suggested, the fact that many "chapters" or "sections" in the Hippocratic Epidemics are of approximately the same length, may be explained by reference to the material conditions in which information was stored, such as the size of writing-tablets.[75]

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[69] The brevity and obscurity of the Hippocratic writings were already noted and explained as a deliberate strategy by Galen; see the references mentioned by Langholf 1977:11 n. 5, and the discussion by Sluiter 1995.

[70] The evidence has been conveniently assembled by Usener 1990.

[71] μέγα δὲ μέρος ἡγεῦμαι τῆς τέχνης εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι σκοπεῖν καὶ περὶ τῶν γεγραμμένων ὀρθῶς· ὁ γὰρ γνοὺς καὶ χρεώμενος τούτοις οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκεῖ μέγα σφάλλεσθαι ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ (3.100 L.).

[72] *Regimen in Acute Diseases* 3 (2.238 L.); 16 (2.354 L.); *Joints* 10 (4.104 L.).

[73] οἱ συγγράψαντες τὰς Κνιδίας καλεομένας γνώμας (. . .) οἱ μέντοι ὕστερον ἐπιδιασκευάσαντες ἰητρικώτερον δή τι ἐπῆλθον (2.224–228 L.).

[74] For a discussion of this phrase, and in general of the material conditions for writing in the Hippocratic Corpus, see Langholf 1989c; Nieddu 1993; Althoff 1993. Cf. also *Prorrheticon* 2.4 (9.20 L.).

[75] Langholf 1989c.

These passages indicate that the Hippocratic writers gradually realized the importance of written documents for the preservation and transmission of knowledge; and also that they regarded these written records not as the intellectual property of one person, but as a common reservoir of knowledge accessible to a group of physicians (who copied and used the same information more than once, as can be seen from the doublets in the Hippocratic writings) and admitting of additions and changes by this same group of physicians. The significance of this can hardly be overstated. Rather than claiming that in the case of Hippocratic medicine the transition from orality to literacy brought about a change in mental attitude and even in thinking, as has been suggested by Miller and Lonie,[76] it seems more likely that, conversely, the development of prose-writing, and the various forms in which the Hippocratic writers expressed themselves, is to be understood as a consequence of new ways of thinking—or rather as the result of a new *attitude towards knowledge* resulting in a desire to store data gained by practical experience, to systematize them and to make them accessible for future use. Thus it seems that the Hippocratic authors regarded writing as an instrument for the *organization* of knowledge concerning a great variety of phenomena, i.e., not only in order to prevent knowledge from being forgotten—a desire they shared with, e.g., Herodotus—, but also to keep knowledge *available* for practical application. And it seems quite reasonable that medicine (rather than, say, mathematics or astronomy) should play this part: for on the one hand, the empirical data reflected in case histories such as the *Epidemics* must soon have reached such vast proportions and such a high degree of detail that it could not possibly be remembered; so there was a need for storage of information based on the belief that such information might remain useful. On the other hand, since medicine was incessantly confronted with new cases in which existing knowledge had to be applied or against which it had to be checked and, if necessary, modified, it had to be accessible in a conveniently retrievable form.

If all this is plausible, the emergence of the Hippocratic writings, and especially the variety of forms they display, can be seen as a result of the need for organization of knowledge and research—a need arising also from the fact that their authors must have formed a community of scholars rather than being single scientists working

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[76] Miller 1990; Lonie 1983; more in general Goody 1968 and Havelock 1982.

independently. This might also suggest an explanation why all the Hippocratic writings are anonymous: while the works of Herodotus and Hecataeus of Miletus begin with a statement of the author's name (and this seems also to have been the case with medical writers such as Alcmaeon of Croton) the Hippocratic writings do not bear the name of their authors—which is not to deny that they are written by very self-conscious people who are much more prominently and explicitly present in the text (with personal pronouns and first person verb forms) than, say, Aristotle.

In the course of the fourth century, the collection and organization of knowledge was further implemented and applied to a much broader area by Aristotle and his pupils (or colleagues), and a similar process of data-preservation, common intellectual property and exchange of information evidently took place in the Lyceum.[77]

Let us now see how this situation is reflected in the form the Hippocratic writings take and how the linguistic peculiarities they display may be related to the circumstances in which they were produced.

6. *Dialect, Vocabulary, Terminology*

On the level of phonology and morphology, the language used by the Hippocratic writers first raises the question of dialect. Although Cos and Cnidus (the places where Hippocratic medicine is traditionally believed to have originated) were Dorian settlements and the language used in Coan inscriptions is the Doric dialect, the Hippocratic writers wrote in Ionic. To be sure, some Doric forms survive in some of the older Hippocratic writings, and there is some evidence to suggest that medicine was also associated with Doric.[78] Yet Ionic became the language of Hippocratic medicine and continued to be closely associated with medicine throughout antiquity, as is clearly shown by the mannerist Ionicism of the Pneumatist medical writer Aretaeus of Cappadocia (first century C.E.). We are in no position to say what prompted the Hippocratic writers, who for the most part must have been Doric speaking people, to use Ionic even in texts which were probably meant for private use only—unless any association of the

[77] See Ostwald and Lynch 1992.
[78] See Craik: forthcoming; Langholf: forthcoming: 920.

Hippocratic writings with the tradition of a Hippocratic "school" of medicine at Cos should be abandoned. It has been suggested that the use of Ionic should be seen as evidence of the influence of Milesian natural philosophy on Hippocratic medicine, or indeed as a deliberate strategy of the Hippocratic writers to associate themselves with the new, "rational," spirit that gave birth to Greek natural philosophy and science.[79] It might also be suggested that they followed the example of Herodotus—which does not help very much, for it raises the question why Herodotus, who came from the Doric speaking Halicarnassus, wrote in Ionic—unless one is prepared to accept this as an imitation of Hecataeus and of the *periegesis* literature of this time.

However, I would suggest as an alternative explanation that the Hippocratic writers envisaged a wider distribution of their writings outside their own circles. Many of them were itinerant doctors, and we know that the geographical area covered by their activity as attested in the Corpus comprises large areas in which the Ionic dialect was spoken.[80] Thus the use of Ionic may have been inspired by a desire to facilitate an easier reception of their ideas in this area. However, this remains a matter of speculation, and it may be questioned how deliberate the use of Ionic was in their cases (they may just have followed an already existing tradition, or the use of Ionic in this region may have established itself prior to the emergence of Hippocratic writing). It should further be said that from the middle of the fourth century B.C.E. onwards, the Attic dialect also came to be used for medical prose, as is clear in the case of Diocles of Carystus, who probably knew several Hippocratic writings but who decided to write in Attic (and in addition to avoid hiatus, and to write in the form of letters and perhaps also dialogues); and Attic was probably used also by Diocles' contemporary Praxagoras of Cos (!).[81] This indicates that medical authors were under no obligation to obey the "laws" of the genre—if such laws existed at all—though in the case of Diocles, too, one can only guess what his reasons were: he may have aimed at making medicine more acceptable to an Athenian

[79] Longrigg 1993:32.

[80] See Byl 1995.

[81] Not many verbatim fragments of Praxagoras survive. In Fr. 10 Steckerl, the Attic forms γλώττης and κοιλίαν are used, but later on in the same fragment we find γλώσσης and ἐπιγλωσσίς (if the text printed by Steckerl is reliable); frs. 13 and 90 are inconclusive. From the fact that Praxagoras wrote a work *On Foreign Diseases*, Steckerl (1958:1) concludes that he must have traveled.

audience or at underscoring the conjunction between Hippocratic medicine and Attic philosophy which his medical doctrines may be said to incorporate.

A related question is the presence of a number of so-called "Homericisms" in the Hippocratic Corpus. Several words occur nowhere (or hardly anywhere) else in archaic and classical Greek literature except in Homer and the Hippocratic Corpus,[82] but the significance of this has been called into question and a direct dependence of the Hippocratic writers on the Homeric poems has been doubted.[83] As for grammatical forms, the presence of a number of uncontracted, Homeric verb forms is beyond question—even though some of these may be the result of hyper-correction by scribes in the later tradition.[84] Again, the occurrence of these forms in a much later medical writer such as Aretaeus suggests that in later times a medical connotation was certainly considered to inhere in these, but it is less clear whether this was already so in the fifth century B.C.E. and what the underlying reasons may have been.

A linguistic problem in itself is the formation of a scientific terminology and its relation to ordinary language. Various aspects of the development of an anatomical and pathological terminology in the Hippocratic Corpus have received due attention, such as the formation of nouns and their frequent usage in the *Epidemics* as a result of the tendency towards nominalization in the case histories (where the emphasis is on presence of symptoms rather than the processes leading to them).[85] Another characteristic development is the gradual replacement of temporal subclauses stating the occurrence of particular symptoms (e.g., "when this or that happens") by nosological terms referring to the set of symptoms considered to constitute the disease;[86] such terms typically have the ending *-itis* (originally adjective) being earmarked as the common denominator for diseases (e.g.,

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[82] On this, see Leumann 1950:308–315, who lists words such as καταπρηνής, ἦμος, ἄρμενον, γυιόω, ἐνδυκέως, ἰχώρ, ὠτειλή, etc.

[83] For a survey of the discussion, see Langslow (forthcoming); I am grateful to David Langslow for giving me access to his paper before publication.

[84] See Smith 1990:43–44 (with references to further discussions of medical Ionic).

[85] Verbal nouns ending on -σις (e.g., κώφωσις "numbing," ἵδρυσις "settling down"), -μα (e.g., διαχώρημα "excrement," ἐναιώρημα "sediment," ἐρύθημα "redness," ἐμπύημα "suppuration"), -μός (e.g., βληστρισμός "tossing," παροξυσμός "aggravation," πεπασμός "concoction"), -ίη (e.g., αἱμορραγίη "violent bleeding," δυσφορίη "discomfort," καρηβαρίη "heaviness in the head"); for other examples, see Hellweg 1985:72–73.

[86] On this phenomenon, see Althoff 1995:73.

phrenitis, pleuritis). Furthermore, there is the gradual replacement of vague denotations such as *tà ánō* "the upper parts"[87] by more differentiated anatomical descriptions; adjective formation with the aid of suffixes such as *-ṓdēs* and *-ikós* to indicate similarity to, or susceptibility to, a particular disease;[88] and the formation of compound verbs, nouns, and adjectives to achieve greater accuracy and differentiation.[89] Yet here, too, systematicity seems to be lacking; the first attempts at medical lexicography date from the Hellenistic period.[90] In philosophical prose, attempts at lexicographic and terminological systematization can be traced back to the Pseudoplatonic *Definitiones* and Book Five (Δ) of the Aristotelian *Metaphysics*. In Latin medical literature, the whole complex of adaptation of the Greek heritage to the Latin situation presents a problem in its own right.[91]

7. *Syntax, Style, Sentence-Structure: "Shorthand"*

On the sentence level, several texts in the Hippocratic Corpus as well as a number of Aristotelian treatises display a striking degree of anomaly or irregularity of sentence-structure which has proved hard to describe with the aids of traditional Greek syntax. Pioneering work in this area has been done by Langholf and Hellweg, who have, among other things, aptly demonstrated the inadequacy of terms such as "elliptic" or "anacoluthic" to describe what is going on in such texts.[92]

A passage from the Fourth Book of the *Epidemics* may give an impression of the kind of prose one encounters here:[93]

> ἐν Κραννῶνι τῇ Νικοστράτου ληφθείσῃ τεσσαρεσκαιδεκάτῃ ἔφθασεν αὐτίκα ἀκράτεια τραχήλου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ σῖτος ἐγκατεκλείσθη μέχρι δεκάτης. πνεῦμα πυκνὸν σμικρόν. ἀκρασίη. ψηλαφῶσα δακτύλους, <u>παραλέγουσα</u>, <u>ἱδρῶτες</u>. εἱλκύσθη ἐπὶ δεξιὰ τράχηλος, στόμα, ὄμμα, ῥίς. οὔρων ὑπόστασις λευκὴ ὀροβώδης, ἑτέρη λευκὴ ξυσματώδης, ἄλλη ὑπόχλωρος λεκιθώδης·

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87 See López Férez 1996:376–79.
88 See Op de Hipt 1972.
89 E.g., ὑποδυσφορέω, ἐπίξηρος, ὑποχολώδης, ὑποδιασπάω, παραρρέω, ἐπαναχρέμπτομαι (see Hellweg 1985:66–67).
90 Wellmann 1931; von Staden 1989:453–55, 485–500.
91 See Langslow 1989, 1991, and 1994b; Adams 1995.
92 [Editor's note: on anacoluths and "irregular" syntax, see also the second study of Slings in this volume.]
93 Translation Smith 1994:103.

ταύτῃ ἔστιν ὅτε ὡς πιμελῶδες ἐφίστατο, τοῦτο ἀθρόον, οὐκ ἐπὶ πολὺ διεσκεδασμένον, οἷον τὸ ἐναιώρημα διεστηκός, οἷον ἔξω ἐξ οἵου τὸ ὑφιστάμενον ἔπειτα οὐρεῖται. καὶ τὸ μέν τι τοιοῦτον· τὸ δὲ ἱδρυμένον ἄλλο τοιοῦτον ὀλίγον ἐπὶ πλατὺ διεσκεδασμένον, ἄλλο τεταραγμένον. ἕτερον τοιοῦτο ἐναιώρημα νεφελίου ὑπομέλανος δοκέοντος πάχος ἔχειν, χαύνου δέ. ἄλλο λεπτόν. ἄλλο ἐναιώρημα λεπτὸν τοιοῦτον. ἄλλο οἷον ἵππου. ἄλλο οἷον τὰ ζοφώδεα.

In Crannon, Nicostratus' wife, who had had a seizure, on the fourteenth day suddenly experienced weakness in the neck and other parts, and food was shut in (constipation?) till the tenth. Fast, shallow breathing, loss of control, groping around with the fingers, delirious talk, sweat. Neck drawn to the right, also her mouth, eye, nostril. There was one sediment in her urine: white, like vetch seed; another, white, like scrapings; another, yellowish, like egg yolk. With that one sometimes a scum like fat; it was thick, not much dispersed, like the separated, suspended matter that occurs after urine has been withheld. Some was of that sort, some quite stable. In another instance a small amount of that kind scattered over a flat plane. In another instance it was turbid. Another: suspended matter of blackish clouds, that appeared to have thickness but were unsubstantial. In another instance it was thin; another of that kind but thin suspended matter. Another was like that of a horse, and another opaque.

(Hp. *Epid.* 4.14 = 5.152 L.)

The text of this passage is not free from difficulties and its interpretation by no means self-evident.[94] For the present, however, it may suffice to point to a number of characteristic syntactic features which occur throughout the *Epidemics*, such as unmarked change of subject (*paralégousa* "speaking in delirium," *hidrôtes* "sweat"); absence, or infrequency, of predicates; absence, or infrequency, of connecting particles; infrequency of articles; predominance of parataxis. A number of syntactic peculiarities in the *Epidemics* can, with greater or lesser

[94] The text is printed according to Smith's (1994:102) edition; Langholf (1977:142) translates the passage from οἷον τὸ ἐναιώρημα διεστηκός onwards as follows: "[Untersuchen,] Wie der Schwebstoff [ἐναιώρημα] dispergiert ist. [Untersuchen,] Welcher Bodensatz [ὑφιστάμενον] später nach welchem uriniert wird. Der Schwebstoff [τὸ μέν] ist nun so beschaffen [wie bekannt]: der abgesetzte Teil jedoch [τὸ δὲ ἱδρυμένον] ist ein anderer solcher (1.), wenn er [nur] wenig in die Breite verteilt ist, und ein anderer (2.), wenn er [stark] aufgewühlt ist. Der auf letztere [(2.)] Weise beschaffene [ἕτερον τοιοῦτο] Schwebstoff [ἐναιώρημα] besteht aus einer dunklen Wolke, die dicke Konsistenz zu haben scheint, jedoch locker ist. Manchmal [ἄλλο] ist der so beschaffene Schwebstoff [ἐναιώρημα] fein, manchmal wie [der des Urins] vom Pferd, machmal wie der dunkle Urin [τὰ ζοφώδεα, vgl. Coac. 570]. [Untersuchen,] Wie viele [Arten von Bodensatz bzw. Schwebstoffen es gibt]." Langholf deletes ἔξω and ἄλλο λεπτόν and accepts πόσα (present in one MS, lacking in several others) at the end of the passage.

difficulty, be accounted for by assuming that a form of *eînai* should be supplied; yet in the majority this is not the case, and some can only be accounted for on the assumption that we are dealing with a kind of shorthand intelligible only to the writer himself or to his colleagues. Thus Langholf draws attention to the use of *Stichwörter* "labels" which only mention a category without actually describing it, as in the following example:[95]

> πρὸς κρίσιν μάλιστα ἰόντι ῥῖγος ἄτρομον, διάλυσις, πάρεσις, σύμπτωσις. τὰ τῶν ἀπιόντων. κωματώδης...
>
> As he was approaching near the crisis, chill without shivering, loss of faculties, collapse, the [symptoms] of the excrements, comatose...
>
> (Hp. *Epid.* 4.45 = 5.186 L.)

The patient's excrements were examined, but the text says nothing about their nature, which has to be inferred by the doctor.

Very frequent in texts such as the *Epidemics* is the so-called "nominativus pendens" (a nominative which cannot be construed) at the beginning of a sentence.[96] Here, alleged syntactic anomalies can be explained as cases of "topic marking" or, at the beginning of a new paragraph, as "heading" or "title,"[97] e.g., when the patient (or in some cases the disease) is mentioned at the beginning of a section:[98]

> ἡ ἄνω οἰκοῦσα ἡ Θεοκλεῖ προσήκουσα, ὑπὸ Πληιάδα πυρετὸς ὀξύς
>
> She who lived above, the relative of Theocles, acute fever towards the setting of the Pleiads.
>
> (Hp. *Epid.* 7.24 = 5.394 L.)
>
> καὶ ὁ Ποσειδοκρέων, τρίτῃ σπασμός, θέρμη, οὐκ ἔλιπεν. ἐτελεύτησεν ὀκτωκαιδεκαταῖος

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[95] Translation Smith 1994:139, modified.

[96] For a discussion of this, and similar "absolute" constituents, see Slings 1992. See also Chapter 5 in this volume.

[97] On this, see Bakker 1990 and 1993.

[98] I should stress that this is by no means the only possible explanation of this phenomenon. As Volker Langholf reminds me (private correspondence), such cases of nominativus pendens, just as several other syntactic and structural "anomalies" or "oddities," may also find their origin in the way the text acquired the form it finally got, which may have been a long and complicated process of transmission, revision, and addition by different authors. I do not wish to rule out that such absolute constituents were added later, but the point I wish to make is that in the text as it stands they are by no means necessarily out of place or syntactically awkward.

<u>Also Poseidocreon</u>, convulsion on the third day, heat, [it] did not leave [him]. [He] died on the eighteenth day.

(Hp. *Epid.* 7.35 = 5.404 L.)

With anaphoric pronoun:

<u>γυνὴ ἐν Λαρίσσῃ κύουσα τῷ δεκάτῳ μηνί</u>, αἷμα ἐχώρεε αὐτῇ πουλύ

<u>Woman in Larissa, pregnant, in her tenth month</u>, blood flowed from her, much"

(Hp. *Epid.* 5.13 = 5.212 L.)

Or with a relative clause:

<u>Κλεανακτίδης, ὃς κατέκειτο ἐπάνω τοῦ Ἡρακλείου</u>, πῦρ ἔλαβε πεπλανημένως

<u>Cleanactides, who lay north of the Heracleion</u>, intermittent fever took possession [of him]

(Hp. *Epid.* 1.26.6 = 2.208 L.)

Similar examples of "absolute" use of constituents, i.e., words or groups of words that are syntactically unconnected with the sequence, can be cited for adjectives and finite verb forms, which often occur without indication of the subject, either because this is clear from the context, or indeterminate, or simply absent.[99] Other syntactic "anomalies" are: lack of agreement between subject and verb,[100] or between adjective and noun;[101] the use of participles instead of finite verbs;[102] the use of cardinal instead of ordinal numbers;[103] the use of the definite article where the noun to be understood is not mentioned in the context but apparently clear to the specialist;[104] and "metonymia"

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[99] Langholf 1977:61–70.

[100] E.g., *Epid.* 3.4 (3.72 L.): τοῖσι μὲν οὖν πλείστοισιν αὐτῶν ἀποστάσιες ἐς ἐμπυήματα συνέπιπτε "With most of them, abscesses turned into suppurations." (see Langholf 1977:85).

[101] E.g., *Epid.* 5.54 (5.238 L.): ὀρίγανος ὀφθαλμοῖσι κακὸν πινόμενον καὶ ὀδοῦσιν "Oregano is bad for the eyes when drunk and for teeth." (Langholf 1977:85).

[102] E.g., *Epid.* 3.17.1 (3.112 L.): οἱ δὲ πυρετοὶ τὸ μὲν ὅλον οὐκ ἐκλείποντες, πεπλανημένως δὲ παροξυνόμενοι, τὰ μέν, τὰ δ' οὐ "In general, the fevers were not fading away, but on rare occasions they were aggravating, some were, some were not." (Langholf 1977:94).

[103] E.g., *Epid.* 4.10 (5.150 L.): περὶ τὰς εἴκοσιν οὐ τελέως ἐκρίθη "About the twenty [days] incomplete crisis." (Langholf 1977:99).

[104] E.g., *Epid.* 4.37 (5.180 L.) ἔπειτά τι καὶ αἷμα ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἴξιν [sc. μυκτῆρος] σμικρὸν ἐρρύη "Then also some blood from the [nostril] on the corresponding side, a small amount, flowed out." (Langholf 1977:105).

(e.g., adjectives characterizing the state of the patient being syntactically connected with the disease).[105]

Hellweg has shown that a number of these syntactic peculiarities tend to occur with the same words and may therefore be seen as *stehende Redewendungen* "stock phrases," formulae that are simply used to record the presence of a certain symptom or otherwise significant characteristic of the patient without being syntactically integrated into the sentence as a whole.[106] Some examples are: *lógoi polloí* "many words;" *pánta parékrouse* "he was completely driven from his senses;" *puretòs oxús* "acute fever;" *ápuros* "without fever;" *húpnoi* "sleep" + adjective; *oûra* "urine" + adjective. Many of these syntactic peculiarities can be explained on the assumption that we are dealing with "brachylogic" language, a kind of shorthand for private use or for circulation among specialists only; in this respect, comparisons with the language of modern medical reports reveal striking similarities.[107] They may well reflect the notes made by the doctor during his visits. However, closer analysis has shown that within the *Epidemics* there is a development towards greater syntactic and stylistic organization, which seems to correspond with an increasing awareness of the audience (as indicated by direct addresses to the reader). As Hellweg has shown, the data recorded in Books One and Three are clearly structured according to a fixed pattern ("Fragebogen" or "questionnaire") reflecting the author's "pathophysiological" views as to the relevant items to look for.[108] And Althoff has pointed to numerous signs of stylistic revision in these books.[109] This suggests that the "case histories" in Books One and Three represent not so much the records of medical examinations of actual patients (though they may be derived from these) as didactic models for apprentices; and in some cases it has even been suspected that we are dealing with deliberate attempts at "aphoristic" writing.[110]

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[105] E.g., *Epid.* 5.73 (5.246 L.): μετὰ κύνα οἱ πυρετοὶ ἐγένοντο ἱδρώδεες καὶ οὐ περιεψύχοντο παντάπασι μετὰ τὸν ἱδρῶτα, πάλιν δ' ἐπεθερμαίνοντο, καὶ μακροὶ ἐπιεικέως, ἄκριτοι καὶ οὐ πάνυ διψώδεες "After the Dogstar, the fevers were [accompanied by] sweat and did not cool down entirely after the sweat; they got hot again, lasted considerably long, did not reach a crisis and were not [accompanied by] much thirst." (Langholf 1977:103).

[106] Hellweg 1985:29–52.

[107] Cf. Langholf 1977:13–14.

[108] Hellweg 1985:22.

[109] Althoff 1995:104–28.

[110] Althoff 1995:114.

8. *Syntactic "Anomalies" in Argumentative Contexts*

The above examples may all be said to be characteristic of lists or catalogues. As for argumentative texts, some peculiarities which traditional syntax would regard as examples of "primitiveness" or "clumsiness" can better be explained by reference to the function (e.g., topic-marking) which a given phrase is intended to serve.

An interesting example is provided by *On Places in Man*, which is probably one of the oldest Hippocratic writings;[111] the work presents a striking combination of considerable care and affectedness of style, e.g., in the use of hexametric rhythm and sound-effects, and a number of seemingly primitive characteristics. In an anatomical description of the human body, the author deals with the sutures in the skull:

> αἱ κεφαλαὶ ῥαφὰς ἔχουσιν, αἱ μὲν τρεῖς, αἱ δὲ τέσσαρας· αἱ μὲν τέσσαρας ἔχουσαι, κατὰ τὰ ὦτα ἑκατέρωθεν ῥαφὴ, ἄλλη ἔμπροσθεν, ἄλλη ἐξόπισθεν τῆς κεφαλῆς, οὕτω μὲν ἡ τὰς τέσσαρας ἔχουσα· ἡ δὲ τὰς τρεῖς, κατὰ τὰ ὦτα ἑκατέρωθεν, καὶ ἔμπροσθεν· ὥσπερ δὲ ἡ τὰς τέσσαρας ἔχουσα, οὐ διαπέφυκεν οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ῥαφή· ὑγιεινότεροι δ' εἰσὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν οἱ τὰς πλέονας ῥαφὰς ἔχοντες.
>
> The skulls have sutures, some three, others four; [as to] those that have four, on each side by the ears [is] a suture, another at the front, another at the back of the skull; such [is] the [skull] that has four [sutures]; [as to] the [skull] that [has] three, on each side by the ears [there are sutures], and at the front; just as the [skull] that has four [sutures], there is no suture across [the skull] here either; healthier with regard to their skull are those [people] who have more sutures.
> (Hp. *Loc. hom.* 6 = 6.284 L.)

It might seem easy to dismiss this paragraph as a piece of "archaic," "clumsy" writing. However, the author does his best to combine accuracy of description of the human skull with distinction of various types (without using anything like an equivalent of the word "type"). The use of the plural *hai kephalaí* "the skulls" at the beginning (instead of the singular *hē kephalḗ*, which one would expect) can be accounted for by the fact that he is going to distinguish between various skulls. The decision to deal with the skulls that have four sutures first may be seen as an instance of functional chiasmus.[112]

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[111] See Craik: forthcoming.

[112] On this, see Slings 1993:30–33 [as well as exx. (16)–(22) of his first study in this volume, ed.]. By "functional" I mean that the organization of the passage is not

The disruption of the syntax can be seen as a Theme construction that stands outside the syntactic construction: *kai mèn tèssaras ékhousai* "as for those with four sutures...." Once the distinction between various types of skulls has been made, the writer can switch from plural to singular; and the phrase *hoútō mèn hē tàs téssaras ékhousa* "such is the one with four [sutures]" concludes the description of the first type, the particle *mén* here being used in the transition from the item just discussed to the item to be discussed (marked by *dé*).[113] The phrase *hē dè tàs treîs* "and the one with three [sutures]" states the topic of the second part of the message; again the syntax is disrupted (there is no need to supplement a verb like *ékhei* "has"); and again, there is a change of syntactic structure.[114]

This kind of articulation of the various components of the sentence in a sort of staccato style seems above all to serve the purpose of clarity, possibly for didactic reasons;[115] and it is not inconceivable that it is intended to facilitate an aural reception of the information.[116]

A similar syntactic feature occurring in contexts where the author wishes to define a certain piece of information as distinct from information presented as the next step in the argument, is the occurrence of "anacoluthon" in Aristotle, who often begins an argument by stating the presuppositions to be taken for granted as a starting point for the discussion, e.g., principles that have been established in an earlier stage of the argument or in another treatise. One way of doing this is by using formulae such as *hupokeísthō* "let it be taken for granted that" or *hupókeitai* "it is assumed" but he may also begin with a subclause introduced by *epeí* or *epeidḗ* "when," "since," which, as it gets longer, begins to lead a life of its own and then suddenly

motivated by aesthetic intentions but by a consideration of what is most likely to be conducive to the reception of the message by the audience. As Slings points out, in contexts where two items are first stated and then discussed individually, the chiastic order A B B' A' is preferred over the parallel order A B A' B' in cases where the comment (A', B') is more complex.

[113] For this use of *mén* and *dé*, see Bakker 1993:303–5.

[114] With ὥσπερ δὲ ἡ τὰς τέσσαρας ἔχουσα, οὐ διαπέφυκεν οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ῥαφή.

[115] On the didactic nature of *On Places in Man*, see Craik forthcoming.

[116] To be sure, at several occasions the author refers to earlier passages in his work as being γεγραμμένα "written". However, of the four occasions two (both in 6.10 = 6.290 L.) may also refer to anatomical diagrams he uses in combination with his words; 47.9 (= 6.346 L.) may be comparable to the references to "written records" discussed above (prescriptions); which leaves 47.10 (= 6.348 L.) as the only (but perhaps not conclusive) indication that the work is intended to be presented in written form.

ends without being followed by a main clause, as in the following example:[117]

> Ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία μέρη τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἦν, ἓν μὲν δεσποτική, περὶ ἧς εἴρηται πρότερον, ἓν δὲ πατρική, τρίτον δὲ γαμική· καὶ γὰρ γυναικὸς ἄρχει καὶ τέκνων, ὡς ἐλευθέρων μὲν ἀμφοῖν, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἀλλὰ γυναικὸς μὲν πολιτικῶς τέκνων δὲ βασιλικῶς· τό τε γὰρ ἄρρεν φύσει τοῦ θήλεος ἡγεμονικώτερον, εἰ μή που συνέστηκε παρὰ φύσιν, καὶ τὸ πρεσβύτερον καὶ τέλειον τοῦ νεωτέρου καὶ ἀτελοῦς. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἀρχαῖς ταῖς πλείσταις μεταβάλλει τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχόμενον (. . . .) τὸ δ' ἄρρεν ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον.
>
> Since the skill of household consists of three parts, one being the skill of the master, which has been discussed above, one that of the father, and one that of marriage; for it is part of the household also to rule over wife and children, over both as free persons, yet not with the same type of rule, but over the wife in the manner of a statesman, over the children in the manner of a king; for the male is by nature more fitted to rule than the female, unless an unnatural situation exists, and that which is older and perfect is more fitted to rule than that which is young and unperfected. Now in most cases of rule by statesmen both that which rules and that which is ruled interchange . . . but the male stands in this relationship to the female continuously.
>
> (Ar. *Pol.* 1259^{a}37–1259^{b}10)

At first sight, one would expect that after the subclause introduced by *epeí dé* a main clause will follow. However, the subclause itself seems to display several levels of subordination: an explanatory parenthesis seems to be inserted (*kaì gàr gunaikós árkhei* "for it rules over the wife") which elucidates the second and the third part of the enumeration (*hèn dè patrikḗ, tríton dè gamikḗ* "one that of the father, and one that of marriage"). This parenthesis in its turn receives an explanation in the clause *tó te gàr árrēn* "for the male," which again consists of an enumeration of several segments the first of which is qualified with a conditional clause (*ei mḗ pou* "unless"). Consequently, when one arrives at the sentence beginning with *en mèn oûn taîs politikaîs arkhaîs* "now in cases of rule by statesmen," one may feel one has completely lost track. But in fact, the "main clause" (if this term is appropriate here at all) starts with *kaì gàr gunaikós árkhei* "for it rules over the wife," and this corresponds with the distribution of

[117] Other examples are Ar. *Poetics* 1452^{a}1–11, and the Hippocratic *Prognosticon* 1 (on which, see Althoff 1995:130–31). [Editor's note: See also Pl. *Grg.* 500d6–e4, discussed by Slings as ex. (15) of his second study in this volume, p. 204.]

information over the preceding and following chapters. For at the beginning of his discussion (1253^{b}1–14), Aristotle has identified the three forms of relationship mentioned here as types of household, and he has dealt with the first in an earlier stage of this discussion (chs. 4–6), leaving the other two for treatment in the present chapter. The sequence of the present passage shows that the point Aristotle wishes to make is that the type of management exercised by the husband and the father, while having some things in common with political leadership, differs from this in that there is no change of role between ruler and ruled. Thus the subclause beginning with *epeì dé* "and when/since" states information that is already known and which provides the relevant framework for what is to follow; and within this subclause a differentiation is made between an item that has already been discussed and two items which are now going to be discussed and explained.

The frequent occurrence of this type of construction in Aristotle has traditionally been explained as a sign of carelessness; however, if *epeí* or *epeidḗ* are seen as indicators that what follows is to be understood as a "given" on the basis of which the inquiry can proceed and thus providing the framework for the subsequent discussion, there is less reason to be upset. It is in correspondence with the use of *epeí* and *epeidḗ* in pre-posed subclauses stating the topic (which is "given") that is further to be discussed ("commented") in the following clause;[118] and it is in keeping with the kind of information contained in the subclause, which almost invariably belongs to what Aristotle takes for granted as "given," because he has either dealt with it in an earlier stage of his discussion or in another treatise or because it belongs to general human experience.[119]

Similarly in the Corpus Aristotelicum, "unconnected" clauses introduced by the subordinator *hóti* "that" can be regarded as "paragraph headings" or "topic markers" in a wider sense, as at the beginning of the (perhaps Pseudo-)Aristotelian *Physiognomonica*:[120]

> <u>ὅτι</u> αἱ διάνοιαι ἕπονται τοῖς σώμασι, καὶ οὐκ εἰσὶν αὐταὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰς <u>ἀπαθεῖς οὖσαι τῶν τοῦ σώματος κινήσεων. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον</u> πάνυ γίνεται ἔν τε ταῖς μέθαις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀρρωστίαις·

[118] On this, see Bakker 1991:231, with references to literature on topic and comment and the discourse function of preposed adverbial subclauses.

[119] For an examination of the philosophical contents of these subclauses, see Bodéüs 1991.

[120] [Editor's note: see also ex. (16) in Slings's second study in this volume, p. 205.]

> That mental dispositions follow the body and that they are not on themselves being unaffected by the movements of the body. This becomes very clear in cases of drunkenness and illness.
>
> (Ar. *Phgn.* 805ᵃ1–4).

In this case, the linguistic organization of the message may be intended to prevent misunderstanding concerning the point that is to be made: for example, it might be thought that *apatheîs oûsai tôn toû sṓmatos kinḗseōn* "being unaffected by the movements of the body" is presented as the explanation for what precedes, the statement that mental dispositions follow the body and are not on themselves. But in reality it belongs to the q.e.d. which is going to be illustrated by the examples of drunkenness and illness. Or it might be thought that once one arrives at *dē̂lon* "clear" the message is complete: "That mental dispositions follow the body and that they are not on themselves being unaffected by the movements of the body is evident," which in itself would be a familiar pattern in Aristotle. The use of *toûto* indicates that the whole contents of the previous clause is to be taken *en bloc* as the issue which is going to be demonstrated. And the use of the particle *dé* can be regarded as an instance of boundary-marking, because it indicates the shift between the topic which has just been stated and the comment which is to follow.[121]

9. *Structure and Organization of the Text*

As for the composition and structure of a text, patterns can also be discerned which may be viewed as elements of a collective cultural discourse determined by conventions of communication rather than as individual decisions by the author.

Ring composition has been examined in great detail and need not be discussed here;[122] the various ways in which this technique is

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[121] On the use of δέ as boundary-marker, and the relation of this notion with topic marking, see Bakker 1993, esp. 293–95. A similar example of ὅτι in (Pseudo-?) Aristotle is to be found at the beginning of book 2 (α) of the *Metaphysics* (993ᵃ30–ᵇ4): ὅτι ἡ περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας θεωρία τῇ μὲν χαλεπὴ τῇ δὲ ῥᾳδία. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ μήτ' ἀξίως μηδένα δύνασθαι θιγεῖν αὐτῆς μήτε πάντας ἀποτυγχάνειν, ἀλλ' ἕκαστον λέγειν τι περὶ τῆς φύσεως, καὶ καθ' ἕνα μὲν ἢ μηθὲν ἢ μικρὸν ἐπιβάλλειν αὐτῇ, ἐκ πάντων δὲ συναθροιζομένων γίγνεσθαί τι μέγεθος· (it should be said, however, that ὅτι is deleted at the beginning of this passage by some editors because of this very syntactic difficulty).

[122] See van Groningen 1958; van Otterlo 1944.

employed in the Hippocratic Corpus have been studied by Wenskus.[123] Paragraph division may be made in a variety of ways, for example by stating the subject of the section at the beginning and by a concluding remark at the end. Many nosological treatises in the Hippocratic Corpus follow a fixed pattern, stating the topic (e.g., a disease) followed by a description of symptoms, a statement of the cause, and therapeutic prescriptions. Here, again, data are organized in such a way as to allow for further addition and revision by later writers; cross-references to other parts of the work or to other treatises (very rare in the Hippocratic Corpus,[124] but used in an almost routine way by Aristotle) appear in various forms, referring either to what has already been said (or written down)[125] or to what is still to come, with the verb either in the active (singular: "I shall say" or plural: "We shall say") or in the passive, the latter with or without personal pronoun (see below).

A treatise that makes abundant, almost pedantic use of introducing and concluding formulae is *On Generation—On the Nature of the Child—Diseases IV*.[126] The linguistic organization of these structuring devices has been studied by Regenbogen.[127] Various types of announcements, all used on numerous occasions, can be distinguished: *ékhei dè hoútō kaì tóde* "such is the matter also with the following;" *eréō* "I shall say;"[128] *thélō* "I wish" plus infinitive (e.g., *ethélō dè apophēnai kállion* "I will give a better account"); *méllō ereîn* "I am going to say" (e.g., *katà anánkēn toiḗnde, hḕn méllō ereîn* "in accordance with a necessity of the kind I am going to explain"). Likewise, there is abundant use of concluding formulae, for example, *taûta dé moi es toûto eírētai* "this is what I have had to say about this," with many variations.[129]

In general, the use of such formulae, the form they take, the dis-

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[123] Wenskus 1982.

[124] In *On Affections*, the author refers at various occasions to a treatise on pharmacology, e.g., in chapters 4 (6.212 L.), 9 (6.216 L.), 15 (6.224 L.), and 18 (6.226 L.).

[125] See Usener 1990:295–98, with many examples.

[126] These three titles refer to different parts of what is generally agreed to be one continuous work by the same author.

[127] Regenbogen 1930 (1961:173–76).

[128] Either with a direct object or a subclause, e.g., ἐρέω δὲ καὶ ἄλλην διάγνωσιν "I will state yet another diagnosis"; ὁκοῖον δὲ ἦν, ἐγὼ ἐρέω "what it was like, I will tell you".

[129] E.g., καὶ ταῦτα μὲν εἴρηταί μοι περὶ τῶν ἐκ σπερμάτων φυομένων "this, then, is what I had to say about the growth of the seed;" πάντα ταῦτα εἴρηταί μοι ὅτι τῆς γῆς τὸ κάτω θερμότερον φαίνεται ἐὸν τοῦ χειμῶνος ἢ τοῦ θέρεος "all this I have said because what is under the earth appears to be warmer in winter than in summer."

tribution of each of these types, and the moment they enter the discussion (e.g., the length of the sections surrounded by announcement and conclusion), would deserve a study in its own right. The same can be said of the use of particles as structuring devices in argumentative texts.[130] For example, a transition from one paragraph to another, or from one treatise to another, is often marked by particle sequences like *mèn oûn. . . . dé*, as in the following passage:[131]

> περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τίνα τρόπον ἔχει καὶ κοινῇ καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον αἰσθητήριον εἴρηται· τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πρῶτον σκεπτέον περὶ μνήμης καὶ τοῦ μνημονεύειν.
>
> About the sense-organs and the sensible objects, it has now been stated in what way they work both in general and for each sense organ in particular; as for the remaining topics, first memory and remembering have to be examined.
>
> (Ar. *Sens.* 449b1–3).

10. *Beginning and End*

How a scientific text begins, or should begin, is a question which does not appear to have been definitively settled in the fifth and fourth century B.C.E.;[132] and this is even less the case with how it should end. Even something as obvious as a statement of the subject matter is by no means necessarily present at the beginning of the discussion; indeed, in some cases items mentioned in a proem or introductory section to Hippocratic writings are not discussed in the later sequence of the treatise. Thus the mentions of "the divine" at the beginning of the Hippocratic writings *Prognosticon* and *On the Nature of the Woman* seem to serve a ritual function rather than being announcements of things to be discussed later.[133] It may also happen that the author, while failing to indicate what he is actually going to talk about, begins by stating what he is not going to discuss, as in the Hippocratic work *On Fleshes*. This immediately raises the problem

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[130] On this subject, see in general van Ophuijsen 1993.

[131] For a similar example of such a "Gelenkstelle" in Aristoxenus of Tarentum, *Elementa harmonica*, proem, see the discussion by Althoff 1995:296. On the use of the particles μὲν οὖν. . . . δέ in such contexts, see Bakker 1993:302–5.

[132] On proems in the Hippocratic writings, see Lara Nava 1992. On proems in Latin scientific literature, see Santini and Scivoletto 1990–1992.

[133] Cf. Althoff 1995:323.

how the proem, if present, is related to the rest of the work, and whether it is part of the work in its original form or added later.

Some works begin without any introduction whatsoever.[134] Others state the subject matter in the first sentence without actually presenting it as such.[135] And again other works explicitly define the topic of discussion, e.g., by means of *peri* "about," as does the writer of *On the Sacred Disease*:

> Περὶ τῆς ἱερῆς νούσου καλεομένης ὧδ' ἔχει
>
> Concerning the so-called sacred disease, matters are as follows.
> (Hp. *Morb. sacr.* 1.1 = 6.352 L.)

This procedure is also often used by Aristotle.[136]

Some works begin with a strong statement, often in the form of a generalization; examples can be found in Aristotle, such as the beginning of the *Metaphysics* and of the *Nicomachean Ethics*,[137] or in the Hippocratic *On Places in Man*.[138] We also find the device (which was to have a long history in scientific communication, as every lecturer knows from experience) of attracting attention by beginning with a story or a particular example illustrating the general point to be revealed shortly. This happens, for instance, in Aristotle's *Eudemian Ethics*.[139]

What a number of proems in the Hippocratic Corpus have in common is the definition of the author's work in relation to predecessors or competitors, often with great polemical vigor. Famous examples are the proems of *Regimen*, *On the Nature of Man*, *Regimen in Acute Diseases*, and *On Ancient Medicine*.

As for endings, most works of Aristotle and some of the Hippocratic writings (e.g., *On Breaths*) conclude with some sort of closing formula

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[134] E.g., the Hippocratic *On Dental Problems*, *Internal Affections*, Books Two and Three of *Diseases*, and most surgical works.

[135] E.g., the Hippocratic *On Haemorrhoids*: Αἱμορροΐδων τὸ μὲν νόσημα ὧδε γίνεται, etc.

[136] E.g., at the beginning of *On the Progression of Animals* (704ᵃ4–9).

[137] *Met.* 980ᵃ21: πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει "All men by nature desire to have knowledge". *NE* 1094ᵃ1–2: πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξίς τε καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ "Every art and every discipline, just as [every] action and decision, appear to be striving after something good".

[138] Ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία εἶναι τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὁμοίως ἀρχὴ καὶ πάντα τελευτή "It seems to me that there is no beginning of the body, but everything is beginning and everything is end alike" (*Loc. Hom.* 1.1 = 6.276 L.).

[139] *EE* 1214ᵃ1–8. On this, see Gigon 1971.

("This subject has now been discussed") or with a reference to another treatise or discussion (e.g., the end of the Hippocratic *On Fleshes*). Some works end with a confident statement of what the author claims to have achieved (such as the end of *On the Sacred Disease*) or with an otherwise impressive sounding final chord (e.g., *Airs Waters Places*). The majority of the Hippocratic writings, however, simply end without any explicit indication that this is where the discussion stops.

Again, a comprehensive study of the beginning and concluding sections of Greek scientific writings would be desirable. Apart from the problems already raised, it might discuss questions of length, use of the first and second person (singular or plural), commonplaces (e.g., difficulty of the topic), the relation between beginning and end, and so on. Here, it would be particularly interesting to examine to what extent scientific literature is influenced by rhetorical theory.

11. *"Key:" Presence of the Author and the Audience in the Text*

Closely related to the previous sections is the presence or absence of the author in the text.[140] The use of the first person singular, in verb forms like *phēmí* "I state" or more emphatically in the use of the personal and the possessive pronoun, varies considerably from treatise to treatise. Different types can be distinguished:

In a number of cases, e.g., in the Hippocratic *Epidemics* (where the use of the first person is very limited), it tends to be used in order to support an empirical statement by an appeal to autopsy, as in:

> καὶ οὐδένα τούτων οἶδα ἀποθανόντα
>
> and I am not aware that any of these have died
>
> (Hp. *Epid.* 1.10 = 2.632 L.)

or in brief remarks such as *hōs kagō eîdon* "as I, too, have observed."[141]

The first person may also be used in emphatic, confident statements of the author's own opinion (often, but not always, in polemical context). It seems that this use by no means intends to qualify

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[140] "Key" is used here in the sense defined by Hymes 1972 (referred to above in section 2).

[141] Similar to this is a passage in *On Fleshes* 19 (8.610 L.), where the writer refers to what he himself has seen as a doctor and what public prostitutes have shown to him.

the statement as a personal, subjective view and thus should not be seen as a sign of modesty. Here, a parallel with archaic Greek lyric poetry can be perceived, where gnomic statements or general truths are frequently introduced by a formula such as "I say" or "it seems to me." Thus the Hippocratic *On Places in Man* begins as follows:[142]

> <u>Ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ</u> ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν οὐδεμία εἶναι τοῦ σώματος
>
> <u>I think</u> that there is no beginning of the body
>
> (Hp. *Loc. Hom.* 1.1 = 6.276 L.)

or *Regimen*:

> <u>φημὶ</u> δὲ δεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς συγγράφειν περὶ διαίτης...
>
> <u>I state</u> that the person who wishes to write correctly about diet...
>
> (Hp. *Vict.* 2.1 = 6.466 L.)

The use of the first person plural is less well-defined. In some cases, "we" refers to a group of doctors, as in the following case:

> ὅτ' ἐν Περίνθῳ <u>ἦμεν</u>, ἡ ἀσθμαθώδης ἡ 'Αντιγένεος...
>
> As <u>we were</u> in Perinthos, the asthmatic daughter of Antigenes...
>
> (Hp. *Epid.* 4.21 = 5.160 L.)

Perhaps a matter of decorum is the use of the first person plural in:[143]

> Κριτίας ἐν πυρετοῖς ὑπὸ ἐνυπνίων ὀχλεῖτο ὑφ' οἵων <u>οἴδαμεν</u>.
>
> Critias, in his fever, was disturbed by dreams; of which kind they were, <u>we know</u>.
>
> (Hp. *Epid.* 4.57 = 5.196 L.)

In a majority of cases, the first person plural is used when general human experience is referred to ("we humans"), as in *On the Sacred Disease*:

> κατὰ ταῦτα νομίζω τὸν ἐγκέφαλον δύναμιν πλείστην ἔχειν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· οὗτος γὰρ <u>ἡμῖν</u> ἐστι τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἠέρος γινομένων ἑρμηνεύς.

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[142] See also *On the Sacred Disease* 1.1 (6.352 L.) Περὶ τοῦ ἱερῆς νόσου καλεομένης ὧδ' ἔχει· οὐδέν τί μοι δοκεῖ τῶν ἄλλων θειοτέρη εἶναι "As for the disease called the sacred, matters are as follows: I believe that it is in no way more divine than the others."

[143] For a discussion of this passage, see Althoff 1995:92–93.

> This is how I know that the brain has the greatest power in man; it is <u>for us</u> the interpreter of what arises from the air.
>
> (Hp. *Morb. sacr.* 16.1 = 6.390 L.)

A significant alternation of singular and plural is to be found at the end of the first chapter of the same work, where the author cleverly tries to make his audience feel involved in a course of religious action which he defends and indeed opposes to the magical one advocated by his opponents:

> οὐ μέντοι <u>ἔγωγε</u> ἀξιῶ ὑπὸ θεοῦ ἀνθρώπου σῶμα μιαίνεσθαι (...) τὰ γοῦν μέγιστα τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων (...) τὸ θεῖόν ἐστι τὸ καθαῖρον καὶ ἁγνίζον καὶ ῥύμμα γινόμενον <u>ἡμῖν</u>, <u>αὐτοί</u> τε ὅρους τοῖσι θεοῖσι τῶν ἱερῶν (...) <u>ἀποδείκνυμεν</u> (...) <u>ἡμεῖς περιρραινόμεθα</u> (...). καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν καθαρμῶν οὕτω <u>μοι</u> δοκέει ἔχειν.
>
> However, <u>I</u> do not believe that the human body is polluted by a god... as for the greatest transgressions, the divine purifies, sanctifies and cleanses <u>us</u> from these, and <u>we ourselves</u> <u>mark</u> the boundaries of the sanctuaries of the gods... <u>we sprinkle ourselves</u>... This is <u>my</u> opinion on the purifications.
>
> (Hp. *Morb. sacr.* 1.44–46 = 6.362–64 L.)

Compared to the Hippocratic writings, the works of Aristotle are paradigmatic of the impersonal style. The only uses of the first person singular are in formulae such as *légō* "I mean," where the meaning or the sense in which a word is used is clarified, or in vivid examples.[144] Cross-references are either in the passive (without indication of the agent) or in the active plural: ("we shall deal with this later on"). The use of *hēmeîs* "we" in Aristotle is confined to the sense of "we humans," or "we observers."

A similar difference manifests itself in the presence of direct addresses to the reader or hearer. In the Hippocratic writings these are relatively frequent, which is due largely to the subject matter: in most cases the physician is addressed or instructed (in the text) to perform certain prognostic or therapeutic actions. Again, different types can be discerned. Second person singular (either with personal pronoun, or implicit in second person singular imperative) is used to instruct the physician or healer as to what he is to do or to believe when a certain set of symptoms are to be observed, as in the following case:

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[144] E.g., *On the Soul* 426^{b}19: οὕτω μὲν γὰρ κἂν εἰ τοῦ μὲν ἐγὼ τοῦ δὲ σὺ αἴσθοιο, δῆλον ἂν εἴη ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων "Thus, if I perceive one thing and you perceive another, it will be evident that they are different from one another".

ἢν δέ σοι ταῦτα ποιέοντι ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου σώματος ἡ νοῦσος ἐξελελήθῃ... καθήρας... μεταπῖσαι

If, when you do these things, the disease passes out of the rest of the body... you should clean out the head again... you should have the patient drink

(Hp. *Morb.* 2.13 = 7.24 L.)

Less direct addresses are in the form of verbal adjectives (*skeptéon*, "one should examine," constructions with *khrḗ* and *deî* "one should," "one ought to"), third person imperatives, and imperative infinitives.

Direct addresses in Aristotle's works are extremely rare. The only instances of the second person singular are cases where a pupil present at Aristotle's lectures appears to be addressed as the subject of an example to make the teaching more vivid, as in:[145]

τὸ γάρ σε ἑστάναι νῦν ψεῦδος μέν, οὐκ ἀδύνατόν δέ

that you are now standing is untrue, but it is not impossible

(Ar. *Met.* 1047^{b}13)

The only occurrence of a second person plural in Aristotle is the famous final chapter of the *Organon*, where he proudly invites his audience to assess his achievement in logic:

εἰ δὲ φαίνεται θεασαμένοις ὑμῖν ὡς ἐκ τοιούτων ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπαρχόντων ἔχειν ἡ μέθοδος ἱκανῶς (...) λοιπὸν ἂν εἴη πάντων ὑμῶν ἢ τῶν ἠκροαμένων ἔργον τοῖς μὲν παραλελειμμένοις τῆς μεθόδου συγγνώμην τοῖς δ' εὑρημένοις πολλὴν ἔχειν χάριν.

If, on consideration, it appears to you that, in view of such original conditions, our method is sufficient... the thing that remains for all of you or those who have listened is to pardon any omissions the method displays and to be very grateful for what has been found.

(Ar. *SE* 184^{b}3–8)

Other formal devices associated with "key" or personal flavor are formulae for fictional objections such as *all' ísōs phḗsei tis* or *ísōs d'án tis eípoi* "but someone might well say," or (in Aristotle) *aporḗseie d'án tis* or *ésti d'enstênai* "someone might object;" or the use of "rhetorical questions" by means of *tí kōlúei* "what prevents us from assuming that," inaugurated by the Hippocratic writers and exploited by Aris-

[145] Cf. also *Met.* 1029^{b}14; 1024^{b}20. These addresses to the reader are relatively frequent in the perhaps Pseudo-Aristotelian *Magna Moralia* (on which, see Brink 1932).

totle, just as its equivalent statement *oudèn kōlúei* "nothing prevents us from assuming that. . . ."[146]

12. *Modes of Argument; Rhetorical Arguments; Personality and Commonplaces*

Modes of argument used by the Hippocratic writers and Aristotle, the use of metaphors and analogies, and patterns of thought, such as antithesis, binary or quaternary schemata, have been studied in considerable detail, especially by Lloyd, Langholf, and Wenskus. While in some cases such a pattern of thought may be seen as a structuring device common to the mentality of the cultural community to which the writer belonged, in more specific cases one may suspect a deliberate effort on the part of the author to present his ideas in such a form that they are more likely to be accepted by his audience. For example, in the Hippocratic *Airs Waters Places*, the discussion of the various climatic differences between different areas seems to be structured according to a rather strict pattern of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. And a rather artificial looking quaternary system correlating humors with elementary qualities and seasons is used as an all-pervading principle of arrangement in the Hippocratic *On the Nature of Man*.

Apart from the use of rhetorical questions, already mentioned, there is the use of rhetorical arguments which do not stand up to logical scrutiny but which are intended simply to overrule the audience or to discourage potential objections. Here studies in the theory of argumentation provide useful instruments for classification of the various techniques employed by the ancient scientific writers.[147] In particular, it would be interesting to study the various forms of overstatement available to them, e.g., Aristotle's use of expressions such as *phanerón* or *dêlon* "it is clear that," *homologeîtai* "it is agreed that," *phaínetai* or *dokeî* "it seems," *horômen* "we observe," *phamén* "we say," etc. in contexts where it is in his interest to pass over a difficulty in the argument. One could examine whether there is any rationale underlying the distribution of the various formulae, or their negative

[146] Hp., *On the Sacred Disease* 1.25 (6.358 L.).

[147] E.g., Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Kruiger 1984; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1983.

counterparts or understatements (*ouk ádēlon* or *ouk aphanés* "not unclear"). Likewise, the use of words like *pollá* "many" and *pollákis* "often" where empirical justification is not easily available, or of *anankaíōs* or *anánkē* "necessarily" in cases where it is in the interest of the author's argument to give a greater impression of stringency than is actually warranted, would deserve more systematic examination.

More generally, it would be worthwhile to study the ways in which ancient scientific writers, just like orators, tried to convey a certain *ēthos* (in the ancient rhetorical sense of "personality") to their audiences, e.g., by presenting themselves in a certain way or assuming a certain pose with regard to their audience and their subject matter. Thus Lloyd has drawn attention to the alternation of dogmatism and uncertainty in ancient scientific writing;[148] and I have already mentioned the exploratory style of some of Aristotle's works, where an impression of uncertainty on the author's part may be intended to suggest to the audience that the author knows just as little about the subject matter as they do, and thus invite them to think along with him or to raise objections. Alternatively, the author may present himself as a venerable authority, as a schoolmaster ready to praise good suggestions and to castigate foolish answers, as a dispassionate self-deprecating seeker of the truth, or a committed human being who brings the whole of his life experience to bear on the subject he is dealing with, and so on. As we are all aware from our own experience with scientific communication, these are different styles of discourse, with different stylistic registers, types of argument, appeals to the audience, commonplaces, etc.; what they were like in the ancient world deserves to be described, and the attempt should be made to detect patterns, and perhaps systematicity, in them. For ancient scientists also had an interest in *captatio benevolentiae* and were aware of the importance of strategies such as a "rhetoric of modesty," a "rhetoric of confidence," etc. In this respect the dialogues of Plato provide good examples of these attitudes, and they may serve as starting points for a similar analysis of scientific writing which is not in the form of a dialogue (in this respect, the voluminous works of Galen would present a promising area of study).[149]

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[148] Lloyd 1987b.

[149] Barton 1994; von Staden 1995a.

13. *Conclusion*

The topics discussed above may give some idea of the problems to be addressed in a study of the forms of ancient scientific writing; and I hope to have shown that they are real issues, not just things already known and wrapped in new terminology. A systematic handbook (comparable to Lausberg's manual of *literary* rhetoric) of all the formal techniques used by scientific writers, supplemented by an account of what the ancient scientists themselves thought about these issues (e.g., the debate about the permissibility of metaphor in scientific writing), is a real *desideratum*. However, such a treatment has to be comprehensive, i.e., it should not focus exclusively on linguistic and textual matters, but take into account also the contexts and circumstances that influence the form a scientific speech act takes.[150]

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[150] I am grateful to the editor, Egbert Bakker, for inviting me to contribute to this volume and for his valuable suggestions and criticisms on an earlier version of this paper. I am also indebted for comments and stimulating exchange of ideas to Jochen Althoff (who kindly sent me a copy of his *Habilitationsarbeit* before publication); Volker Langholf (who sent me a pre-print of his forthcoming article on medical semiotics); David Langslow (who sent me the text of a paper on Latin medical terminology he delivered at Newcastle); James Longrigg, and Jonathan Powell. Naturally, these scholars are in no way to be held responsible for the use I made of their suggestions or for any other errors and infelicities this chapter may contain. Some of the ideas in this chapter were presented at a Classics Seminar at Leiden University in Spring 1994; I thank the organizers of this seminar, P. H. Schrijvers and C. M. J. Sicking, for this opportunity.

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE GRAMMAR OF THE SO-CALLED HISTORICAL PRESENT IN ANCIENT GREEK

C. M. J. Sicking and P. Stork

1. *Introduction*

Some two thousand years ago, the author of the treatise *On the Sublime* described the use of the present tense for relating past events as one of the so-called "Figures of Speech" (*trópoi*) that help poets and prose-writers enhance the quality of their writing:[1]

> If you introduce events that are past in time as happening at the present moment, you will turn the passage from mere narrative (διήγησις) into drama (ἐναγώνιον πρᾶγμα). "Someone," Xenophon says, "has fallen under Cyrus's horse, and being trampled on, *strikes* (παίει) the horse in the belly with his sword. It rears and *throws* (ἀποσείεται) Cyrus, and he *falls* (πίπτει) to the ground."
>
> (*De Subl.* 25)

Many scholars, both within and outside classical philology, would still be prepared to believe that this interpretation of the Historical Present[2] (hereafter: HP) as a stylistic variation of the past tenses in historical narrative hits at least part of the truth.[3] It has, however, long since become apparent that, in ancient Greek, the Present is frequently used for referring to past events that cannot possibly be construed as "vivid" or "dramatic."[4]

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[1] In our paraphrases and translations, we have italicized all translations of a Historical Present. Note that the author is quoting from memory: he has added a Historical Present (πίπτει) that is not in Xenophon's text, and has omitted ἀναβάλλει, which concludes the scene and gives it its point. See further Section 6 below.

[2] We will use the term Historical Present for those Present verb forms that, in a stretch of narrative text, are used in alternation with past tenses for referring to past events.

[3] See, e.g., the summing up of the explanation that "is traditionally put forth to account for the so-called Historical Present" in Fleischman (1990:75): "The use of the Historical Present is a technique for reporting events that are vivid and exciting, or for enhancing the dramatic effect of a story by making addressees feel as if they were present at the time of the experience, witnessing events as they occurred."

[4] See, e.g., Pl. *Prot.* 321e3, where the HP δίδωσιν refers to an action the audience has already been told about (321d3: δωρεῖται). See Section 3 below.

In order to account for these instances, scholars have resorted to a number of explanations. Attempts have been made to explain instances that do not meet the description, by subsuming the time-honored concepts "vivid" and "dramatic" under the much wider category "highlighted," which will accommodate a number of rather vague concepts such as "crucial," "decisive," "salient," "turning point," etc.[5] The instances that still resist classification under one of these headings have been set apart as instances of a *praesens annalisticum* or *praesens tabulare*, echoing the use of the Present in chronicles and genealogies.[6] Finally, it has been observed that certain categories of verbs, for one reason or another, are particularly prone to being used in the Present,[7] and that the HP is rare both in subordinate and in negative sentences.[8]

So a commentator who has to explain an instance of the *praesens pro praeterito* may make a choice out of at least four possibilities—if, that is to say, he does not decide just to remain silent on the subject: first, the event referred to is "highlighted," because it was meant to be dramatic, decisive, crucial, salient, etc. by the author; second, we have an instance of the *praesens annalisticum*; third, the verb involved belongs to a category that yields a more than average number of Historical Presents;[9] fourth, we simply have to do with a rarity, so any *ad hoc* explanation may or may not hit the mark.

This seems tantamount to confessing that we simply do not know exactly what motivated writers of Greek archaic and classical prose and poetry to opt, now and then, for a Present verb form for referring to a past event in a past context.[10] In this chapter we offer some

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[5] See, e.g., Rijksbaron 1994:22–24.

[6] See, e.g., Schwyzer and Debrunner (1966:272): "Das praesens pro praeterito erscheint aber auch inexpressiv (andere Bezeichnungen dafür sind registrierend, notizenhaft, praesens annalisticum oder tabulare). Es ist nicht nur bei Historikern, sondern auch in der Tragödie neben dem erstgenannnten Gebrauche, *von dem es sich nicht immer scharf abhebt*, häufig; es gibt ein trockenes Faktum, das durch den Zusammenhang zeitlich bestimmt wird." Emphasis added.

[7] For an attempt to define the semantic characteristics ("Aktionsart") of these categories, see Koller 1951, who, unfortunately, *a priori* takes it for granted that the usage of the *praesens pro praeterito* in Greek is comparable to what we find in Latin. See also de Jong (1991:40), who rightly allows for the possibility of idiosyncratic usage on the part of the author.

[8] See the summing up in Russell 1964:143. As to the small number of HPs in subordinate clauses, see note 35 below.

[9] Cf. Sections 4.7.1 and 8 below.

[10] There are, in classical Greek, virtually no instances where the Present is the

observations on the usage of the Historical Present that may enable the student of ancient Greek to give a more adequate and precise answer to this question. We have studied a representative sample of the relevant material: the narrative sections from Lysias's first and third speeches; the myth on the original state of man from Plato's *Protagoras*; the messenger speeches in the tragedies of Sophocles; the first book of Herodotus's *Histories*; some passages from Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*; and the first book of Xenophon's *Anabasis*.

1.1 Two preliminary observations seem to be in order:

First, from a morphological point of view the Greek Present[11] differs from both the Aorist and the Imperfect, in *two* respects: (i) the Present is characterized as a nonpast tense by the absence of the augment; and (ii) the Present is, just as the subjunctive, marked by "primary" endings, whereas Imperfect and Aorist, along with the optative, have "secondary" endings (e.g., [Ø]-*lú-ei* versus *é-lu-e*[Ø] or *é-lus-e*[Ø]). So, we may, at least in theory, link the suitability of the Greek Present to carry out some as yet unspecified function either to its not being marked as a past tense, or to its having primary rather than secondary endings.[12]

Second, the HP is absent from Homer; it is used more or less frequently by the classical historians (Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon) and orators (Lysias, Demosthenes) and in tragedy (especially in messenger speeches); in historical prose of the Hellenistic period, it has become almost extinct,[13] but reappears later—under the influence of "Atticism." The contradicting statements of the author of *On the Sublime*, who regards it as "dramatic," and of the rhetorician Aristides, who says that it produces *aphéleia* "simplicity,"[14] seem to indicate that

dominant vehicle of extended passages of a narrative text. The passage with the highest HP-density we know of is Thuc. 1.135–38, discussed in Section 7.1 below.

[11] In Homeric Greek matters are, or course, more complicated.

[12] Regarding the latter possibility it may be observed that scholars have seldom addressed the question of determining the semantic contribution of the contrast between primary and secondary endings. An attempt to do so has been made by Ruijgh 1971:238–39. Many scholars (e.g., Lehmann 1993:173) take it that the final -ι, being originally a deictic suffix (referring to the speaker's here and now) has been "reanalyzed" as a marker of present tense. On tense and deixis, see also Bakker's contribution to this volume.

[13] See Eriksson 1943, in particular his conclusion at pp. 112–14.

[14] Spengel 1854:552–53.

in the meantime the feeling for its original function had got lost.

Taken together, these observations suggest that treating the Historical Present in classical Greek as just another instance of a linguistic strategy that cuts across language, period, and genre is an unwarranted practice. We will have to reckon with the possibility that classical Greek authors used the Historical Present in a way that has no exact parallel in other languages (Latin being among them)—or even in later Greek authors.

2. *Forensic Speeches (Lysias)*

As our point of departure we have taken the instances of the HP in narrative sections in two forensic speeches of Lysias.

2.1 Collecting the HPs from the so-called *narratio* in Lysias 1, we get the following series of events:[15]

> Some time after my marriage a child *is born* [6: γίγνεται, in an ἐπειδή clause] to me and my wife; at the funeral of my mother, my wife was seen by Eratosthenes and *is seduced* by him [8: διαφθείρεται]. One day, when I came home unexpectedly, she pretended that she had to give our child the breast, and that she wanted to keep me from trying my hand with the maid meanwhile; she *shuts me up* in my room [13: προστίθησι, ἐφέλκεται]. I was unaware of the wrongs being done to me until an old woman *comes up* to me [15: προσέρχεται]; I followed up her advice and extorted from my servant all she knew about what was going on. After a few days, Eratosthenes once again *enters* my house [23: εἰσέρχεται], and the servant *tells* me that he was there [φράζει]; I *go out* of the house [23: ἐξέρχομαι], and *call* at the houses of several neighbors [23: ἀφικνοῦμαι]. Taking with me as many as I could, I entered the bedroom, and *knock* Eratosthenes down [25: καταβάλλω].
>
> (Lys. 1.6–25)

In order to prove that, in killing Eratosthenes, he was exercising the right of punishment accorded to him by the laws, the speaker has to show that Eratosthenes seduced his wife, that he corrupted her and brought disgrace upon his offspring, and insulted him by entering his house.[16] Since Eratosthenes' relatives are prosecuting the speaker

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[15] We have supplied a minimum of context, so as to enable the reader who is not familiar with the text, to understand what is communicated by the Present forms.

[16] See also par. 4 of the introduction to the speech.

for premeditated murder, he also has to show that he did not entice Eratosthenes into his house in order to kill him. We have only to rephrase the HP events in more legal terms in order to see that the selection gives us precisely the facts that will substantiate the speaker's specific claims, together with the fact that he took care to procure witnesses for the circumstances of the killing:

> My wife, who is the mother of my child, was seduced by Eratosthenes; she deliberately fooled me in order to sleep with him in my own house. I was informed about what was going on, and the next time Eratosthenes visited my wife, my servant told me that he was there. I went out to find witnesses, and knocked him down.

2.2 In Lysias 3, the main events reported by the speaker are the following:[17]

> Both myself and Simon were in love with the same boy. I wooed him with kindness and succeeded; Simon, on the other hand, sought to coerce the boy and failed. After an unsuccessful attempt to recover the boy from my home, he found out where I was dining, called me out and pelted me with stones: he *misses* me [8: ἁμαρτάνει], but *wounds* [8: συντρίβει] the forehead of one of my friends. Unwilling to make a laughing stock of myself for being in love at such a mature age, I decided to avoid Simon: I went abroad and took the boy with me. After an interval I *return* to Athens [10: ἀφικνοῦμαι]. While I was at the Piraeus, the boy visited a certain Lysimachus, who happened to live near Simon's house. Simon arranged an ambush. I *come home* [12: ἀφικνοῦμαι] and *join* the boy at Lysimachus's house [12: τρέπομαι]. When we *leave* the house [12: ἐξερχόμεθα] Simon and his friends *spring upon* us [12: ἐκπηδῶσιν]. They tried to seize the boy, who dropped his cloak and fled in his tunic. I fled in another direction. Thus, on the spot where Simon says that the fight occurred, nobody on either my or Simon's side received any hurt. After this the boy took refuge in a shop. Simon and friends followed him and tried to drag him away. When the bystanders tried to intervene, they too were assaulted. They had already got as far as Lampon's when, walking by myself, I *run into them* [17: ἐντυγχάνω]. Considering it a monstrous thing to stand by and see the boy subjected to such an outrage, I *get hold of* the boy [17: ἐπιλαμβάνομαι]. In the confused fracas that followed we all *receive* head *wounds* [18: συντριβόμεθα].
>
> (Lys. 3.5–18)

[17] Our paraphrase and discussion of the *narratio* are heavily indebted to the illuminating introduction to this speech in Carey 1989:87–92.

In order to find the common denominator of the events given in the Present, it is important to realize that the speaker is being prosecuted for *traûma ek pronoías* "premeditated wounding with intent to kill." From the fact that, in 3.18, he is content to obscure the issue of who wounded whom by claiming that both his opponent and he himself were hurt, we may gather that there was no denying that he actually had injured his opponent. So he had to make his stand on the circumstances of the action, and to make an attempt at disproving Simon's allegation (see also 3.28–37) that he himself was the aggressor. The speaker's selection of events that are given in the HP is in accordance with this legal position:

> At the first confrontation, Simon indeed missed me, but injured one of my friends. The second time, Simon and his friends were the ones who attacked me and my boy friend. When the final confrontation took place, I was trying to rescue the boy from being violently dragged away by his attackers, and on that occasion, everyone, myself included, was hurt.

The remaining Present verb forms (2 times *aphiknoûmai* "I arrive;" *trépomai* "I turn to;" *exerkhómetha* "we go out;" *entunkhánō* "I run into") all refer to the speaker's entering the scene of the action. Apart from making it clear that there have been three, and only three, confrontations, they suggest that, each time, the speaker's entering the scene was all that was needed to trigger off yet another manifestation of his opponent's propensity to violence. This is in line with what we read in the proof section, where the speaker further elaborates on his total lack of *prónoia* "premeditation:" he came utterly unprepared to Lysimachus's house (3.32), and, subsequently, far from seeking out his opponents, he just happened to encounter them when they were dragging the boy away.[18]

The two passages we have discussed so far seem to indicate that the criterion which made Lysias opt for an HP is the relevance of the events thus presented *for the legal claims he had to present* in order to refute his opponent's case.

3. *Protagoras's Myth "On the Original State of Man"*

In Plato's *Protagoras*, Socrates has observed that, when the Athenians are deliberating on issues of public policy, anyone can stand up and

[18] See also 3.37 ἐντυχών; cf. ἐντυγχάνω in 3.17.

advise his fellow citizens, whereas in matters they consider technical, they refuse to listen to anyone who cannot claim to be an expert on the subject. Would this not mean that they disagree with Protagoras, who has claimed that general policy is a technical subject calling for a special training? Protagoras undertakes to answer Socrates' question, and starts doing so by telling a *mûthos* "myth:"

> The gods *mold* [320d2: τυποῦσιν] the mortal species by blending together earth, fire, air, and water. Epimetheus *assigns* [320d8: νέμει] to each race the abilities for preserving itself. When he was at a loss how to equip the human race, Prometheus *arrives* [321c3: ἔρχεται], and *sees* [321c4: ὡς ὁρᾷ] that man is still naked and unprotected against the elements. He *enters* the building where Hephaestus and Athena practiced their arts [321e1: εἰσέρχεται], *steals* [321d1: κλέπτει] from them the arts that would enable man to keep himself alive, and *gives* [321d3: δωρεῖται, repeated at 321e3: δίδωσιν] them to man. This proved insufficient for preventing man from being killed by the wild animals, against which the only defense lay in combined action. When, however, they tried to live together, it turned out that they did not manage to do so without eventually killing each other. Fearing, therefore, that the whole species would be wiped out,. Zeus *sends* [322c2: πέμπει] Hermes to bring the human race the social virtues. Hermes *asks* [322c3: ἐρωτᾷ] him how he should distribute these gifts, and Zeus ordered him to give all men a share in them.
>
> (Pl. *Prt.* 320d1–322d5)

As in the narrative sections in Lysias, the incidence of the HP appears to be bound up with the relative importance the events referred to have for the speaker's intentions. The HP events constitute precisely what Protagoras needs in order to demonstrate that the "political virtues" are unlike the practical abilities: although they were not innate in man from the beginning, the gods saw to it that they are at least possessed to some degree by everybody. This will enable him to maintain that the Athenians are right in distinguishing between issues that call for an expert and issues which pertain to general policy, and to claim at the same time that this still leaves him room for teaching citizens how to use successfully the basic faculties assigned to them.

4. *Messenger Speeches*

In order to see whether the usage of the HP in poetry differs from what may be observed in prose texts, we have studied a number of

so-called messenger speeches. We have taken our examples from the work of Sophocles[19] because this makes it possible to discuss the complete material in one author.[20]

4.1 In the *Ajax*, the Messenger has been asked by the Chorus (746–47) to inform them about a prophecy that has been made by Calchas. The content of his report is the following:

> Calchas has advised Ajax's brother Teucer to keep Ajax at home for just one day, since, on this day, he is doomed to meet Athena's wrath. Athena's wish to punish Ajax was motivated by the following: the day he left his home, his father *warns* [764: ἐννέπει] him that he needed the help of the gods, and Ajax said that he intended to win on his own account, since any fool could win with a god beside him. A second time, when Athena herself told him where to lay about amongst his enemies, he *retorts* [773: ἀντιφωνεῖ][21] that she may as well give her assistance to some other Greek, since he was perfectly able to stand his ground by himself. By this kind of talk Ajax earned himself the fury of Athena. But if he lives today, there is a chance that he may yet be saved.
>
> (S. *Aj.* 748–79)

There are only two HPs, both of them occurring in what may be called an embedded story, quoted by the Messenger from the mouth of Calchas, to explain why Athena wanted to punish Ajax. The first HP introduces the conversation Ajax had with his father Telamon, the second one introduces Ajax's blasphemous reaction to Athena's offer to help him.

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[19] For the use of the HP in Euripides' messenger speeches, see de Jong (1991:38–45): "the frequent use of the historic present is in keeping with the messenger's technique of mentally going back in time and recounting the events as he experienced them (. . .). Generally speaking he uses historic presents to draw his addressees into the story, to allow them to share his own experience." She seeks to account for the variety of instances by distinguishing between different "levels of engagement" (p. 45), the lowest level resulting from the HP as *variatio*, and the more telling instances serving, for instance, to highlight important or decisive actions, to draw attention to the starting point of a series of events (or to its climax), to bring life to a quick succession of events. The problem with this type of analysis, however, is that it is difficult to see how each category relates to the central concept of "vividness," and that it will accommodate practically any instance one can imagine without offering something like a common (and, preferably, testable) criterium which both includes and explains *all* instances actually found in our texts.

[20] Of the seven complete tragedies by Sophocles we have, only the *Philoctetes* is without a messenger speech.

[21] There is a *varia lectio* ἀντεφώνει.

It is at first sight surprising that the first HP represents Telamon's warning rather than the answer to it of Ajax himself, whereas in the conversation with Athena the hero's own words are introduced by an HP. The reason for this seems to be that the first conversation is meant as a prelude to the second one: precisely the fact that Ajax has been warned by his father to pay due respect to the gods enhances the significance of his willfully and consciously scorning Athena. An adequate summary, then, of the facts related by Calchas would have to be something like: despite having been instructed to the contrary by his father, Ajax, nevertheless, insulted Athena.

4.2 The story that is told in the messenger speech in the *Electra* (680–763) is made up by Orestes' tutor and confidant, for the purpose of making Clytaemnestra believe that Orestes has died in the course of a chariot race. The speech is an answer to Clytaemnestra's question as to how Orestes finds his death (679: *tôi trópōi dióllutai?* "in what way does he die?").[22] The instances of the HP are confined to the final section of the narrative:

> To begin with all went well with every chariot. Then, the Athenian's horses *run away* [725: φέρουσιν] and *clash* [727: συμπαίουσι] with the chariot of the African competitor. Seeing this, the Athenian charioteer *manages to avoid* the chariot wrecks [732: παρασπᾷ, ἀνακωχεύει]. Orestes *sees* [736: ὅπως δ' ὁρᾷ] that there was only one rival left, and *gives chase* [738: διώκει]. He *misjudges the turn* [744: λανθάνει], fouled the post, was hurled over the rail of his chariot, and *gets entangled* in his reins [746: ἑλίσσεται]. *When the people see* his fall [749: στρατὸς δ' ὅπως ὁρᾷ], a cry of pity went up [750: aor. indic.].[23] They extricated his mangled body [755: aor. indic.]. Having burned [757: aor. partic.] him, some men of Phocis *carry away* [759: φέρουσιν] the urn with his ashes so that he may rest in his native soil. Such is my sad story.
>
> (S. *El.* 723–62)

[22] The question as to why Sophocles wrote διόλλυται instead of a past tense will not be discussed here (*Trach.* 749 is another instance of a dramatis persona questioning a messenger by means of Present verb forms). It may be relevant that Clytaemnestra's interest in the way Orestes found his death contrasts with her previous dismissal of Electra's grief: "you may see to your own concerns: my present concern is that I want to know how he perished." See also note 12 above, and our final hypothesis in Section 8.

[23] We do not discuss the Present λαγχάνει (751) because, strictly speaking, it is part of the crowd's reaction to what happened to Orestes, rather than of the narrative itself: "when the people saw him fallen from the car, a cry of pity went up—what a sad doom [οἷα λαγχάνει] for who has done such deeds, now dashed to earth,

As can be seen at once, all the HPs but the final one describe the final stage of the race that has resulted in Orestes' death, up to and including the reaction of the crowd that introduces the conclusion of the narrative. The last HP in the series has been thought to refer to the speaker's own "here and now." The optative in the final clause that follows it (760: *eklákhoi* "would be his part"), however, makes it clear that, like the preceding Present forms, *phérousin* "they carry" must temporally refer to the past.[24] So it both continues and concludes the series of HPs: "the Phocians carried his ashes away (from the scene in Delphi) to find due burial in his fatherland."

4.3 In the *Oedipus Tyrannus*, it is explicitly announced by the Messenger that he is going to answer the Chorus's question (1236: *pròs tínos pot' aitías?* "from what cause?") as to what has brought Iocaste to her death: "her own hand did it. (. . .) keeping to my own memory,[25] I will tell you about her last agony" (*peúsēi tà keínēs athlías pathḗmata*).[26]

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now tossed feet uppermost to the sky!—till the charioteers, with difficulty checking the career of his horses, loosed him" (749–55; translation Jebb).

[24] Surprisingly, most editors (Jebb, Pearson, Dawe, and Lloyd-Jones & Wilson among them) have decided to print J's reading ἐκλάχῃ, presumably because making φέρουσιν refer to a past action runs counter to what is generally believed to motivate the usage of the HP. Cf. Jebb's note *ad loc.*: "ἐκλάχῃ, depending on φέρουσιν, is more natural here than ἐκλάχοι, which would depend on τεταγμένοι and refer to the purpose of the senders." This seems to imply that ἐκλάχοι cannot depend on φέρουσιν. It will, however, not do to make the optative depend upon τεταγμένοι, since that is no past tense either. Moreover, 1) by reading ἐκλάχῃ, one would make the *tutor himself* responsible for the indication of the purpose of bringing the urn—which, of course, he is not: like the preceding narrative, the intention to bury the ashes in Orestes' native soil is part of the fiction that has been concocted in order to mislead Clytaemnestra; *pace* Jebb, it must, therefore, refer to the purpose of the (invented) senders; 2) the urn is actually brought in only at 1098. So, if one reads ἐκλάχῃ, one is almost compelled to make φέρουσιν into an instance of the *praesens pro futuro* (cf. Watling's Penguin translation: "shortly some men of Phocis will be bringing you"). For this there is no indication in the context (unless, of course, one is prepared to take, as Watling seems to do, εὐθύς (757) with φέρουσιν instead of with κέαντες). Jebb's "are bringing in" does not fit the situation, which would require something like "are on their way to bring [hither]." But for thus stressing the durative *actio* of the process there is no indication either.

[25] The great majority of the messengers in Greek tragedy stress the fact that they have been eye-witnesses to the events involved. This speech is an exception, since the Messenger has not witnessed Iocaste's suicide. For the same reason, Sophocles makes him promise to report about her παθήματα, rather than—as he was asked—about the αἰτία of her death.

[26] S. *OT.* 1237–40.

> She cried aloud [1245: imperfect?][27] to her first husband Laius long since dead (. . .). She *dies* [1251: ἀπόλλυται] in a way that was hidden from us:[28] Oedipus broke in, and wanted to kill her. Some demon *guides* him [1258: δείκνυσι] to the place where she was. He *sees* her [1265: ὅπως ὁρᾷ νιν] and *unties* [1266: χαλᾷ] the rope on which she had hanged herself.
>
> (S. *OT* 1245–66)

The remaining part of the Messenger's report (1268–79) is concerned with Oedipus's subsequently blinding himself. It contains no further instances of the HP—which would be very surprising indeed if the HP would owe its presence to the author's wish to highlight dramatic events: no one would contest that Oedipus's piercing his eyeballs is both dramatic and crucial to Sophocles' play, or that the Messenger himself feels involved in what he has to report (cf. 1267: *deinà g' ẽn tanthénd' horân* "what came next was terrible to see"). As it is, however, the only actions that are presented by means of an HP are those that concern Iocaste. We cannot but conclude, then, that Sophocles has chosen the HP only for those events that are directly relevant to the specific question the Messenger has been asked and has promised to answer.

4.4 In *Antigone* 1095 ff., Creon has decided to release Antigone from her prison and to set up a tomb for the unburied Polynices, and has left the scene in order to do so. After a choral song, a Messenger comes and informs the Chorus that Haemon is dead, by his own hand (1155–71). Then Creon's wife, Eurydice, enters the scene and asks the Chorus to tell her what they have heard (1183–91). A summary of the messenger-speech that follows (1192–1243) will make clear that only those events that are directly relevant to what must be supposed to be Eurydice's primary interests, are given in the HP: the HPs inform her as to what happened to her husband and her

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[27] Most editors print καλεῖ instead of the unanimous κάλει of the manuscripts. It will, however, be clear that our manuscripts testify only to some scribe's, or scholar's, interpretation of the ambiguous ΚΑΛΕΙ that must have been in Sophocles' autograph. The same goes, *mutatis mutandis*, for φοιτᾷ (1255, φοιτᾷ Lrpat: φοίτα p). It will be clear that, when one is studying the grammar that underlies the usage of the HP, this kind of dubious instances should not play a role in the argument.

[28] If one wants to maintain that the HP is motivated by the speaker's wish to make his addressees into a kind of witnesses of what he has seen himself, the instance is, to say the least, problematic: in this case, the messenger has seen nothing at all. We owe this observation to the editor of this volume.

son. The burial of Polynices, however, is reported in the Aorist, as is the discovery that Antigone has hanged herself—although Creon's decision to bury Polynices concerns what is the cardinal issue of the tragedy, and the audience strictly speaking does not yet know whether he will arrive in time to set Antigone free. We may conclude that Sophocles has used the HP for marking those parts of the Messenger's report that constitute the answer to the question of the *dramatis persona* who is present, and who is the primary addressee of the speech:

> We first washed [1201: Aor. partic.] Polynices' remains, and burned [1202: Imperf.] what was left of him. Having raised a mound of earth over his ashes [1204: Aor. part.], we went [1204: Imperf.] to the rock-chamber where Antigone had been left to die. Someone *hears* [1207: κλύει] cries of anguish, and *tells* [1208: σημαίνει] Creon. As Creon approached, sounds of lamentation *are to be heard* [1209: περιβαίνει], and he *cries* aloud [1211: ἵησι] about what he feared. We went and looked [1220: Imperf.] and saw [1221: Aor. indic.] Antigone hanging by the neck and Haemon standing with his arms about her. When Creon *sees* [1226: ὡς ὁρᾷ] this, he *goes* to his son [1227: χωρεῖ], and *beseeches* [1227: καλεῖ] him to come away.[29] But Haemon *draws* his sword [1233: ἕλκει], and missed Creon. Then Haemon thrust his sword in his own side, *embraces* [1237: προσπτύσσεται] Antigone and *dies* [1238: ἐκβάλλει].
>
> (S. *Ant.* 1201–39)

4.5 In the *Trachiniae*, the introduction to the messenger-speech is a short conversation between Deianira—who, in a desire to win back her husband by means of a love-charm, has, unwittingly, poisoned him—and Heracles' son Hyllus:

> – I wish that you were not my mother.
> – How have I given you cause to hate me?
> – Do you know that today you have killed your husband, my father?
> – Who is your witness to this thing you charge me with?
> – I saw it with my own eyes.
> – You found him? Were you with him at the time? Where was it?
> – Do you want to know? Then let me tell you.
>
> (S. *Trach.* 734–48)

Then Hyllus reports the following:

[29] Here, all the manuscripts have the Present forms χωρεῖ and καλεῖ, but it is, of course, uncertain whether this is what Sophocles actually meant to write.

When Heracles was on the point of celebrating his victory over the city of Eurytus, Lichas arrived with the robe that was your present to your husband. Heracles put it on and proceeded with the sacrifice. He *slays* twelve oxen [760: ταυροκτονεῖ], and, as the flame of the sacrifice began to feed on the blood and the juice of the pinewood, the robe *clings* tightly [767: προσπτύσσεται][30] to every inch of his body, and the poison began to consume him. He shouted for Lichas, who told him that he had delivered the gift as he received it from you. Heracles thereupon seized the man by the joint of his ankle, *dashes* him upon a rock [780: ῥίπτει] and *breaks* his skull [781: ἐκραίνει]. Then he called me and asked me[31] to carry him elsewhere. We rowed him over to this shore. Whether he is still alive, I do not know. This is what you have done, mother, to my father.

(S. *Trach.* 749–812)

The *raison d'être* of the HPs becomes clear when we realize, first, that, according to Hyllus, Deianira must have known about the effect of the robe, and, second, that Heracles' killing the man who brought the robe is a substitute for the punishment he wanted to inflict on Deianira herself. So it is the prime concern of Hyllus's narrative to justify his accusation and to answer Deianira's questions:

It was at the moment Heracles started celebrating his victory [at the moment, that is, chosen by Deianira herself], that the poison had its effect. He killed the man you had entrusted with bringing him your "present."[32]

That is all, and for Deianira it is enough: she goes silently towards the palace, and, later on, the Chorus is told that she has killed herself.

4.6 In the *Oedipus at Colonus*, Oedipus has left the scene at v. 1555. He has taken Theseus with him, speaking to him as follows:

I shall take you to the place where I must die. You alone shall see and know. You are to keep the secret for ever, and when your life is drawing to an end, disclose it to your chosen heir, and he to his, and so for ever and ever. This will ensure Athens' future safety.

(S. *OC* 1518–55)

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[30] προσπτύσσεται: Musgrave, codd.: προσπτύσσετο. We have, with Jebb, Pearson, and Lloyd-Jones & Wilson, printed the Present because we share Musgrave's belief that an Imperfect would be very surprising indeed.

[31] 796: καλεῖ H. Stephanus, κάλει codd.: cf. note 27 above.

[32] If, at 796, καλεῖ is read, Heracles' asking his son to take him to a place where he could die, must be included in this summary.

After a choral song, a Messenger enters. His speech is preceded by a short conversation with the Chorus:

> – I am here to say that the life of Oedipus is ended.
> – He is dead, poor man?
> – He has seen the last of his mortal days.
> – By some act of God, was it? And with no pain?
>
> (S. *OC* 1579–85)

The Messenger then reports what he has seen:

> Oedipus went to a sacred place. There, he was washed and dressed by his daughters. When he was satisfied, there came a peal of thunder. On *hearing* it [1610: ὡς ἀκούει], Oedipus said farewell to his daughters, and then, suddenly, there was a voice: a god called[33] him again and again by his name. When he heard the summons, he *calls* [1630: αὐδᾷ] for Theseus, and made him promise to take good care of his daughters. When this was done, he *tells* [1639: λέγει] everybody to go from the place, since only Theseus would be permitted to see the rest. When we had gone a little distance, we turned and looked back. Oedipus was nowhere to be seen, but Theseus was standing alone, holding his hand before his eyes as if he had seen some terrible sight. And soon we *see* [1654: ὁρῶμεν] him salute heaven and earth with a short prayer. In what manner Oedipus passed from this earth, no one can tell.
>
> (S. *OC* 1586–1616)

The HPs only start at the moment immediately before Oedipus's end, and give neither less nor more than what is essential for the issues at hand: answering a god's call, Oedipus said farewell to his daughters and entrusted them to Theseus. Then he told everyone but Theseus to go away, and the next thing we saw was Theseus saying a prayer.

4.7 It may be concluded that Sophocles' use of the HP has nothing to do with enhancing the dramatic impact of the events involved; nor can the HP events be characterized as merely crucial, salient or important. In order to understand why it is that some events are given by means of an HP, while others are not, we have to be more specific, and to take into account the communicative situation in which the messengers find themselves: what the HP verbs have in common

[33] 1626: καλεῖ, κάλει t: the verb form is part of a γάρ clause, expressing the Messenger's conviction that the voice they heard belonged to a *god*: so it seems likely that Sophocles meant to write an Imperfect.

is that, together, they contain the information that is desired by the *dramatis persona* who is the addressee of the speech. It is to be noted that the selection of HP events is apparently not bound up with a messenger's own wish to highlight certain events.[34]

Furthermore, the speeches often contain a number of Aorist indicatives referring to other information that, for instance in the *Oedipus Tyrannus*, must be considered to be at least as dramatic, surprising and/or crucial to the play as a whole as is the information given by means of the HPs. In other cases, the Aorist indicatives do little more than fill in the messenger's narrative so as to make it into a complete report of what has happened. A case in point is the speech in the *Oedipus at Colonus*, where we are told by means of Aorist indicatives that Oedipus "sat down" at the sacred place (1597: *kathézeto*) and "took off" his old garments (1597: *éluse*), or that his daughters "returned" (1602: *epóreusan*) with the water their father wanted. Even the peal of thunder, which signals that, from now on, the gods will take over, is referred to by means of an Aorist (1606: *ktúpēse*), as is its effect on those who are present, the Messenger himself among them (1607: *rhígēsan* "they shuddered").

4.7.1 It has to be noted that in the messenger-speeches HP verbs of saying are rather frequent. In these instances, it is, of course, the *content* of what is being said, rather than a character's just opening his mouth, that is decisive. The same goes for verbs of hearing and seeing, where it is the speaker's intention to inform his audience as to *what* someone saw, or heard, rather than that he/she saw or heard something.[35]

5. *Some Examples from Herodotus and Thucydides*

5.1 In the first book of Herodotus's *Histories* the HPs are distributed unevenly: alongside long stretches of narrative where the HP is conspicuous by its absence, there are other passages where it is

[34] *Pace* de Jong 1991:41.

[35] See further Section 8 below. We may note in passing that the phrases ὡς/ὅπως ὁρᾷ and ὡς ἀκούει are, so to speak, stock-phrases in a Sophoclean messenger-speech (e.g., *El.* 736, 749; *OT* 1265; *Ant.* 1226; *OC* 1610; see also *OT* 807, in Oedipus's own report of what happened when Laius was killed). So, although it is, of course, only natural that only a small number of HPs occur in subordinate clauses, there is,

comparatively frequent. A good example of the latter is the story of Gyges and the wife of Candaules (1.8–12). This passage is one of the stock examples for illustrating the use of the HP, since it seems at first sight to confirm the belief that the HP is used for enhancing the dramatic impact of certain events. As in the instances discussed so far, however, it is important to realize that the purpose of the story in its context is to explain how the sovereignty of Lydia passed from Candaules, the last of the Heraclid dynasty, to the family of Croesus (1.71)—who is one of the main characters in Herodotus's *Histories*. The contextual function of the HPs can be made clear by the following summary:

> Candaules had a passion for his own wife. His body-guard and confidant Gyges refused his master's invitation to hide himself in his bedroom so as to admire her naked beauty. Candaules nevertheless introduced him into his bedroom. The queen *notices* [10.2: ἐπορᾷ] that Gyges had watched her when she was naked. She did not cry out, nor let it be seen that she had perceived anything. She summoned Gyges, and made it clear to him that he must either kill her husband or die himself. Gyges *decides* [11.4: αἱρέεται] to follow the course of action that would make him survive. The queen *hides* him [12.1: κατακρύπτει] behind the door of the bedroom, and Gyges, by killing [12.2: Aor. part.] Candaules, obtained [12.2: Aor.] the throne and the queen.
>
> (Hdt. 1.8–12)

The takeover of the monarchy itself (Gyges' killing the last Heraclid and himself obtaining the throne) is presented by an Aorist. The HPs together provide the gist of what has led up to it, the crucial moves being those of Gyges, who is to be the new king, and the queen, who eventually will become his wife:

> Candaules' wife noticed the offensive behavior of her husband, and she provided Gyges, who chose to survive rather than to die, with the occasion to kill him.[36]

5.2 Thucydides' story of Harmodius and Aristogiton (6.54–58) is, in many respects, comparable to Herodotus's Gyges story. Thucydides' reason for writing about the so-called "tyrant killers" is that he wants

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apparently, no characteristic of the HP *as such* that would make it less apt for being used in such clauses.

[36] This passage is fully discussed in Sicking 1996:83–102, along with Herodotus's story of Periander and his son (Hdt. 3.50–53), where, *mutatis mutandis*, the HP is used in exactly the same way.

to correct the mistaken ideas of his contemporaries about what actually happened when the tyrant's brother, Hipparchus, was murdered.[37] The facts that are of prime importance for the *raison d'être* of the narrative in its context are given in the HP:[38]

> Harmodius *informs* [54.3: καταγορεύει] his lover Aristogiton that he had been approached by the tyrant's brother Hipparchus; Aristogiton, fearing that Hipparchus might take Harmodius by force, *plots* to overthrow the regime [54.3: ἐπιβουλεύει]. Harmodius and Aristogiton *kill* Hipparchus [573: ἀποκτείνουσιν]. Aristogiton, for the time being, *escapes* [57.4: διαφεύγει], Harmodius *is killed* on the spot [*ib*.: ἀπόλλυται].

6. *Book One of Xenophon's* Anabasis

The observations of the author of *On the Sublime* which we have cited above are exemplified by a passage from Xenophon: it is part of a scene that occurs during a battle between Egyptians and Persians, and meant to illustrate how important it is for a sovereign to enjoy the loyalty of his subjects:[39]

> The king's horse is *wounded* [37: παίει], and *shakes off* [37: ἀποσείεται] its rider; he is rescued from a certain death only when one of his followers mounts him [38: ἀναβάλλει] on his own horse.
>
> (X. *Cyr*. 7.1.37–38)

The author of *On the Sublime* could also have cited a similar passage from Xenophon's *Anabasis*, which is even more dramatic, since it contains the report of Cyrus's unexpectedly being killed during the battle of Cunaxa.[40]

Yet it is easy to shake the belief that is illustrated by pointing out that, in the very first sentence of Xenophon's *Anabasis*, the fact that Darius and Parysatis had two sons born to them (of whom the elder was Artaxerxes and the younger Cyrus) is also referred to by an HP (1.1.1: *gígnontai paîdes dúo* "two sons are born"). Some modern scholars would, perhaps, consider this to be an instance of the *praesens*

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[37] See Thuc. 6.54.1: ἣν ἐγὼ ἐπὶ πλέον διηγησάμενος ἀποφανῶ οὔτε τοὺς ἄλλους οὔτε αὐτοὺς Ἀθηναίους περὶ τῶν σφετέρων τυράννων οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενομένου ἀκριβὲς οὐδὲν λέγοντας.

[38] See also the discussion of this passage in Sicking 1996:94–101.

[39] 38: ἔνθα δὴ ἔγνω ἄν τις ὅσου ἄξιον εἴη τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ἄρχοντα ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ αὐτόν.

[40] See Section 6.2.3 below.

annalisticum—which, of course, would be an appropriate vehicle for reporting about the birth of two royal sons. This, however, will not do either, if only because in the first book of the *Anabasis* no less than twenty-four HPs (out of ninety-seven) are instances of *elaúnei* or *exelaúnei* "he drives/marches," all of them referring to the stages of the army's journey from Sardes to inner Persia. So one may well maintain that no current belief about the function of the HP will provide a satisfactory explanation of the way it is used in the first book of the *Anabasis*: the twenty-four stages of the expedition are neither "dramatic" nor "crucial" to the story, nor are they likely candidates for the label *praesens annalisticum*. Let us first state the facts in *Anabasis* 1.1–10:[41]

6.1 Up to Cyrus's departure from Sardes (*An.* 1.2.5), Xenophon's narrative appears to have two main objectives: to explain how it came about that Cyrus decided to aspire to the throne of Persia (1.1.1–4), and to explain how he gathered his forces (1.1.4–2.5).

As to the former subject, the HPs inform the reader of the following:

> Darius *gets* two sons [1.1.1: γίγνονται]. When he was dying, he wished [Imperf.] to have both his sons with him. The elder one happened [1.2: Imperf.] to be already there, but Cyrus he *summons* [1.2: μεταπέμπεται] from the province over which he had made [1.1.2: Aor.] him satrap. Cyrus *goes up* [1.1.2: ἀναβαίνει] to his father, taking Tissaphernes with him. He took [1.1.2: Aor.][42] with him three hundred Greek hoplites. When Darius had died, and Artaxerxes had become king, Tissaphernes falsely *accuses* [1.1.3: διαβάλλει] Cyrus of plotting against his brother. Artaxerxes *believes* him and *arrests* Cyrus [1.1.3: πείθεται καὶ συλλαμβάνει], intending to kill him. His mother, however, interceded [1.1.3: Aor. part.] for him and *sends* him back [1.1.3: ἀποπέμπει] again to his province. When he had thus returned, Cyrus *sets about planning* [1.1.4: βουλεύεται] that he might never again be in the power of his brother, but, if possible, might be king himself.
>
> (X. *An.* 1.1.1–4)

After this, Xenophon goes on to explain how Cyrus managed to get support for his enterprise and how he collected his forces from the

[41] All citations from Xenophon's *Anabasis* have been taken from Book One.

[42] The Greek text has ἀνέβη ἔχων, the Aorist ἀνέβη recapitulating the HP ἀναβαίνει. This seems to imply that the Aorist can be used as an (unmarked) substitute for the HP. [Editor's note: see section 4 of Bakker's contribution to this volume (Chapter 1) for an account of the aorist that is compatible with this observation.]

cities in Asia. Not until 1.1.9 do we meet again with a number of HPs, in a passage that deals with the way Cyrus recruited his Greek forces from Europe. It consists of three paragraphs. The first paragraph is about the Greek commander Clearchus. It is introduced by a separate "heading:"

> Still another army was collected [Imperf.] for him in the Chersonese, in the following manner. Clearchus was a Lacedaemonian exile. Cyrus came to admire him [Aor.] and *gives* him [1.1.9: δίδωσιν] a large sum of money. By means of this money Clearchus collected an army [Aor.], and made war [Imperf.] upon the Thracians. Thereby he aided [Imperf.] the Greek cities on the Hellespont, who contributed [Imperf.] to the support of his troops. So it was that this army was secretly maintained for Cyrus.
>
> (X. *An.* 1.1.9)

Then a new topic is introduced, the Thessalian Aristippus:

> He was a friend of Cyrus. Since he was hard pressed [Pres. part.] by his political opponents, he *comes* [1.1.10: ἔρχεται] to Cyrus and *asks* [1.1.10: αἰτεῖ] him to pay his troops for him. Cyrus *gives* [1.1.10: δίδωσι] him money and *requests* [1.1.10: δεῖται] him not to come to terms with his opponents until he had consulted with him. Thus the army in Thessaly was secretly maintained for Cyrus.
>
> (X. *An.* 1.1.10)

A final paragraph (1.1.11) is devoted to other Greeks who, under false pretenses, are invited [Aor.] by Cyrus to come to his assistance. Unlike Clearchus and Aristippus, however, these do not get a story of their own. Then the whole section is concluded by a summarizing formula: "and these men did as they were told by Cyrus" (1.1.11).

At the beginning of Chapter Two, the time has come for Cyrus actually to begin his "anabasis." We get three HP events:

> Cyrus *brings together* [1.2.1: ἀθροίζει] both his barbarian and his Greek troops; He *sends word* [1.2.1: twice παραγγέλλει] to Clearchus and to Aristippus to join him.
>
> (X. *An.* 1.2.1)

The summoning of the troops at Miletus and the arrival of the other Greek commanders are given in the Aorist (1.2.2–3). Finally, the reader is informed in a separate paragraph (1.2.4–5) that Tissaphernes, who had got wind of what was going on, *goes* to the Persian king [1.2.4: πορεύεται] in order to warn him.

6.2 Xenophon's report of Cyrus's journey to inner Asia is structured as a series of episodes, each taking the army to the next main stop on its way to Persia, and all of them being introduced by an identical formula:

> Thence Cyrus *marches* [ἐξελαύνει] *x* stages, *y* parasangs, to . . . There he remained [Aor.] *z* days.

Within this framework, Xenophon offers, by means of Imperfect indicatives, different kinds of what may be termed backgrounded information (geographical details, description of buildings, etc.). In those cases where he wants to report what happened during the stop, he typically does so by means of Aorist indicatives, for example:[43]

> Here he remained [Aor.] thirty days (. . .). He held a review and made a count [Aor.] of the Greeks; they amounted [Aor.] to eleven thousand hoplites and about two thousand peltasts.
>
> (X. *An.* 1.2.9)

6.2.1 In some cases, however, Xenophon uses the HP. The first instance of the HP occurs in the following passage:

> At Caÿstrupedium, he remained five days. At this time he owed [Imperf.] the soldiers more than three months' pay, and they demanded [Imperf.] what was due to them. (1.2.11) (. . .) At this moment, Epyaxa, the wife of Syennesis, the king of the Cilicians, *comes* to visit him [1.2.12: ἀφικνεῖται], and the story was that she gave him a large sum of money. People said also that Cyrus had intimate relations [Aor. infin.] with the queen (1.2.12).
>
> (X. *An.* 1.2.11–12)

Xenophon's motive for thus marking Epyaxa's arrival becomes clear only when we read on: at 1.2.14 we are told that (at Tyriaeum), on Epyaxa's request, Cyrus *exhibits* his army to her [*exétasin poieîtai*], and at 1.2.20, when the army has reached the border of Phrygia, we are told that Cyrus *sends* her *back* [*apopémpei*] to Cilicia. So, the only HPs that occur 1.2.5–20 all belong to what, at first sight, looks like a substory about Cyrus's relationship with the Cilician queen. Later on, however, the one event that, apart from Epyaxa's arriving and being sent away, is marked by an HP [*exétasin poieîtai*] turns out to have a special relevance: at 1.2.21 Cyrus's army enters Cilicia, and when

[43] [See section 4 of Bakker's contribution for a similar distribution of Aorist and Imperfect in Thucydides.]

they have reached its capital, Epyaxa's husband Syennesis refuses to put himself in Cyrus's hands until his wife has convinced him of the enemy's superior strength and he has received pledges (1.2.26). Only now do we understand why Cyrus's parading his army for the queen was expressed as an HP: it was intended by Cyrus to make her see that there was no point in trying to prevent him from marching through Cilicia.[44]

6.2.2 The next cluster of HPs occurs at 1.3.20–21, after Xenophon's report of the soldiers' refusal to go any further, now that they begin to understand that Cyrus plans to lead them against the Persian king. The final outcome of a long discussion is that representatives are sent to Cyrus, in order to put to him the questions they have resolved on:

> They chose representatives and *send* [1.3.20: πέμπουσιν] them to Cyrus. He replied [1.3.20: Aor.] that he intended to march against Abrocomas, who was at the Euphrates, twelve stages from where they were at the moment. If he would be there, Cyrus wished to punish him. If it would turn out that Abrocomas had fled, Cyrus declared himself willing to deliberate then and there about the matter. The deputies *report* [1.3.21: ἀγγέλλουσι] this to the soldiers, who thought [Imperf.] it best to follow Cyrus. They *ask* [*ib.*: προσαιτοῦσι], however, for more pay, and Cyrus *promises* [*ib.*: ὑπισχνεῖται] to give them half as much again as they had been receiving before.
>
> (X. *An.* 1.3.20–21)

At 1.4.11 Cyrus summons the Greek commanders in order to tell them that the march is to be to Babylon, against the Persian king:

> Cyrus *orders* [1.4.11: κελεύει] them to explain this to the soldiers and to try to persuade them to follow. The soldiers refused [1.4.12: οὐκ ἔφασαν] to go unless they were given money, and Cyrus promised [1.4.13: Aor.] to give every man five minas. By this the greater part of the Greek army was persuaded [1.4.13: Aor.]. Only Menon's men hoped,

[44] Lendle (1995:22, ad 1.2.15) observes that, when Cyrus first mustered his troops, Clearchus's men occupied the left wing, and Menon's men the right wing, whereas, in 1.7.4, they have changed places. He seeks to explain the change by the fact that, meanwhile, Clearchus has become the most prominent Greek commander. This would add extra significance to the mustering of the troops at 1.2.14, by connecting it with the story-line that has to do with Clearchus's gradually succeeding in making himself into the first commander of the Greek mercenary troops that served under Cyrus. It would, however, not account for Xenophon's referring to Cyrus's dismissal of Epyaxa by means of an HP.

without openly saying so, to gain special favors from Cyrus, by starting to cross the river before Clearchus's troops had decided on their further course of action.

(X. *An.* 1.4.11–14)

At 1.5.11 ff. there is a story about a near-fight between Menon's and Clearchus's men:

In a dispute between one of Menon's soldiers and one of his own men, Clearchus decided that Menon's man was in the wrong, and gave him a flogging [1.5.11: Aor.]. When Clearchus *rides* [1.5.12: ἀφιππεύει] back to his tent, one of Menon's men *throws* his axe [*ib*: ἵησι] at him. The man missed him, but others started throwing stones at him. Clearchus *escapes* [1.5.13: καταφεύγει] and *calls* his troops to arms [*ib*.: παραγγέλλει]. Proxenus begged him not to proceed with his attack, thereby making Clearchus all the more angry. Cyrus learnt about the situation and *tells* [1.5.15: λέγει] the men to stop fighting.

(X. *An.* 1.5.11–15)

At first sight, this episode may look like a sub-story without further special relevance; yet it seems probable that Xenophon wanted his readers to connect it with the narrative line that has the Greek soldiers' reluctance to follow Cyrus as its subject. So far, the hope of Menon's men for special favors from Cyrus has not come true, and the present conflict, therefore, represents the last flicker of unrest among the Greek soldiers. By putting it down, Cyrus finally secures the cooperation he needs for fighting Artaxerxes.

Before Xenophon starts his report of the final battle, there is one more cluster of HPs. The story in which we find them is the following:

At this moment a certain Orontas *devises a plot* [1.6.1: ἐπιβουλεύει] against Cyrus. Under false pretenses he obtained from Cyrus a thousand horsemen. Then he *writes* a letter [1.6.3: γράφει] to the Persian king, saying that he would come to him with a large cavalry force. He *gives* [*ib*.: δίδωσι] the letter to a man he trusted, who *gives* [1.6.3: δίδωσιν] it to Cyrus. Cyrus *arrests* [1.6.4: συλλαμβάνει] Orontas, and *summons* [*ib*.: συγκαλεῖ] seven noble Persians to his tent.

(X. *An.* 1.6.1–4)

Then Xenophon proceeds to report that Clearchus was among those whom Cyrus invited into his tent:

When Clearchus came out, he reported to his friends how Orontas's trial had been conducted: after having questioned Orontas, Cyrus invited Clearchus to be the first of his counselors to give his opinion, and Clearchus advised him to put the man out of the way. In this

> opinion the others concurred, and Orontas was condemned to death. From that moment, no man ever saw him again, nor could anyone say from actual knowledge how he was put to death.
> (X. *An.* 1.6.6–11).

We submit that this story is intended by Xenophon to be the last "installment" of the story line that tells us how Cyrus secured loyalty of the Greek soldiers. The facts about Orontas's plot and Cyrus's discovery of it are, we suggest, the upbeat to what is to be the point of the story: Clearchus's acting as Cyrus's first counselor.[45]

6.2.3 Immediately after this, Xenophon starts his report of the final battle. Cyrus *holds a review* [1.7.1: *exétasin poieîtai*] of the Greeks and the barbarians, encouraged his soldiers, and promised them the moon in case they would succeed in gaining victory. When they got near Babylon, a messenger *comes* into sight [1.8.1: προφαίνεται] who shouted that the king was approaching with a large army. At 1.8.14 the king's army actually advances:

> When the Greeks proceeded, the Persians, before an arrow reached them, *give ground* and *flee* [1.8.19: ἐκκλίνουσιν, φεύγουσι]. In order to prevent the king from encircling the Greeks, Cyrus himself *charges* to meet him [1.8.24: ἐλαύνει], and *is victorious* [*ib.*: νικᾷ] over the forces that were stationed in front of the king. But Cyrus's own six hundred, when pursuing the king's men, *become scattered* [1.8.25: διασπείρονται] also. Then Cyrus *catches sight* [1.8.26: καθορᾷ] of the king, rushed upon [Imperf.] him, *strikes* [*ib.*: παίει] him in the breast and *wounds* [*ib.*: τιτρώσκει] him. While he was delivering his blow, someone *hits* [1.8.27: ἀκοντίζει] him, and in the struggle that followed, Cyrus was killed [Aor.].
> (X. *An.* 1.8.19–27)

It has to be noted that only the events that lead up to Cyrus's death are given in the HP, while the fact that Cyrus was actually killed—which is of course a major turning point in Xenophon's narrative—is presented by means of an Aorist. This would seem to confirm once more that Xenophon's motive for expressing an event by means of an HP is not that the event is, *as such*, crucial or salient.

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[45] It may or may not be significant that Xenophon explicitly does not take responsibility for Clearchus's report of what happened in Cyrus's tent. We may even suspect that Cyrus just wanted to put up a show in order to secure himself of Clearchus's loyalty. After all, nobody knew whether Orontas was actually put to death.

6.3 For an explanation of what we have seen in Sections 6.1 through 6.2 the following observations seem relevant. First, the main chronological framework of the narrative is constituted by the subsequent stages of the journey, that are, all twenty-four of them, given in an HP with Cyrus as subject and the army as (implicit) object.[46] Second, seventeen out of the remaining fifty-two HPs have Cyrus as subject; the remaining thirty-five HPs have different (most of them Greek) subjects, but the great majority of them are part of a piece of narrative that leads up to some final action by Cyrus that has direct consequences for the Greeks.[47] Third, from 1.1.4 onwards, i.e., after the introduction, events that do not in one way or another involve *both* Cyrus *and* the Greeks, but have to do *either* with Cyrus *or* with the Greeks are given in Aorist indicatives.

On the basis of these observations, we submit that, in Book One of the *Anabasis*, Xenophon has used the HP as a device for organizing his narrative for the purpose of distinguishing what he intended to be its main subject matter from the rest: the HPs signal to the reader that the story is not about Cyrus or about the Greek mercenary troops, but about Cyrus's taking the Greeks with him in order to dethrone his brother.

There are, however, a few exceptions. Besides the introduction in 1.1.1–4, we may note Tissaphernes' journey to Artaxerxes (1.2.4: *poreúetai* "he marches"), and the events that concern Epyaxa. As regards Tissaphernes, it has to be noted that he has been introduced by means of an HP at 1.1.2–3 (*diabállei* "he accuses"), and that, when the battle of Cunaxa is over, he will become a participant in his own right in the narrative of the return of the Greeks. Regarding Epyaxa we have observed earlier that her arrival is marked by an HP (1.2.12: *aphikneîtai* "arrives") in order to make it into the starting point of what is meant to be a separate story line (albeit a minor one) concluded by *apopémpei* "sends away" in 1.2.20. It appears, then, that, in

[46] Note that Xenophon has given the very last stages of the journey, that lead up to the battle itself, some extra profile by presenting not only the journey itself, but also the army's arriving at its next halting-place by means of an HP (1.4.19, 5.4: ἀφικνοῦνται; 5.5: ἀφικνεῖται).

[47] Relevant cases are: 1.1.4: βουλεύεται (the starting point of the whole enterprise); 1.1.9: δίδωσιν; 1.1.10: δίδωσιν, δεῖται; 1.2.1: ἀθροίζει, twice παραγγέλλει; 1.3.21: ὑπισχνεῖται; 1.4.11: κελεύει; 1.5.15: λέγει; 1.6.4: συγκαλεῖ; and the report of Cyrus's last moments, where Cyrus's own actions (1.8.26: καθορᾷ, παίει, τιτρώσκει) lead up to his being wounded (1.8.27: παίοντα δ' αὐτὸν ἀκοντίζει τις). For the preponderance of verbs of saying, promising, etc., see Section 4.7.1 above.

these cases, the HP is used as a means for distinguishing a separate narrative line from its surrounding context.

6.4 These findings are borne out by the instances of the HP that occur in Xenophon's report of the remaining part of the day Cyrus fell, which occupies the last chapter of the First Book of the *Anabasis*. The narrative is complex, if only because it involves a number of different participants and scenes of action. The following events are presented by means of 18 HPs:

> Cyrus's dead body is *mutilated* [1.10.1: ἀποτέμνεται]; the Persian commander Ariaeus's troops *stop offering resistance* and *flee* to the stopping place they had left that morning [*ib.*: οὐκέτι ἵστανται, ἀλλὰ φεύγουσι];[48] Artaxerxes *takes* Cyrus's camp [1.10.1: εἰσπίπτει], *plunders* it [1.10.2: διαρπάζουσι], and *captures* [*ib.*: λαμβάνει] one of his wives; another concubine of Cyrus *makes her escape* [1.10.3: ἐκφεύγει]; Artaxerxes, on hearing that the Greeks were victorious, *gathers* his troops and *lines* them *up* for battle [1.10.5: ἀθροίζει, συντάττεται]; Tissaphernes *does not rally* his troops again, but made for the Greek camp and there *falls in* with Artaxerxes [1.10.8: οὐκ ἀναστρέφει, συντυγχάνει]; the Persian king and his cavalry detachment, when the Greeks were approaching them, *leave* [1.10.13: λείπουσι] the hill they were occupying, whereupon Clearchus *sends* one Lycius to the hill and *orders* him to observe what was beyond it. Lycius *reports* that the enemy was in headlong flight [1.10.14–15: πέμπει, κελεύει, ἀπαγγέλλει]; the Greeks, not knowing that Cyrus was dead and, having decided to return to their camp, *reach* their tents [1.10.17: ἀφικνοῦνται], and *find* [1.10.18: καταλαμβάνουσι] most of their property pillaged.
>
> (X. *An.* 1.10.1–18)

Collecting the events that are given in the Aorist indicative, one observes that some of them are not part of the main line of the narrative—for instance at 1.10.2–3, where we are told that the Greeks who were to guard the baggage did all the damage to the Persians they could. Other events in this category fill in the details that connect the events of the main story. To offer two examples of the latter group: the Aorists in 1.10.7 report the movements of Tissaphernes before he joined Artaxerxes, and those in 1.10.9 the movements of

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[48] Note that the reader has been told before (1.9.31) that Ariaeus and his men are the only ones who did not die in the defence of Cyrus's body, but took to flight when Cyrus had fallen; in Book Two they will turn out to be, for some time, participants in the narrative in their own right.

the Persians and the Greeks that led up to the Persian king leaving the hill at the approach of the Greeks.

6.5 By way of conclusion to our discussion of Book One of the *Anabasis*, we submit that the HP has been used by Xenophon as a device for organizing his narrative and enabling the reader to distinguish between matter that relates to what is the writer's main concern, and other ingredients of the narrative. Limiting himself to the possibilities of the Aorist and the Imperfect would have forced Xenophon *either* to assign the same relevance to all narrative assertions, *or* to present by means of an Imperfect a large number of assertions which do move forward narrative time and are not without interest or importance in their own right, in spite of being not indispensable for what is the central purpose of the narrative.[49] The HP is an effective device to avoid this dilemma: it adds an extra "level" that lifts out from the surrounding narrative context the dominant story line that is the author's primary concern, or that (in one or two cases) distinguishes an independent narrative "strand."

7. *Back to Thucydides and Herodotus*

In Section 5 we have discussed two passages from Herodotus and Thucydides that seem to be clear examples of the HP as a means for marking those narrative assertions that are primarily relevant to the author's explicitly stated purpose. There are, however, other instances that are not as clear-cut.

7.1 Thucydides' report of the final stages of Themistocles' career is the only passage in his work where HPs do not come "single spies, but in battalions:" besides one instance of *éphē* "he said" (1.137.2), it contains no less than seventeen HPs as against four Aorist indicatives, and therefore comes closer than any other passage in the texts we have studied to a narrative that has the HP as its main vehicle. The participial clauses (both Aorist and Present participles) and Imperfect indicatives perform their normal duties, whereas the Aorist indica-

[49] For the description of the difference between Aorist and Imperfect underlying this analysis, see Sicking 1996:93–94, 101–2.

tive, when we compare its incidence to normal usage, has, so to speak, moved one level down: it is used for giving details which, in themselves, are not of special importance:

> The Athenians *send* [1.135.3: πέμπουσι] some officers to Sparta, with orders to arrest Themistocles, who *flees* [1.136.1: φεύγει] to Corcyra. The Corcyraeans *send* him [1.136.1: διακομίζεται] across to the mainland opposite, where, being hard pressed by his pursuers [1.136.2: Imperf.], he *has to* rest [1.136.2: ἀναγκάζεται] at the house of Admetus, who happened [1.136.3: Aorist] not to be there. Themistocles *is instructed* [1.136.3: διδάσκεται] by Admetus's wife to act as a suppliant, and, on Admetus's return [1.136.4: Aorist gen. absol.], he *tells* him [1.136.4: δηλοῖ] who he was, and *begs* him [1.136.4: ἀξιοῖ] for assistance. Admetus *raises him to his feet* [1.137.1: ἀνίστησι], *refuses to give* him *up* [1.137.1: οὐκ ἐκδίδωσιν] to the Athenians, and *sends* him [1.137.1: ἀποστέλλει] to Persia. Themistocles' ship *is carried* [1.137.2: καταφέρεται] by a storm towards the Athenian fleet near Naxos. He *informs* [1.137.2: φράζει] the captain who he was and promised [1.137.2: ἔφη] him a suitable reward if he followed his instructions. The captain *does* as he was told [1.137.2: ποιεῖ], and Themistocles *arrives* [1.137.2: ἀφικνεῖται] safely at Ephesus. Here he rewarded [1.137.4: Aor.] the captain and *sends* [1.137.4: ἐσπέμπει] a letter to the Persian king, saying [1.137.4: Imperf.] that he had the power to do him important services. The king was greatly struck [1.138.1: Aorist] by the content of the letter, and ordered him [1.138.1: Imperf.] to do as he wished. Themistocles learned [1.138.1: Aor.] as much as he could of the Persian language, and after a year he arrived [1.138.2: Aor. partic.] at the Persian court, where he *becomes* [1.138.2: γίγνεται] a person of importance. His death *comes* [1.138.4: τελευτᾷ] as a result of an illness.
>
> (Thuc. 1.135–38)

This passage occurs as a sequel to an "excursus" on Pausanias,[50] which is part of the report of the preliminaries to the war, and owes its presence to Thucydides' wish (1.128) to explain an Athenian embassy's demanding the Spartans "to drive out the curse of the goddess of the Brazen House." At 1.135.1, after the explanation of the curse, Thucydides proceeds to report that, at the time, the Spartans accused Themistocles too of collaboration with the Persians, on the basis of the evidence they had discovered at their inquiry against

[50] Thuc. 1.128.3–135.1. The concentration of HPs in this passage is less remarkable than in the Themistocles story: only the principal events (including one fact from Pausanias's former life that is anterior to the time of the story we are being told: 1.128.5: ἀποπέμπει: "at that time he [had] sent back the prisoners to the king") are given in the HP (1.128.3: ἀφικνεῖται; 1.129.1: ἀποστέλλει, κελεύει; 1.131.2: ἐσπίπτει, καθίστησιν; 1.132.5: γίγνεται; 1.134.3: ἐξάγουσιν).

Pausanias. Thus in being occasioned by an "excursus,"[51] the story is exceptional in that it seems to have no direct relevance to Thucydides' report of the war.[52] It has to be noted that before reporting about Themistocles' death, Thucydides presents the reader with a highly favorable evaluation of Themistocles' qualities, that puts him on a par with Pericles: "to sum him up in a few words, it may be said that through force of genius and by rapidity of action this man was supreme at doing precisely the right thing at precisely the right moment" (1.138.3). Since Thucydides has given no other indication of any other purpose he had with the story, we will have to reckon with the possibility that his motive for inserting it at this point was a desire to state that the controversial final stage of Themistocles' career did not alter his admiration for the man. His motive for presenting it almost completely by means of HPs may have been that he wanted to signal to the reader that the story, as a whole, has to be kept apart from its surrounding context (cf. Section 7.4.1).

7.2 We proceed with a discussion of the use of the HP in the First Book of Herodotus's *Histories*. At 1.29 Herodotus interrupts his report of Croesus's territorial expansion in order to tell his audience that, at the moment Croesus had subdued the nations west of the river Halys,

> Solon *comes* to Sardis to visit him [1.29.1: ἀπικνέονται ἐς Σάρδις ἄλλοι ... σοφισταί ... καὶ δὴ καὶ Σόλων]. Croesus asked Solon who was the happiest man he had ever seen, and Solon *answers* [1.30.3: λέγει] that, in his view, the Athenian Tellus was the one who best met this description, and told him that the gods are envious of human prosperity, and that he, therefore, preferred to keep the word "happy" in reserve until he would know that Croesus had died happily. Croesus thought Solon a fool for disregarding his present prosperity and *sends* him away [1.33: ἀποπέμπεται].
>
> (Hdt. 1.29–33)

Herodotus then proceeds to relate how Croesus was punished for overestimating his powers:

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[51] Note that at 1.138.6 the excursus about Pausanias is concluded together with that about Themistocles.

[52] Gomme supposes (1959:447) that Thucydides was impelled to narrate the episode because he thought that the facts had been inadequately or inaccurately dealt with by others; Hornblower (1991:202–3) sees it as part of a "triptych," together with Thucydides' reports on Cylon and Pausanias.

Croesus *dreams* that his son Atys would be killed by a blow from an iron weapon [1.34.2: σημαίνει]. He *gets his son a wife* [ἄγεται γυναῖκα].[53] The newly wed Atys was completely taken up by his marriage, when Adrastus, who had been guilty of manslaughter, *comes* to Sardis [1.35.1: ἀπικνέεται]. He begged Croesus to cleanse him from blood-guilt, and Croesus did as he asked. Just at this time *it happens* that Mysia was infested by a monstrous boar [1.36.1: γίνεται]. Croesus refused to send his son, but at that very moment Atys *enters* the room [1.37.1: ἐπεσέρχεται]. He *has a conversation* with his father [1.37.1–40.1: λέγει, thrice ἀμείβεται], and succeeded in persuading Croesus to allow him to join the expedition to Mysia. Croesus then *sends for* Adrastus [1.41.1: μεταπέμπεται] and *asks* [λέγει] him to take charge of his son's safety. Adrastus *declares* himself ready to do as he was asked [1.42.1: ἀμείβεται]. The hunting party set out, and Adrastus *misses* the boar and *strikes* the king's son [1.43.2: ἁμαρτάνει, τυγχάνει]. The unlucky killer begged Croesus to kill him, but Croesus *is moved to pity* [1.45.2: κατοικτίρει] and *realizes* [1.45.2: λέγει] that it all was the work of God. Adrastus *kills* himself upon Atys's tomb [1.45.3: ἐπικατασφάζει].

(Hdt. 1.34–35)

This passage differs from those we have analyzed in Sections 2 through 5: the frequency of the HP is higher (there are fifteen instances of the HP as against six instances of the Aorist); and moreover it is not immediately clear how the events referred to by an HP relate to a specific purpose of the narrative in its context. It may, however, be relevant to note that in 1.28 Herodotus has broken off his report of Croesus's expanding the Lydian empire,[54] and that at 1.46 he returns to it: the growth of the Persian power, so he tells us, put an end to Croesus's mourning for the death of his son, and he resolved to forestall the increase of Persian power before it would have gone too far.

7.3 For an understanding of Herodotus's use of the HP in Book One it is relevant to note that in addition to the two passages we have discussed so far, the main clusters of HPs are concentrated in the following passages:

1.59–64: Pisistratus (13 HPs)
1.65–70: The Lacedaemonians (3 HPs)

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[53] In 1.38.2 we are told that Croesus did so in order to ensure the continuation of the dynasty.

[54] Cf. 1.29.1: κατεστραμμένων δὲ τούτων καὶ προσεπικτωμένου Κροίσου Λυδοῖσι.

1.95–130: Who was Cyrus, and how did the Persians win their predominant position in Asia?
- 1.95–101: Deioces becomes the first king of the Medes (3 HPs)
- 1.102–6: Phraortes, Kyaxares (3 HPs)
- 1.107–30: Astyages, Cambyses, Harpagus, Cyrus (23 HPs)

1.205–14: The suicide of Tomyris's son; Cyrus's death (4 HPs).

7.3.1 Some of these clusters occur in passages that are similar to the story of Gyges and Candaules (1.8–12, discussed in Section 5.1 above) in that they are explicitly marked by Herodotus as separate narrative sections with a purpose of their own. Good examples of this category are the stories of Pisistratus and of the Lacedaemonians which we will briefly discuss.

7.3.1.1 In 1.56 Herodotus has reported that Croesus wanted to find out which of the Greek states were the most powerful, with a view to forming an alliance:

> His inquiries revealed that the Lacedaemonians were the most eminent of the Dorian people, and the Athenians of the Ionian.
> (Hdt. 1.56.2)

After an excursus on the "prehistory" of the Dorians and the Ionians, Herodotus returns to the subject:

> Athens, Croesus learned, had been split by faction and was now under the "tyranny" of Pisistratus, the son of Hippocrates.
> (Hdt. 1.59.1)

The next sentence is introduced by the explanatory particle *gár*, and is the starting point for Herodotus's report of how Pisistratus became master of Athens: he seized power, was driven out, managed to come back, was driven out a second time, and, finally, succeeded in firmly establishing his regime. In this narrative there are altogether thirteen HPs, all of them (in a way that is comparable to what we have seen in Sections 5.1 and 5.2) referring to what may be considered the basic framework of the narrative, that is concluded in 1.64.1: "Thus for the third time Pisistratus made himself master of Athens."

7.3.1.2 The purpose of Herodotus's report about the Lacedaemonians is twofold: first, the narrative is meant to explain how it came about that, having once been the worst governed people in Greece, the

Lacedaemonians changed their laws for the better (1.65.2); second, how they contented themselves with subduing the Tegean plain (since the Pythia had advised them to leave the Arcadians alone), and how in Croesus's time, after having consulted the Pythia once again, they finally succeeded in defeating the Arcadians (1.68.6). In this passage there are only three HPs, the first one [1.65.2: *légei* "speaks"] referring to the Pythia's response to Lycurgus, who gave the Lacedaemonians their laws, the other two [1.66.2: *khrâi*, 1.67.3: *légei*] to the Pythia's responses regarding the Arcadians and the Tegeans.

7.3.2 After completing his report of the enslavement of the Lydians by the Persians, Herodotus announces what will be his next subject:

> The course of my inquiry now leads me to Cyrus: who was this man who destroyed the empire of Croesus, and how did the Persians win their predominant position in Asia?
>
> (Hdt. 1.95)

The chapters that follow are, in fact, a prelude to the story that is to provide the answer to this question: they contain a report of the history of the Medes up to the reign of Astyages, who was the last king of the Medes before Cyrus made the Persians revolt against them. The HPs in this section refer to

> The Medes' being made subject to autocratic government (1.96.1: ὧδε αὖτις ἐς τυραννίδας περιῆλθον), and Deioces becoming their first king and building the capital city of Ecbatana [1.98.1–3: καταινέουσι, ποιεῦσι, οἰκοδομέουσι, οἰκοδομέει]; the accession to the throne of Deioces' successor, Phraortes [1.102.1: γίνεται]; the death of Phraortes, who was Astyages' immediate predecessor [1.106.3: τελευτᾷ].
>
> (Hdt. 1.95–106)

In the report of Cyaxares' reign one more HP is used. It occurs in an excursus about the Scythians, who, after having defeated the Medes, turned their attention to Egypt. The HP states that the Egyptian king Psammetichus managed to prevent the Scythians from further advancing into Egypt (1.105.1: *apotrépei* "averts").

At 1.107 Herodotus finally reaches the start of the narrative he has promised his audience at 1.95. In the course of this narrative eighteen HPs are used. They refer to the main events in the following episodes:

> Astyages marries his daughter Mandane to Cambyses [1.107.2, twice διδοῖ], thus trying to escape the consequences of an oracle that told

him that he would be dethroned by a son of hers; Harpagus accepts [1.108.5: ἀμείβεται] Cambyses' order to kill Mandane's son, Cyrus. In a conversation with his wife [1.109.2: λέγει, ἀμείβεται], Harpagus decides to entrust the execution of the order to a herdsman of Astyages; the herdsman and his wife decide to substitute their own stillborn child for the young Cyrus [1.111.1: ἀπικνέεται, 1.112.2: λέγει, 1.113.1–2: παραδιδοῖ, τιθεῖ]; Astyages discovers that Cyrus is still alive [1.116.3: πέμπει, 1.117.2: οὐ τρέπεται ἐπὶ ψευδέα, ἀλλὰ λέγει], and takes his revenge on Harpagus by making him eat the flesh of his own son [1.119.2: ἐκπέμπει, φράζει, 1.119.6: ὁρᾷ, ἐντὸς ἑαυτοῦ γίνεται]; Astyages consults the Magi about another dream he has about Cyrus [1.120.2: ἀμείβεται]; Astyages sends Cyrus back home [1.122.1: ἀποπέμπει]; Harpagus persuades Cyrus to make the Persians revolt against Astyages [1.123.3: ἐπιτεχνᾶται].

(Hdt. 1.107–23)

Herodotus concludes this part of his narrative in the following way:

This, then, is the story of the birth and upbringing of Cyrus, and how he seized the throne.

(Hdt. 1.130.3)

7.3.3 At 1.140.3, after an excursus on the customs of the Persians (1.131–39), Herodotus goes back to the moment in time he had reached at 1.94, in order to relate the remaining part of Cyrus's reign.[55] The greater part of the narrative is given in Aorist indicatives. The only cluster of HP events is part of Cyrus's war against the Massagetae. Before he starts his report of this expedition, Herodotus indicates the reasons Cyrus had for undertaking it:

First, his birth, whereby he seemed to be something more than a mortal man, and next the success of all his previous campaigns: till then it had been impossible for any nation to escape, once he had marched against it.

(Hdt. 1.204.2)

Such information may be considered a signal to Herodotus's audience that the expedition will turn out badly for Cyrus—which gives the narrative a relevance of its own, as an illustration of Herodotus's conviction that this kind of misguided optimism tends to result in disaster. The HP events of Cyrus's final campaign are the following:

Hystaspes *casts doubt* [1.210.2: ἀμείβεται] on Cyrus's interpretation of a dream he had about Darius, which actually foretold him that he was to die in Massagetia, and that Darius was to be his successor. The son of Tomyris, queen of the Massagetae, *kills* himself when he has been

[55] ἄνειμι δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν πρότερον λόγον, Hdt. 1.140.3.

taken prisoner by Cyrus [1.213: διεργάζεται ἑαυτόν, 1.214.1: τελευτᾷ], which adds to his mother's determination to fight Cyrus in a battle judged by Herodotus to have been "more stubborn than any other fought between foreign nations;" Cyrus *is killed* [1.214.3: τελευτᾷ] by the Massagetae.

(Hdt. 1.210–14)

7.3.4 All of the remaining HPs in Book One occur in more or less independent sub-stories: The end of Alyattes' war against the Milesians (1.19.2: *pémpei* "sends;" 1.21.1: *mēkhanâtai* "contrives");[56] Croesus tests the credibility of a number of oracles, shows his gratitude to the Delphians, and consults the oracle at Delphi on the length of his reign (1.47.2: *légei* "says," 1.54.1: *dōréetai* "offers presents," and 1.55.1: *khrâi* "proclaims"); the extradition of Pactyes to the Persians (1.160.1: *ekpémpousi* "send away;" 1.160.3: *ekkomízousi* "bring out"); the death of Mazares (1.161: *teleutâi* "dies");[57] the fortunes of the Phocaeans in Southern Italy (1.166.1: *strateúontai* "they march"); the Cnidians surrender to Harpagus (1.174.5: *khrâi* "proclaims").

7.4 The results of our analysis of Herodotus's usage of the HP may now be summed up as follows. Virtually all instances of the HP occur in stories that have been marked by Herodotus as separate narrative units within the surrounding context. In a number of cases Herodotus's selection of HP events is clearly bound up with the relevance the facts in question have for what he himself has stated to be the specific purpose of the story in which they occur.[58] In other cases, there is no explicit indication by Herodotus himself as to the *raison d'être* of the story in question.[59] Yet in these cases, too, there are indications that Herodotus wanted the reader to realize that the story has a significance of its own as an illustration of the "laws" that underlie the course of human history—in addition to being part of his report of the conflict between Greeks and barbarians.

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[56] Note that Herodotus' report is to disprove other versions of the reconciliation between Alyattes and the Milesians: 1.22.2 ὡς ἐγὼ πυνθάνομαι, δι' οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐγένετο ἡ διαλλαγή.

[57] It may be relevant to our subject that Mazares' death marks the reappearance of Harpagus (1.162: "the same man who was given the abominable supper by the Median king Astyages, and helped to put Cyrus on the throne"), who is one of the principal characters in Herodotus's story of Cyrus's becoming king of the Persians.

[58] For example, 1.59–64 (Pisistratus); 1.65–70 (the Lacedaemonians); 1.96–101 (the Medes become subject to autocratic government); 1.107–30 (Cyrus).

[59] For example, 1.29–45 (Solon, Croesus, Atys, Adrastus); 1.210–14 (Cyrus's war against the Massagetae).

In the few remaining cases, Herodotus's use of the HP seems inspired by little more than his wish to characterize the story at hand as a more or less independent piece of narrative. A case in point is the excursus on the fortunes of the Phocaeans (1.166), that interrupts the report of the subjection of the Ionian cities by Harpagus.

7.4.1 It has to be noted that a fair number of passages that feature a cluster of HPs *interrupt the progression in time* of Herodotus's main narrative: for example, the sections on Pisistratus and on the Lacedaemonians inform the reader about events that preceded Croesus's expedition against Cyrus; the chapters 1.95–130 are inserted at the moment when Cyrus has conquered Lydia, in order to inform the audience about the history of Cyrus up to this moment; and the report of the Phocaeans' fortunes in Italy comes in at the moment the Persians have taken Phocaea, and tells us what subsequently happened to its inhabitants, who had preferred voluntary exile to the prospect of slavery.

The same observation applies to the instances we have quoted from Thucydides. As we have seen, the story of Themistocles is occasioned by Thucydides' report of the Spartans demanding the Athenians to drive out a curse. In order to explain the meaning of this, Thucydides relates (1.128.3) how, *many years ago*, the Spartans had punished Pausanias for collaborating with the Persians by starving him out in a temple, where he had taken refuge. After having done so, they sent an embassy to Athens, accusing Themistocles of the same crime, and this constitutes Thucydides' starting point for the passage we have discussed in Section 7.1 above.

The story of Harmodius and Aristogiton is part of Thucydides' explanation of the Athenians' reaction to the sacrilegious treatment of the mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermae:

> The people knew from hearsay that the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons had, in its later stages, become oppressive. They knew, moreover, that it was not because of themselves and Harmodius that it had come to an end, but because of the Spartans. They were consequently always in a state of fear, and apt to look at everything suspiciously. (Thuc. 6.53.3)

This is Thucydides' starting point for going back in time in order to present his readers what he has ascertained to be the truth about the facts he has just referred to.

8. *General Conclusion*

Our conclusions are the following:

8.1 The incidence of the so-called Historical Present in the authors we have studied has nothing to do with an author's wish to "highlight" the past events that are referred to by a Present form, as being, as such, "salient," "decisive," "a turning point in the story," etc., or to enhance the dramatic impact of his narrative, or the "vividness" of his description, by making the audience or the reader feel as if they were present at the time of the experience.

8.2 The primary function of the HP is to lift out from their context those narrative assertions that are essential for what the speaker has stated to be his immediate concern: together the HP assertions constitute what is primarily important with respect to the purpose the narrative is to serve in its context. In some cases (for example, in the messenger speeches) it is the addressee's specific need for information that is decisive for the speaker's selection of HP events; in others (such as forensic speeches and a number of narrative sections in historical texts) the selection is determined by what the speaker or narrator himself has explicitly stated to be his reason for telling the story at hand. We may add that in these instances it is possible to avoid the circularity that vitiates many explanations that so far have been given.[60]

8.3 In longer stretches of complex narrative such as, for instance, Xenophon's *Anabasis*, the HP may be used for lifting out from a continuous narrative those narrative assertions that, together, constitute what the author intends to be its main line; it may also be used for distinguishing an embedded story, or a separate strand of the narrative, from the narrative as a whole.

8.4 We have refrained from labeling the HP as we have analyzed it as a "foregrounding" (or "highlighting") device: those who occupy themselves with the study of "discourse" tend to use these quasi-technical terms for a great variety of phenomena, and by applying them to the case of the HP one would run the risk of including the HP in a category that is less specific than it ought to be. Moreover,

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[60] Even if we amend, with de Jong (1991:41), the usual shorthand formula that "historic presents highlight important or decisive actions" and say that "historic presents highlight important or decisive actions which are thereby marked (by the speaker) as important or decisive" we have to find out ourselves (and, therefore, risk inventing) the reason a speaker may have had for doing so.

doing so would bring us close to regarding the HP as a "stylistic" rather than as a grammatical phenomenon. By adding an "extra level" to the Aorist and Imperfect indicatives, the HP allows an author to organize his narrative in such a way that the audience will be able to discriminate between what is of primary and what is of secondary importance, between main issues and side issues, or between the main narrative and an embedded story or an independent story line.

8.5 The way the instances of the HP are distributed over the texts we have studied, gives one the impression that what we have called its "primary" function (8.2) may well be at the same time its "original" function.[61] After all, to organize a complicated and extensive narrative that is more than a mere succession of events that all seem to have the same status or relevance, requires the optimal use of any grammatical tools available in the language, if one is to avoid all sorts of cumbrous devices. One can well imagine writers to have diversified what was the "original" or "primary" function of the HP in order to use it for these purposes.

8.6 There are no specific verbs or categories of *verbs* that are more prone to be used in the HP than others. There are only categories of *events* (i.e., saying, answering, ordering, hearing, seeing, arriving, dying, etc.), that more often than others are part of what constitutes the main framework of a piece of (historical) narrative. Many of these serve as an introduction to a *dramatis persona*'s words or to a whole scene; in these cases, what is to be lifted out from its context is not so much the "event" itself as the words or the scene that are, so to speak, under the scope of the verb with which they are introduced.[62]

8.7 Negated HPs are rare indeed. The reason is, of course, that the overwhelming majority of narrative assertions refer to something that was actually the case.

8.8 We have found no traces whatsoever of anything like a *praesens annalisticum.*

8.9 There is no characteristic of the Present referring to past events in a past context that would justify the traditional label "Historical Present." We would, therefore, like to drop the label in favor of, for instance, "narrative Present," or, perhaps more esoteric, "diegetic Present."

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[61] There is, of course, no way to tell how the use of the HP in our texts relates to the use of the Present in spoken language.

[62] A clear instance is ἐννέπει in Soph. *Aj.* 764, quoted in Section 4.1. above.

8.10 It is to be noted that there are a number of instances where an HP is coordinated with an Aorist,[63] whereas we have found no instances where it is coordinated with an Imperfect.[64] Together with the fact that an HP can be used to express the conclusion of a story[65] this seems to indicate that the Aorist and the HP have the same "information status," insofar as both have focus function, and can function as the predicate of a self-contained statement.[66]

8.11 To offer a final speculative hypothesis: it may well be the case that the semantic property of the Present that was the basis for using it in the way we have described, is to be found in its being characterized by primary endings. When we contrast, for instance, the subjunctive *automolômen* (cf. Aristophanes, *Knights* 26) which, like the Present, has primary endings, with the optative *automoloîmen* (+ *án*), the difference can be described as something like:

> I can imagine that we desert (and I myself will take the initiative)

as against

> I can imagine that we desert (but I leave it to the other members of the company to decide whether or not we shall do so)

Although it is difficult (and beyond the purpose of this paper) to generalize on the issue, the Present and the Subjunctive seem to have in common that both of them refer to what belongs to the "here and now,"[67] the sphere of influence, the range, or, in the case of the narrative Present, to the immediate concerns of the speaker.[68]

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[63] E.g., Hdt. 5.77.2 <u>συμβάλλουσί</u> τε δὴ τοῖσι Βοιωτοῖσι οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι <u>καὶ</u> πολλῷ <u>ἐκράτησαν</u>.

[64] De Jong observes (1991:41) that in a number of cases we find the HP "used alongside" both the Aorist and the Imperfect. The instances cited by her, however, feature (μέν . . .) δέ, and are, therefore, no instances of coordination in the strict sense of the word.

[65] E.g., ἐπικατασφάζει in Hdt. 1.45.3.

[66] The fact that the Aorist can be used as an "unmarked" substitute for the HP (see note 42 above), points in the same direction. For the relevance of the concept of "focus function" for the analysis of the contrast between Aorist and Imperfect, the reader is referred to Sicking 1996:74 ff., 103–4.

[67] See note 12 above.

[68] We thank E. J. Bakker for his helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

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CHAPTER FIVE

FIGURES OF SPEECH AND THEIR LOOKALIKES

Two Further Exercises in the Pragmatics of the Greek Sentence

S. R. Slings

The subtitle of this contribution refers to the one of an earlier paper, "Written and Spoken Language: An Exercise in the Pragmatics of the Greek Sentence,"[1] in which I tried to prove that certain linguistic features (the so-called pendent nominative,[2] repetition of the modal particle *án*, prolepsis), which occur frequently in Greek poetry, and to a certain extent also in conversational prose, are to be accounted for in terms of information strategy in oral discourse: they are necessary to fulfill one basic requirement of oral discourse: "the density of information packing in spoken language is appropriate for the listener to process comfortably."[3] Since readers are able to process the text they read at the speed they determine themselves, such strategies are unnecessary in written language: they tend to disappear—or are considered ungrammatical when they occur. This is because our notions of what is and what is not grammatical Greek are determined by the rules that apply to written prose. As I argued, these notions are ahistoric, because there was no written prose in Homer's time, and even in Aristophanes' time prose was still in its formative period. What we are preconditioned to approach as *text* by our own

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[1] Slings 1992.

[2] I have changed my position on this phenomenon, as will be clear from the second part of this contribution. Instances of it are so numerous in authors whom we must regard as representatives of the written (prose) language—especially the orators—that I now consider their analysis as anacolutha as the result of the sort of bias that I describe in the beginning of part II.

[3] Brown and Yule 1983:18. See also Givón 1984–1990:1:258–63 on the "one-chunk-per-clause principle:" "The majority of sentence/clauses in connected discourse will have only one chunk... under the scope of asserted new information [in the wide sense to be discussed in the next note, S. R. S.]. All other elements in the clause will tend to be topical, background or presupposed old information" (258). Chafe, in numerous studies (particularly 1994:109–19), discusses this principle, substituting "intonation unit" for "clause;" see also Bakker 1997:99. This is a useful specification, as we will see in part II below, in the discussion of Theme constructions.

cultural habitat and our training as classicists is in fact nothing other than *voice*.

In this pair of studies I will apply this approach to a number of figures of speech. The first study discusses anaphora, antithesis, and chiasmus in Greek poetry down to Aristophanes; the second study discusses anacoluthon in Plato. Ancient literary theory and most modern classical scholars agree that these figures are (a) deviations from normal speech, and (b) used for the adornment of texts—except that anacoluthon is more often felt to be a slightly embarrassing deviation, which has to be explained in psychological terms. I will argue that whereas for some instances of these figures both (a) and (b) are true (except that (b) is never true for anacolutha), in the majority of cases neither (a) nor (b) is true. Furthermore, I will argue that in most cases our analysis of anaphora, antithesis, and chiasmus as figures of speech is based on a culturally determined misunderstanding of early Greek poetry and the early Greek language—culturally to the extent that these phenomena are necessary tools of the language in oral discourse, having no function in written discourse. I will argue that anaphora, antithesis, chiasmus, and Theme constructions (which are responsible for many anacolutha) are all "chunking devices," used—in their various ways—to ensure that the information packaged in a clause or sentence does not become so dense as to obstruct its successful processing by a listener.

The pragmatic framework that I use, out of several that concentrate on the way in which information is distributed over the clause and sentence, is that of Functional Grammar (FG) as developed by Simon C. Dik and his school. I will explain pragmatic terminology as I go along, but its two key concepts, Topic and Focus, need to be discussed by way of prologue. Most clauses, though not necessarily all, are "about" something; all clauses impart new information.[4] Resuming several analyses of Topic that have been given in FG, I propose the following definition:

> A Topic is an entity or State of Affairs[5] (action, event, state, process) which is known or inferrable within the discourse, and which is used by the speaker to produce a predication which may be regarded to be "about" the entity or State of Affairs.

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[4] "Information" is used here in its widest possible sense: it refers not only to knowledge as imparted in statements but also to informational elements in commands, questions, etc.

[5] H. Dik 1995:207–35 argues that predicates can be Topics—I agree, subject to

Topics operate within various segments of discourse; the definition given above takes the predication as its field (clause-Topic or sentence-Topic). Similarly, a paragraph or longer unit, even a whole text (or in oral discourse, conversation) may have its Topic. Such Discourse Topics are beyond the scope of the present study. As for Focus, I will quote S. C. Dik:[6]

> A constituent with Focus function presents the relatively most important or salient information with respect to the pragmatic information and the Addressee.

Topic and Focus differ from each other in two important respects: A Topic is a referent in the extra-linguistic world, a Focus is a constituent in a clause (Subject, Object, Predicate, adverbial adjunct etc.). A Topic may be referred to by means of more than one constituent, a Focus is one constituent.

The first of the two studies that follow is a strongly expanded version of the second part of a paper written in Dutch; the second has appeared in that language in roughly the same form.[7]

I. *Between Chunking Device and Embellishment: An Analysis of Figures of Speech in Greek Poetry*

As I said above, in the following analysis I will claim that anaphora, antithesis, and chiasmus—allegedly figures of speech—are originally, and particularly in Greek poetry, strategies used to alleviate the processing load in spoken discourse. Only in the relatively rare cases where it can be shown that they are not so used, is it at all useful to call them "figures of speech."[8]

Besides the pragmatic framework as outlined in the introduction, I will use as a paradigm the reader-response stylistics developed by Stanley Fish and Timothy Austin.[9] I do this in order to arrive at a

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the proviso that entities are far more often Topics than predicates; cf. the discussion of ex. (15) below. Dik also allows (1995:69–70) for the possibility that Topic units consist of more than one constituent; see further below.

[6] Dik 1981:130.

[7] Slings 1993 and 1996, respectively.

[8] [Editor's note: on the limitations and dangers of the notion of "style," see also the contribution of van der Eijk to this volume. The other contributions are, each in its own way, equally concerned with delimiting the sphere of the stylistic, aesthetic, and the arbitrary in the study of ancient Greek texts.]

[9] See Fish 1980; Austin 1983.

more or less satisfactory answer to a type of question sometimes overtly asked, and often implied in the discussion of figures of speech: to what extent is this figure a meaningful (or intended) deviation from the norm? Does it improve the aesthetic value of the text, or does it detract from it (and did the author not care), or even—given the fact that archaic and classical Greek poets were no classical scholars—did the author realize that he was deviating from a norm?

If put like this, these questions do not admit of an answer. In general terms: those who equate interpretation with establishing the author's intention assume (a) that literary creation is an entirely conscious process, and (b) that the interpreter is able to trace that process. It does not require more than a few moments' thought to realize that both (a) and (b) are untenable. There may be a number of isolated instances where by some fluke we may answer such questions to our satisfaction as well as that of others; but in general the questions do not admit of an answer, and in addition they are theoretically incorrect.[10]

This is where reader-response stylistics can help us out. Austin has developed the concept of "native reader," a native speaker whose stylistic feeling has been conditioned by a good knowledge of his own literature.[11] The basic method is to establish by means of linguistic research whether in a given passage native readers (or rather "listeners") would have noticed a deviation from the linguistic and stylistic norm, and if so, how they would have reacted to it. It may be objected that we have no knowledge of the Greek poets' audiences any more than of their intentions, but this is not entirely true: we have a substantial corpus of Greek poetry, against which we can check a given phenomenon, and we are entitled to draw certain inferences also on the basis of the results of modern (spoken) discourse analysis (along the lines of my 1992 paper).

There are many important points of theory involved, of which I discuss only one. Once the author's intention is abandoned as the object of interpretation, the question whether there is such a thing as a single correct interpretation is answered automatically in the negative. If the aim of a scholarly interpretation of a literary text is to

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[10] See also Fehling 1968:70–78.

[11] I prefer this term to Fish's "interpretive community" (as proposed in the subtitle of his 1980 book), because it is more language-oriented: the "native reader" is Chomsky's competent native speaker translated into stylistics (cf. Fish 1980:5). It stands to reason that the concept can also be used by those who, unlike Austin, do not use Chomsky's methods for stylistic purposes.

reconstruct the audience's response, as I think it is, it would be foolish to claim that all members of the audience (even if these are restricted to the oral equivalent of Austin's native readers) will have had identical responses. This is not to preach a Derrida-style nihilism: there is no such thing as a single correct interpretation, but there are many incorrect interpretations: untenable ones, improbable ones, less probable ones.[12] There is a qualitative hierarchy of interpretations, from which the classical scholar should choose the highest-ranking one or ones, using the audience's reconstructed response as a criterion.

Since the figures of speech studied here all have to do with word order, I will rely heavily on Helma Dik's important recent study.[13] Even though I have no doubt that her results, based on a study of Herodotus alone, will be refined and improved upon by later scholars,[14] she has laid a good solid foundation, which is helpful in reconstructing the readers' response. Dik claims that the basic order of constituents in a Greek clause is:

(1) Topic—Focus—Predicate—X

In other words: if a clause has overt Topic expression (which it need not have), the Topic is the first constituent; it is followed by the Focus, or if there is no Topic expression, the Focus is the first constituent. If the predicate is not either Topic or Focus, it is placed after the Focus, and other pragmatically unmarked material follows

[12] Cf. Fish 1980:341–42: "After all, while 'The Tyger' is obviously open to more than one interpretation, it is not open to an infinite number of interpretations. There may be disagreement as to whether the tiger is good or evil, or whether the speaker is Blake or a persona, and so on, but no one is suggesting that the poem is an allegory of the digestive processes or that it predicts the Second World War, and its limited plurality is simply a testimony to the capacity of a great work of art to generate multiple meanings." I do not necessarily believe that the last clause of this quotation is relevant to the study of ancient Greek poetry—I have yet to be persuaded that outside of Pindar, and perhaps Sophocles, ambiguity was, for the contemporary readers/listeners, a criterion for judging works of arts.

[13] Dik 1995. See also her contribution to this volume.

[14] I propose the following modification: a Setting ("Orientation") constituent may be placed between Topic and Focus. This gives a more satisfactory account of cases like Hdt. 6.108.4 Θηβαῖοι$_{Top}$ δὲ πυθόμενοι ταῦτα$_{Setting}$ ἐστράτευον$_{Foc}$ ἐπὶ τοὺς Πλαταιέας$_{X}$ (cf. Dik 1995:57–58); 1.166.1 στρατεύονται$_{Top}$ ὦν ἐπ' αὐτοὺς$_{postpos}$ κοινῷ λόγῳ χρησάμενοι$_{Setting}$ Τυρσηνοὶ καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι$_{Foc}$ (cf. Dik 1995:61–62—to deny Focus status to Τυρσηνοὶ καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι, as Dik is forced to do, is highly counterintuitive); 1.66.3 οἱ$_{Top}$ δὲ πέδας φερόμενοι$_{Setting}$ ἐπὶ Τεγεήτας$_{Foc}$ ἐστρατεύοντο$_{Pred}$ (cf. Dik 1995:81—I fail to see how *πέδας φερόμενοι* can be part of the Topic, since its information is "brand-new"—for this term, see Prince 1981).

the predicate. In order to illustrate how this schema can be helpful in a reader-response study of figures of speech, I quote an instance of hyperbaton, a figure which I will not discuss any further here:

(2) ἵν' ὁ φίλαυλος ἔπαλλε δελφίς
(the Aegean), where the flute-lover, the dolphin, was playing
(E. *El.* 435–36)

Here *ho phílaulos* "the flute-lover" occupies the Topic position, and as such, it is presented as more or less given. The predicate *épalle* "was playing" is Focus, and the hyperbaton forces *delphís* "the dolphin" into the slot for unmarked information.[15] Normally, such a clause-final constituent contains information which is already known but which has to be expressed for the sake of coherence.[16] The effect is therefore that *ho phílaulos* is presented as if it were more or less well-known, and *delphís* is added just to be sure that *ho phílaulos* is correctly identified.[17] But in actual fact, both *ho phílaulos* and *delphís* are "brand-new" information, so presenting them as given is a departure from the linguistic norm. One possible reconstruction of the audience's response might be that the clause is reminiscent of Aeschylus's kennings, with the solution at the end.

This is a reconstruction that is different from, though not entirely inconsistent with, the traditional wisdom about hyperbaton, viz., that it gives emphasis (in this case, presumably, to *ho phílaulos*)—it does, but it does much more than that. To give Topic position to a brand-new constituent is indeed to emphasize it, but to emphasize it in a

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[15] Formally, this clause is identical in structure to *Il.* 22.131 ὁ δέ οἱ σχεδὸν ἦλθεν Ἀχιλλεύς, as analyzed in Bakker 1997:92 (and see comparable instances from Homer cited in his n. 11). Within Dik's analysis of Greek word order, I would call ὁ Topic, σχεδὸν Focus, ἦλθεν Predicate, and Ἀχιλλεύς topically unmarked clause-final information. I agree with Bakker that Ἀχιλλεύς does not stand outside of the clause. Therefore, it would not qualify for Tail function, an extra-clausal pragmatic function whose main purpose is to give additional information or comment to the clause; cf. S. C. Dik 1989:358 "He bought the house, the rich man," in which "the rich man" is not part of the clause, but elaborates on the Topic "he." Since Ἀχιλλεύς is not set off from the clause by metrical means (*pausa*, caesura), it belongs to the same intonation unit as the preceding constituents—a fortiori, δελφίς in my example must belong to the same intonation unit as ἵν' ὁ φίλαυλος ἔπαλλε, since the word is normally regarded as split between two cola.

[16] See also de Strycker and Slings 1994:384.

[17] Note that this analysis is supported by the article in ὁ φίλαυλος, which is not necessary metrically speaking, and is slightly out of key in the language of choral lyric: Topics are typically preceded by the article because they normally refer to known information.

special way: by treating an entity as given when it is in fact not given, one causes a break in the cohesion of its clause with respect to the preceding one.

If this analysis is correct, it tells us two things. First, our intuitive feeling that the hyperbaton is here "literary" is confirmed by means of a comparison of the resulting order with standard Greek word order—in other words, what was intuition becomes a hypothesis about a possible audience response which can be argued for (and against): reader-response stylistics enables us to decide whether or not a figure of speech in a given context is literary or not. Second, we are able to go beyond that: pragmatic analysis enables us to attribute a certain meaning (beyond vague ones like "emphasis") to deviations from normal usage.

The second point can be treated only after an examination of each of the various figures of speech. About the first point, however, a general statement is more usefully made in advance. The phenomena under discussion here—anaphora, antithesis, chiasmus—all have to do with strategies devised to give maximum accessibility to the information as distributed over the clause or sentence. As a general rule it may be stated that the more complex the information supplied in a clause or sentence is, the higher the chances are for one of these distribution phenomena to occur. In reader-response stylistics it follows automatically that the simpler the information supplied in a clause or sentence is, the higher the chances are that the distribution phenomenon was experienced as "literary." Put differently: a figure of speech is a fixed strategy used for arranging information, borrowed from everyday language but employed in such a way that the competent native reader/listener will recognize it as untypical of everyday language and interpret it as literary.

However, there are clear limits to this rule, and therefore to the method proposed in this paper. No matter how trite a figure of speech is, how predictable it is in a given sentence, and how well it can be accounted for in terms of discourse analysis, it may still add considerably to the native reader/listener's aesthetic experience. *In poetry, everything is poetry.*[18] A good illustration is the following quotation, perhaps the most famous anaphora in English literature:[19]

[18] I discussed this insight with regard to alliteration and assonance (likewise from a reader-response point of view) in Slings 1993.

[19] Quoted after Gilbert 1991:656.

(3) We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender.

Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that Churchill was managing his thoughts as he spoke these words, and that therefore the anaphora was a natural strategy for him to use. If so, to deny that it had, and still has, an impressive effect on those who listened to the speech at the time, and on those who read the speech, or listen to the recording that was made of it, would be utter foolishness. The best that any stylistic theory can do is to fine-tune our tools. But since any aesthetic experience is necessarily subjective, or partly so, no stylistic method will ever capture all possible responses to a figure of speech, or indeed to any element of style. But when faced with the choice between the total subjectivity that is the hallmark of stylistic analysis of Greek poetry as it is practised today and a degree of objectivity, even at the cost of not accounting for everything, as in the approach advocated here, I prefer to err on the side of objectivity.

As a corollary, the use of "a fixed strategy used for arranging information, borrowed from everyday language" may also occur in everyday language when there is not enough information to be arranged in a certain way (e.g. as an anaphora). There is no reason to think that in spoken language, the distribution phenomena that I am about to discuss may not be similarly "misused." Even in conversational situations, anaphoras like the one quoted from Churchill may occur. In this sense, and in this sense only, do I agree with Fish that ordinary language cannot be isolated from poetic language.[20] But since we are dealing here with a dead language, it would be unwise to press the point any further. I will speak of "literary" (and therefore, by implication of "nonliterary") use of certain strategies for distributing information, rather than of "marked" and "unmarked" use, even though I am aware that the "literary" use may not have been unknown in spoken Greek.

Having just given an example of anaphora, I might just as well begin there. Consider the following spoken passage, in which a fairground inspector describes his work:[21]

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[20] Fish 1980:97–111; see also Bakker 1997:125–26.

[21] Borrowed from Brown and Yule 1983:17. A "+" denotes a pause between 1.0 and 1.9 seconds.

(4) I look at fire extinguishers + I look at fire exits + I look at what gangways are available + I look at electric cables what + are they properly earthed + are they properly covered

This speaker organizes his information in a number of clauses in which "I look at" is Topic, and the various complements of this phrase Focus (in the last "I look at" clause the Focus becomes itself Topic or part of it in the next two clauses, but that is not relevant to my argument). It would of course be possible to contract the first four clauses by dint of simply adding on new Focuses in clauses two, three and four:

(4') I look at fire extinguishers, fire exits, what gangways are available, electric cables.

In spoken language, (4') would probably be avoided, because it requires too much organization of the information on the part of the speaker, and imposes too heavy a processing load on the listener. By contrast, in written language (other than a conversation within a narrative), (4') will almost invariably be preferred to (4), probably with an adjustment to avoid the incongruous indirect question as the third complement: as readers we have become accustomed to associate the anaphora in (4) with a certain stylistic register, and the information given in (4) is incompatible with that register. Any competent writer of English knows this, if only instinctively, and will accordingly avoid the anaphora.

But the stylistic analysis of examples like (4) is more complex, because the conversational setting of any utterance should be taken into account.[22] Consider the following pairs of question and answer:

(5) What did you give John for his birthday?—I gave him a book, I gave him a bottle of wine, and I gave him a couple of glasses.

(5') What did you give John for his birthday?—I gave him a book, a bottle of wine and a couple of glasses.

"I gave him" is entirely given, and the three complements are semantically related (they refer to objects that qualify as gifts) and, presumably, easily retrievable from the speaker's memory. Therefore the

[22] Unfortunately, Brown and Yule do not provide one for (4).

felicity conditions for (5') are better than those for (4'). If the fairground inspector had been asked "What do you look at when checking the fairground?," his reply would more likely have been like (4') than if the question was something like "Could you describe your work on the fairground?"

In other words, chances are that in spoken language anaphora is confined to conversational settings where a speaker is given the freedom to express him or herself more or less at will: the speaker is given the floor, and does not have to use floor-holding devices. On the other hand, in (5) the answer is more likely to be interrupted before the speaker has finished, because it consists of a string of complete clauses: the speaker is given the floor only for a short period. If this analysis is correct, it explains (or helps explain) why anaphora is frequent in epic and lyric, including choral lyric in tragedy (and in historic prose), whereas it is relatively infrequent in dialogue in tragedy, and virtually does not occur in comedy.

The following data are based on an examination of anaphora in Sophocles' *Electra* and Euripides' *Hecuba*: anaphora occurs once in 26 (short) lines in lyrical passages and anapaests in Sophocles' play, and once in every 31 lines in Euripides's. In dialogues, it is found once in 42 iambic trimeters in *Electra*, and no more than once in every 115 in *Hecuba*.[23] For the *Electra*, it is intriguing to observe that anaphora is relatively frequent in the two scenes between Electra and Chrysothemis, almost exclusively in lines spoken by Electra, whereas it virtually does not occur in the confrontation between Electra and Clytaemestra. One might be tempted to say that when speaking to Chrysothemis, Electra feels superior and holds the floor, whereas in the debate between mother and daughter both of them are on equal terms, and aggressive, and therefore neither of them is confident enough to use a strategy that presupposes floor-holding.[24] Of course the difference between lyric and dialogue also suggests that anaphora may be used as a literary device, as does the relative frequency in the dialogue in Sophocles as opposed to Euripides.

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[23] As opposed to anaphora, nonanaphoric forms of complex contrast (chiasmus and antithesis) are avoided in lyric passages in tragedy. In Sophocles' *Electra*, 22 out of the 25 examples of antithesis are found in iambic trimeters, and all 8 of chiasmus. For the *Hecuba*, the figures are 32 out of 35 antitheses and all 14 chiasmuses.

[24] Note that anaphora is too scarce in the dialogues of the *Hecuba* to draw significant conclusions, but it may not be a coincidence that it is nearly always used by Hecuba's partners, who are speaking from a position superior to hers.

If anaphora is a natural way of organizing information in natural language, one requirement it must fulfill is that every clause imparts a new chunk of information. A speaker who uses anaphora in saying the same thing two or more times is guilty of violating Grice's third maxim of manner: "Be brief."[25] If this occurs in a literary text, it will therefore be taken as a figure of speech. Let me illustrate this by means of two instances of question-word anaphora (which I shall not discuss in this paper, because this anaphora is a function of a decision to ask two or more questions, rather than an autonomous phenomenon):

(6) ἔνθα τίνα πρῶτον, τίνα δ' ὕστατον ἐξενάριξε;

Whom did he kill first, whom last?

(*Il.* 11.299)

(7) τίς ἄρα ῥύσεται τίς ἄρ' ἐπαρκέσει
θεῶν ἢ θεᾶν;

Who will protect us, who will shield us, of the gods and goddesses?

(A. *Th.* 93–94)

The two questions in (6) are real questions bearing on two different persons. If they have a literary effect, it is because the questions are asked by the author himself, who then goes on to answer them, and of course because in fact there were more persons killed than the first and the last (which in Greek is already indicated by the use of the superlative rather than the comparative). So the selection is slightly arbitrary: in natural language, one might have preferred "Whom did he kill and in what order?" But the Gricean maxim is not violated here, as it is in (7): there the second question adds nothing because the two predicates are virtually synonymous. Such forms of anaphora (rare in Homer, relatively frequent in tragedy, especially in Euripides) are clearly recognizable as figures of speech.

In natural language use, therefore, anaphora is a chunking device, a strategy that enables the user to distribute complex information over several clauses. Poetry, however, is not natural language use. It already has a chunking device of its own: line end. This makes the

[25] Grice 1989:27. Grice gives only one example (1989:37), in which the violation of the maxim indicates irony ("Miss X produced a series of sounds that corresponded closely with the score of 'Home Sweet Home'")—as opposed to "Miss X sang 'Home Sweet Home.'" I propose to apply the maxim to literary registers as well.

strategy superfluous in some cases, especially when the information is not of a serial nature, in other words, when the second clause is not syntactically parallel to the first. In Herodotus we frequently encounter the following type of anaphora:[26]

(8) τὸν Σάλμοξιν τοῦτον ἐόντα ἄνθρωπον δουλεῦσαι ἐν Σάμῳ, δουλεῦσαι δὲ Πυθαγόρῃ τῷ Μνησάρχου

This Salmoxis was a human being, a slave on Samos, and his master was Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus.

(Hdt. 4.95.1)

This nonserial anaphora enables the speaker to add a number of syntactically and informationally new constituents to a clause that is already syntactically and pragmatically complete (it has a Topic and a Focus)—without the anaphora, the sentences would carry too heavy a load of new information, so a chunking device is necessary. Denniston says that this type of anaphora is a peculiarity of Herodotus, Fehling adds an example from an inscription. Neither scholar attempts to explain why it does not occur in poetry, but I think the chunking function of line end accounts for it easily enough.[27]

In poetry, the most common type of anaphora occurs when a Topic constituent is repeated, whereas the variant constituents have Focus function. The Topic may already be given in the previous sentence. Consider the following passage from the *Iliad*:[28]

(9) Αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ τεῦξε σάκος μέγα τε στιβαρόν τε,
τεῦξ' ἄρα οἱ θώρηκα φαεινότερον πυρὸς αὐγῆς,

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[26] See also Denniston 1952:87; Fehling 1968:143–44.

[27] To give an example from the *Iliad* taken completely at random: εὗρε δὲ Πατρόκλῳ περικείμενον ὃν φίλον υἱὸν, || κλαίοντα λιγέως, 19.4–5. Here Herodotus would probably have written εὗρε δὲ κλαίοντα λιγέως. I have found an instance of this prose type in E. *Hec.* 59–60: ἄγετ', ὦ παῖδες, τὴν γραῦν πρὸ δόμων, ἄγετ' ὀρθοῦσαι τὴν ὁμόδουλον. This is an exception that proves the rule: the lines are anapaests, therefore there is no proper line end that can be used to chunk the sentence.—Dr. Bakker draws my attention to S. *OT* 312–13 ῥῦσαι σεαυτὸν καὶ πόλιν, ῥῦσαι δ' ἐμέ, ῥῦσαι δὲ πᾶν μίασμα τοῦ τεθνηκότος. This is indeed a real exception in that the third member of the anaphora, which follows on the pausa, adds a complement of a different nature than the two first objects. But it is also a very typical example of Sophocles' predilection for triadic sentence structures, which are often used where logic would require a binary structure, as here. Cf. *OT* 371 τυφλὸς τά τ' ὦτα τόν τε νοῦν τά τ' ὄμματ' εἶ, three juxtaposed accusatives of respect when the meaning is "your ears and your mind are as blind as your eyes are." See also Slings 1993:22.

[28] The translation is Lattimore's, slightly modified.

τεῦξε δέ οἱ κόρυθα βριαρὴν κροτάφοις ἀραρυῖαν
καλήν, δαιδαλέην, ἐπὶ δὲ χρύσεον λόφον ἧκε,
τεῦξε δέ οἱ κνημῖδας ἑανοῦ κασσιτέροιο.

Then after he had wrought the shield, which was huge and heavy,
he wrought for him a corselet brighter than fire in its shining,
and wrought him a helmet, massive and fitting close to his temples,
lovely and intricate work, and laid a gold top-ridge along it,
and wrought him greaves out of pliable tin.

(*Il.* 18.608–12)

It would be foolish to look for any special poetic effect in this anaphora: rather the opposite is called for, since this is the matter-of-fact ending of a majestic episode—further literary elaboration of the lines would have harmed them. This is a simple, straightforward everyday anaphora, not unlike ex. (4) above.[29] The Topic *teûxe* "he wrought" is taken over from the introductory temporal clause.

Sometimes the Topic is given in or inferrable from the preceding context, but its information status is very low in itself:

(10) εἰσὶν μέν μοι παῖδες ἀμύμονες, εἰσὶ δὲ λαοὶ
καὶ πολέες

I have blameless children, I have men, and many men too.

(*Il.* 10.170–71)

The Topic (which could be paraphrased as "My human subjects are . . .") is suggested by Diomedes' question at 165–66: "Aren't there younger Greeks than you to arouse the kings?"[30] But there are also cases where the Topic status of the repeated constituent is unexpected, indeed doubtful:

(11) αὐτοῦ μιν κατέρυκε, δίδου δ' ὅ γε θυγατέρα ἥν,
δῶκε δέ οἱ τιμῆς βασιληΐδος ἥμισυ πάσης·

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[29] Fehling 1968:192 says of anaphora with μέν . . . δέ in general: "Ferner ist für die Form charakteristisch die rhetorisch sehr schwache Verwendungsweise, die sie an vielen Stellen kaum als echte pointierte Wiederholungsfigur, sondern fast nur als besondere Art der Satzverbindung erscheinen lässt." I disagree fundamentally with the implication that a "Wiederholungsfigur" is normally speaking rhetorically strong—this means very little in itself unless it can be backed up by a pragmatic analysis, and it is untrue in any case of anaphora. See also exx. (13) and (14) below.

[30] H. Dik calls existential εἰμί at the beginning of the clause "dummy Topic" (1995:229). This is not necessary here, since μοι is, I think, part of the Topic. But it is relevant at *Il.* 23.549–50. Cf. Chafe 1994:111–13 on "low-content verbs."

He kept him there, and offered him his daughter,
and gave him half of his royal sovereignty

(*Il.* 6.192–93)

Given the fact that the subject (the king of Lycia) is not expressed in the first clause, it is probably the Topic; this may be confirmed by *hó ge* (this cluster is often used in Homer to repeat the Topic). The status of *dídou* "he offered" is uncertain: it could be Focus, but *thugatéra hến* "his own daughter" better qualifies for that, or it could perhaps be maintained that *dídou . . . thugatéra hến* "he offered . . . his daughter" is one Focus. What is clear, however, is that in the second clause of the anaphora *dôke* "he gave" is Topic (a Topic is often derived from a preceding Focus, see the discussion of ex. (16c) below) and *timês . . . hḗmisu* "half of his sovereignty" Focus. This is true of nearly all cases of anaphora in poetry which I have examined: the pragmatic status in the first clause may differ or be uncertain, but in the subsequent clauses the repeated constituent is Topic, the varying constituent Focus.[31] Curiously enough, this deviation from the normal use of anaphora does not, I think, lead to an interpretation of it as "literary." On the contrary: not only are the two varying constituents (*thugatéra hến* and *timês . . . hḗmisu*) but also the first of the pair of repeated ones (*dídou* "offered") brand-new. Therefore the density of information is so high that a chunking strategy would seem to be even more necessary than in other cases.[32]

The repeated constituent is often not the first word of its clause.[33] In such cases the repeated constituent has Focus function at its first occurrence, and is usually followed by unmarked information; in the second clause it has Topic function and the varying constituent is Focus. See for example:[34]

(12) αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς
μιμνέτω αὖθι τέως περ, ἐπειγόμενός περ Ἄρηος·
μίμνετε δ' ἄλλοι πάντες ἀολλέες

[31] Except when the repeated constituent is an adjective: in that case one sometimes finds that the entire construction has the value of Focus plus additive Focus. Cf. *Il.* 11.494–95; 23.326; Ar. *Eq.* 305–6.

[32] Similar cases are also found in Hdt.; an example with ἐδίδου occurs at 5.94.1.

[33] Cf. δουλεῦσαι in ex. (8) above.

[34] Translation Lattimore.

> Let Achilleus stay here the while, though he lean very hard toward the work of the war god, and remain the rest of you all here assembled.
> (*Il.* 19.188–90)

Achilles is Topic in the first clause, and *mimnétō* "let him stay" Focus. From this Focus, a Topic *mimnete* "you must stay" is derived—a procedure which we will see is the basis for the ordering of constituents known as chiasmus—and the other Greek heroes are the Focus of the second clause.[35] Here, too, the anaphora is a relatively straightforward chunking device.

There is a thin line, however, between what may and what may not have been interpreted as literary. The following appeal by Electra to Chrysothemis, which closes a long speech, may illustrate this:

(13) ἀλλ', ὦ φίλη, πείσθητι, συμπόνει πατρί,
σύγκαμν' ἀδελφῷ, παῦσον ἐκ κακῶν ἐμέ,
παῦσον δὲ σαυτήν

> Dear sister, please, make an effort for your father, and for your brother too, save me, and yourself as well, from misery.
> (S. *El.* 986–88)

The two anaphoras are additive, as are almost all two-clause anaphoras—anaphora is one of the ways in Greek to express "A, and B too" ("additive Focus"). The repeated constituents[36] cannot be predicted from the preceding lines—indeed it may be doubted whether *sumpónei* "make an effort for" and the first *paûson* "save" are Topics. At first sight, then, ex. (13) looks rather like ex. (11) discussed earlier. But there is a difference: all through her speech, Electra had spoken of her father and her brother, her sister and herself. Therefore, one may wonder if the information load is really strong enough to warrant the double anaphora. Moreover, father and brother, and the two sisters, had been coupled throughout, so there is no real need

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[35] This seems to be relatively rare in prose, but cf. Hdt. 1.137.1 αἰνέω μέν νυν τόνδε τὸν νόμον, αἰνέω δὲ καὶ τόνδε, where I would analyze the first αἰνέω as Focus and τόνδε τὸν νόμον, which refers to a custom which has just been described, as unmarked old information (the Topic is, I think, the author, who is grammatically encoded in the first person singular form). In the second clause αἰνέω is Topic, καὶ τόνδε (note the Focus particle καί) Focus. See also Hdt. 5.89.2.

[36] συμπόνει . . . σύγκαμν' is a typically Sophoclean *variatio* in anaphora. See also *Ant.* 898–99 φίλη . . . προσφιλής . . . φίλη. The idiom is not exclusively Sophoclean, however, cf. E. *Hec.* 982 φίλη . . . προσφιλές. Instances from older poetry are collected by Fehling, 1968:213.

for a (double) additive Focus, which in normal circumstances one would use for more or less unexpected additions.[37] Therefore I feel reasonably confident that we have to do with a *bona fide* figure of speech here. Yet a word of caution is in order: anaphora is wholly alien to most modern West-European languages as a means of saying "A, and B too," whereas it is normal in Greek. We should be careful therefore not to be influenced too much by our intuition.

In any case, matters are quite clear in the following passage:[38]

(14) ἀλλ' ὅδ' ἀνὴρ ἐθέλει περὶ πάντων ἔμμεναι ἄλλων,
πάντων μὲν κρατέειν ἐθέλει, πάντεσσι δ' ἀνάσσειν,
πᾶσι δὲ σημαίνειν·

Yet here is a man who wishes to be above all others,
who wishes to hold power over all, and to be lord of
all, and give them orders.

(*Il.* 1.287–89)

Formally speaking, *pántōn* "of all" etc. is the Topic of which the three successive infinitives are predicated. But this is an unnatural way of presenting the information. The adjective *pâs* "all" is, by its very meaning, a word with strong focal properties; moreover, the three infinitives are closely related semantically, and therefore add nothing new—in fact the three clauses are simply variants of *ethélei peri pántōn émmenai állōn* "he wishes to be above all others." A Topic/Focus structure would therefore seem to conflict with the meaning. In addition, Grice's maxim quoted above is violated: an additive strategy is used where there is nothing to add. And finally, the virtual synonymy conflicts with the chunking function of anaphora. We may conclude, then, that a literary interpretation is beyond doubt. But such clear-cut cases are rare in epic, lyric, and comedy, and not particularly frequent in tragedy, except for choral songs.

Anaphora (A—B, A—B') is related to two mutually exclusive ordering strategies in complex contrasts: antithesis[39] (A—B, A'—B') and

[37] Note that the additive Focus is reinforced by the parallel line ends between the two anaphoras, which add their chunking force to that of the anaphora.

[38] Translation is Lattimore's.

[39] I use the term "antithesis" for all cases of parallel order of two pairs of semantically parallel constituents in subsequent clauses: semantic opposition is a special kind of antithesis, but antithesis is not limited to it.

chiasmus (A—B, B'—A'); in fact anaphora can be a special case of antithesis.[40] It may seem paradoxical that both orders are treated as figures of speech by modern commentators—in antiquity, antithesis was treated as such from the fourth century B.C.E. onwards, chiasmus hardly ever, as noticed by Leeman.[41] Once a speaker or writer decides to contrast two pairs of constituents in two successive clauses, he has no option but to use either the one or the other. Leeman therefore considers chiasmus to be the basic order in Greek and Latin literature: antithesis is normal for the modern, rational mind, but for the Greeks and Romans chiasmus was more natural.

It is true that one may adduce many passages in which antithesis looks like an embellishment of the style. I quote the most conspicuous instance from Sophocles' *Electra*:

(15) οἴχεται πατήρ·
τέθνηκ' ἐγώ σοι· φροῦδος αὐτὸς εἶ θανών·
γελῶσι δ' ἐχθροί· μαίνεται δ' ὑφ' ἡδονῆς
μήτηρ ἀμήτωρ

My father has gone, I am dead to you, you have perished yourself, my enemies are laughing, and raving with glee is my mother un-mother.
(S. *El.* 1151–54)

Here we have five times the order predicate-subject, which means that the successive states are presented as Topics, and therefore more or less as given or inferrable; the subjects, on the other hand, all have Focus function—a more precise, if rather cumbersome translation would be: "who has gone is my father, who is dead am I," etc. This is hardly a natural way of presenting these states: entities, in this case human beings, are usually more eligible for Topic status than predicates.[42] And in this case Electra had already spoken at length about her father, herself, her brother, her enemies, and, last but not least, her mother. We are, I think, entirely justified in assuming that the audience will have taken this as a highly literary use of the word order, the more so as it culminates in another figure,

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[40] In the following analysis of chiasmus and antithesis I analyze these orderings only in parallel clauses; cases like S. *El.* 59–60 λόγῳ θανὼν | ἔργοισι σωθῶ will be left out of account.

[41] Leeman 1963:1:22.

[42] See the statistics in Givón 1984–1990:2:900.

the typically tragic oxymoron *mētēr amētōr* "mother un-mother."[43] I have the personal impression that (15) is the emotional climax of Electra's monologue—and this has of course important consequences for the overall interpretation of Electra's character in this play. However that may be, this is certainly its rhetorical climax.

The problem with Leeman's argument, however, is that there is simply no Greek author for whom it can be maintained that A—B, B'—A' is the natural order. I present some more statistics: in book 13 of the *Odyssey*, I have counted 12 instances of antithesis as against 6 of chiasmus; for Sophocles' *Electra*, the numbers are 25 cases of antithesis as against 8 cases of chiasmus, for Euripides' *Hecuba* 32 cases of antithesis, and 14 of chiasmus.[44] In inscriptions, A—B, A'—B' is as predominant as it is in literary texts: in a mini-corpus constructed *ad hoc* I counted 27 instances of antithesis as against 10 of chiasmus.[45]

The choice between the two orderings of the constituents depends on the processing load of the two clauses. When the four constituents A—B, A'—B' are relatively simple in form, and not too unpredictable or focal qua content, parallel order is the rule; as they become more complicated, chiastic ordering becomes more likely. This is nothing out of the ordinary: the rule applies to English as well. Consider the following replies to the question "How do you like the European cities?:"

(16) a. Rome is nice, Paris is awful.
b. Rome is nice, awful is Paris.
c. Rome I actually like a lot, but a city I really hate is Paris.

At the moment when the speaker of (16)a–c starts replying, "European cities" has been suggested as Topic by the interlocutor. Normally such a Topic would appear in the sentence, but the speaker of (16) opts for another strategy, by which the suggested Topic is split into two contrastive Topics: Rome and Paris. These Topics are not given but inferrable ("Sub-Topics").[46] As long as the Focuses are as

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[43] See Fehling 1968:287–89.
[44] In this count, anaphoras have not been included in antitheses.
[45] Consisting of *IG* I³ 10, 11, 14, 34, 35, 40, 46.
[46] See the literature quoted in Bakker 1997:103, n. 32; add Hannay 1985 on inferrability and Sub-Topic formation. In this particular instance, the two inferred Topics are members of the suggested Topic, but the notion of Sub-Topic is actually much wider: any relationship of inference allows deriving a Sub-Topic from an old Topic, see Hannay 1985:57–58.

manageable as they are in (16)a, the sentence is clear enough. The speaker of (16)c opts for another strategy: as in (16)a, an inferrable Topic (Rome) is selected, but the focus is much more complicated in form than "is nice" in (16)a: it contains a phrase with a meaning that is focal by itself ("a lot"), and in particular it introduces a first person form: first persons tend to take over as Topics from third persons, especially inanimate ones.[47] This explains why from the Focus ("I actually like a lot"), the speaker derives a new inferrable Topic, his varying appreciation of European cities: "Paris" now becomes Focus rather than contrastive Topic as in (16)a. It will be clear that (16)b does not have the same complexity in information structure as (16)c. Therefore, "awful is" in (16)b is illogical as a Topic.

The following general rule may now be postulated: the more complex the information structure of two contrasted pairs of constituents, the greater, in natural language use, the chance of chiasmus. Within reader-response stylistics, the following prediction can be derived from this rule: the less complex the information structure in a chiasmus, the stronger the probability that this chiasmus will be experienced as literary. Answer (16)b is a good example of this principle. Any competent native reader of English will immediately recognize the literary register of this sentence.

Complexity is a relative concept: what may be complex for one speaker is not complex for another. Hence the wavering between chiasmus and antithesis in the following two Attic boundary stones:[48]

(17) a. δεῦρ' 'Ελευσινίων τριττὺς τελευτᾶι, Πειραιῶν δὲ τριττὺς ἄρχεται.

Here ends the *trittús* of Eleusis and begins the *trittús* of Piraeus. (*IG* I^2 897)

(17) b. δεῦρε Παιανιῶν τριττὺς τελευτᾶι, ἄρχεται δὲ Μυρρινουσίων τριττύς.

Here ends the *trittús* of Paeania and begins the *trittús* of Myrrhinus. (*IG* I^2 898)

The inscription (17)a gives Topic function to both *trittúes*,[49] which seems logical enough. However, these inscriptions being statements

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[47] See also Slings 1992:98.

[48] Quoted from Dover 1960:53. Spelling normalized, letters doubtful or absent on the stone not indicated.

[49] I take δεῦρε as Theme in both texts (on this term, see the second study below). It could also be taken as Topic, and the first *trittús* as Focus, but this does not affect

without a context, the Topics are untypical in being brand-new; and so are the Focuses, at least *teleutâi* "ends"—*árkhetai* "begins" is of course more or less predictable. Therefore, the chiastic order of (17)b is just as understandable: since in the first clause both Topic and Focus are brand-new, an inferrable Topic is derived from the preceding Focus.

I now quote a longer passage from Sophocles' *Electra* to illustrate this analysis:

(18) εἷς ἦν 'Αχαιός, εἷς ἀπὸ Σπάρτης, δύο
Λίβυες ζυγωτῶν ἁρμάτων ἐπιστάται·
κἀκεῖνος ἐν τούτοισι Θεσσαλὰς ἔχων
ἵππους, ὁ πέμπτος· ἕκτος ἐξ Αἰτωλίας
ξανθαῖσι πώλοις· ἕβδομος Μάγνης ἀνήρ·
ὁ δ' ὄγδοος λεύκιππος, Αἰνιὰν γένος·
ἔνατος 'Αθηνῶν τῶν θεοδμήτων ἄπο·
Βοιωτὸς ἄλλος, δέκατον ἐκπληρῶν ὄχον.

There was one from Achaea, one from Sparta, two drivers of teams from Libya. Among them, he [Orestes], with his Thessalian horses, was the fifth. Number six came from Aetolia, with chestnut colts, number seven from Magnesia, number eight, with his team of grays, from Aeniania, number nine from Athens, the god-built city, and from Boeotia there was another one, rider of the tenth chariot.

(S. *El.* 701–8)

The normal order throughout is numeral—origin. This order is broken twice, which creates a chiasmus: it is less interesting that number five is number five than that he is Orestes, so he becomes Topic of his clause (*kakeînos* "and he"). Number nine is from Athens, so Sophocles has to give him a more or less standard compliment: his origin is a slightly complex Focus, and from this, a new Topic is derived (*Boiōtós* "a Boeotian"); the numeral (*dékaton* "the tenth") is Focus. In both cases, the chiasmus can be accounted for in terms of information structure, and there is no reason to assume that the audience has understood it as literary.

It is not always the case that in chiasmus the four constituents A—B, B'—A' have the functions of Topic—Focus, Topic—Focus.

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the point I am making: complexity of information is variable, and may inspire different writers to use different strategies. On the alternative interpretation, (17)b is analogous to (20) below.

Sometimes the chiasmus is caused by the fact that both A and B' have Focus function, and are followed by more or less predictable, pragmatically unmarked constituents:

(19) προσθεὶς δ' ἀνάγκην σιτοποιὸν ἐν δόμοις,
σαίρειν τε δῶμα κερκίσιν τ' ἐφεστάναι

compelling me to make food in the palace, to sweep it and to tend the loom.

(E. *Hec.* 362–63)

Saírein "to sweep" and *kerkísin* "the loom," literally "the shuttles," are the Focuses of their respective infinitive clauses (the Topic is the unexpressed subject of the infinitives). *Dôma* "the house" is entirely predictable (it repeats the synonymous *dómois* in the previous line), and *ephestánai* "to supervise" is, in this context, a relatively empty word. The order is thus entirely natural: the chiasmus is caused by the fact that of the two Focus constituents, the first is a verb, the second a noun. There are other possibilities as well:

(20) ὅσσοι ἐνὶ μεγάροισι γερούσιον αἴθοπα οἶνον
αἰεὶ πίνετ' ἐμοῖσιν, ἀκουάζεσθε δ' ἀοιδοῦ.

All of you who always drink the sparkling chieftain-wine in my palace, and who listen to the singer.

(*Od.* 13.8–9)

I would analyze *geroúsion aíthopa oînon* "sparkling chieftain-wine" as Focus (*hóssoi* "as many as" being Topic, as a relative pronoun or relative adjective logically is).[50] If so, *pínete* "you drink" is the Predicate, and of course it is predictable. The Topic *akouázesthe* "you listen" is derived not from the Focus of the previous clause, but from the Predicate.

In any case, chiasmus and anaphora have in common that the two contrasted constituents in the second clause nearly always have the functions of Topic and Focus (in that order), whatever their pragmatic roles in the first clause—ex. (19) is a rare exception. This is true for antithesis as well.

Here is a candidate for use of chiasmus as a figure of speech:

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[50] ἐν μεγάροισι is a Setting; see note 14 above.

(21) ἀνδράσι μὲν θηητὸς ἰδεῖν, ἐρατὸς δὲ γυναιξίν.

He is admired by men, beloved of women.

(Tyrt. fr. 10.29)

The semantic relationship between *thēētòs* "admired" and *eratòs* "beloved" is very close, so there is no obvious reason why the latter should be Topic rather than Focus, as the former is. But there are many borderline cases. Consider:

(22) ζηλῶ σε τοῦ νοῦ, τῆς δὲ δειλίας στυγῶ.

I envy you your common sense, but I hate you for your cowardliness.

(S. *El.* 1027)

As in (21), the two clauses are short, so the chiastic order is surprising. Besides, the expression creates a distinction that is not really warranted by the meaning: one of the normal preconditions for chiasmus is that the first Focus and the second Topic (B and B' in the general schema A—B, B'—A') refer to parallel but distinct entities or states of affairs. This is only formally the case here, because Chrysothemis' *noûs* "intelligence" and her *deilía* "cowardliness" are one and the same: they are two ways of looking at her conduct. The chiasmus therefore creates a contrast, even an opposition, that does not correspond to anything in reality (although it may be maintained, of course, that the opposition exists in the mind of Electra). Chiasmus may be less obviously a chunking device than is anaphora—it is probably more correct to say that as a chunking device it is not as obviously restricted to spoken language as anaphora is. But like anaphora, it is an additive device, and when there is little to add, it is a fair inference that we have to do with literary use of it.

The hypothesis that in this instance the chiasmus is to be taken as a figure of speech is strengthened by a number of other factors. The two verbs *zēlô* "I envy" and *stugô* "I hate," with their opposite meanings, are put at the beginning and the end of the line: dramatic poets, especially Sophocles and Aristophanes, like to place words which in whatever way are related to each other in the initial and final positions.[51] Furthermore, the two verbs are both disyllabic, and

[51] In S. *Ant.* 162–236 (Creon's and the guard's first speeches), I have noted the following instances: 162 (ἄνδρες ... θεοί); 168 (κἀκεί.... ἔτι); 173 (ἐγώ ... ἔχω); 225 (πολλάς ... ἐπιστάσεις); 233 (τέλος ... μολεῖν).

they rhyme. The two constituents in the genitive are juxtaposed, and the second is longer than the first (the so-called "Gesetz der wachsenden Glieder" is used by Sophocles more than by any other Greek poet).[52] The position of the words in the line and the chiasmus reinforce each other mutually.

It has to be noted, however, that the indubitable use of chiasmus as a figure of speech is quite rare: in book 13 of the *Odyssey*, 1 out of 6 examples may perhaps be classed as such (i.e., 409–10); in Sophocles' *Electra*, ex. (22) cited above is the only instance out of 8; in Euripides' *Hecuba*, none of the 14 instances seems literary.

A similar reasoning applies to antithesis: we may reasonably suppose that this arrangement has been taken as a figure of speech when there is no real difference between two contrasted constituents, in other words, if B' in the general schema A—B, A'—B' is synonymous with (or identical to) B, for example:

(23) ὡς ἐνταῦθ' †ἐμεν
ἵν' οὐκέτ' ὀκνεῖν καιρός, ἀλλ' ἔργων ἀκμή.

We are at the point where there is no time to hesitate but the best opportunity for acting.

(S. *El.* 21–22)

The two nouns *kairós* and *akmḗ* are synonyms (both "good opportunity"), so there is no pragmatic or functional reason why the second should have been used at all. The example, then, seems a clear violation of Grice's third maxim of manner. Sometimes it is the A' constituent that is superfluous: when this happens, we have a figure close to anaphora:[53]

(24) τέρας μὲν
θαυμάσιον προσιδέσθαι,
θαῦμα δὲ καὶ παρεόντων ἀκοῦσαι

A wondrous marvel to behold,
a wonder even to hear from those who live close by

(Pi. *P.* 1.26)

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[52] Fehling claims (1968:22) that this tendency is "nur ein Gesetz des längeren letzten Gliedes." But Sophocles is quite fond of triadic structures in which each member is longer than the preceding, e.g., *Ant.* 891 ὦ τύμβος, ὦ νυμφεῖον, ὦ κατασκαφής; 892 οἴκησις ἀείφρουρος οἷ πορεύομαι: three, four and five syllables, respectively.

[53] Translation Sandys, slightly modified.

In a number of cases, a B' constituent is added when the first clause is negative and the second positive (e.g., "John is not at home but Mary is"), for example:

(25) Αἴγισθος μὲν οὐ κατὰ στέγας
μήτηρ δ' ἐν οἴκοις

Aegisthus is not in the palace, but my mother is in the house.
(S. *El.* 1308–9)

Here a simple *mḗtēr dé* "but my mother is" would have sufficed; *en oíkois* "in the house" is synonymous with *katà stégas* "in the palace."

When omissibility of the A' or B' constituent is used as a criterion, antithesis is more often used as a figure of speech than chiasmus, especially in tragedy: 1 instance out of 12 in *Odyssey* 13; 7 out of 25 in Sophocles' *Electra*; 6 out of 32 in Euripides' *Hecuba*.

II. *Clause Structure and Oral Grammar: Anacolutha in Plato*

When we define "anacoluthon" as an ungrammatical construction, the question what we mean by ungrammatical arises immediately. We must not assume, as Greek grammars tend to do, that the ideas of what is and what is not ungrammatical Greek, are unchanged and unchangeable for all time. Our notions of grammaticality are influenced by the habits of, first, a very long tradition of written Greek prose, which in Plato's time, however, was still in its formative phase; second, the rules of Latin grammar—Latin was, after all, the first foreign language of a long count of generations of classicists; and finally, the various grammars of our own respective languages. Certain types of what we consider anacolutha are found even in the most careful of fourth-century prose writers, Isocrates and other orators, and this to such an extent that we may well doubt whether these types were considered ungrammatical at the time.

Thus, right from the start, we must distinguish between two types of anacolutha: a type which we would consider ungrammatical but which we have good reasons to assume were not considered ungrammatical by fourth-century Greeks—for example because they occur in sufficient quantity in writers of continuous prose; and another type which is found only in texts which reflect what in an earlier study I

called "oral grammar:"[54] the rules and regulations of the spoken language as reflected in Greek poetry and in Greek conversational prose, for example Plato's dialogues. As I tried to show, such phenomena can be described by means of grammatical rules, but these are rules that have to be specified in the grammar as valid only in those texts for which the spoken, not the written language is the norm. These include of course all texts that stem from a period in which there was no written language (i.e., prose), as well as dialogical texts, in which a conversation is imitated. In such an analysis, anacolutha of this second type are in principle never ungrammatical, since that verdict is dependent on the grammar of written language.

First I will deal with anacolutha that are entirely acceptable from the point of view even of the grammar of continuous Greek prose. I will start with the so-called Theme constructions. In certain linguistic models, especially in Functional Grammar, Theme is a term used for a constituent that precedes the clause proper.[55] A Theme construction may be used for various reasons; the type of Theme we are concerned with in this study is the one that states explicitly and in advance the Topic of the following clause. Consider the following pair of sentences:[56]

(1) a. Is that guy a friend of yours?
b. That guy, is he a friend of yours?

The speaker of (1)a simply asks a question about the male person who is the Topic of the question; the Topic is expressed by means of the subject of the question. The speaker of (1)b uses a different strategy: he cuts the question in two. In Simon Dik's words:[57] "here is something with respect to which I am going to produce a predication," (i.e., the Theme, in this case, "That guy"); "and here is the predication" (in this case: "is he a friend of yours?"). In the predication itself, the Topic is expressed, as it has to be in English, by means of the pronoun "he." This pronoun is the subject of the clause; it is

[54] Slings 1994.
[55] See, e.g., Wakker 1994:53–54. I will use "clause" both for syntactic units recoverable in written language and for intonation units in spoken language.
[56] See Dik 1981:132.
[57] *Ibid.*

less easy to assign a syntactic function to "that guy," and this is of course what makes Theme constructions apt to create an anacoluthon.

Using a Theme construction has the advantage of splitting up the information load contained in a sentence, and thereby of making it more easily accessible. Theme constructions are a good example of the principle of "one chunk per clause," which specifies that a clause should not contain more than one bit of new information.[58] If there are more bits of information at the same time, a clause is normally "chunked," i.e., split up, and that is just what a Theme construction does. In Chafe's discussion of this principle,[59] the clause is defined as an intonation unit, and this helps us understand why Theme constructions are chunking devices—in (1)a, there is one intonation unit, in (1)b there are two.[60] This way of chunking information is of course more necessary in spoken than in written language, because a reader can read a text through at his or her own speed, whereas in spoken discourse information has to be understandable at once. But the distinction is a gradual one: even in written language, Theme constructions are occasionally required.

In Greek, Theme constructions are not always easy to demonstrate, because subject expression is not compulsory in Greek, as it is in English. Often it is impossible to decide whether a nominative constituent at the beginning of a (written) clause is a Theme or a Topic. But sometimes the text gives us an indication. A famous example comes from the story of Gyges and Candaules' wife in Herodotus:[61]

(2) ὡς δὲ κατὰ νώτου ἐγένετο ἰούσης τῆς γυναικὸς ἐς τὴν κοίτην, ὑπεκδὺς ἐχώρεε ἔξω, καὶ ἡ γυνὴ ἐπορᾷ <u>μιν</u> ἐξιόντα.

When the woman had turned her back and gone to bed, Gyges slipped softly out of the room, but the woman, she saw <u>him</u> leave.

(Hdt. 1.10.2)

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[58] See Givón 1984:1:258–63.

[59] Chafe 1994:108–19.

[60] Bakker (1997:96–97) discusses Meillet's analysis of the Proto-Indo-European clause in terms of "autonomy" along the same lines: Meillet would analyze an early Greek version of (1)a–b automatically in terms of apposition, in other words, as (1)b. This is basically right, provided the analysis is stripped of its evolutionist and even primitivist bias: whereas Meillet claimed that the appositional construction is a hallowed relic from Proto-Indo-European, I would hold that it is a universal of spoken language. See also Lambrecht 1987 on the relative rareness of full NPs within the clause in spoken French, and the virtual absence of two full NPs.

[61] See also Dover 1960:17. See Bakker (1997:100–101) for examples from Homer.

The enclitic pronoun *min* "him" does not occupy the second position in the last clause, as it normally does in Greek down to the end of the fifth century (this is known as "Wackernagel's Law"): the regular order would have been *kaí min hē gunḕ eporâi exiónta* "and the woman saw him leave".[62] The best way to account for this is to assume a pause between *hē gunḗ* "the woman" and *eporâi* "she saw". If this is correct, *hē gunḗ* is a Theme ("but the woman, she saw him leaving"). The unusual position of *min* is, however, the only indication for this, and if Herodotus had omitted it, we would never have known (or rather: we would never have had reasons to think) that *hē gunḗ* is a Theme standing outside the clause, rather than a simple Topic inside it. There must be thousands of sentences where we have no such indication at all. What is prose for us, in other words strings of words to be decoded, was still sound (and therefore also silence) for Herodotus and his readers—we have to assume that the composition and reception of his work was much closer to oral discourse than in a purely literate culture.

Ex. (2) also shows that Theme constructions do not necessarily involve anacolutha. Sometimes it is possible to construe the Theme constituent: in (2) we might say that *hē gunḗ* is subject of *eporâi*, although I am not sure that this is entirely correct or indeed relevant.[63] If a Theme constituent is in the nominative, and if it is not repeated in the following clause, traditional syntactic analysis will have no problems with it. But in other cases it will. In such cases, the anacoluthon may be considered a side effect of the author's choice for a Theme construction. Let me illustrate this with two examples taken from Plato's *Politeia*:[64]

(3) οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ <u>τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν γένος</u>, ἐὰν μὲν πρὸς τέχνην τινὰ ἢ ἄλλο ἐπιτήδευμα διαφέρον φαίνηται, τοῦτο δὴ φήσομεν ἑκατέρῳ δεῖν ἀποδιδόναι.

[62] An example comes from nearby: Hdt. 1.12.1: καί μιν ἐκείνη ἐγχειρίδιον δοῦσα κατακρύπτει ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν θύρην. [On the present tense in these examples, see the contribution of Sicking and Stork in this volume (p. 146), ed.]

[63] If the assumption that the position of μιν is caused by a break is correct, the subject of ἐπορᾶι is not expressed—a subject must be expressed, if at all, in a clause, and γυνή is not placed in it but before it.

[64] Translation of (3) is Shorey's, modified.

> <u>Now for the male and the female sex as well</u>, if it appears that they have distinct qualifications for any arts or pursuits, we shall affirm that they ought to be assigned respectively to each.
>
> (Pl. *R.* 454d7–9)

Those who confine their interpretational activities to traditional syntactic construing would probably call *tò tôn andrôn kaì tò tôn gunaikôn génos* "the male and the female sex" the subject of the predicate *phaínētai* "proves to be" in the subordinate clause, and would go on to say that it is placed outside the clause. This analysis may or may not be incorrect—I think it is incorrect[65]—but it is certainly superficial, indeed deficient. The phrase *tò tôn andrôn kaì tò tôn gunaikôn génos* is a Theme: it stands outside the following complex of clauses and presents the entity about which this complex is going to say something. The following example is entirely similar and does involve anacoluthon:

(4) ὡς ἄρα <u>ὁ γευσάμενος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχνου</u>, ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλων ἱερείων ἑνὸς ἐγκατατετμημένου, ἀνάγκη δὴ τούτῳ λύκῳ γενέσθαι.

> The story that <u>he who has tasted of human entrails</u>, if one bit is minced up with bits of other victims, that he is inevitably transformed into a wolf.
>
> (Pl. *R.* 565d9–e1)

Here the nominative phrase *ho geusámenos* "he who has tasted" cannot be construed, since the person referred to appears in the clause proper in the dative (*toútōi*, "[it is inevitable] for him"). But what matters more is the similarity between (3) and (4): in both sentences, a rather lengthy Theme constituent is placed outside the clause or clause complex, as a result of the strategy described earlier. I repeat Simon Dik's words: "here is something with respect to which I am going to produce a predication," i.e., *tò tôn andrôn kaì tò tôn gunaikôn génos* "the male and the female sex" in (3), *ho geusámenos toû anthrōpínou*

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[65] It seems unattractive to me to try and construe Theme constructions at all costs. To give an example that has been bothering me because it conflicts with the Case Hierarchy as set out below: ἃ μὲν γὰρ ἐξείρηκας, ἄγνοιά μ' ἔχει (S. *Tr.* 350). Here it is possible to construe the relative clause by means of the subterfuge called "unexpressed antecedent:" if such an antecedent were expressed, it would have been in the genitive case ἅ μὲν γὰρ ἐξείρηκας, (sc. τούτων) ἄγνοιά μ' ἔχει. But "unexpressed antecedents" are dubious on general grounds, and they are in any case quite rare when their case is the genitive or the dative (see Kühner and Gerth 1898–1904:2:402). I prefer an analysis of the relative clause as a Theme construction, the grammatical relationship with the following clause being disregarded.

splánchnou "he who has tasted of human entrails" in (4); and again: "and here is the predication." Whether or not there is an anacoluthon is irrelevant from a pragmatic point of view, although syntactically speaking, the anacoluthon in (4) is quite interesting. But let us concentrate on pragmatics first.

The obvious question to ask is of course: why does Plato use a Theme construction in these two sentences? In other words, why does he prefer a construction of the type "That guy, is he a friend of yours?" to the simpler "Is that guy a friend of yours?," which has a normal Topic/Focus structure? I can think of several answers, and as so often in pragmatics, the answers do not exclude but reinforce each other. The answers I am about to give have to be seen as various factors that together trigger a Theme construction.

The first factor is the degree of givenness of a constituent. Normally speaking, a Topic is given or at any rate inferrable information. For someone who wishes to produce a predication with respect to something which is mainly or entirely new information, a Theme construction is an obvious strategy. Given the fact that a part of the predication itself will always be new—in human discourse, all sentences contain at least one bit of new information, the Focus—the clause will be too hard to process if both the entity of which the predication is predicated and the predication itself, or part of the predication itself, contain new information. The clause will burst at the seams, so to speak. A Theme construction will prevent this, since a Theme is, by definition, not a part of the clause.

Now in ex. (4), the Theme is indeed brand-new: the man who has tasted human entrails has not been mentioned before: he is part of an Arcadian tradition that Socrates tells in order to clarify his treatment of the tyrant. In ex. (3), the male and the female sex are not entirely new—Socrates and Glaucon had been talking about their respective roles for quite some time, but this was some time ago: the last time the sexes were mentioned was at 453e, almost a page and a half before. After that, Socrates had detected a flaw in the argument, and now, after a couple of analogical examples, the discussion returns to the sexes. Thus, the male and the female sex are a Discourse Topic that is reactivated in this sentence after a long time.[66]

Secondly, a clause may have a Topic and must have a Focus, but

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[66] From the vast literature on accessibility and reactivation, I cite Prince 1981 on "unused" information; Chafe 1987 (especially 28–31) and 1994 (passim) on "semi-

apart from that, other constituents may have topical or focal properties as well.[67] If a potential Topic has focal properties, then there is, again, the danger of an overload of focality in the clause: a focal Topic plus a Focus. This, too, may lead the speaker to use a chunking strategy, for instance a Theme construction. This is the case in (3), where the Focus particle *kaí* "also" marks the focality of the male and the female sex; so in this respect, too, presenting them as a Theme will prevent the clause from bursting at the seams.

And finally, a potential Topic constituent may simply be too long to be accommodated within the clause, because lengthy clauses are avoided in natural language use. Long constituents tend to be placed outside the clause. In Dutch prescriptive stylistics, this is known as the "fat-things-overboard" principle.[68] No-one will doubt that both *tò tôn andrôn kai tò tôn gunaikôn génos* in (3), and *ho geusámenos toû anthrōpínou splánchnou* in (4), qualify as "fat things."

Let us now turn to the syntactic problem posed by the Theme constituent in (4), in other words, to the anacoluthon. For even when one accepts the explanation of the Theme construction I have proposed, it still remains a problem why the Theme is in the nominative, not the dative, as the Topic *toútōi*. Would it not have been easy for Plato to write *tôi geusaménōi?* The answer is probably negative. It would not have been easier: it would have been impossible. In a study I mentioned earlier, I discussed a related problem in Homer and proposed a Case Hierarchy as a solution:[69]

(5) Nominative—Accusative—Genitive—Dative

The more to the right a case is on this scale, the more marked it is, and the stronger the restrictions on its being admitted as a first constituent. A famous example from Homer illustrates this:

(6) Ἀνδρομάχη θυγάτηρ μεγαλήτορος Ἠετίωνος,
Ἠετίων, ὃς ἔναιεν ὑπὸ Πλάκῳ ὑληέσσῃ

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active" concepts. See especially Givón 1984–1990:2:933–35 on left-dislocation (= Theme construction) as a reactivation device.

[67] See Dik 1989:265 ff.; Slings 1992:99 and n. 17. To give a simple example: in a μέν ... δέ structure, both constituents will almost always express two Topics—at the same time, by virtue of their being contrasted, they acquire focal properties.

[68] See also Chafe 1994:82–92 on the "Light Subject Constraint."

[69] See Slings 1994:420–25.

Andromache, daughter of stout Eetion, Eetion, who used to live underneath the wooded Plakos.

(*Il.* 6.395–96)

The apposition *Eetion* marks a break in the sentence: the constituent is repeated to make it the Theme of new information. Repetition in the genitive would have been impossible because the genitive is too marked, too far to the right in the Case Hierarchy.[70] In Plato, as in Homer, Theme constituents are found only in the nominative and the accusative.[71] The choice between the two cases depends on various factors. One of these is the semantic function which the referent of the Theme is going to play within the clause: if it is going to be an Agent or Agent-like constituent, as in (4), it will be in the nominative; an accusative, on the other hand, will appear if it is going to be more like a Patient, for example:[72]

(7) ἡμέρας γὰρ καὶ νύκτας καὶ μῆνας καὶ ἐνιαυτούς, οὐκ ὄντας πρὶν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι, τότε ἅμα ἐκείνῳ συνισταμένῳ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν μηχανᾶται.

Days, nights, months, years, which did not exist before heaven came into being, he contrived their production together with the construction of heaven.

(Pl. *Ti.* 37e1–3)

For Themes in the accusative we must avoid a particularly dangerous pitfall. In English, Themes are often introduced by such expressions as "as for" or "with regard to." It so happens that these phrases are also used to explain (and translate) the Greek accusative of respect. The temptation is great to construe the accusative of a theme

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[70] The Case Hierarchy is also responsible for changes in case, cf. Pl. *R.* 500b8–c5, where the dative participle τῷ ... ἔχοντι (b8–9) is picked up by the accusatives μαχόμενον (c1) and (with further switch from singular to plural) ὁρῶντας καὶ θεωμένους (c3). See Reinhard 1920:88–116; Slings 1994:410–23 for parallels in Homer.

[71] Theme constituents in the "partitive" genitive are a separate category: they define the whole of which the Topic is a part. An example: Hdt. 3.118.1 τῶν δὲ τῷ μάγῳ ἐπαναστάντων ἑπτὰ ἀνδρῶν, ἕνα αὐτῶν Ἰνταφρένεα κατέλαβε ... ἀποθανεῖν (needless to say, some editors delete αὐτῶν). In Plato, I know no instance of a sentence-initial constituent in the partitive genitive, which is demonstrably an extra-clausular Theme—there are cases where such an interpretation is possible, but these are subject to the reservations I made with regard to (2).

[72] In many linguistic paradigms, including Functional Grammar, "Agent" is the function assigned to the subject of a nonpassive sentence; "Patient" (or "Goal") the function assigned to the object of a nonpassive sentence and subject of a passive sentence.

as one of respect,[73] and so to avoid the anacoluthon. But apart from such standard translations, the accusative of respect has nothing in common with the accusative of Themes. The accusative of respect limits the validity of a predication (normally the expression of a human quality) and belongs to the clause itself; the Theme accusative, on the other hand, states an entity with regard to which a predication is relevant, and precedes the clause. A typical example of an accusative of respect is:

(8) τὸ δὲ ἔργον μού ἐστιν καλούς τε καὶ ἰσχυροὺς ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὰ σώματα.

My work is to make men decent as far as their bodies are concerned.
(Pl. *Grg.* 452b6–7)

Tà sṓmata "as for their bodies" restricts the general statement; typically, its position is at the end of the clause. A Theme, on the other hand, is different, for example:

(9) τὰ μὲν γὰρ λεγόμενα, δικαίῳ μὲν ὄντι μοι, ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ, ὄφελος οὐδέν φασιν εἶναι, πόνους δὲ καὶ ζημίας φανεράς·

As for what people say, if I'm just, it's no use to me, unless I'm also thought to be just; the consequences are labors and public damage;
(Pl. *R.* 365b4–6)

The phrase *tà mèn gàr legómena* "as for what people say" cannot in any way be said to restrict the following sentence—it does what a Theme typically does: it "specifies the universe of discourse with respect to which the subsequent predication is presented as relevant."[74]

Before moving on, I have to clarify the relationship between Theme constructions and prolepsis.[75] Prolepsis is a special Theme construction, which helps to chunk a complex sentence, for example:

(10) σκοποῦντες γὰρ καὶ τοιαύτην τάχ' ἂν κατίδοιμεν τήν τε δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀδικίαν ὅπῃ ποτὲ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐμφύονται.

[73] So even Reinhard 1920:172.

[74] Dik 1981:19. See Slings 1989:389–90 for a full discussion of all the textual problems involved.

[75] For a classification of several Left-Dislocation ("displacement") phenomena that may be analyzed as, or are related to, prolepsis, cf. Slings 1992:106–8. Closely related is what in some paradigms is known as Raising to Object (cf. Givón 1984–1990:2:768).

For if we examine such a city too, it may be that we will discern the origin of justice and injustice in the states.

(Pl. *R.* 372e4–6)

Justice and injustice are the Topic of the subordinate clause *hópēi . . . emphúontai* "how. . . . they grow." But if they had been put in that clause, it would clearly have contained too much information: Perhaps we will observe—What?—How justice and injustice originate in states. The particular type of Theme construction known as prolepsis turns the information into a kind of three-stage rocket: Perhaps we will observe—What?—Justice and injustice.—What about them?—How they originate in the state.

Clearly, prolepsis is related to Theme constructions and the two even overlap.[76] In order to analyze their relationship we must realize that three quantities are involved in prolepsis: the main clause with its predicate, the displaced constituent, and the subordinate clause, which has been robbed of this constituent. There are two major orders of these three elements:

(11) a. main clause—displaced constituent—subordinate clause
b. displaced constituent—main clause—subordinate clause

The order in (11)a is typically a phenomenon of spoken Greek: it is very frequent in tragedy, comedy, and prose dialogue, quite rare outside these genres—which is logical enough: in written language the need for chunking subordinate clauses is not great. The order of (11)b, which qua structure is very similar and sometimes identical to Theme constructions, is the predominant type of prolepsis in continuous prose.[77] In other words, there are two types of prolepsis: one virtually confined to the spoken language (or rather, to the literary genres that imitate a conversational situation), a sentence-internal chunking strategy; and another one, which is found in all genres, a Theme-like construction that creates more cohesion between sentences, or announces a focal or new Topic. The following example

[76] As in X. *Cyr.* 2.1.5 as analyzed in Slings 1992:108.

[77] In continuous prose, the order displaced constituent—subordinate clause—main clause is found occasionally as well: D. 18.69–70: Ἀμφίπολιν, Πύδναν, Ποτειδαίαν, Ἁλόννησον, οὐδενὸς τούτων μέμνημαι [Theme construction with accusatives as in (7)]. Σέρριον δὲ καὶ Δορίσκον καὶ τὴν Πεπαρήθου πόρθησιν καὶ ὅσ' ἄλλ' ἡ πόλις ἠδικεῖτο, οὐδ' εἰ γέγονεν οἶδα [Theme construction identical to prolepsis].

illustrates the similarity between this type of prolepsis and Theme construction:[78]

(12) κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ μετὰ Γλαύκωνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος, προσευξόμενός τε τῇ θεῷ καὶ ἅμα τὴν ἑορτὴν βουλόμενος θεάσασθαι τίνα τρόπον ποιήσουσιν ἅτε νῦν πρῶτον ἄγοντες.

I went down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon, the son of Ariston, to pay my devotions to the Goddess, and also because of the festival: I wished to see how they would conduct it since this was its inauguration.

(Pl. *R.* 327a1–3)

From the goddess, Focus of the first participial clause, a potential Topic, the goddess's festival, is derived, but the festival is not accessible enough in the shared knowledge of speaker and addressee: it is not given and hardly even inferrable. Therefore a subordinate clause *tína trópon tḕn heortḕn poiḗsousin* "in which way they will conduct the festival" would have too heavy a processing load: a focus *tína trópon* "in which way," and a (virtually) brand-new Topic. This explains why *tḕn heortḕn* "the festival" is put in a Theme-like position;[79] as we saw, new Topics tend to be replaced by Themes.

Extra-clausal Themes are found in all types of Greek: whether in spoken or in written language, cohesion between sentences is always necessary. Therefore one would expect that Theme constructions involving anacoluthon are equally frequent in continuous prose as in conversational prose, and this expectation is borne out by the facts: unconstruable Themes are cited from Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, from Demosthenes and Isocrates.[80]

The same holds true for another type of anacoluthon, which I will discuss only very briefly, the so-called pendent nominative or nominative absolute.[81] In this construction, a sentence opens with a participle in the nominative, but when we arrive at the main clause, the referent of the participle appears in a different case, for example:

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[78] Translation is Shorey's, modified.

[79] I doubt whether it is really a Theme, since I see no reason to assume that there is a break after τὴν ἑορτήν: I would rather assume a break after θεάσασθαι.

[80] See Kühner and Gerth 1898–1904:1:47, 330.

[81] A more extensive analysis is offered in Slings 1992. [See also the examples from the Corpus Hippocraticum in van der Eijk's contribution to this volume, ed.]

(13) <u>διασκοπῶν</u> οὖν τοῦτον, ὀνόματι γὰρ οὐδὲν δέομαι λέγειν, ἦν δέ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν πρὸς ὃν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ <u>διαλεγόμενος</u> αὐτῷ ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ, εἶναι δ' οὔ.

<u>As I examined</u> this man—there's no need for me to name the man with whom I had this experience in my examination, men of Athens—and <u>as I talked to</u> him I got the impression that he seemed wise to many others and to himself above all, but wasn't.

(Pl. *Apol.* 21c3–7)

The construction of this sentence is disputed.[82] I take the participles *diaskopô̂n* "examining" and *dialegómenos* "talking with" as coordinated predicative participles. We may ask the same question as we did with regard to ex. (4) discussed earlier: why are these participles not in the dative? The answer I propose again relies on the Case Hierarchy: depending on the complexity of the sentence, a participle agreeing with a Topic requires too much concentration of the speaker and the addressee in spoken Greek if it is put in such a marked case as the dative. Of course complexity is a relative concept: in the following example the dative presents no problem:

(14) ἀποροῦντι δὲ αὐτῷ ἔρχεται Προμηθεὺς ἐπισκεψόμενος τὴν νομήν

As Epimetheus was puzzled, Prometheus came to him to inspect the distribution.

(Pl. *Prt.* 321c3–4)

The participle is followed immediately by its Head *autôi* "to him," literally "for his benefit," and the syntactic relation of the Head and the main predicate is made clear right away.

Again, the pendent nominative is not particularly characteristic of spoken language: sentence-initial participles in the nominative followed by Heads particularly in the dative are found in the historians and the orators.[83] We may feel that the nominative in (13) is ungrammatical, but evidently the Greeks of the classical period felt differently.[84]

I now turn to a much larger group of anacolutha, for which it is

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[82] See de Strycker and Slings 1994:275–76.
[83] See Kühner and Gerth 1898–1904:2:105–7.
[84] But the nominative absolute is often qualified as σόλοικος or σολοικοφανής in the Scholia, so opinions must have changed during the post-classical era.

reasonable to assume that the rules and habits of the spoken language, in other words, oral grammar, do indeed play a decisive part. It is a characteristic of all spoken language, as we can observe daily ourselves, that speakers start sentences with a relatively complex structure; in the course of the sentence the structure proves too complex, so the speaker shifts to a more simple structure. I propose to call this "downshift." Downshift creates all sorts of anacolutha: from part to whole, from paraphrase to the entity that is paraphrased, from indirect to direct speech, from infinitive to finite verb, from subordinate clause to main clause, and of course from marked case to unmarked case. I will concentrate here on downshift phenomena that have to do with the boundary between main and subordinate clauses. In written language the border-line between main clause and sub-clause is always clear-cut; in spoken language, there tends to be a gray area between the two. For example, clauses may begin as subordinate clauses but end as main clauses.[85] In Plato, this is often caused by self-interruptions, as in the following example:[86]

(15) <u>ἐπειδὴ</u> ὡμολογήκαμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ εἶναι μέν τι ἀγαθόν, εἶναι δέ τι ἡδύ, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἑκατέρου δὲ αὐτοῖν μελέτην τινὰ εἶναι καὶ παρασκευὴν τῆς κτήσεως, τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἡδέος θήραν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ—αὐτὸ δέ μοι τοῦτο πρῶτον ἢ σύμφαθι ἢ μή. σύμφῃς;—οὕτως φημί.—<u>ἴθι δή</u>, ἃ καὶ πρὸς τούσδε ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, διομολόγησαί μοι, εἰ ἄρα σοι ἔδοξα τότε ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

<u>Since</u> you and I are agreed that there is something good and something pleasant, and that the pleasant is different from the good, and that there is a training and practice for the gaining of both, on the one hand a pursuit of the pleasant, on the other a pursuit of the good—well, first of all accept or reject this very point. Do you accept it?—I do.—<u>All-right</u>, now I ask you to accept what I was saying to these people, too, if, that is, you thought I was right then.

(Pl. *Grg.* 500d6–e4)

Just as Socrates has finished the subordinate *epeidē* clause, he interrupts himself and turns to Callicles in order to make sure that the latter does indeed agree so far. There is no main clause; its content is framed as a new step in the interrogation, starting with *íthi dḗ* "all-

[85] See the analysis of *Od.* 6.187–92 in Slings 1994:414–15, where other downshift phenomena are illustrated as well.

[86] Translation is Irwin's, slightly modified. [Editor's note: for a very similar example, see van der Eijk's quotation of Ar. *Pol.* 1259^{a}37–1259^{b}10, with his note 117, p. 109.]

right." Few scholars would regard this as an anacoluthon, but the mechanism is the same as in the following instance:[87]

(16) παντάπασι γάρ, ὃ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἴπομεν τοῦδε τοῦ λόγου, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀληθείας μετέχειν δέοι δικαίων ἢ ἀγαθῶν πέρι πραγμάτων, ἢ καὶ ἀνθρώπων γε τοιούτων φύσει ὄντων ἢ τροφῇ τὸν μέλλοντα ἱκανῶς ῥητορικὸν ἔσεσθαι.

For absolutely, as we said at the very beginning of this discussion, namely that the man who is going to be competent at rhetoric need have nothing to do with the truth about just or good things, or indeed about people who are such by nature or upbringing.

(Pl. *Phdr.* 272d3–7)

The *hóti* clause starts as an apposition to the *hó* clause: Socrates considers it useful to quote what they had said at the beginning. But as it goes on, the *hóti* clause seems to lose its subordinate character, and becomes a main clause. This is precisely what I meant with "gray area:" if we classify the *hóti* clause as subordinate, there is no main clause; if we consider it a main clause, it should not start with the conjunction *hóti* in the first place.

A related downshift phenomenon that does not, strictly speaking, involve anacoluthon (although it is often treated under that heading) is found at the end of a sentence, when the speaker uses an independent clause where an embedded clause would have been more logical:

(17) ἐπεὶ ποίῳ δικαίῳ χρώμενος Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευσεν ἢ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ Σκύθας; ἢ ἄλλα μυρία ἄν τις ἔχοι τοιαῦτα λέγειν.

For with what right did Xerxes march against Greece, or his father against the Scythians, or you could mention innumerable other instances.

(Pl. *Grg.* 483d6–e1)

The second *ē* "or" suggests that Callicles is about to say, as would seem logical, "or countless others whom you could mention." Instead, he shifts down to the easier, nonembedded construction. This idiom is a favorite with Plato; it is also found, for example, in a famous passage at the end of the *Apology*, where Socrates gives a list of famous people whom he would like to question in Hades: Agamemnon, Odysseus, Sisyphus, "or you could mention countless others"

[87] Translation is Rowe's, slightly modified.

(41c1). More in general, the end of lengthy sentences is a *Fundgrube* for downshift phenomena.[88]

By definition, downshift involves two constructions, a more complex and a less complex one. This gives rise to an interesting psycholinguistic problem, which I will briefly address by discussing two relevant passages from Plato. Given the fact that Discourse Topics can be reactivated after a long time (see the discussion of ex. (4) above), we may ask whether the same possibility of reactivation applies to more complex constructions which were downshifted to less complex ones. Psychologically speaking, after the downshift has occurred, the complex construction is stored in the speaker's memory and there is no ground for supposing that it may not surface again. If it does, an embedded construction without an embedding one is created, and such constructions do occur. Textual critics tend to remove these; being grammarians of written discourse at the same time, they tend to deny the existence of subordinate clauses or dependent infinitives without governing main verbs.

My first example is from the end of the Cave episode in the Seventh Book of the *Politeia*:[89]

(18) Τί οὖν; ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενον αὐτὸν τῆς πρώτης οἰκήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐκεῖ σοφίας καὶ τῶν τότε συνδεσμωτῶν οὐκ ἂν οἴει αὐτὸν μὲν εὐδαιμονίζειν τῆς μεταβολῆς, τοὺς δὲ ἐλεεῖν; —. . .—
τιμαὶ δὲ καὶ ἔπαινοι εἴ τινες αὐτοῖς ἦσαν τότε παρ' ἀλλήλων καὶ γέρα τῷ ὀξύτατα καθορῶντι τὰ παριόντα, (. . . . . .), δοκεῖς ἂν αὐτὸν ἐπιθυμητικῶς αὐτῶν ἔχειν . . .—. . .—
καὶ τόδε δὴ ἐννόησον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. εἰ πάλιν ὁ τοιοῦτος καταβὰς εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν θᾶκον καθίζοιτο, ἆρ' οὐ σκότους ⟨ἂν⟩ ἀνάπλεως σχοίη τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς . . .—
. . .—
τὰς δὲ δὴ σκιὰς ἐκείνας πάλιν εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν γνωματεύοντα διαμιλλᾶσθαι τοῖς ἀεὶ δεσμώταις ἐκείνοις, ἐν ᾧ ἀμβλυώττει, πρὶν καταστῆναι τὰ ὄμματα, οὗτος δ' ὁ χρόνος μὴ πάνυ ὀλίγος εἴη τῆς συνηθείας, ἆρ' οὐ γέλωτ' ἂν παράσχοι, καὶ λέγοιτο ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀναβὰς ἄνω διεφθαρμένος ἥκει τὰ ὄμματα, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἄξιον οὐδὲ πειρᾶσθαι ἄνω ἰέναι, καὶ τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα λύειν τε καὶ ἀνάγειν, εἴ πως ἐν ταῖς χερσὶ δύναιντο λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτεινύναι ἄν;

Well then, if he recalled to mind his first habitation and what passed for wisdom there, and his fellow-bondsmen, do you not think that he

[88] See also Reinhard 1920:72–88.
[89] Translation is Shorey's. In this extract, an "—" denotes change of speaker and ". . ." an omitted passage.

> would count himself happy in the change and pity them?—. . . —
> And if there had been honours and commendations among them which they bestowed on one another and prizes for the man who is quickest to make out the shadows as they pass . . ., do you think he would be very keen about such rewards . . .?—. . .—
> And consider this also, said I, if such a one should go down again and take his old place would he not get his eyes full of darkness . . .?—
> . . .—
> Now if he should be required to contend with these perpetual prisoners in evaluating these shadows while his vision was still dim and before his eyes were accustomed to the dark—and this time required for habitation would not be very short—would he not provoke laughter, and would it not be said of him that he had returned from his journey aloft with his eyes ruined and that it was not worth while even to attempt the ascent? And if it were possible to lay hands on and kill the man who tried to release them and lead them up, would they not kill him?
>
> (Pl. *R.* 516c4–517a6)

The first two questions in this extract are framed around a main verb meaning "do you think" (*oíei* and *dokeîs*, respectively); these verbs are followed by an accusative and infinitive plus the modal adverb *án*, an embedded *potentialis* mood. In the third question, there is a new start, marked by *kaì tóde dè ennóēson* "and consider this also." Here the main verb is a nonembedded potential, an optative plus *án*—a clear case of downshift: from an infinitive to a finite verb form; in other words, the "do you think that" of the first two questions has disappeared.

The fourth question, starting with *tàs dè dè skiàs ekeínas* "and those shadows" proceeds at first in the same way, with two potential optatives plus *án* (*paráskhoi* "would provoke" and *légoito* "would be said"). But at the very end of the sentence, we observe that all of a sudden the embedding has returned. There is a change in construction that goes hand in hand with another important change in this sentence. The semantic function of the man who has seen the light had already changed from Agent to Patient: In the *ei* clause ("if he should be required to contend with these perpetual prisoners") as well as in the following clauses up to *tês sunētheías* "habitation," his semantic role is Agent. But this role turns into a Source in the first main clause *âr' ou gélōt' àn paráskhoi* "would he not provoke laughter," and into a related function (*perì autoû* "about him") in the second main clause plus its two subordinate clauses. And, finally, it becomes Patient, a shift that is marked by a Theme construction: *tòn epikheiroûnta lúein te kaì anágein*

"the man who tried to release them and lead them up," which is placed before the *ei* clause at the end of the extract, in which it is object. It is the prisoners that have now become Agents.

Parallel to this shift in semantic roles is a change in construction: the final predicate is again an infinitive plus *án*, as if the sentence depended on an unexpressed "do you think." There is a transition in the semantic framing of the sentence, and this transition is, I think, responsible for the reintroduction of the embedded structure, although the embedding is not expressed by means of a governing main-verb predicate. Attempts to correct the transmitted text are doomed to failure: the most obvious conjecture is *apokteíneian* "they would kill," but the chances that an original optative was corrupted to a rare form of the infinitive such as *apokteinúnai* "to kill" are almost nil.

Towards the end of Diotima's speech in the *Symposium*, there is an anacoluthic sentence that I am confident should be explained along the same lines:[90]

(19) τοῦτο γὰρ δή ἐστι τὸ ὀρθῶς ἐπὶ τὰ ἐρωτικὰ ἰέναι ἢ ὑπ' ἄλλου ἄγεσθαι, ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῶνδε τῶν καλῶν ἐκείνου ἕνεκα τοῦ καλοῦ ἀεὶ ἐπανιέναι, ὥσπερ ἐπαναβασμοῖς χρώμενον, ἀπὸ ἑνὸς ἐπὶ δύο καὶ ἀπὸ δυοῖν ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ καλὰ σώματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ μαθήματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο τὸ μάθημα τελευτήσῃ, ὅ ἐστιν οὐκ ἄλλου ἢ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ μάθημα, καὶ γνῷ αὐτὸ τελευτῶν ὃ ἔστι καλόν.

The proper way to go about or be guided through the ways of love is to start with beautiful things in this world and always make the beauty I've been talking about the reason for your ascent. You should use the things of this world as rungs in a ladder. You start by loving one attractive body and step up to two; from there you move on to physical beauty in general, from there to the beauty of people's activities, from there to the beauty of intellectual endeavours, so that from there you ascend to that final intellectual endeavour, which is no more and no less than the study of that beautiful itself, and finally you recognize the beautiful itself.

(Pl. *Smp.* 211b7–d1)

What I print here is the text given by all the medieval MSS plus a papyrus roll from the late second or early third century (*P. Oxy.* 843). The various stages of the ascent, all neatly marked by means of the prepositions *apò* "from" and *epì* "to," depend on the infinitive *epaniénai*

[90] Translation is Waterfield's, slightly modified.

"to ascend." But in the final stage of the ascent, we find two subjunctives lacking a construction: *teleutḗsēi* "he will end" and *gnôi* "he will recognize." It is easy enough to get rid of the first one: one has to change only one letter to form an infinitive (*teleutḗsēi* to *teleutêsai*); but the second subjunctive is impossible to remove: not only would *gnôi* have to be changed into an infinitive (*gnônai*), but in addition the participle *teleutôn* "finally" would have to be changed from nominative to accusative. Various other solutions involve introducing a conjunction, but none of the seven or eight conjectures that have been proposed along those lines explain the corruption.

Therefore, albeit with some hesitation, I submit that the text is correct, and that we have here another instance of an embedding turning up again. This sentence is in fact a recapitulation of a process described at greater length one page earlier (210a4–211b5). And in that earlier description, Diotima had used infinitives and final *hína* clauses throughout, the infinitives marking the beginning of each next step, the *hína* clauses the result. In particular the description of the last stage but one may be important in this respect:[91]

(20) μετὰ δὲ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἐπὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἀγαγεῖν, ἵνα ἴδῃ αὖ ἐπιστημῶν κάλλος, καὶ βλέπων πρὸς πολὺ ἤδη τὸ καλὸν μηκέτι τὸ παρ' ἑνί, ὥσπερ οἰκέτης, ἀγαπῶν παιδαρίου κάλλος ἢ ἀνθρώπου τινὸς ἢ ἐπιτηδεύματος ἑνός, δουλεύων φαῦλος ᾖ καὶ σμικρολόγος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος τετραμμένος τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ θεωρῶν πολλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς λόγους καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τίκτῃ καὶ διανοήματα ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀφθόνῳ...

Then, after activities, he must be led towards the things people know, so that he will see the beauty there, too, and, now that he has beauty before his eyes in abundance, he will no longer be content, like a slave, with single instances of beauty, in a boy or a human being or an activity, and will no longer be a paltry and small-minded slave, but facing instead the vast sea of beauty and gazing upon it he will give birth to plenty of beautiful, expansive reasoning and thinking...
(Pl. *Smp.* 210c6–d6)

This sentence, in which the infinitive *agageîn* "to lead" in the first line depends on a far earlier *deî* "one must" (210a4), contains a lengthy *hína* clause with three subjunctives: *ídēi* "he will see," *êi* "he will be," and *tíktēi* "he will give birth;" this tripartite clause describes the result of the ascending philosopher's seeing the beautiful in knowledge.

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91 Translation is Waterfield's, modified.

If we now turn to (19), we see that the problematic subjunctives here take over after the stage of knowledge (*apò tôn mathēmátōn ep' ekeîno tò máthēma* "from single pieces of knowledge to the supreme knowledge"). Even though there is no *hína* in (19), the subjunctives describe the final stage of the ascent. There appear to be several factors, then, that combine to produce the renewed embedding: first, the fact that in the previous passage—of which (20) is only one sentence—the steps themselves had been in the infinitive and the result in the subjunctive, whereas in (19) the whole process focuses on the result; second, the lengthy *hína* clause in (20) in the description of the stage of knowledge; third, the fact that in (19) the whole process of ascent is in turn one long string of prepositional phrases, depending on and following the single infinitive *epaniénai* "to ascend:" psychologically speaking, it is easy to understand that after all the prepositional phrases the influence of this infinitive is weakened. Therefore, when a new verb is necessary—and this seems crucial to me[92]—the parallelism between (19) and (20) causes a shift from infinitive to subjunctive.

So far we have seen cases of simple downshift (loss of embedding), as in (15) through (17), and of re-emergence of embedding, as in (18) and (19). I conclude with a situation that might be called the opposite of downshift, namely double embedding: a governing clause (not necessarily a main clause) is followed by a subordinate clause, but by the time we reach the end of the sub-clause, the governing clause has been lost sight of, and the sub-clause is treated as the protasis to a new governing clause. The result is a sentence with two predicates:[93]

(21) εὖ οὖν ᾔδησθα ὅτι εἴ τινα ἔροιο ὁπόσα ἐστὶν τὰ δώδεκα, καὶ ἐρόμενος προείποις αὐτῷ—"ὅπως μοι, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, μὴ ἐρεῖς ὅτι ἔστιν τὰ δώδεκα δὶς ἓξ μηδ' ὅτι τρὶς τέτταρα μηδ' ὅτι ἑξάκις δύο μηδ' ὅτι τετράκις τρία, ὡς οὐκ ἀποδέξομαί σου ἐὰν τοιαῦτα φλυαρῇς"—δῆλον οἶμαί σοι ἦν ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἀποκρινοῖτο τῷ οὕτως πυνθανομένῳ.

[92] For this reason I reject Burnet's solution to change τελευτήσῃ to τελευτῆσαι but to leave γνῷ unchanged: the shift from infinitive to subjunctive is then much more difficult to account for. This conjecture would split up the final stage into two parts without a sufficient justification: no new stage is introduced at καὶ γνῷ τελευτῶν—it is merely the final result. And whereas in the preceding passage this split between new step and result of the new step is crucial, in the present sentence it is irrelevant.

[93] Translation is Shorey's, slightly modified.

> <u>And so you knew very well that</u> if you asked a man how much is twelve, and in putting the question warned him: "don't you be telling me, chum, that twelve is twice six or three times four or six times two or four times three, for I won't accept any such drivel from you as an answer," <u>it was, I think, obvious to you</u> that no one could give an answer to a question framed in that fashion.
>
> (Pl. *R.* 337a8–b5)

The *ei* clause beginning in the first line was intended as the protasis to a higher-level clause governed by *eû* . . . *éidēstha hóti* "you knew very well that. . . ." But the direct speech embedded in the *ei* clause makes it so lengthy that at the point where the apodosis should start, the governing *eû* . . . *éidēstha hóti* has been forgotten and is repeated in a different form as *dêlon oîmaí soi ên hóti* "it was, I think, obvious to you that. . . ." Thus, the sentence contains two main-verb predicates, *éidēstha* "you knew" and *dêlon* . . . *ên* "it was clear." The same can also happen within subordinate clauses:[94]

(22) τί δῆτα, ἔφη, οἰόμεθα, εἴ τῳ <u>γένοιτο</u> αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ἰδεῖν εἰλικρινές, καθαρόν, ἄμεικτον, ἀλλὰ μὴ <u>ἀνάπλεων</u> σαρκῶν τε ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ χρωμάτων καὶ ἄλλης πολλῆς φλυαρίας θνητῆς, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον καλὸν <u>δύναιτο</u> μονοειδὲς κατιδεῖν;

> What do you think would happen if someone managed to see the beautiful itself, in its perfect, immaculate purity, not <u>full</u> of human flesh and colouring and all that mortal rubbish, but if he <u>could</u> see the divine beautiful itself in its unchanging shape?
>
> (Pl. *Smp.* 211d8–e4)

Within the *ei* clause, the predicate *génoito* "it would befall" is repeated by *dúnaito* "he could;" the long string of predicative adjectives, culminating in the very lengthy *anapléōn* "full" with its dependent genitives, makes the repetition necessary.

Repetition of the predicate is a very wide-spread phenomenon in Plato, and editors and commentators are not always alert to it: they tend to circumvent the problem by means of artificial punctuation, which creates asyndeta that are not always easy to understand. Here is a possible candidate:[95]

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[94] Translation is Waterfield's, modified.
[95] Translation is Irwin's, slightly modified.

(23) πρὸς αὑτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὑτοῖς συμφέρον τούς τε νόμους τίθενται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐπαινοῦσιν καὶ τοὺς ψόγους ψέγουσιν, ἐκφοβοῦντες τοὺς ἐρρωμενεστέρους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ δυνατοὺς ὄντας πλέον ἔχειν, ἵνα μὴ αὑτῶν πλέον ἔχωσιν, λέγουσιν ὡς αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἄδικον τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν.

So with an eye on themselves and their own advantage they lay down the rules and assign their praise and blame, terrorizing the stronger men capable of having more, to prevent them from having more than themselves they say that taking more is shameful and unjust.

(Pl. *Grg.* 483b6–c4)

Those editors who accept the tradition print a colon or even a full stop after *pségousin* "they blame."[96] The resulting asyndeton is accounted for by Dodds as explanatory. This may well be right, but I have some lingering doubts. First, in Plato explanatory asyndeton is normally preceded by at least some indication that there is going to be an explanation—there is no such indication here. Second, *ekphoboûntes* "terrorizing" refers to the same action as *légousin* "they say:" by saying that *pleonexía* is shameful and unjust, the weak scare the strong—in other words, *ekphoboûntes* is a coincident participle. Now, in Plato as in most Greek authors coincident participles tend to follow the predicate, not to precede it.[97] Therefore, an alternative analysis of (23) as one sentence with two predicates deserves at least serious consideration.[98]

It is not my contention that anacolutha do not exist except in the eye of the beholder. An analysis of anacolutha in Xenophon would yield many instances that could neither be accounted for as regular in fourth-century prose nor as regular in oral grammar. I am prepared to assume the existence of anacolutha that are the result of carelessness even in Plato. But far more often it is reasonable to assume that Plato consciously admitted an anacoluthon where a "regular" sentence structure would have a strained, pedantic effect smacking of the written language.

The general tone of a passage may also play a role. In the *Politeia*

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[96] Y, a secondary MS, reads ἐκφοβοῦντές τε after ψέγουσιν.

[97] An examination of the collection of some 80 coincident participles from Herodotus' Book 7 in Hettrich 1976:116–18 reveals that the main verb precedes unless either the participle is (part of the) Topic, or the participle immediately precedes the main verb—the two conditions overlap to a large extent.

[98] For further examples in Plato, see Slings 1990:344–45; de Strycker and Slings 1994:344–45; 396.

we find a striking clustering of anacolutha in Book Eight, with its homely descriptions of the decay of the constitutions and their corresponding types of person. By contrast, the discussion of poetry, music, rhythm, and gymnastics in Book Three, with its lengthy, regular, sometimes even Isocratean periods, has very few anacolutha.

But this is as far as I wish to go in claiming a relationship between anacoluthon and content. It is the very purpose of this study to show that anacoluthon is not a deviation from an eternal norm, which has to be explained away as a figure of speech, in such vague terms as vividness or emotionality.[99] Some classes of anacoluthon caused no offense to Greeks of the classical period, however much we may feel inclined to reject them. For other classes, the anacoluthon is a natural feature in types of texts for which the spoken language is the standard. Anacolutha are there to be analyzed, classified and accounted for in pragmatic terms. As the voice of the spoken language changes into the text of the written language, the mode of expression, the structure of the clause, changes with it, but the process is a slow one. We must avoid the pitfall of regarding the outcome of it as the canon by which all Greek should be judged.

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[99] See also Slings 1992:96–97.

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CHAPTER SIX

MODAL PARTICLES AND DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW IN HERODOTUS AND THUCYDIDES

Gerry C. Wakker

1. *Introduction*

In recent studies on Herodotus and Thucydides there is an increasing interest in narratological issues and narrative techniques.[1] One of the subjects studied is that of *narrative voices* or *multiple perspective*: events are not only described "directly," i.e., from the narrator's point of view, but also "indirectly," from an other viewpoint. Sometimes the perspective even shifts several times in a single paragraph, for example, in Thuc. 2.93, where the Peloponnesian raid on the Piraeus is described partly from the Peloponnesian point of view ("there was no fleet on the look-out," Thuc. 2.93.3) and partly from the Athenian point of view ("and there was no expectation that the enemy would make an attack," Thuc. 2.93.3).[2] One obvious means to obtain a shift of perspective and to introduce another narrative voice than that of the narrator is the use of indirect speech. Here the issue of whose point of view is expressed is often very complex. In this chapter I will focus on one of the expressions that is difficult to interpret in this respect.

It is a well-known fact that there are various means by which speakers comment on the information they are presenting. Among these means are the so-called *attitudinal* or *modal* particles. These may be defined as particles with which a speaker or narrator may signal his own attitude towards the proposition he is presenting.[3] Greek

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[1] See Hornblower 1994 with an elaborate bibliography.

[2] This passage is extensively discussed in Connor 1985:8–9. For multiple perspective in Herodotus and Thucydides in general, Hornblower 1994:164–65, Walker 1993 as well as Bakker's contribution to this volume.

[3] In the literature these particles are called Abtönungspartikeln (Weydt 1969), sentence or grade particles (van der Auwera and Vandeweghe 1984; Sicking 1986; Sicking and van Ophuijsen 1993), or modal particles (Weydt 1969, 1977; Franck 1980; Heinrichs 1981; Wolski 1986; Bakker 1993a; Wakker 1994; Kroon 1995). In view of their function, attitudinal particle is perhaps the most perspicuous characterization.

examples are, for instance, *ára* "interestingly," "apparently," *pou* "perhaps," and *ê* "truly." These particles will be discussed in section 3 below. Whereas in direct speech and narrative these particles are always connected in a straightforward way with the speaker's or narrator's own attitude, their use in indirect speech or free indirect speech is sometimes more difficult to account for. In an example such as (1) the interpretation of the particle combination *ê mén* "truly" seems rather unproblematic:

(1) Ἱππίης δὲ αὐτὸν ἀμείβετο τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπικαλέσας θεοὺς ἐκείνῳ, ἦ μὲν Κορινθίους (. . .) ἐπιποθήσειν Πεισιστρατίδας, ὅταν . . .

Hippias answered him calling the same gods as he [= Socles] had invoked to witness that truly the Corinthians would long for the Pisistratidae, when . . .,

(Hdt. 5.93.1)

For two reasons it seems quite plausible that *ê mén* "truly" is part of the reported speech, i.e., that it expresses Hippias's attitude towards the state of affairs he is predicating. First, there seems no reason for the narrator to affirm the truth of the reported speech in this way; second, this example of indirect speech is fully comparable with the following example of direct speech, where it is self-evident that the particle combination *ê mén* "really, I assure you" expresses the speaker's attitude towards the content of his oath:

(2) ἥλιον ἐπόμνυμί (. . .) ἦ μέν σε ἐγὼ (. . .) αἵματος κορέσω.

I swear by the sun, I will really, I assure you, give you your fill of blood

(Hdt. 1.212.3)

In the following example, however, the situation seems much more complex:

(3) λέγων ὡς ἄμεινον σφίσι εἴη κρησφύγετόν τι ὑπάρχον εἶναι, ἢν ἄρα ἐξωθέωνται ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου.

saying that it were better for them to have a place of refuge at their disposal in case it would turn out that/unexpectedly, they should be pushed out of Miletus.

(Hdt. 5.124.2)

Here one might want to argue that, just as in ex. (1), the particle *ára* "it would turn out that unexpectedly" is part of the reported speech, and expresses the attitude of the reported speaker, Aristagoras. In using *ára,* Aristagoras expresses that it could turn out this way, but at the same time that he does not expect it.[4] Alternatively, *ára* may express the narrator's, i.e., the reporter's attitude, with which he either conveys his own surprise if Aristagoras and his men would be expelled from Miletus, or with which he would primarily indicate that the condition still comes under the scope of the subordinator *hōs* "that:" "supposing them to be."[5]

This paper will focus on Herodotus's and Thucydides' use of attitudinal particles in indirect speech and free indirect speech. I will try to determine whether these two historians use attitudinal particles as a means to express their own attitude—more precisely, that of their narrator—to the content of the words reported, or whether, alternatively, they use these expressions as a means of embedding the point of view of others, i.e., of the reported speakers, in their speech representation. An answer to this question may refine our interpretation of Thucydides' and Herodotus's way of dealing with the text type indirect speech, and may perhaps reveal differences between the two historians in the way in which they comment on the reported words.

Since it seems probable, on the basis of the examples (1) and (3), that there are differences between the various attitudinal particles, I will discuss them separately. An important part of the investigation will be to determine whether there are contextual cues that help the reader arrive at an unambiguous interpretation of the attitudinal particles in indirect speech. In order to detect such cues, I will first give a brief sketch of indirect speech in Greek, with special attention to those linguistic elements that have to do with the different perspectives involved in speech representation: that of the reporter and of the reported speaker.

2. *Indirect Speech in Classical Greek: Some General Remarks*

In Classical Greek, just as in many other languages, two kinds of reported speech are traditionally distinguished: *oratio recta,* direct quotation

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[4] See Abicht *ad loc.*; Wakker 1994:350.

[5] As is argued by van Ophuijsen 1993:131.

or direct speech report, abbreviated as direct speech; and *oratio obliqua*, indirect quotation.[6] The grammatical rules for indirect speech in Greek are generally described along the following lines:[7] main (declarative) clauses are given either in the accusative with the infinitive construction or as a complement clause with finite verb form introduced by *hóti* or *hōs* "that." In such complement clauses, as well as in non-declarative main clauses and in subordinate clauses, the mood and tense of the (imagined) direct speech are retained.[8] In case of a past main verb of saying or thinking, however, the oblique optative may occur in the subclause, usually representing a direct speech subjunctive with *án*, but sometimes representing a primary indicative.[9] The optative has the temporal value which the corresponding subjunctive or indicative would have had in direct speech.

In reality, however, the above sketched dichotomy between direct and indirect speech is far too simple. First of all, there are many different forms of indirect speech, as we shall see. Second, even though the rules formulated above may seem at first sight quite simple, the semantic value and use of the oblique optative in post-Homeric Greek in particular pose several problems. I can investigate these only briefly, since a thorough discussion falls outside the scope of the present study. Let us first have a closer look at the various means which a reporter or narrator may use to represent someone else's thoughts or words. Compare the constructed examples in (4) below with the Herodotean and Thucydidean examples in (5):

(4) a ἤγγειλε/ἔλεγε· ὁ Πλάτων ἀσθενεῖ

he announced/said: "Plato is ill."

b1 ἤγγειλε/ἔλεγε ὅτι ὁ Πλάτων ἀσθενεῖ

he announced/said that Plato was ill

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[6] See, e.g., Coulmas, ed. 1986, with further bibliography.

[7] See also Kühner and Gerth 1898–1904:2:541–57; Goodwin 1889:272–83; Schwyzer and Debrunner 1950:2:331–35; Stahl 1907:590–92, 612–67; Humbert 1954:182–89; Rijksbaron 1994:49–58.

[8] In exceptional cases an Accusative with Infinitive construction is found in the subordinate clause (only when the verb introducing the indirect speech is at some distance), the infinitive functioning as a signal that the clause in question still belongs to the indirect speech; see Kühner and Gerth 1898–1904:2:550–52. For a discourse-based explanation of this phenomenon in temporal subordinate clauses, see Bakker 1991.

[9] The oblique optative may also occur when the main verb is a historical present, e.g., Xen. *An.* 1.1.3. In other words, what matters is the past reference of the main verb, not its morphosyntactic form.

b2 ἤγγειλε/ἔλεγε ὅτι ὁ Πλάτων ἀσθενοίη

he announced/said that Plato was ill

c ἤγγειλε/ᾔδει ὅτι ὁ Πλάτων ἠσθένει

he announced/knew that Plato was ill

d1 ἤγγειλε/ᾔδει τὸν Πλάτωνα ἀσθενοῦντα

he announced/knew (the fact that) Plato was ill

d2 ἤγγειλε/ἔφη τὸν Πλάτωνα ἀσθενεῖν

he announced/said that Plato was ill

(5) a ὡς δὲ ἀπίκετο ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀποπεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ Μαρδονίου, ἔλεγε τάδε· Ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Μαρδόνιος τάδε λέγει· ἐμοὶ ἀγγελίη ἥκει παρὰ βασιλέος ...

When he had arrived in Athens as Mardonius's ambassador, Alexander spoke in the following terms: "Men of Athens, Mardonius says this: a message has come to me from the king ..."

(Hdt. 8.140α1)

b1 ... τινες (...) εἶπον ὅτι νῆες ἐκεῖναι ἐπιπλέουσι

Some said that those ships were sailing against them

(Th. 1.51.2)

b2 ἐλέχθη (...) ὡς οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι φάρμακα ἐσβεβλήκοιεν ἐς τὰ φρέατα

It was said that the Peloponnesians had put poison in the cisterns (Th. 2.48.2)

c ᾔδεσαν δὲ οὔκω ὅτι σφέας περιεκυκλεῦντο τῇσι νηυσὶ οἱ βάρβαροι

they did not yet know (the fact) that the barbarians were surrounding them with ships

(Hdt. 8.78)

d1 τὸν (...) Μῆδον (...) ἴσμεν (...) ἐπὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἐλθόντα

We know that the Medes have come to the Peloponnese (Th. 1.69.5)

d2 (...) ἐληλύθεε ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναῖος ἀγγέλλων ἥκειν τὸν βάρβαρον ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν

an Athenian man had come with the message that the barbarians had arrived in Attica

(Hdt. 8.50.1)

In the first examples (4)a and (5)a, the words of some other person are quoted directly. In this way the reporter (narrator) implies that the quotation faithfully reports what the subject of *élege* "he said," i.e., the original speaker, announced, both as to content (*de re*) and as to wording (*de dicto*). He thus gives the impression of presenting an eyewitness report. In the examples b through d of (4) and (5), on the other hand, the words of some other person are quoted indirectly, that is, the reported utterance is adapted in some way to the speech situation of the report. It is a characteristic of indirect speech in general, first of all, that the responsibility for the actual wording is the reporter's, who may present the words of the person quoted accurately, or impose his own wording on the speech reported. Secondly, the content of the reported speech represent the words or thoughts of the reported speaker, not of the reporter.

The extent to which the reporter is involved in the representation of the other's words may differ considerably, as appears from the examples (4) and (5) b through d. In (4)b1 and (5)b1 the words or thoughts of the "protagonist," i.e., the reported speaker, are represented from the protagonist's point of view, just as in the a examples. But now they are embedded in a complement clause introduced by *hóti* "that." Just as in a, the reporter/narrator suggests that he is quoting the protagonist's words. However, he does not commit himself to the exact wording of the quotation, although the verbs used (*élege* "he said" in [4]b1 and *eîpon* "they said" in [5]b1) suggest that the protagonists said something similar.

Deictic shifts will sometimes occur. Thus, cases such as (4)b1 may involve a shift in person. For example, an indirectly reported *élege hóti astheneî* "he said he was ill" may report a third person's illness, but also that of the reporting speaker himself, and so reflect a direct *asthenô̂* "I am ill." In such cases there may also be a shift in the pronouns used. For instance, a phrase like *élegon hóti ekeînoi sphâs éblapsan* "they said that they had hurt them" may correspond to an (imagined) direct speech utterance *humeîs hēmâs eblápsate* "you have hurt us." In the indirectly reported statement *sphâs* is an indirect reflexive pronoun and *ekeînoi* "they" a demonstrative denoting a third party ("the others," "the persons mentioned before") from the perspective of the reporter. In these respects, then, the words are represented from the point of view of the reporter. Generally speaking, an important criterion to distinguish direct from indirect speech in cases such as (4)b1 and (5)b1 is a shift in the deictic elements. In direct

speech reports deictics always point to the reported speech situation, as for example *emoi* "for me" in (5)a, pointing to the reported speaker Mardonius. In indirect speech, on the other hand, the deictics (the "here, now, and I") of the original or imagined speech have been shifted to "indirect" or "intercepted" deictics ("there, then, and he") in an indirect report.[10]

In the examples b2 of (4) and (5) the narrator/reporter commits himself less to the exact words of the embedded speech. Just as in the case of the b1 examples, the thoughts of the reported speaker are represented, but there is an important difference. In the b1 examples the protagonist's thoughts are presented from the temporal perspective of his speech situation. In the b2 examples, on the other hand, the temporal perspective of the reported speaker is, as it were, "deactualized" by the reporter, by means of the oblique optative. This optative is a means to indicate explicitly that the reported speech expresses the thoughts of the subject of the main verb; accordingly, these thoughts belong, from the reporter's point of view, to the domain of non-actuality.

It may be appropriate to mention here briefly the problems pertaining to the oblique optative. The first problem concerns its value. The oblique optative may perhaps be best described as a means of representing some past thought from the present point of view of the reporter or narrator.[11] Neither the direct speech construction nor the oblique optative construction gives any indication as to the reporter's own judgment about the speech he reports (i.e., in neither case does he indicate whether he considers the reported words true, false, or dubious).[12] The use of the oblique optative, however, explicitly indicates that the reporter is presenting the original message from his own temporal perspective, that is, as a message belonging to the past. He is not responsible for the *content* of the words reported, inasmuch as the optative explicitly characterizes the words reported as the thoughts of the subject of the main verb. The oblique optative is a

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[10] Another indication for indirect speech is the occurrence of a future or present indicative in the complement clause, which is to be interpreted as posterior to or simultaneous with a moment in the past, rather than as posterior to or simultaneous with the "now" of the reporter.

[11] See Kühner and Gerth 1898–1904:1:253–54; 2:552.

[12] See Basset 1989:148: "En effet, aucune des deux constructions [i.e. mood and tense of direct speech versus oblique optative] ne permet de savoir le jugement du rapporteur sur ce qu'il rapporte: en aucun cas, il n'en garantit la vérité."

means to indicate explicitly the subjectivity of the protagonist's point of view.[13] In other words, the degree of commitment of the reporter to the truth of the embedded speech is lower than in those cases where the mood and tense of the direct speech have been retained.[14] Consequently, whereas the retainment of the mood and tense of direct speech suggests a kind of eyewitness report, the oblique optative indicates a temporal distance between the representation of the words and their actual utterance in the past.[15]

Now, from a theoretical point of view, the semantic difference between the oblique optative and the mood and tense of direct speech may seem clear. Similarly, it may seem clear that the decision to use the oblique optative is based on the question whether or not the reporter wants to indicate formally that he is dealing with some past thought. In actual use, however, it is far less clear which factors influence the decision of the reporter or narrator, especially in those cases in which both constructions are used side by side within one and the same stretch of discourse.[16]

After this brief discussion of the problems concerning the oblique optative, I return to the description of the different types of reported speech. In the c examples of (4) and (5), the protagonist's thoughts are represented entirely from the point of view of the reporter or narrator: "he knew for a fact that..." in (4)c and "they did not yet know the fact that..." in (5)c. The embedded words contain information presented by the reporter as true. In Classical Greek this

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[13] The question whether the oblique optative may perhaps be preferred with main verbs implying a subjective opinion (such as ἐλπίζω "hope, expect," αἰτιάομαι "accuse," ἀπολογέομαι "defend oneself," etc.) might prove an interesting subject for further research. Cf. Basset 1986.

[14] For a comparable difference between the subjunctive and indicative in indirect speech in German, see Dik and Hengeveld 1991:248–49.

[15] Of course, one could say that the construction in the b1 examples is more vivid than that of the b2 examples (as Goodwin 1889:261 argues) since it implies a complete shift to the past and represents the reported words as if they were actually spoken right there and then, thus conveying the impression that an eyewitness report is given (just as with the use of the historical present). However, I rather prefer seeing this aspect as a *consequence* of the degree of commitment to the truth of the embedded statement, and not as an essential difference.

[16] See, for example, ἠπείλουν αὐτῷ, ὅτι, εἰ λήψονται ἀποδιδράσκοντα, τὴν δίκην ἐπιθήσοιεν "they threatened him that if they caught him running away, they would inflict due punishment upon him," X. *An.* 5.6.34. It is not immediately clear why in the εἰ clause the future indicative is retained whereas in the main clause an oblique optative is used. For further examples, see Kühner and Gerth 1898–1904:2:555–56; Goodwin 1889:276–77; Stahl 1907:329–30. See also ex. (38) below with note 60.

construction occurs only with verbs with factive complements, since only these may be represented as facts from the point of view of the reporter. One could paraphrase (4)c as "it was a fact that Plato was ill and he [= subject of *éidei*] knew that Plato was ill." Likewise, (5)c may be paraphrased as "it was a fact that the barbarians were surrounding them, but they did not know it." The narrator thus guarantees the truth of the complement clause: from his present point of view it refers to a past fact.[17] Thus, cases like (4)c and (5)c are not cases of indirect speech in the strict sense of "merely representing someone else's words" because in these cases the narrator presents the states of affairs in question from his own perspective, and so also pronounces his own judgment about their truth.

In (4)d and (5)d we see nonfinite embedded constructions, in d1 a case of the accusative with the participle, and in d2 accusative with the infinitive. Whereas in (4)b and (5)b, particularly in b1, the wording is much like the wording of direct speech, in (4)d and (5)d the words reported are more integrated into the matrix construction, i.e., into the reporting clause: they have lost the semantic distinctions conveyed by the moods.

After this survey of the possibilities illustrated in (4) and (5), we may conclude that there is no real dichotomy between direct speech and indirect speech. Rather, there is a sliding scale with at the one end minimal integration of the words reported into the matrix construction (i.e., "direct speech") and at the other end constructions in which the words reported are entirely nominalized, sometimes merely *summarizing* the speech reported.[18] Thus, from a semantic point of view, the scale runs from the suggestion of literal representation of the protagonist's words (direct speech report) to a presentation of no more than the gist of someone's words or thoughts. Whereas in (4)a and (5)a the narrator is not responsible for the wording (since he suggests that he is giving a literal report of what some other person said), in the d examples (and especially in cases such as "he told what he heard about . . ."), the narrator himself is very much present, since he uses his own words to describe some other person's utterance, words presenting what he considers to be the gist of the original message.

But the issue of direct versus indirect speech is still more complex

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[17] See also Stahl 1907:552; Basset 1986:92; 1989:148.

[18] Cf. Bakker 1991:226–27.

than this. There is a third type of speech reporting which is known as "free indirect speech" or "style indirect libre." Here the reporter reports someone's thoughts or words without overtly indicating that he is doing so, as in the following case:[19]

(6) So that was their plan wasn't it? He well knew their tricks and would show a thing or two before he was finished. Thank goodness he had been alerted, and there were still a few honest people in the world....

In this example speech reporting is indicated by the underlined verb forms. Free indirect speech is used mainly in literary narratives.[20] Generally speaking, it is a characteristic of free indirect speech that there is an omniscient narrator who can invade other minds freely and relate events, utterances, and thoughts as if he were witness to a scene to which no witness can have had access. Free indirect speech is thus a device which simultaneously presents the third person perspective of the reporter and the first person perspective of the reported speaker. Such a device, then, neutralizes the distinction between direct and indirect speech. Grammatically, distinguishing free indirect speech from nonreportive narrative speech is often difficult. A means to indicate free indirect speech is, for instance, the use of imperfect verb forms (as in 6), or the presence of "here and now" deictics (as in "and he was telling Dolly, I don't want Dolly").[21] In Greek historiographical texts, free indirect speech can be signaled, among other things, by the verb *méllein*, as in the following example, in which Alcibiades addresses the Lacedaemonians:

(7) a ἐπλεύσαμεν ἐς Σικελίαν πρῶτον μέν, εἰ δυναίμεθα, Σικελιώτας καταστρεψόμενοι, μετὰ δ' ἐκείνους αὖθις καὶ Ἰταλιώτας, ἔπειτα καὶ τῆς Καρχηδονίων ἀρχῆς καὶ αὐτῶν ἀποπειράσοντες. εἰ δὲ προχωρήσειε ταῦτα ἢ πάντα ἢ καὶ τὰ πλείω, ἤδη τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ ἐμέλλομεν ἐπιχειρήσειν.

We sailed to Sicily, first, to subdue the Siceliots, if we could, and after them the Italiots also; and then to make an attempt upon the

[19] The example is from Quirk *et al.*, 1972:789.

[20] The first description of this text type is found in Tobler 1894; other names currently used are: verschleierte Rede (Kalepky 1899), style indirect libre (Bally 1912), erlebte Rede (Lorck 1921). In French literature examples abound, but ancient Greek provides examples as well. See, for instance, de Jong 1987:168–79 for the use of free indirect speech in Homer.

[21] The example is from Coulmas 1986:41–42. For an overview of possible means indicating free indirect speech, see e.g., McHale 1978.

empire of the Carthaginians and upon the city itself. If these things, either all, or at least the greater part of them, succeeded, then <u>we intended</u> to attack the Pelopponnese.

(Th. 6.90.2–3)

In the first sentence the purpose of the Athenians is expressed by two future participles (*katastrepsómenoi* "in order to subdue," *apopeirásontes* "to make an attempt upon"). That this is a case of indirect speech is shown by the oblique optative *dunaímetha* "we could" in the conditional clause. The second sentence may be interpreted as free indirect speech, the supposed direct speech being: *ḕn dè prokhōrḗsēi taûta* . . ., *ḗdē têi Peloponnḗsōi epikheirḗsomen* "if these things will succeed, then we will attack the Pelopponnese" (*ḕn* [= *ei* "if" with the modal particle *án*] with subjunctive indicating that the speaker considers realization of the state of affairs concerned very well possible). By the use of *eméllomen* "we were going to" with future infinitive it is explicitly indicated that we are dealing with an expectation for the future which the protagonists, i.e., the Athenians, had in the past. In other cases it is the indirect use of the reflexive pronoun that may be interpreted as signaling free indirect speech:

(7) b οἱ δὲ ἀντεπεξελθόντες αὐτοὶ καὶ Πελοποννήσιοι ἱδρύθησαν ἐπὶ λόφου καρτεροῦ πρὸ τῆς πόλεως, <u>ὃν εἰ μὴ</u> ἕλοιεν οἱ ἐναντίοι, οὐκ ἐγίγνετο <u>σφῶν</u> περιτείχισις.

The Scionians and the Peloponnesians had come out against them and taken position on a strong hill before the city, which had to be taken by the enemy before <u>their</u> city would be invested with a wall

(Th. 4.131.1)

The relative clause beginning with *hòn ei mḕ* "which unless" is to be interpreted as free indirect speech, as is shown by the use of the oblique optative *héloien* "they would take" and by the indirect use of the reflexive pronoun *sphôn* "of them." The past tense *egígneto* "occurred" is here roughly the same as *eméllomen ésesthai* "was going to be." The supposed direct speech might have run as follows: *ḕn mḕ toûton hélōsin hoi enantíoi, ou gígnetai periteíkhēsis* "if the enemy has not taken that hill, then our city will not be invested with a wall."

In indirect speech, as we saw above, the reporter does not purport to give the actual words that were uttered by the original speaker, and his report is therefore not restricted to what was actually said. So he is also free to introduce additional information about the

reported speech event, from his point of view and on the basis of his knowledge about the world.[22] The possibility for the reporter to do so creates potential ambiguities in indirect speech, because it is not always unequivocally clear whether a linguistic item originates from the original speaker or from the reporter. This ambiguity may arise, for instance, in the case of descriptive terms, as in:[23]

(8) Oedipus said that *his mother* was beautiful.

Is it Oedipus who has uttered the words "my mother is beautiful" or is the woman so characterized only by the reporter (Oedipus having said, for instance, "Iocaste/my wife is beautiful")? Similar problems may arise with attitudinal or emotionally charged expressions, as in "John said that *this idiot* doesn't know what he is saying"—see also ex. (6), where in principle "tricks" may be interpreted as originating from the reporter or from the reported speaker. Generally speaking, it is clear that especially in cases of free indirect speech, in which the words of the protagonist are not overtly quoted and there is no verb of saying or thinking, the reporter can easily add information from his own perspective. In particular emotionally charged words such as "tricks" in (6) are at least potentially ambiguous. They may well betray the reporter's own perspective, but might—depending on the context and situation—also belong to the thoughts of the protagonist. As to such expressions Coulmas argues: "Generally, however, it cannot be determined whether identifications in indirect discourse belong to the original utterance or to the report."[24]

This brings us back to my questions concerning the interpretation of attitudinal particles in indirect speech, formulated in section 1. Do we have to conclude with Coulmas that attitudinal particles in embedded speech are always ambiguous, or is it possible to relate the interpretation of attitudinal particles to the degree of "involvement" of the reporter? This could mean that in cases such as (4)b1 and (5)b1 they have to be related to the original speaker, whereas in cases such as (4)b2, (5)b2, and (7) they express the attitude of the reporter. In other words, one may ask whether, for instance, the presence of the oblique optative and indirect reflexive pronouns might

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[22] Cf., e.g., Leech 1980:51–52; Coulmas 1986:3–6; Bambgbose 1986:91–93.
[23] Example from Banfield 1973:5.
[24] Coulmas 1986:4.

indicate that an attitudinal particle belongs to the perspective of the reporter, whereas the retainment of the mood and tense of direct speech may be considered a sign that the attitudinal particle, too, stems from the original speaker. Or are there other (contextual) cues that guide the interpretation? As indicated above I will discuss the various particles separately.

3. *Attitudinal Particles in Indirect Speech*

Even though the description of particles is problematic, it is now generally accepted practice to reckon the following particles in at least part of their uses among the group of attitudinal particles: *toi* (τοι), *ȇ* (ἦ), *mȇn* (μήν), *pou* (που), *ára* (ἄρα), and *dḗ* (δή).[25] As to their behavior in indirect speech these particles are not all equally problematic; *toi*, *ȇ*, *mȇn*, and *pou* in particular do not pose serious problems. I will first briefly discuss these four particles, before discussing the interpretative problems posed by *ára* and *dḗ* in indirect speech.

3.1 Toi

The description of *toi* does not pose serious problems.[26] It seems plausible to assume that the particle *toi* finds its origin in the (ethical) dative of the personal pronoun *sú* "you:" "I tell you," "you know." Note that in Ionic *toi* is still used as the enclitic variant of *soi* "to you," whereas in Attic *toi* always functions as a particle. In using *toi* a speaker makes a strong appeal to the addressee to pay attention to the proposition, suggesting that the proposition concerns him personally, and anticipating a reaction such as "Why do you say this?" or "What does it have to do with me?" There are various reasons for the speaker to wish to attract the attention of the addressee, and, consequently, *toi* may express different nuances, depending on the context. Thus, in the following example the particle emphasizes the threatening and provocative character of the proposition:

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[25] See Ruijgh 1990; Bakker 1993a; Sicking 1986, 1993; van Ophuijsen 1993; Wakker 1994, 1995, fc.

[26] See Denniston 1954:537; Ruijgh 1971:197–98; Sicking 1993:64; Wakker 1994:360–62; 1995:254–55.

(9) ἢν γάρ τοι ἐς βασιλέα ἀνενειχθῇ τὰ ἔπεα ταῦτα, ἀποβαλέεις τὴν κεφαλήν

for if, I tell you, those words are reported to the king, you will lose your head.

(Hdt. 8.65.5)

Given this value it is not surprising that *toi* is preferably used in dialogic contexts. Thucydides has only four examples, while Herodotus has twenty-two. All these examples resemble (9) in that they occur in direct speech, where of course the particle *toi* expresses straightaway the speaker's attitude. For the question addressed in this article, then, *toi* is not relevant.

3.2 Ê *and* Mên

The difference between *ê* and *mên*, which are both considered affirmative attitudinal particles, may be described along the following lines:[27] with *ê* a speaker expresses beforehand (and not necessarily in reaction to a previous discussion) that his statement is *in faith/really* true (whether or not you, addressee, and I, speaker, will consider this desirable or believable). With *mên*, on the other hand, the speaker as it were personally guarantees the truth of the proposition, often because he supposes his proposition to be in contrast with what the addressee supposes or wishes. The combination of these semantically comparable particles thus affirms the truth of a proposition in a very strong way and makes the declarative utterance have the value of a *strong assurance*. We often find this combination in oaths. The supposed negative reaction, anticipated by *mên*, is usually not explicit in the text itself, but *ê mên* may be paraphrased here as follows: "you addressee, you will not perhaps believe me, but, in faith, I assure you. . . ." This is clear in the following example, which was already presented above:

(10) ἥλιον ἐπόμνυμί (. . .) ἦ μέν σε ἐγὼ (. . .) αἵματος κορέσω.

I swear by the sun, I will really, I assure you, give you your fill of blood

(Hdt. 1.212.3)

[27] See also Wakker, fc.

In indirect speech in Herodotus and Thucydides only examples of the combination *ê mên* occur,[28] all of them in a future infinitive construction—for this type of indirect speech, see (4)d2 and (5)d2 above. An example is:

(11) ὀμόσαντα αὐτὸν ἐξέπεμψαν, ἦ μὴν ἔσεσθαι ξυμμάχους αὐτονόμους.

they sent him away after he had sworn that truly the allies would be independent.

(Th. 4.88.1)

As I argued above concerning ex. (1), it seems most natural for two reasons to take the particle combination as part of the reported speech. First, there seems no reason for the reporter to affirm the truth of the reported speech in this way. Second, (11) is fully comparable with the direct speech example (10), where it is self-evident that the particle combination expresses the speaker's attitude towards the content of his oath.

3.3 Pou/Kou

Similarly to the case of *toi*, the description of *pou* does not pose serious problems.[29] The particle *pou*, being originally an indefinite pronominal local adverb meaning "somewhere" has developed the attitudinal value "I think/suppose," "perhaps," "perchance," "conveying," as Denniston puts it, "a feeling of uncertainty in the speaker."[30] In other words, in using *pou* the speaker indicates that he is not sure whether or not the proposition is true, thus forestalling possible doubts on the part of the addressee, for example:

(12) εἶπάν κου παρὰ σφίσι αὐτοῖσι they said, I think, among themselves

(Hdt. 5.1.3)

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[28] E.g., Hdt. 1.196.3; 3.74.2, 133.2; 4.154.3; 5.93.1; 6.74.1; 9.91.2; Th. 4.86.1, 88.1, 118.14; 5.38.1, 50.1; 6.72.5; 8.33.2, 75.2, 81.3.

[29] On *pou*, see Denniston 1954:490–95; Humbert 1954:434; LSJ *s.v.*; Sicking 1986:132–33, 137; 1993:57–61; Wakker 1994:357–60. As Sicking convincingly shows (1993:57–58), some of Denniston's statements concerning the distribution of *pou* are not felicitous. Thus there appears to be hardly any difference in use between Thucydides and Herodotus, whereas Denniston suggests that *pou* is more suitable for Herodotus's style and is thus found more often in Herodotus.

[30] Denniston 1954:490–91.

Quite often, however, the speaker only feigns doubt, and is in fact quite sure of his ground. In this way an ironic nuance is conveyed, as in *ē pou*, where by *ē* the speaker indicates that he is very sure of what he says (see 3.2), as in the following example:

(13) ἦ που ἄρα (. . .) ἡμῖν γε τοῖς ἔτι ἐλευθέροις πολλὴ κακότης

surely then, I suppose, for us who are still free it would be the height of baseness . . .

(Th. 5.100)

The majority of examples of attitudinal *pou* occur in assertions (such as those above). This is not surprising for it is especially in making an assertion that speakers want to specify their attitude towards the truth of its propositional content. Not infrequently, however, *pou* is also found in conditionals. This is easy to understand, since the element of uncertainty is inherent in *if* clauses, it being a characteristic of *if* clauses that the state of affairs expressed may or may not be realized. As such there is a natural affinity between *pou* "perhaps" and conditional clauses. The only two examples in Herodotus and Thucydides of *pou* as particle in indirect speech are found in conditional clauses, for example:[31]

(14) φοιτῶντές τε πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἠξίουν αὐτοὺς ἡγεμόνας σφῶν γίγνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ Παυσανίᾳ μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν, ἤν που βιάζηται.

Often going to the Athenians they [= Ionians] expected them [= Athenians] to be their leaders because of their kinship and not to give way to Pausanias if perchance he would use violence.

(Th. 1.95.1)

The only natural interpretation here is that *pou* belongs to the original message, and that the Ionians are supposed to have said in direct speech *ēn pou biázētai* "if perchance he will use violence," just as in the indirectly reported speech. Again there are two arguments for this interpretation: first, *pou* is also found in *ēn* clauses in direct speech (e.g., Th. 2.39.3). Second, I do not believe a narrator may express with simple *pou* something such as "if he uses violence, which I, the narrator, think he will perhaps do." To express this, a parenthesis or relative clause would be required.[32]

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[31] See also Th. 6.22.

[32] As in Th. 1.141.5 (ὅπερ εἰκός) or Th. 4.18.5 (ἃ πολλὰ ἐνδέχεται).

3.4 Ára

Previous scholarship usually sought the meaning of *ára* in the origins of the particle.[33] The etymology of *ára* is, however, uncertain: its root *ar-* has been said to occur in such widely divergent words as *ararískō* "to fit" (yielding "fittingly," "accordingly" as the original meaning of *ára*), *harpázō* "seize" (yielding the idea of quickness or surprise as the basic element of the meaning of *ára*), and *áristos* "best" (yielding "well" as the original meaning).

In view of this situation, it seems best to formulate the meaning of *ára* on its actual synchronic use, rather than on etymology.[34] The Homeric material allows us to give the following rough characterization. *Ára* is a modal particle, by which the speaker signals his lively interest in the new information contained in the proposition uttered. In other words, by using *ára* the speaker characterizes the propositional content of the clause as "interesting," and thus invites the addressee to pay attention to it. If one assumes that *ára* expresses interest, one may satisfactorily account for the variety in its use in Homer. In all cases, *ára* is used to signal the speaker's interest, which often implies his surprise, vis-à-vis the proposition. In Homer, approximately 91 percent of the about 1800 examples of *ára* are found in clauses with a secondary indicative. This means that the interest or surprise expressed by *ára* mostly concerns an *established fact*. See, for example:

(15) καί νύ κεν εἴρυσσέν τε καὶ ἄσπετον ἤρατο κῦδος,
εἰ μὴ ἄρ' ὀξὺ νόησε Διὸς θυγάτηρ Ἀφροδίτη,
ἥ οἱ ῥῆξεν ἱμάντα . . .

and now he [= Menelaos] would have dragged him [= Paris] away and would have won unspeakable glory, if Aphrodite, daughter of Zeus, had not watched sharply, Aphrodite, who broke for him the throng (sc. of his helmet) . . .

(*Il.* 3.373–75)

The particle signals the surprising character of the fact that, what in other circumstances would have been the natural course of events (here Menelaos's winning of glory), has been precluded by the intervention

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[33] For elaborate descriptions of the meaning and uses of ἄρα, see Denniston 1954:32–44; Grimm 1962; Ruijgh 1971:432–39; Sicking 1986:133, 137; Bakker 1993a:15–25; van Ophuijsen 1993:82–83, 101–39; Wakker 1994:343–50.

[34] Cf. Denniston 1954:33; Ruijgh 1971:434.

of the goddess (who by breaking the strap of Paris's helmet prevents him from choking and Menelaos from dragging him away). With *ára* the narrator expresses his surprise to the reversal of the natural course of events, i.e. towards the established fact that Aphrodite did watch sharply. In this way the narrator may anticipate his audience's reaction to the events as they are unfolding.[35]

In post-Homeric Greek, on the one hand, the use of *ára* is no longer limited to established facts, and, at the same time, its use becomes more specialized. Its value may perhaps best be described as "apparently," "as it appears:" the speaker signals that he cannot but conclude that the proposition presented is true.[36] An element of surprise is often present, deriving from the meaning "apparently." But this nuance does not seem to be the basic element of *ára* in post-homeric Greek, particularly in conclusions in argumentative passages.[37] The surprise is certainly present in the following example. Prexaspes has told Cambyses that the Persians praised him in all other respects, but criticized his excessive drinking. Cambyses angrily replies:

(16) νῦν ἄρα μέ φασι Πέρσαι οἴνῳ προσκείμενον παραφρονέειν καὶ οὐκ εἶναι νοήμονα. οὐδ' ἄρα σφέων οἱ πρότεροι λόγοι ἦσαν ἀληθέες.

Now, apparently, the Persians say that excessive drinking has driven me to frenzy and madness. And, apparently, what they said before was untruthful.

(Hdt. 3.34.3)

With *ára* Cambyses indicates that he cannot but come to this conclusion, surprising, unexpected and enraging as this may be in view of the situation he experienced in the past.

Ára may also simply have the effect that the speaker disclaims responsibility for the truth of the proposition, even though he does not express disbelief. He dissociates himself from the truth of the proposition by explicitly indicating that, on the basis of the previous information and of the situation at hand, he cannot but conclude that a given fact is the case. However, he is not himself committed

[35] For a more detailed discussion of such examples and for further literature, see Wakker 1994:212–14, 345–46.

[36] This value is already found in Homer, cf. Ἕκτορ εἶδος ἄριστε μάχης ἄρα πολλὸν ἐδεύεο "Hector, the most splendid to look at, apparently you come far short in your fighting," *Il.* 17.142; cf. Denniston 1954:35–37; Bakker 1993a:15–25.

[37] In this respect I have changed my previous views (Wakker 1994:343–50), following van Ophuijsen 1993:82–83, 101–39.

to this statement, and thus would not argue with the addressee if the latter would contest the truth of the statement, for example:

(17) καίτοι ἐλέγεσθε ἀσφαλεῖς εἶναι, ὧν ἄρα ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἔργου ἐκράτει.

And yet you had the reputation of running no risks, you of whom, apparently, repute goes beyond the facts.

(Th. 1.69.5)

Here *ára* indicates in a more neutral way "as it now appears."

Let us now turn to the use of *ára* in indirect speech. In the representation of the thoughts or words of someone other than the speaker or narrator *ára* quite often occurs in conditional clauses.[38] These conditional clauses are either regular *if* clauses, as in examples (18) and (19) below, or so-called *in case that* clauses,[39] as in (20) through (22):

(18) καὶ πολλάκις τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις παρῄνει, ἢν ἄρα ποτὲ κατὰ γῆν βιασθῶσι, καταβάντας ἐς αὐτὸν ταῖς ναυσὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀνθίστασθαι.

and he often advised the Athenians, if ever it would turn out that they were hard pressed on land to go down to the Piraeus and resist all their opponents with their fleet.

(Th. 1.93.7)

(19) ἐπὶ δ' αὐτῷ εἴκοσιν ἔταξαν τὰς ἄριστα πλεούσας, ὅπως, εἰ ἄρα (. . .) ὁ Φορμίων (. . .) ταύτῃ παραπλέοι, μὴ διαφύγοιεν πλέοντα τὸν ἐπίπλουν σφῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔξω τοῦ ἑαυτῶν κέρως.

Upon their right wing they had placed their twenty best sailing ships, in order that, if Phormio should (appear to) sail in that direction, the Athenians should not escape their attack by sailing outside their wing.

(Th. 2.90.2)

(20) λέγων ὡς ἄμεινον σφίσι εἴη κρησφύγετόν τι ὑπάρχον εἶναι, ἢν ἄρα ἐξωθέωνται ἐκ τῆς Μιλήτου

saying that it were better for them to have a place of refuge at their disposal in case it would turn out that/unexpectedly, they should be pushed out of Miletus.

(Hdt. 5.124.2)

(21) ἐκ πολλοῦ προπαρεσκευασμένους, εἴ ποτε ἄρα πολεμήσονται

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[38] In Thucydides 15 out of the 40 instances of ἄρα belong to this group and in Herodotus 6 out of 68 instances of ἄρα.

[39] On these, see Wakker 1994:277–81.

[you say that some of us are enslaved and that they are plotting against others,] while they have long been making their preparations in case it should ever turn out that they should fight.

(Th. 1.68.3)

(22) ἐδεήθησαν δὲ καὶ τῶν Μεγαρέων ναυσὶ σφᾶς ξυμπροπέμψαι, εἰ ἄρα κωλύοιντο ὑπὸ Κερκυραίων πλεῖν.

They asked the Megarians to convoy them with ships, in case the Corcyraeans should (appear to) prevent their sailing.

(Th. 1.27.2)

In these and similar cases,[40] we may interpret *ára* as belonging to the discourse of the original speaker. In support of this claim, the following arguments may be put forward. First, it makes little sense to ascribe the attitudinal *ára* to the reporter. For example, in (20) it does not seem reasonable to argue that the reporter indicates that he does not commit himself to the statement that the Milesians would be driven out of their town, since he has stated just before in his narrative that the situation was desperate. Second, just as in the case of *ê* and *pou* there are parallels of this use of *ára* in direct speech, where, of course, the particle is by definition connected with the speaker. Compare, for instance, with (18) above:[41]

(23) καὶ νῦν πρὸς ἀλλήλους (...) πειρώμεθα καταλλαγῆναι καί, ἢν ἄρα μὴ προχωρήσῃ ἴσον ἑκάστῳ ἔχοντι ἀπελθεῖν, πάλιν πολεμήσομεν.

Let us endeavor to come reconciled with each other; and then, if (it turns out that) we do not succeed in securing, each of us, what is fair and just before we part, we shall go to war again.

(Th. 4.59.4)

Examples such as this one are a strong argument in favor of the attribution of *ára* in ex. (20) and similar examples to the original speaker, rather than to the narrator.[42] But the reason exactly why

[40] Compare with ex. (18): Th. 1.136.4; 2.13.1; 4.92.1; Hdt. 3.45.4; 7.149.1; 8.109.5; 9.90.2, 104.1. In all these examples the mood of the supposed direct speech is retained in the εἰ clause, i.e., either an indicative (Th. 1.136.4) or a subjunctive with the modal particle ἄν (all other examples mentioned); with ex. (20) compare Th. 2.5.4; 4.8.5, 42.4; 6.75.1; another instance of the use of the future indicative exemplified by (21) is Th. 3.84.3; and for further examples with oblique optative as exemplified in (22), see Th. 2.5.1, 12.1; 8.100.2. In all, there are 21 cases.

[41] See also Th. 1.140.1; Hdt. 9.45.2.

[42] See van Ophuijsen, who suggests (1993:131) that ἄρα in (20) is a means for the

ára is used in (20) and (21) and not in other cases seems unclear. For example, compare with (20) and (21):

(24) καὶ τἄλλα, ἢν ἔτι ναυμαχεῖν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τολμήσωσι, παρεσκευάζοντο.

They made other preparations in case the Athenians should still venture to fight at sea.

(Th. 7.59.3)

If the conclusion is correct that in cases such as (18) through (22) *ára* expresses the original speaker's attitude, then we may conclude that the interpretation of the attitudinal particle is insensitive to the presence or absence of elements that reveal the reporter's "presence" or "involvement" in the speech representation. Such elements include the oblique optative vs. the retainment of the mood of the direct speech, as in (22), or indirect reflexive pronouns, *sphôn* in (19) and *sphâs* in (22). Thus even in cases with an overtly expressed "presence" of the narrator *ára* is part of the original message, for example:

(25) Μιλησίοισι δὲ προσετέτακτο (...) τὰς διόδους τηρέειν (...) ὡς ἢν ἄρα σφέας καταλαμβάνῃ οἷά περ κατέλαβε, (...) σῴζωνται

The Milesians were appointed to watch the passes in order that, should it turn out that such a fate should overtake them as did in fact overtake them, they might be brought into safety.

(Hdt. 9.104)

With *hoîá per katélabe* "as did in fact overtake them" the narrator adds a comment from his own temporal perspective.

In Herodotus (not in Thucydides) *ára* also occurs in indirect main clauses. In these cases the question of the interpretation of *ára* seems more difficult to settle. It seems necessary, first of all, to distinguish cases where *ára* does not directly follow the subordinating conjunction from cases where it does, as the first word of the embedded proposition. An example of the former possibility is the following case. The Andrians refused to give Themistocles money. Themistocles said that he had come with two mighty gods, Persuasion and Necessity:

(26) ὑπεκρίναντο πρὸς ταῦτα λέγοντες <u>ὡς</u> κατὰ λόγον <u>ἦσαν</u> <u>ἄρα</u> αἱ Ἀθῆναι μεγάλαι τε καὶ εὐδαίμονες, ⟨αἱ⟩ καὶ θεῶν χρηστῶν ἥκοιεν εὖ· ἐπεὶ . . .

they [the Andrians] replied saying that it was <u>apparently</u> reasonable that Athens was great and prosperous, Athens, that was blessed also with serviceable gods.

(Hdt. 8.111.2)

In view of its position, it seems most natural to take *ára* as part of the embedded speech, and so related to the original speakers, the Andrians, who cannot but conclude this on the basis of Themistocles' words. *Ára* is used with the imperfect, a combination that often occurs in direct speech.[43] This may perhaps be taken as a further indication that the presentation is given from the point of view of the Andrians. But other cases are different. Consider:[44]

(27) πυνθάνομαι τὸν πάντα λόγον θεράποντος ὃς ἐμὲ (. . .) ἐνεχείρισε τὸ βρέφος, <u>ὡς ἄρα</u> Μανδάνης τε εἴη παῖς (. . .) καὶ Καμβύσεω.

I heard the whole story from a servant, who put the child into my arms, to wit, <u>that</u> it was, <u>apparently, as he told</u>, the son of Mandane and Cambyses.

(Hdt. 1.111.5)

(28) τότε δὲ θῶμά μοι μέγιστον γενέσθαι λέγεται ὑπὸ Θηβαίων· ἐλθεῖν <u>ἄρα</u> τὸν (. . .) Μῦν . . .

And then there, as it is said by the Thebans, has occurred what is to me cause for wonder, that, <u>apparently/as they say</u>, this Mus came.

(Hdt. 8.135.1)

In these cases *ára* directly follows the subordinator *hōs* "that" or the embedded infinitive. It seems best to take *ára* here as stemming from the reporter, who by using *ára* marks the reported speech as such, opposing it to his own view and indicating that he is not himself responsible for the statement.[45] In such cases *ára* also seems to make the function of a given constituent more explicit, forestalling possible confusion. In (27), for instance, after the intervening relative clause, the *hōs* clause without *ára* might perhaps be interpreted as a causal

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[43] For the use of the imperfect ἦσαν as expressing a present *fact* which has just been recognized as such by the speaker and which has been previously overlooked or not understood, see Goodwin 1889:13; Bakker 1993a:17.

[44] With (27), compare also Hdt. 7.152.3; with (28) Hdt. 8.136.2.

[45] See also van Ophuijsen 1993:126–27.

or temporal clause, and in (28) *ára* helps to distinguish the different functions of the infinitives *genésthai* "to have occurred" and *elthеîn* "to have come;" in other words, *ára* helps to mark off the embedded proposition from the narrative.

Thus in main declarative propositions the position of *ára* seems to guide the interpretation. There remain, however, two embedded subordinate clauses in Herodotus where the interpretation seems indeed problematic. First consider Xerxes' response to the Thessalians:

(29) σοφοὶ ἄνδρες εἰσὶ Θεσσαλοί. ταῦτ' ἄρα πρὸ πολλοῦ ἐφυλάσσοντο γνωσιμαχέοντες καὶ τἆλλα καὶ ὅτι χώρην ἄρα εἶχον εὐαίρετόν τε καὶ ταχυάλωτον.

The Thessalians are wise men. This apparently was amongst other things the cause of their precaution long before, when they changed to a better mind, that they apparently had a country easily and speedily conquerable.

(Hdt. 7.130.2)

The first *ára* is unproblematic: Xerxes uses it to indicate that he cannot but come to this conclusion on the basis of the information provided by the Thessalians about their country. As for the second instance, the point of view could be either the Thessalians' or Xerxes'.[46] The first possibility seems more likely on account of the position of *ára*—and perhaps also its combination with an imperfect. The example would thus be comparable to (26), but this is not easy to prove in the absence of real parallels. Another problematic case is:

(30) στρατὸν (. . .) διεσκέδασε, οὐδαμὰ ἐλπίσας μή κοτε ἄρα ἀγωνισάμενος οὕτω παραπλησίως Κῦρος ἐλάσῃ ἐπὶ Σάρδις.

He disbanded the army never thinking that after so equal an issue of the contest Cyrus would ever turn out to march against Sardis.

(Hdt. 1.77.4)

Ára may betray Croesus's point of view: after such a battle he does not expect that Cyrus would come to Sardis. However, we cannot perhaps entirely exclude the possibility that *ára* belongs to the perspective

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[46] Cf. van Ophuijsen 1993:122: "The *second* ἄρα could either mark (1) a consideration, whether expressed or not, of the Thessalians *χώρην ἄρα ἔχομεν κτλ., i.e. a shift to their point of view; or (2) another component of Xerxes' insight ἐφυλάσσοντο . . . ὅτι χώρην . . . εἶχον: Xerxes realizes 'that they took shelter, *apparently* because . . .'; or both."

of the narrator.[47] But I do not know of parallels for this use of *ára*. If a narrator would like to indicate that what his protagonist does not expect did in fact happen, I think commenting clauses such as the relative clause in (25) are more suited and less unambiguous. Thus the interpretation of *ára* as belonging to the embedded speech is in both cases slightly preferable. This would make these examples parallel to the examples discussed above in (18) through (22) and (25), where *ára* figures in embedded conditionals.

As a conclusion of this overview of the uses of *ára* in indirect speech I argue that in conditional clauses (both in Thucydides and in Herodotus), and perhaps also in other subordinate clauses (Herodotus only), *ára* reflects the point of view of the original speaker. In dependent declaratives the interpretation depends on the position of *ára*: when the particle directly follows the embedding device, it belongs to the perspective of the reporter; in other cases it belongs to the perspective of the original speaker. All in all, then, the interpretation seems guided more by the type of clause in which *ára* figures (as well as by the position of *ára* within this clause) than by other factors that have to do with the "involvement" of the reporter, such as the oblique optative and indirect reflexive pronouns.

3.5 Dḗ

A comprehensive discussion of *dḗ* in Thucydides and Herodotus will be impossible here in view of the variety and frequency of its uses (in Herodotus the particle occurs 1390 times, in Thucydides 201 times). However, a preliminary description must be given as the background for the discussion of *dē* in indirect speech. Just as in the case of *ára*, a number of widely divergent proposals have been made about the etymology and the meaning of *dḗ*.[48] I will follow Ruijgh, who describes *dḗ* as a particle which in principle signals "l'importance du fait nouveau qui est le contenu de la phrase."[49] In other words, *dḗ*

[47] See van Ophuijsen 1993:127: "At the same time an interpretation relating ἄρα to ἐλάσῃ alone, i.e. 'that Cyrus would appear to...', 'that he would, as he in fact turned out to...', implicitly characterizing the event as unaffected by any deliberations of Croesus, need not be ruled out."

[48] Cf., e.g., Kühner and Gerth 1898–1904:2:123–31; Schwyzer and Debrunner 1950:562–63; Humbert 1954:403–6; Denniston 1954:203–40; Ruijgh 1971:646–47; Bakker 1993a:13–14; van Ophuijsen 1993:82–83, 140–51; Wakker 1994:351–60.

[49] Ruijgh 1971:646–47.

draws special attention to the importance and interest of the proposition presented. As such, *dḗ* may be paraphrased by means of such expressions as French *voici*, Dutch *zie hier*, *let wel*, or English "look (how interesting)," and the like.[50] Of course, the basic value of *dḗ* may result in widely different semantic nuances, depending on the context or situation. After all, a speaker may have several reasons for demanding special attention. See for example:

(31) εἰ ὦν δὴ τούτου εἵνεκεν ἄξιός τεο κακοῦ εἰμι, ὅδε τοι πάρειμι.

If, then, I really deserve any harm for this, here I am.

(Hdt. 1.115.3)

The speaker here is Cyrus; his tone is rather indignant. Astyages, who will later turn out to be his grandfather, has accused him of insulting the son of a man of importance. Cyrus replies that he had the right to do so, for when he was playing with the other boys, he was made king by the boys and everyone obeyed him except the boy in question. He rounds off his self-defence with the conditional period cited in the extract. It seems best to interpret the particle *oûn* as marking the next step, here the conclusion, in the argumentation ("then," "therefore") and *dḗ* as a particle with which the speaker expresses his attitude to the subordinate proposition: *dḗ* attracts attention to something which the speaker thinks unjustified (i.e., his being punished for the reason mentioned): "if—attention please—for this reason I deserve to be punished." In a translation "if really" may very well be used here to convey this nuance but this is not, of course, the basic value of *ei dḗ*.

Special attention may also be demanded for the focus, i.e., for the most important part of the proposition. See, for example, the following extract, where after saying that thus far there had been nothing worse than mutual bride-stealing in the conflict between the Greeks and the barbarians, Herodotus continues:

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[50] By signaling that the proposition is important, δή shows some resemblance to ἄρα. What is important will often be interesting or surprising and *vice versa*. In Homer one point of difference is that ἄρα is usually connected with established facts, whereas δή occurs with nonfacts as well, e.g., with imperatives. Otherwise Homeric ἄρα and δή are roughly equivalent, as was already observed by the ancient grammarians, cf. Ruijgh 1971:436, 646. In Homer, δή is found about 1000 times (ἄρα 1800 times), whereas in post-Homeric Greek δή is much more frequent than ἄρα. Not surprisingly, the semantic value of ἄρα becomes more specific (see section 3.4), whereas the range of uses of δή becomes wider than in Homer.

(32) τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τούτου Ἕλληνας δὴ μεγάλως αἰτίους γενέσθαι·

But after this it was the Greeks, you must know, that were seriously to blame.

(Hdt. 1.4.1)

In the Persians' account of the cause of the war between the Greek and the barbarians the real culprit is now pointed out. The Persians therefore call attention to this important proposition and especially to its focus, *Héllēnas* "the Greeks" by the use of *dḗ*. In the next sentences their statement is explained.[51] In this context, putting emphasis on "the Greeks" may in a translation convey the same nuance as *dḗ* in Greek. This is not, of course, the basic value of *dḗ*, only a possible way to render it in an English translation.

To illustrate the various nuances expressed by *dḗ* with a last group of examples, in Classical Greek *dḗ* is often found in conclusions and other assertions the truth of which is observable, immediately understandable, or a generally known fact. As elsewhere, *dḗ* in principle draws the addressee's special attention to the important and interesting conclusions presented, but since the addressee may as it were observe with his own eyes that the proposition is true, *dḗ* gets the nuance "obviously," "as you see," "clearly," or the like. An example is:

(33) ἔστι δὲ νέος· φοβούμεθα δὴ περὶ αὐτῷ, οἷον εἰκὸς περὶ νέῳ.

he [= Kleinias] is young; and so we are concerned about him, as is logical to be expected about a young man.

(Pl. *Euth.* 275b2)

I argue, then, that "obviously" is not the general or basic meaning of *dḗ*; in my opinion, this semantic nuance is rather a later development of *dḗ*, which occurs only in specific contexts such as conclusions.[52] Put differently, in the appropriate circumstances, *dḗ* with the

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[51] Perhaps the rather fixed combination of δή with a superlative, found especially in Thucydides, may originally be explained in the same way, cf., e.g., κίνησις γὰρ αὕτη μεγίστη δὴ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐγένετο "For this was, you must know, the greatest movement that had ever stirred the Hellenes", Th. 1.1.2.

[52] I disagree with Sicking 1986:133–34, 136–37 and van Ophuijsen 1993:82–83, 85, 141. However, van Ophuijsen, even though he departs from a basic meaning that is different from mine ("the basic value of the particle relates to what is visible to the mind's eye as well as to the organ of sight," 1993:141), gives a paraphrase comparable to mine (1993:141 n. 2): ἰδού "look;" "here you have . . .," and compares it with French: "voici" and "voilà."

original value *idoú* "look" or *ísth' hóti* "you must know that" easily turns into *oîstha hóti* "you know that," "obviously."[53] In Herodotus and Thucydides, too, examples of this use of *dḗ* can be found, though far less frequently than in Plato, e.g.:

(34) Λακεδαιμόνιοί (. . .) ἄκοντας προσάγουσι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐς τὸν κίνδυνον, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐνεχείρησαν ἡσσηθέντες παρὰ πολὺ αὖθις ναυμαχεῖν. μὴ <u>δὴ</u> αὐτῶν τὴν τόλμαν δείσητε.

The Lacedaemonians have to drag the majority [i.e. of their allies] into battle against their will, for otherwise they would never, after their defeat, have attempted to fight a second time at sea. So do not fear their courage.

(Th. 2.89.4–5)

Here, just as in (33), *dḗ* marks the important conclusion which is characterized as obvious since it naturally follows on the basis of what is said before. Consider also:

(35) αἱρέεται αὐτὸς περιεῖναι. ἐπειρώτα <u>δὴ</u> λέγων τάδε.

He made the choice to stay alive himself. <u>So</u> he asked the following.
(Hdt. 1.11.4)

This passage is, of course, no argumentation with a conclusion, but a narrative. Gyges is forced by the wife of Candaules to make the choice: to die himself or to kill Candaules. He chooses the second alternative. With *dḗ* the narrator asks attention for what happens next, an issue which his addressees certainly want to know: "and so, you have to know, he asked." On the one hand, such examples resemble examples such as (32) in that they mark something as important or interesting, and on the other hand such examples as (34) in directing the attention to something obvious—here the next step in the narrative.[54]

It is but one step from such examples to the well-known use, also often found in Herodotus and Thucydides, of so-called anaphoric *dḗ*. In this use the particle accompanies demonstrative or other deictic expressions which direct the hearer's attention to earlier discourse which is often summarized. *Dḗ* here demands special attention on

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[53] Cf. van Ophuijsen 1993:145.

[54] Cf. also fixed expressions in the narrative such as οὕτω δὴ "in this way then", e.g., Th. 2.12.4; 4.75.1 and τότε δή "at that moment then", e.g., Th. 4.78.1; 5.17.2.

account of the fact that some notion is resumed ("and see/so"), but at the same time resuming means, of course, that that notion is evident, since it may be found in the speaker's own preceding words. In this way *dé* may either continue the story or in combination with *mén* round off a topic and prepare a topic switch.[55] I present an example of each possibility. In the first one, Herodotus has finished a digression about the various expulsions that had taken place:[56]

(36) τοῦτο <u>δὴ</u> τὸ ἄγος οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐκέλευον ἐλαύνειν.

It was this curse <u>then</u> that the Lacedaemonians now bade the Athenians to drive out.

(Th. 1.127.1)

(37) <u>οἱ μὲν δὴ</u> τοιαῦτα εἶπον· <u>τῶν δὲ</u> Κερκυραίων τὸ (...) στρατόπεδον (...) ἀνεβόησεν.

This was what they [= the Corinthian messengers] said, but of the Corcyraeans all the host shouted.

(Th. 1.53.3)

After this broad sketch of the meaning of *dé*, I will now discuss the use of the particle in indirect speech. Of the total number of examples only a small minority is used in this way, about 35 examples in all. It seems necessary to distinguish cases of indirect speech in the strict sense of the word from other comparable cases. We have already seen how in (32) *dé* is used in a longer narrative passage presented as indirect speech ("the Persians told..."). Here *dé* can only be interpreted as belonging to the reported story, the narrator being absent also elsewhere in this indirectly reported story.[57] The same seems to hold in other cases of indirect speech, such as conditional clauses. In the following example the Aegyptians have just said to the Elians that the way in which they organized the Olympian games was not fair:[58]

(38) ἀλλ' <u>εἰ δὴ</u> βούλονται δικαίως τιθέναι καὶ τούτου εἵνεκα ἀπικοίατο ἐς Αἴγυπτον, ξείνοισι ἀγωνιστῇσι ἐκέλευον τὸν ἀγῶνα τιθέναι.

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[55] Cf. Denniston 1954:225–27; van Ophuijsen 1993:143–44; Bakker 1993b:303–4.

[56] For examples in Herodotus similar to (36), see Powell 1938 *s.v.* δή sub E; for examples in Herodotus comparable to (37), see Powell 1938 *s.v.* δή sub AIII.

[57] Cf. also Hdt. 2.121δ4.

[58] Cf. also Hdt. 4.120.4; 6.138.3 (both conditional clauses); Th. 8.48.5 (relative clause).

> But if they <u>really</u> wanted to organize it in a fair way and if it was for this reason that they had come to Egypt, then they ordered them to organize it for competitors that were strangers.
>
> (Hdt. 2.160.4)

The usage of *dḗ* here is comparable to that in indicative conditionals in direct speech in which a sceptical nuance results from the combination of *dḗ*, drawing the addressee's special attention to the subordinate proposition, with a sceptical, resumptive conditional clause.[59] Thus, in the extract the conditional clause introduced with *ei dḗ* refers to the Eleans' boasting statement that they organize the Olympian games in the fairest possible way (Hdt. 2.160.1), a statement with which the Aegyptians, the subject of *ekéleuon* "they ordered" clearly do not agree. With *dḗ* the Aegyptians signal that the addressees' words are resumed and that special, renewed attention should be given. Since the Aegyptians clearly have their doubts about the fair intentions of the Eleans, the result is a sceptical nuance, which may be rendered in English by the translation "if really." In any case, whatever the precise translation or paraphrase of *dḗ* may be, the particle is part of the indirect speech dependent on *ekéleuon* "they ordered."[60]

Of a very different nature is the use of *dḗ* in purpose clauses and causal clauses. These clauses do not belong to indirect speech in the strict sense of the word, in that no words of a character are indirectly presented. Yet they closely resemble indirect speech in two important respects. First, these clauses often present the intentions or reasons which a protagonist had or is supposed to have had. Accordingly, the oblique optative may be used, just as in regular indirect speech. Second, in these clauses, too, the reflexive pronoun may be used indirectly, i.e., referring to the subject of the main verb. Not surprisingly, then, in such clauses there is often a mixture of the point of view of the narrator with that of the protagonist whose actions are narrated or described.

In principle, purpose clauses express the purpose which the subject of the main clause (the protagonist) wants to achieve. In the last resort, however, it is, of course, the narrator who attributes this purpose to the protagonist. The degree of "involvement" of the narrator may

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[59] On this, see Wakker 1994:352–53; see also ex. (31) above.

[60] Note that in the conditional clause an indicative (βούλονται "they want") and an oblique optative (ἀπικοίατο "they arrived") occur side by side. It is difficult to explain the reason for or the effect created by the alternation of moods.

be seen after a secondary tense form in the main clause, in which case either the oblique optative or the subjunctive, the mood of the "direct speech," is used in the subordinate clause. In the first case, the subordinate proposition is presented from the temporal perspective of the narrator, in the second case from that of the subject of the main verb—compare the indirect speech examples (4)b and (5)b above.

Causal expressions, too, may either express the reason as a thought of the protagonist or of the reporter. Ancient Greek possesses some unambiguous means to indicate whether the reason expressed is the protagonist's or the narrator's. Thus by means of *hōs* with a participle or by means of *hóti* with oblique optative—after a past tense in the main clause—the reason is explicitly presented as the reason given or felt by the protagonist (so-called subjective reason). Often, but not always, it is implied that the narrator does not accept this reason.[61] By means of *háte* "because" (also *hoîon, hoîa* and in Herodotus *hōste*) with the participle, on the other hand, the onus of the reason is on the narrator. In this case the reason is presented as an independent fact (so-called objective reason).

In all these cases of purpose and causal expressions we sometimes find *dḗ*. Since the particle is found combined with expressions that unambiguously express the narrator's point of view (e.g., *háte* "because"), it seems attractive a priori to interpret the particle, too, as belonging to the narrator's point of view. On this basis, we may interpret it in the same way in semantically related expressions that are ambiguous as to the question whose point of view is expressed, or that unambiguously express the point of view of the protagonist. It may, indeed, be argued that it is *always* the reporter who uses *dḗ*. As stated above, *dḗ* may have both the value "look/you must know" and "you know/obviously." I would like to argue that the reporter uses *dḗ* with both values in the cases in question. Just as in direct speech, the precise nuance may differ widely, depending on the context.[62]

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[61] See, e.g., Kühner and Gerth 1898–1904:2:90–97; Rijksbaron 1994:82–83, 120–21. When combined with a future participle, ὡς gets purpose value, e.g., ἀπῆλθε ὡς τοῦτο ποιήσων "he went away considering that he would do that/with the intention to do that."

[62] Denniston discusses (1954:231–33) these examples under the heading of ironical δή. However, in my opinion, irony is only one of the possible side effects of δή, as for example in exx. (41) and (46). As to ἵνα δή etc., Denniston argues that it describes "an ingenious strategem or device: often, but not always, indignant or contemptuous in tone." His examples are: Hdt. 1.22.1, 29.1, 94.4; 2.93.4, 161.4; 5.68.1, 87.3; 7.149.1; 8.7.1, 76.2; 9.74.1; Th. 4.67.3; 5.85; 7.26.2. He discerns other

The value "with as reason/purpose, you must know" may be found, for instance, when it is simply an interesting proposition that is given as reason or purpose:[63]

(39) τὰ μὲν δὴ πρῶτα κατώνοντο τὸν Ἄμασιν Αἰγύπτιοι καὶ ἐν οὐδεμιῇ μοίρῃ μεγάλῃ ἦγον, ἅτε δὴ δημότην τὸ πρὶν ἐόντα.

At first the Aegyptians were inclined to be contemptuous and did not think much of Amasis because, you must know, he was originally one of the people.

(Hdt. 2.172.2)

Here with *háte dḗ* the narrator introduces an interesting, objective and factual reason. The purpose may also be presented as interesting in light of the following events, that will show that the purpose aimed at is not achieved:

(40) παρεσκευάζοντο δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβολὴν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, (...) ἐπειδὴ ἐπυνθάνοντο τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων βοήθειαν ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν, ὅπως δὴ ἐσβολῆς γενομένης διακωλυθῇ.

The Lacedaemonians were also making ready for their invasion of Attica when they heard of the reinforcements to be sent from the Athenians to Sicily, in order that, you must know, this might be wholly prevented by the invasion.

(Th. 7.18.1)

By the retainment of the subjunctive, the purpose clause introduced by *hópōs* is explicitly characterized as presented from the perspective of the Lacedaemonians. But it is the narrator who, with *dḗ*, asks special attention for this purpose, which is not accomplished, as he will show later on in the narrative (7.22 ff.). In the following example, Herodotus has just told that the Medes withdrew and that their place was taken by the Persian troops:

(41) οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι (...) ἐπῄισαν, (...) ὡς δὴ οὗτοί γε εὐπετέως κατεργασόμενοι.

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functions in Th. 7.18.1 = ex. (40) (frustrated intention) and in Hdt. 1.32.3 (merely adding emphasis). In my opinion, the idea of an "ingenious strategem or device" is due to the context (if present at all) and not to the presence of δή; see exx. (40) and (45).

[63] See also Hdt. 8.90.2.

The Persians advanced to the attack fully confident, you must know, that they in any case would bring the business to a quick and easy end.

(Hdt. 7.211.1)

Here one may say, of course, that *dḗ* has an ironical effect, in demanding attention for the contrast between the present confidence of the Persians and their ultimate defeat.

Dḗ may also be used to indicate the real purpose in contrast to what is said, for example:

(42) Σόλων (. . .) ἀπεδήμησε ἔτεα δέκα, κατὰ θεωρίης πρόφασιν ἐκπλώσας, ἵνα δὴ μή τινα τῶν νόμων ἀναγκασθῇ λῦσαι τῶν ἔθετο.

Solon, having sailed away, so he said, to see the world, had left his country for 10 years, in order to avoid, you must know, to be forced to repeal any of the laws he had made.

(Hdt. 1.29.1)

Hína dḗ here has the nuance "in reality in order to," thanks to the explicit contrast with the purpose Solon alleges to have (i.e., to see the world). The value "with as the obvious reason or purpose" makes it difficult for the addressee not to accept this reason or purpose, since it is presented as the obvious one. The narrator may do so because it is entirely obvious in the context that this was the real reason; see, for example:

(43) μετέβαλον ὦν ἐς τὸν λίνεον κιθῶνα, ἵνα δὴ περόνῃσι μὴ χρέωνται.

Now they were made to change to linen tunics, obviously to prevent them from using brooches.

(Hdt. 5.87.3)

(44) ἀνήγαγον παρὰ βασιλέα, δοκέοντες χάριτα μεγάλην καταθήσεσθαι, ὅτι δὴ Μιλτιάδης γνώμην ἀπεδέξατο ἐν τοῖσι Ἴωσι πείθεσθαι κελεύων τοῖσι Σκύθῃσι.

They brought him [= son of Miltiades] to the king [= Darius], thinking that this would be a very thankworthy service, because, as you know, it was Miltiades who had advised the Ionians to obey the Scythians

(Hdt. 6.41.3)

In the context of (43) it has just been related that the Athenian women killed a man with their brooches. The reason why they had to change

their dress is, therefore, not difficult to guess. In (44) the narrator refers to his own narrative in 4.137, which his addressees may be supposed to know.

Elsewhere *dē* is used for rhetorical or manipulative reasons, the reason or purpose of the act in question being far from being obvious, as in (45) or true, as in (46):

(45) ἐπειδὴ οὐ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος οἱ λόγοι γίγνονται, <u>ὅπως δὴ</u> μὴ (. . .) οἱ πολλοὶ (. . .) ἀπατηθῶσιν (γιγνώσκομεν γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο φρονεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους ἀγωγή), ὑμεῖς (. . .) ἔτι ἀσφαλέστερον ποιήσατε.

Since our proposals are not to be made before the assembly, <u>your purpose obviously being that</u> the people are not deceived (for we see that it is with this thought that you bring us before the few) you have adopted a still safer course.

(Th. 5.85)

(46) σὺ <u>δὴ</u> κεῖνος εἶς ὁ ἀποσπεύδων Ξέρξην στρατεύεσθαι ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα <u>ὡς δὴ</u> κηδόμενος αὐτοῦ;

Are you <u>then</u> the man who is trying to dissuade Xerxes from marching against Greece <u>obviously as if</u> you are concerned about him?

(Hdt. 7.17.2)

In (45) the Athenians have sent envoys to the Melians, who do not bring them before the popular assembly, but ask them to relate in the presence of the magistrates what they want. (45) is the opening of the speech of the Athenians. Of course they cannot be sure why the Melians act as they do. But by *dē* and by the parenthesis they make it virtually impossible for the Melians not to accept the alleged purpose as their own purpose, unless, of course, they would explicitly deny it. In (46) the tone is contemptuous and indignant, the dream (who is the speaker here) having in fact his doubts about Artabanos's intentions, i.e., his being really concerned about the king. The precise nuance of *dē* may be difficult to capture, but it is quite safe to assume that in indirect speech in the strict sense of the word the particle is part of the original message, as in examples (32) and (38), whereas in examples closely resembling indirect speech the particle is a means for the reporter to express his attitude to the proposition presented, as in examples (39) through (46).

4. *Conclusion*

It appears to be difficult to give one uniform answer to the question whether attitudinal particles in indirect speech express the point of view of the narrator or of the original speaker (the protagonist). On the one hand the attitudinal particles *ê*, *mḗn*, and *pou*, being related to the speaker's attitude towards the *truth value* of the proposition presented—and accordingly found mainly in assertions—can be shown to be always linked to the original speaker. On the other hand, *ára* and *dḗ*, particles that comment on other aspects of the proposition, allow for different interpretations. The interpretation does not seem to be related to the presence or absence of indisputable means of reporter's "involvement," such as the presence of the oblique optative and indirect reflexive pronouns; instead, it seems to depend on the construction and position of the particle in the clause.

Admittedly, these findings are preliminary. The corpus was limited to Herodotus and Thucydides, and the research does not reveal any significant differences between the two historians, other than that they sometimes use the particles in different constructions. What has been shown, however, is that particle research has to be incorporated in the research of the linguistic means which effect the shifts in point of view and perspective in the narrative of both Herodotus and Thucydides.[64]

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[64] Other such linguistic means are, for instance, participles (Lang 1995) and verbal aspect (Bakker, this volume). See also Walker 1993.

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